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This volume is the proceedings of an international conference and workshop The 
Jagiellonians in Europe: Dynastic Diplomacy and Foreign Relations / Die Jagiellonen 
in Europa: Dynastische und Diplomatische Beziehungen held on 10-11 April 2015, 
organized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen 
Hungary in Medieval Europe “Lendület” Research Group, at the Department of 
History, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, the University of Debrecen, Hungary. 
The organizers aimed to give a broad, different approach, other than 
the usual national – for us, Hungarian – spectacle and view the dynasty in a 
European context, mainly concentrating on the European relations and view of 
Poland, Bohemia and Hungary. Since our perspective is pre-1526, based on our 
Hungarian-centred researches, we mainly focussed on earlier periods, 15th and 
early 16th century. 
Our aim was to organize a roundtable discussion as well, where the scholars 
of the different research centres throughout Europe could have an opportunity 
to have a discussion over the place and role of the Jagiellonian dynasty in the 
European constellation of the 15th and early 16th centuries.
We were honoured to welcome twenty speakers in six sessions from several 
countries – beyond the ones that had been under the rule of the Jagiellonian 
dynasty, i.e. Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Slovakia and Poland – from England, 
Germany and Romania. We were also pleased to welcome Dr. Paul Srodecki 
(Ostravská univerzita – Universität Giessen) as a guest speaker who launched the 
program with a key-note lecture (Humanisten als Träger dynastischer Diplomatie 
an ostmitteleuropäischen Höfen des ausgehenden Mittelalters). 
The proceedings collect only a number of selected conference papers, 
nevertheless, beyond the authors of this volume, we welcomed speakers from 
several institutions and research centres from London to Zagreb (Royal 
Holloway University of London; University College London; Zemský archiv v 
Opavě, Opava and the Slezské zemské muzeum; University of Szeged; Hrvatska 
akademija znanosti i umjetnosti). Beyond the scope of the articles, mostly in-
vestigating the fields of diplomacy, law, administration and representation, con- 
ference papers covered a much broader field ranging from matrimonial diploma-
cy, through the Habsburg attitude towards the dynasty and the treatment of the 
Ottoman threat to legal developments and political communication. The con- 
ference also had intriguing case studies on “individuals”, such as Prince Sigismund 
and the counts of Zrin/Zrínyi, while the ideological background of an ideal dy-
nastic rule was seen in a tractate (De institutione regii pueri). 
The event, as present volume is, was sponsored by the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences, Office for Research Groups.
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Nevertheless, the original idea for the workshop stemmed not only from our 
Debrecen research group. In July 2014 we organized a session (The Jagellonian 
‚Empire’ and European Diplomacy) at the International Medieval Congress in 
Leeds, where we came across with the colleagues of two research centres, that 
is, the European Research Council Research Group The Jagiellonians: Dynasty, 
Memory & Identity in Central Europe, Faculty of History, University of Oxford 
and the Instytutu Historii i Archiwistyki, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń, 
in cooperation with the Towarzystwo Naukowe. There in Leeds, mainly through 
the intermediation of Dr. Piotr Oliński (Toruń) and Ilya Afanasyev (Oxford) 
we started a co-operation, first, upon the initiation of Dr. Oliński, leading to a 
joint enterprise of our Jagiellonian-related conference papers at the IMC, then, 
to organize a workshop. Since then we have been in a fruitful co-operation with 
these institutes.  
In the Debrecen conference the research groups introduced themselves: a 
member of the Oxford Jagiellonians Project, Dr. Stanislava Kuzmová gave a 
presentation of their research program.
In 2015 our cooperation was followed at the International Medieval 
Congress, where the Debrecen and Toruń colleagues took part in the sessions 
organized by the Oxford Jagiellonian project (Dynasticism in Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe and Beyond). Two of the Debrecen research group members – 
Attila Györkös and myself – took also part with their papers at the Jagiellonians 
Project’s conference in Somerville College, Oxford, in March 2016 (Dynasty and 
Dynasticism (1400-1700). We also like to thank the Principal Researcher, Dr. 
Natalia Nowakowska for their help in our cooperation.
We also hope to follow up and strengthen the coordination of researches 
with this present volume. 
Attila Bárány
Professor in Medieval History
Department of History
University of Debrecen
Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen „Lendület” Research 
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Balázs Nagy
Ceremony and Diplomacy: The Royal Summit in Buda in 1412
Medieval royal meetings were complex manifestations of various elements of 
medieval history. Besides political history, the study of these events touches on 
the history of rituals and ceremonies and is also relevant to fields like the his-
tory of courtly life and urban history.1 Because of the distinctive features of the 
surviving sources, modern historical research inevitably misses many aspects of 
royal summits in reconstructing these events. Besides, medieval diplomacy typi-
cally used other methods for the communication of monarchs than face-to-face 
meetings. Correspondence and sending envoys were often used in medieval dip-
lomacy, but the conveyance of diplomatic gifts played an even more important 
role in the contacts of medieval rulers.2 Special elements of the ceremonies, the 
location of royal meetings, formal and informal gestures, the exchange of ritual 
kisses, and dining together also had special importance.3
Some of the medieval royal summits involving rulers of Central European 
states have been discussed in detail in the historical literature, especially the 
cases in which the events could be reconstructed with the help of sufficient 
1  On the recent literature of the meetings of medieval monarchs, see: Ingrid Voss, Herrscher-
treffen im frühen und hohen Mittelalter: Untersuchungen zu den Begegnungen der ostfränkischen und 
westfränkischen Herrscher im 9. und 10. Jahrhundert sowie der deutschen und französischen Könige 
vom 11. bis 13. Jahrhundert, (Beihefte zum Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 26), Köln 1987.; John B. 
Gillingham, ‘The Meetings of the Kings of France and England, 1066–1204’, in David Crouch 
and Kathleen Thompson (eds.), Normandy and its Neighbours, 900 – 1250, Turnhout 2011, 
pp.17‒42.; Gerald Schwedler, Herrschertreffen des Spätmittelalters: Formen, Rituale, Wirkungen, 
(Mittelalter-Forschungen, 21) Ostfildern 2008. [hereinafter: Schwedler 2008]
2  Donald E. Queller, The office of ambassador in the Middle Ages, Princeton (NJ) 1967.; Pierre 
Chaplais, English Diplomatic Practice in the Middle Ages, London 1982.; Ernst Fritz, ‘Über Ge-
sandtschaftswesen und Diplomatie an der Wende vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit’, Archiv für Kultur-
geschichte 33 (1951), 64–95.; Gerald Schwedler, ‘Diplomatische Geschenke unter Königen im 
Spätmittelalter. Freundschaft und Gabentausch zwischen politischer Praxis und der schriftlichen 
Norm der Fürstenspiegelliteratur’, in Michael Grünbart (ed.), Geschenke erhalten die Freund-
schaft: Gabentausch und Netzwerkpflege im europäischen Mittelalter: Akten des internationalen Kollo-
quiums Münster, 19. – 20. November 2009. (Byzantinistische Studien und Texte, 1), Münster 2011, 
pp.145–186.
3  Kiril Petkov, The Kiss of Peace: Ritual, Self, and Society in the High and Late Medieval West, Lei-
den 2003.; Schwedler 2008, 331–403.
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sources.4 The meeting of Emperor Otto III and Bolesław I Chrobry of Poland in 
Gniezno in 1000 had a long-lasting effect on the history of Poland and has also 
been richly reflected in the historical literature.5
In Árpádian-period Hungary, royal meetings were typically marked by 
visits of the crusading rulers who travelled through the country and met the 
monarchs. Louis VII of France met King Géza II in 1147, and Emperor Frederick 
I Barbarossa visited King Béla III in 1189 on his way to the Holy Land, but 
these diplomatic encounters were incidental and sporadic and the main inten-
tions of the foreign rulers were undoubtedly not meeting with their Hungarian 
counterparts.6 In the fourteenth century and the first half of the fifteenth cen-
tury the diplomatic activity of the rulers of Hungary can be illustrated by many 
more meetings with foreign monarchs. Not only did the intensity of the royal 
summits increase significantly, but the character of the meetings also changed 
fundamentally. Gerald Schwedler, the author of a work summarising the royal 
and imperial summits of the period 1270 to 1440, notes six meetings of Charles 
I in Hungary or at the Hungarian border and ten similar meetings of Louis I.7 
The 1335 meeting of Czech, Polish, and Hungarian monarchs and many other 
dignitaries in Visegrád played an important role not only in the mid-fourteenth 
century formation of political contacts among the participating rulers, but also 
4  E.g., on the meeting of Friedrich I Barbarossa and Stefan Nemanja, župan of Serbia see: Ferdi-
nand Opll, ‘Das Treffen von Niš vom Juli 1189 in seinem historischen Umfeld’, Mitteilungen des 
Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung 97:3–4 (1989), 435–42.
5  János M. Bak, ‘Some recent thoughts of historians about central Europe in 1000 A.D.’, Hortus 
Artium Mediaevalium 6 (2000), 65–71.; Gerard Labuda, ‘Der “Akt von Gnesen” vom Jahre 1000 
Bericht über die Forschungsvorhaben und -ergebnisse’, Quaestiones medii aevi novae 5 (2000), 
145–88.; Johannes Fried, Otto III. und Boleslaw Chrobry. Das Widmungsbild des Aachener Evange-
liars, der “Akt von Gnesen” und das frühe polnische und ungarische Königtum, Stuttgart 2001. Roman 
Michałowski, The Gniezno Summit. The Religious Premises of the Founding of the Archbish-
opric of Gniezno, Leiden 2016.
6  Zsolt Hunyadi, ‘Hungary and the Second Crusade’, Chronica 9–10 (2009–10), 55–65.; Balázs 
Nagy, ‘The Towns of Medieval Hungary in the Reports of Contemporary Travellers’, in Derek 
Keene, Balázs Nagy and Katalin Szende (eds.), Segregation – Integration – Assimilation. Reli-
gious and Ethnic Groups in the Medieval Towns of Central and Eastern Europe, (Historical Urban 
Studies), Farnham 2009, pp.171–3.; Graham A. Loud, ‘Introduction’, in Graham A. Loud 
(trans.), The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa. The History of the Expedition of the Emperor Frederick 
and Related Texts, Farnham 2010, pp.1–31.
7  Schwedler 2008, 478–9.
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in the construction of a new political identity of the relevant countries in the 
twentieth century, after the political changes at the end of the 1980s.8
In the case of King Sigismund, the frequency and significance of summits 
were different. Sigismund, also being the king of the Romans from 1410, the 
king of Bohemia from 1419, and Holy Roman Emperor from 1433, had a much 
more complex political agenda on a European level than his predecessors. Several 
of his royal meetings meant an encounter with his older brother, Wenceslas IV 
of Bohemia. These meetings typically were not held in Hungary, but in Bohemia, 
Silesia or Austria.9 The active Europe-wide diplomacy of Sigismund can be seen 
in his visits as far as Constantinople and his meeting with Emperor Manuel 
II in the east in 139610 and his tour in England on the west in 1416.11 Most of 
Sigismund’s meetings with other monarchs did not take place in Hungary, but 
during his extensive European journeys. One foreign ruler visited Sigismund 
several times in Hungary; Władysław/Vladislaus II of Poland paid his first visit 
to Hungary in 1397 when, together his wife, Hedwig, the daughter of Louis 
I, the late king of Hungary, he met Sigismund in Spišská Nová Ves.12 At that 
meeting, Sigismund and Władysław agreed to sign a peace treaty after years 
of hostility. In previous years Władysław’s troops had attacked the border re-
gion of Hungary. Sigismund’s major military defeat by the Ottomans at the 
battle of Nicopolis in 1396 convinced him to strengthen his ties with Poland, 
induced him to agree to the conditions of the armistice and renounce his claims 
8  György Rácz, ‘The Congress of Visegrád’, in György Rácz (ed.), Visegrád 1335, Budapest 
2009.; Stanisław Szczur, ‘Zjazd wyszehradzki z 1335 roku’, [The Congress of Visegrád in 1335] 
Studia historyczne 35:1 (1992), 3–17.; Idem, ‘Az 1335. évi visegrádi királyi találkozó’ [The Royal 
Congress of Visegrád in 1335], Aetas 8:1 (1993), 28–42.
9  Schwedler 2008, 468–9.
10  István Baán, ‘Die Beziehungen zwischen Sigismund und Byzanz’, in Imre Takács (ed.), Si-
gismundus Rex et Imperator: Kunst und Kultur zur Zeit Sigismunds von Luxemburg 1387–1437; 
Ausstellungskatalog; Budapest, Szépművészeti Múzeum,18. März–18. Juni 2006; Luxemburg, Musée 
National d’histoire et d’art, 13. Juli- 15. Oktober 2006., Mainz 2006, pp. 438–441. [Edited volume 
hereinafter: Sigismundus 2006]
11 Attila Bárány, ‘Zsigmond király angliai látogatása’, [Sigismund’s visit to England] SZ 143 
(2009), 319–56.; Idem, ‘Zsigmond király 1416-os angliai kísérete’, [Sigismund’s entourage in 
England in 1416] Aetas 19:3–4 (2004), 5–30.
12  Jörg K. Hoensch, ‘Kaiser Sigismund, der Deutsche Orden und Polen-Litauen. Stationen einer 
problembeladenen Beziehung’, Zeitschrift für Ostforschung 46 (1997), 9.
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to Galicia. In the same treaty, Władysław rescinded his claims to the Hungarian 
throne.13
After the 1397 meeting some further talks were planned between Sigismund 
and Władysław II of Poland for November and December 1398, but finally 
these meetings did not occur.14 Sigismund’s next royal meeting in Hungary with 
another foreign monarch only took place 15 years later, in 1412. It was held 
between the same partners, Sigismund and Władysław II, but in a fundamentally 
changed political setting.15
In the early 1400s Władysław attempted to strengthen his claim to the 
Hungarian crown, which worsened his connections with Sigismund and 
strengthened the links between the Teutonic knights and Hungary. The Teutonic 
Order also helped Sigismund to solve his serious financial problem when the 
knights paid a high price for the pledge of Neumark in Brandenburg in 1402.16 
To reinforce the political alliance with the Teutonic Order Sigismund signed 
a pact with the knights in Buda on 20 December 1409.17 This treaty meant 
a clear political position against Poland. Sigismund supported the case of the 
Teutonic Order even when the military conflict of the Teutonic Order and the 
Polish-Lithuanian coalition culminated in the 1409–1411 war.18 The battle of 
Tannenberg (Grünwald) on 15 July 1410 and the subsequent peace treaty on 
1 February 1411 changed the political status quo between the two great powers 
north of Hungary and put Poland in a more favourable position. The position 
of Sigismund also changed in this period, since a fraction of the electors elected 
him king of the Romans on 20 September 1410. In this situation he was forced 
to accept the transformed political realities in the north and re-establish his 
contacts with King Władysław of Poland.19
13  Norbert C. Tóth, ‘Az 1395-ös lengyel betörés (A lengyel–magyar kapcsolatok egy epizód-
ja)’, [The 1395 Polish invasion. An episode of Polsih-Hungarian relations] in Tibor Neu-
mann and György Rácz (eds.), ‘Honoris causa.’ Tanulmányok Engel Pál emlékére, (Társadalom- 
és művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok, 40; Analecta Mediaevalia, 3), Piliscsaba/Budapest 2008, 
pp.447–85.; László Pósán, ‘Zsigmond és a Német Lovagrend’, Hadtörténelmi Közlemények [Sigis-
mund and the Teutonic Order] 111 (1998), 634. [hereinafter: Pósán 1998]
14  Schwedler 2008, 456.
15  On the contacts of Sigismund to Poland in general see: Richard Arndt, Die Beziehungen 
König Sigmunds zu Polen bis zum Ofener Schiedsspruch 1412, Halle 1897.
16  Pósán 1998, 638–9.
17  ZsO II/1. no. 7230.
18  László Pósán, ‘A Német Lovagrend és a lengyel-litván állam közötti “nagy háború” (1409–
1411)’ [The ‘great war’ between the Teutonic Order and the Polish-Lithuanian state], Hadtörté-
nelmi Közlemények 124 (2011), 3–30.
19  Pósán 1998, 641–3.
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After several years of hostilities, the main steps in the direction of reconcili-
ation between Sigismund and Władysław were the personal meetings the two 
rulers held in 1412. The family relationships of the queens of both kings might 
have helped to rebuild friendly relationships between them. Sigismund’s second 
wife was Barbara of Cilli, who was the second cousin of Anne of Cilli, Queen 
of Władysław II of Poland. The grandfathers of the two queens, Ulrich (1331?– 
1368) and Hermann of Cilli (1332/34–1385) were brothers.20
Communication between the two rulers, indirect at first, started in the 
Polish-Hungarian border region in February 1412. At that time both of them 
were already in the region, Władysław II in Stary Sącz, and Sigismund in 
Kežmarok. The negotiations started through intermediaries and they finally met 
personally in Stará Ľubovňa.21
Basically, the two rulers spent the next four months together continuously, 
travelling through Hungary from mid-March until mid-July. The whole process 
of the events in this period was special because of the duration of the royal meet-
ing, the well documented character of the episode, and the number and positions 
of the persons participating in the events.
The stay of Władysław II started with a longish tour in North-eastern 
Hungary.22 The two kings visited Oradea (Várad), the shrine of St. Ladislaus, 
king of Hungary and the burial place of Sigismund’s first wife, Mary of 
Hungary.23 The well-informed fifteenth century Polish chronicler, Jan Długosz, 
describes the itinerary of the royal party in Hungary in detail.24 From Oradea 
they travelled through Böszörmény, where the two monarchs were entertained 
at a major hunting party. Eberhard Windecke, Sigismund’s courtier and finan-
20  On the history of the Cilli family see: Heinz Dopsch, ‘Die Grafen von Cilli – Ein Forschungs-
problem?’, Südostdeutsches Archiv 17–18 (1974 –5), 16.
21  Norbert C. Tóth, ‘Zsigmond magyar és II. Ulászló lengyel király személyes találkozói a lublói 
béke után, (1412–1424)’ [The personal meetings of Sigismund of Hungary and Władysław II after 
the treaty of Ľubovňa], TSZ 56:3 (2014), 342. [hereinafter: C. Tóth 2014]
22  On the itinerary see: Pál Engel and Norbert C. Tóth, Itineraria regum et reginarum (1382–
1438) Subsidia ad historiam medii aevi Hungariae inquirendam I: Királyok és királynék itin-
eráriumai (1382–1437), Budapest 2005, p.94. [hereinafter: Itineraria 2005]; Emir O. Filipović, 
‘Viteske svecanosti u Budimu 1412. godine i ucesce bosanskih predstavnika’, [The knightly 
ceremony in Budapest in 1412 and the participation of Bosnian representatives’] in Dubravko 
Lovrenović (ed.), Spomenica akademika Marka Sunjica (1927–1998), Sarajevo 2010, pp.289–93. 
[hereinafter: Filipović 2010]
23  C. Tóth 2014, 344–5.
24  On the reliability of Długosz’s account on the events of Władysław II see: Béla bottló, Dlugosz 
János Historia Polonicaja mint magyar történeti forrás 1385–1418 [The Historia Polonica of Długosz 
as a Hungarian historical source], Budapest 1932. See especially pp.16–8.
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cier, mentions this hunt, dating it to 1416,25 but he was probably incorrect since 
Sigismund spent the whole year of 1416 out of Hungary.26 After hunting near 
Böszörmény they travelled through Muhi, Diósgyőr, and Eger, arriving in Buda 
in late May 1412, just a few days before Pentecost.27
The lengthy journey of the two rulers together was not only necessary to 
strengthen their recently improved relationship, but also for other political rea-
sons. Sigismund was planning a major international meeting to be held in Buda 
and the preparations certainly required time, and Sigismund and Władysław 
spent together this time travelling in Hungary.
In his recent study, Emir O. Filipović lists dignitaries from Germany, 
among them the prince electors, who were informed in advance about the im-
minent meeting in the Buda and invited to attend the festivities.28 The bishop 
of Passau was informed about the forthcoming events on 28 March.29 On 6 
April, Sigismund sent letters to the German towns of Frankfurt, Friedberg, 
Gelnhausen, and Wetzlar informing them about the meeting in Buda planned 
for the fourteenth day after Pentecost.30
Sigismund tried to secure funding in advance for the high costs of the 
planned meeting. On 20 April 1412 he sent a letter to the royal town of Sopron 
informing the citizens that he had agreed on a peace treaty with King Władysław 
and they were travelling together to Buda, where he intended to entertain his 
royal guest according to his high status. Sopron, like other royal towns, was re-
quired to contribute 300 florins to the costs.31
25  Wilhelm Altmann (ed.), Eberhart Windeckes Denkwürdigkeiten zur Geschichte des Zeitalters 
Kaiser Sigmunds, Berlin 1893, p.90. XCII, 105. [hereinafter: Altmann 1893]
26  Renáta Skorka (ed.), Eberhard Windecke emlékirata Zsigmond királyról és koráról, [Windecke’s 
diary of Sigismund and his age] Budapest 2008, p.365. note 251. See also Itineraria, 100–1.
27  Jan Długosz, Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae. Liber Decimus et Undecimus, 1406–
1412, ed. Danuta Turkowska, Warsaw 1997, pp.201–2. [hereinafter: Długosz 1997]
28  Filipović 2010, 292.
29  Fejér CD, X/5. p.242., no. 107. 
30  Filipović 2010, 291.; Joseph von Aschbach, Geschichte Kaiser Sigmunds, Hamburg, 1838, 
Beilage X. I. pp.439–41. [hereinafter: Aschbach 1838]; Johannes Janssen, Frankfurts Reichscor-
res-pondenz: nebst andern verwandten Aktenstücken von 1376–1519, Freiburg 1863, I.p .248. no. 
451.; Fejér CD, 242–5.
31  ‘Cum nos altissimi disponente clemencia cum serenissimo principe domino Wladislao rege Polonie, 
fratre nostro carissimo super universis et singulis factis inter nos hactenus habitis et hincinde ventilanti-
bus plenam iam et desideratam pacis et concordie unionem facientes et ordinantes, eundem, quem unacum 
nostra maiestate ad civitatem nostram Budensem ducemus, iuxta nostri status regii decenciam pro speciali 
iocunditatis et leticie tripudio honorifice velimus pertractari, pro quibus expediendis, prout ab aliis nostris 
civitatibus, sic non minus ex parte vestri certam pecunie summam decreverimus nobis assignari.’ In: Jenő 
Házi, Sopron szabad királyi város története, Vol. I/2., Sopron 1923. pp.54–5. no. 61.
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This large-scale event and royal meeting rightly attracted the attention of 
several contemporary authors. Eberhard Windecke gave first-hand information 
on the events.32 He was greatly impressed by the delegates present, and refers to 
the presence of 19 princes, 24 counts, 50 lords, 1400 knights and pages, and 298 
heralds.33
A presumably contemporary list of the participants of the meeting has 
also survived.34 Besides the host, Sigismund, and his main guest, Władysław II, 
this text mentions the king of Bosnia, usually identified as Tvrtko II of Bosnia. 
Filipović argues convincingly that it was not Tvrtko II but Stjepan Ostoja who 
visited Buda at that time;35 besides him, Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvatinić and Sandalj 
Hranić Kosača also came from Bosnia and the despot Stefan Lazarević from 
Serbia, was also, bringing two thousand horses. From Austria, dukes Ernest (the 
Iron) and Albert II, later successor of Sigismund, also took part in the Buda 
meeting.
An envoy of the Teutonic knights sent back a report on his experiences 
in Buda to the commander (commendator, Komtur) of the Order, giving an 
impressive but different overview of the number and rank of the participants. 
Besides three kings and three other monarchs, he gives an account of the presence 
of numerous princes, counts, knights, one cardinal, three archbishops, 11 bishops. 
Musicians were present also to entertain the delegates and 40 thousand horses 
were at the disposal of the guests.36 The envoy of the Teutonic order lists 17 
different languages used at the meeting, among them Greek and Tatar, and also 
mentions that people from the Holy Land attended the summit.37 Among the 
people coming from remote territories, the report mentions pagans who wore 
long beards and high hats.38
Długosz reports the arrival in Buda of the envoys of the Jalal al-Din, khan 
of the Golden Horde, who wanted to meet Władysław II of Poland.39 Jalal al-
32  Altmann 1893, 10–1. (VII. 15.)
33  Ibid. 
34  Moritz Wertner, ‘Die Ofener Gäste von 1412’, Jahrbuch der (k. k.) heraldischen Gesellschaft 
“Adler“ in Wien 17 (1907), 170–81.;  The list was also published in ZsO III. no. 2224., See also the 
catalogue entry of György Rácz: Sigismundus 2006, 454–5. (no. 5.21).
35  Filipović 2010, pp. 297–300. See also: John V. A. Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans: A Critical 
Survey from the Late Twelfth Century, Ann Arbor 1990, p.468.
36  Fejér CD, 246–8. See also: Filipović 2010, 294.; Aschbach 1838, Beilage XI. 441–2.
37  ‘Abrahemsche lüte von heiligen grabe’. Fejér CD, 247.
38  ‘und sust vil heszlicher Heiden mit langen Berten groszen Brüchen (Bauchen?) hohen hüten und 
langen goltern’. Fejér CD, 247.
39  Długosz 1997, 203.
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Din was an ally of the Polish and Lithuanian rulers in their fight against the 
Teutonic Order, and according to some reconstructions of the events, Sigismund 
also wanted to rely on the Tatars against the Ottoman threat.40
A narrative source from Lübeck also mentions the proceedings in Buda in 
1412.41 Detmar’s Lübeckische Chronik continued for the period of 1400 to 1413. 
The continuation also gives a detailed description of the participants at the Buda 
meeting.42
The royal meeting was accompanied by festivities and various entertain-
ments. At the tournament, a knight from Silesia named Nemsche and a page 
from Austria won the joust. They were given expensive gifts; each of them got a 
highly decorated steed. On Csepel Island, south of Buda, a special hunting party 
was organised for the Polish and Hungarian rulers.43 Długosz also mentions the 
procession on the day of Corpus Christi, 2 June.44 Thus, both secular and spiri-
tual events were organised during the meeting, seeking to promote the mutual 
understanding of the participants.
Studying the events and the proceedings of the 1412 Buda meeting one 
should also take into account what conditions the location could offer the par-
ticipants and also interactions between the participants at the meeting and the 
urban context of Buda.
Buda had been the location of several previous royal summits; in 1353 
Charles IV visited Buda, in 1355 Casimir III of Poland, and in 1366 John V 
Palaiologos of Byzantium stayed in the city.45 Sigismund ordered the central 
40  Lajos Tardy, Régi magyar követjárások Keleten [Old Hungarian embassies in the East], Buda-
pest 1971, p.15.; Wolfgang von Stromer, ‘Die Schwarzmeer- und Levante-Politik Sigismunds 
von Luxemburg und der Schwarzmeer-Handel oberdeutscher und hansischer Handelshäuser 
1385–1453, (Miscellanea Charles Verlinden)’, Bulletin de l ’Institut historique belge de Rome 44 
(1974), 601–10.
41  I thank Mark Whelan for drawing this source to my attention.
42  Aus niederdeutschen Chroniken. Aus der Fortsetzung von Detmars lübischer Chronik in der Ham-
burger Handschrift, in Theodor Hirsch, Max Toeppen and Ernst Strehlke (eds.), Scriptores re-
rum Prussicarum, Leipzig 1866, III. p.407. Thanks to Mark Whalen to call my attention to this 
reference.
43  Długosz 1997, 202.
44  ‘maximo Cultu, maximaque veneratione circa honorandum festum Corporis Christi fuere versati’. 
Długosz 1997, 202.; On urban processions see: Károly Goda, ‘Buda Festival: Urban Society and 
Processional Culture in a Medieval Capital City’, Czech and Slovak Journal of Humanities 2 (2011), 
58–79. See especially p.70.
45  Balázs Nagy, ‘Royal Summits in and around Medieval Buda’, in Balázs Nagy, Martyn Rady, 
Katalin Szende and András Vadas (eds.), Medieval Buda in Context, Leiden/Boston 2016. 
pp.345-65. [hereinafter Medieval Buda]
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administration and the main law courts to move from Visegrád to Buda in the 
very first years of the fifteenth century, just a few years before the Buda summit.46
New parts of the royal palace had been built in the 1410s and 1420s, 
probably mainly after the 1412 meeting. Thus, when Władysław and the other 
monarchs and dignitaries visited, the Buda palace had not yet undergone the 
main Sigismund-period reconstruction.47
A document from 1437 (i.e., 25 years after the Buda meeting) gives a good 
overview of the houses of Buda. In that year, Sigismund had developed a plan 
which finally did not work out, to transfer the universal council from Basel to 
Buda and therefore ordered a survey of the existing houses to be made in prepa-
ration. According to this enumeration, Buda and its suburbs had 967 houses 
and altogether 1352 rooms that could be heated.48 These numbers were probably 
slightly lower in 1412. In all probability, the royal palace and other accommoda-
tions could not house all the guests arriving for the meeting. To put the meeting 
to May was certainly also due to the fact that some of the participants, especially 
their entourage, would have been housed in provisional lodgings.49
György Rácz estimated the number of the participants at the 1335 royal 
meeting in Visegrád as approximately 10 000 people.50 It is probably an acceptable 
hypothesis to calculate a higher number of the participants at the 1412 Buda 
meeting. One cannot reconstruct the population number of Buda because of 
the lack of adequate written sources, but according to reliable estimates it could 
not have been higher than 9500.51 This means that in the weeks of the Buda 
meeting the population of the city must have at least doubled. The high number 
of visitors in 1412 would have caused major logistical problems for housing and 
provision.
46  Márta Kondor, ‘A királyi kúria bíróságaitól a kancelláriáig. A központi kormányzat és admin-
isztráció Zsigmond-kori történetéhez’ [From the courts of the Royal Curia to the Chancery], SZ 
142 (2008), 404.
47  András Végh, Buda, (Magyar várostörténeti atlasz, 4.), Budapest 2015, I.20. [hereinafter: 
Végh 2015]
48  František Palacký, Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte des Hussitenkrieges vom Jahre 1419 
an:  Von den Jahren 1429–1436, Prague 1873, pp.473–5.; András Kubinyi, ‘Budapest története 
a későbbi középkorban Buda elestéig (1541-ig)’ [The history of Budapest in the Late Middle 
Ages until its fall in 1541], in László Gerevich (ed.), Budapest története, Budapest 1975, II. p.19.; 
Végh 2015, 32., n. 36, 35–6.; János M. Bak and András Vadas, ‘Diets and Synods in Buda and its 
Environs’, in Medieval Buda, pp.322-44.
49  Albert Gárdonyi, ‘Magyarország középkori fővárosa’ [The medieval capital of Hungary], SZ 
78 (1944), 226.
50  György Rácz, ‘The Congress of Visegrád in 1335: Diplomacy and Representation’, The Hun-
garian Historical Review 2:2 (2013), 282.
51  Végh 2015, 36.
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The political outcomes of the meeting of Sigismund and Władysław II were 
significant. Sigismund agreed to intervene for the reconciliation of Poland and 
the Teutonic knights. Sigismund also returned to Władysław the Polish crown 
jewels, which had been kept in Hungary from the reign of Louis I.52
Among the participants of the royal summit information exists only on the 
further travel of Władysław II and Sigismund. At the end of June Władysław 
continued his journey towards Székesfehérvár, Tata, Esztergom, and Visegrád, 
where he again met King Sigismund. The royal party visited some other loca-
tions nearby and finally the two monarchs parted from each other in mid-July 
and the Polish ruler returned to Cracow soon thereafter.
The royal gathering in May-June 1412 was one of the largest and most 
magnificent royal meetings ever held in medieval Buda. It was a well-documented 
event thanks to the number and rank of the participants. This event allows one to 
follow the functioning of medieval diplomacy in action. The descriptions demon- 
strate very well the role and significance of various practices and rituals connected 
to such assemblies. No references on gift-giving survive in the case of the 1412 
meeting, but twelve years later, when the Byzantine Emperor John VIII visited 
Sigismund in Buda it was recorded that he received eight gilded chalices, 1000 
Hungarian golden florins, various textiles, and six excellent horses.53 We may 
assume that the donation of gifts also played a role in the 1412 meeting. The 
repeated hunting parties and ritual occasions like the joint procession at the 
Corpus Christi feast emphasised the mutual allegiance of the participants, thus 
serving efficiently the political purposes of the meeting.
52  Długosz 1997, 207–8.; Stanisław A. Sroka, ‘Stiborici Stibor szerepe a lengyel-magyar kap-
csolatokban az 1409–1412-es években’ [The role of Stibor of Stiborice in Polish-Hungarian rela-
tions between 1409-1412], Kuny Domokos Múzeum Közleményei, 20 (2014), 189.; C. Tóth 2014, 
346.
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Un légat pontifical au service de la paix entre Ladislas Jagellon 
II et l’Ordre Teutonique. Branda Ier di Castiglione et la Hongrie*
Introduction
L’historiographie hongroise s’intéresse (et s’intéressait) très peu à la personne de 
Branda di Castiglione. Suite du fait qu’il manque des études sytématiques des 
représentants pontificaux en Hongrie depuis l’oeuvre de Vilmos Fraknói,1 et des 
défauts méthodologiques, l’étude de ceux-ci offre un beau champ d’action aux 
médiévistes se souciant d’élucider les différents aspects des relations du royaume 
magyar et le Siège Apostolique même durant cette période difficile à comprendre 
qu’était les années du Grand Schisme de l’Occident.
Branda Ier di Castiglione entra en relation avec le royaume de Sigismond 
de Luxembourg (1382–1437) à deux reprises, d’abord entre 1410 et 1414 
ensuite en 1423–1424. Quant à la première, Vilmos Fraknói avait présenté ses 
activités d’une manière très héterogène, néanmoins tout en soulignant sa mission 
diplomatique au service du roi Sigismond qui comprenait des négocoations avec 
le palatin Hermann de Cilli et le traité de Lublo (février 1412). L’auteur érudit a 
mentionné quelques actes sans ordre précis ce qui rend extrêmement difficile la 
reconstution de ce qu’il avait réellement fait en Hongrie dans ces années.2 
Fraknói mentionne le nom de Branda pour la première fois en relation avec 
le droit suprême de patronage royal. L’auteur propose que l’envoyé de Jean XXIII 
aurait dû en 1410 mettre fin aux conflits des ecclésiastiques issus de la double 
* L’auteur est membre du groupement de recherches «  MTA-DE „Lendület” Magyarország a 
Középkori Európában Kutatócsoport », les présentes recherches sont soutenues par le projet de 
recherche « OTKA NN 109690 Papal delegates in Hungary in the XIth-XIIIth Centuries – online 
database». 
1  Les deux premiers volumes de l’oeuvre de Fraknói (Vilmos Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi 
és politikai összeköttetései a római Szent-székkel, I. 1000–1417. [Les relations ecclésiastiques et 
politiques de la Hongrie avec le Saint-Siège] Budapest 1901; II. 1418–1526. Budapest 1902) 
servent toutjours de références aux chercheurs contemporains. Une publication collective a 
entrepris de présenter les relations pontificaux-hongroises sous un aspect tant chronologique que 
thématique. Dans cette oeuvre les périodes de traitement furent définies d’une façon arbitraire – 
par siècles ou par le règne des rois comme Sigismond de Luxembourg ou Matthias Corvin – sans 
tenir compte de celles du côté pontifical et du Royaume de Hongrie. Cf. István Zombori (ed.), 
Magyarország és a Szentszék kapcsolatának ezer éve, Budapest 1996. Il faut y ajouter en même temps 
qu’ils manquent les recherches pour ce qui est aux représentants des papes, sans compter le projet 
d’une base de données prosopographique pour la période des xie–xiiie siècles et quelques études 
récentes. Pour combler cette lacune cf. DeLegatOnline database (Academia.edu).
2  Fraknói 1901. p.321, 323, 325, 326–327, 329, 393.
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collation de bénéfice et remettre la paix entre les parties intéressées en préférant 
la personne étant réellement en fonction.3 Le contexte de l’apparence de Branda 
était très favorable de le présenter comme l’acteur de la politique bénéficiale du 
pape de l’obédience de Pise ( Jean XXIII était le successeur d’Alexandre V, élu à 
Pise), d'une politique basée sans doute sur des actes de collations. 
En réalité le seul mandat de ce même pape issu en matière de la politique 
bénéficiale, ait préscrit à Branda de terminer les procès alimentés par les 
nominations royales tout en défendant la cause royale.4 Cependant dans 
la documentation relative à Branda on en trouve un seul exemple  : en 1412 
il nomma un chanoine de la collégiale de St Martin de Szepes prévôt de St. 
Adalbert de Győr. Jean XXIII cassa cette acte négligeant la réservation de 
toutes les prébendes majeures, il exigea de Georges le chanoine en question de 
démissionne. Ensuite c’était lui-même qui le nomma à ce même titre Le pape y 
ajouta qu’il en voulait manifester un geste de faveur envers le roi Sigismond et 
de son vicechancelier.5 Malgré cette indice, l'interprétation que Fraknói propose, 
relève des doutes.
En 1949 Roger Mols a formulé une lecture qui différait largement de celui 
de l’érudit hongrois. Mols insistait sur le fait que Branda avait été fut envoyé 
initialement en tant que reformator generalis pour renouveler la formation 
intellectuelle des ecclésiastiques sans parler du renforcement des positions de 
l’église catholique à ces confins entre chrétiens et non fidelès. L’auteur n’oublia 
pas cependant les activités diplomatiques de Branda, le rôle qu’il jouait dans la 
régulation du conflit de Ladislas II et l’ordre Teutonique (1411, 1412), l’affaires 
de Venise (1412–1413) ou la préparation du concile de Constance (1414).6 C’est 
cet aspect que la monographie du règne de Sigismond d’Elemér Mályusz a 
également souligné, mais seulement en relation avec la république italienne.7
Dans un deuxième temps Branda fut présent dans le Royaume de Hongrie 
entre 1423–1424. Ici l’historiographie est apparemment d’accord sur le fait que 
le cardinal n’avait qu’un rôle secondaire en Hongrie : il assistait aux négotiations 
entre Sigismond de Luxembourg et Ladislas II de Jagellon visant à mettre fin 
3  Fraknói 1901. p.321 (sans référence documentaire précise).
4  Theiner, Vetera monumenta, II.189.
5  29 décembre 1412 : DF 288 734. Cf. le regesete de cette charte : ZsO IV. nr. 1472. Cf. DF 288 
733, 288 729, ZsO IV. nr. 1466, 1473.
6  Roger Mols, ’1. Castiglione (Branda di) Ier’, in Dictionnaire d’histoire et de géographie ecclésiastique. 
Éd. Alfred Baudrillart [et alii], I–XXXI., fasc. 184. Paris 1912–2013 (dans ce qui suit : DHGE) 
11 (1949),  col. 1434–1444.
7  Elemér Mályusz, Zsigmond király uralma Magyarországon [La règle du roi Sigismond en 
Hongrie] Budapest 1985. 
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aux conflits entre la Bohême et la Pologne. Il était également présent en 1424 
à la réception des ambassadeurs du soultan Mourad à Buda et à Cracovie au 
couronnement de la reine de Pologne, Sophie.8 
La carrière ecclésiastique de Branda Ier di Castiglione
D’après son épitaphe qui précise qu’il mourut en 1443 à l’âge de 93 ans, il serait né 
en 1350. Le fils ainé de Mapheus (probablement Mathieu) et Lucrèce di Stefani 
Porro, comtesse de Polenza prit son nom de sa lieu de naissance, Castiglione 
d’Olona, aux alentours de Milan. Il faisait ses études universitaires à Pavie où il 
fut gradué doctor in utroque iure avant 1389 et il y enseigna comme professeur 
du droit canon en 1388–1389. Du 13 mai 1392 au 17 juin 1403 il travailla 
comme auditeur de la Rota. En 1404 Boniface IX lui attribua le siège épiscopal 
de Plaisance (Piacenza)9 – qui lui permettait plus tard, en tant que cardinal de se 
surnommer « Placentinus ». Deux ans plus tard il fut nommé vicechancelier de la 
curie pontificale à Rome. Comme tant d’autres il prenait place dans les querelles 
du Grande Schisme d’Occident. Dissident de l’obedience de Grégoire XII, il 
s’adhéra aux père de de Pise et participa à l’élection d’Alexandre V. Ce premier le 
priva de son titre épiscopale et lors d’une ambassade en Lombardie qui lui confia 
Alexandre V, il fut arrété par le marquis Orlando Pallavicini qu’il l’emprisonna 
pour trois mois.10
C’est pendant sa mission en Hongrie (1410–1414) qu’il fut nommé par Jean 
XXIII d’abord administrateur de l’archevêché de Kalocsa (25 août 141011), ensuite 
au 6 juin 1411 cardinal-prêtre de St Clément12. Pendant son séjour en Hongrie 
qu’il reçut la charge de l’administration de l’évêché de Veszprém.13 Branda prit 
sa partie de la convocation et des travaux du concile de Constance il se montrait 
partisan de l’union de l’Église. Après l’élection de Martin V  l'ancien supporteur 
8  Fraknói 1902. p.4 et note nr. 10 ; Mols 1949. p.1440 ; Norbert C. Tóth, ’Zsigmond magyar 
és II. Ulászló lengyel király személyes találkozói a lublói béke után (1412–1424)’, [Les rencontres 
personnelles de Sigismond et le roi de Pologne, Ladislas II après la paix de Ľubovňa,] Történelmi 
Szemle 56:3 (2014), p.353. Cf. : Alfred A.  Strnad – Katherine Walsh, ’Cesarini, Giuliano’, in 
Dizionario biografico degli Italiani. 24 (Cerreto – Chini) Roma 1980. 188–195.
9  Eubel, Hierarchia, I. 401.
10  Mols 1949. p.1434–1435.
11  Mols 1949. p.1435–1437 propose 17 août, mais en réalité le mandat du pape se date du 25 
août. Theiner, Vetera Monumenta, II.192. Cf. Eubel, Hierarchia, I. 197, note nr. 9.
12  Eubel, Hierarchia, I, 33, 41 ; Fraknói 1901. 326 ; Mols 1949. p.1436 ; Dieter Girgensohn, 
‚Castiglione, Branda, Kard.’, in Patrick Geary et alii (eds), Lexikon des Mittelalters, J. B. Metzler, 
Turnhout 1977–1999. vol. 2, col. 1562.
13  ZsO III, nr. 2606 ; Eubel, Hierarchia, I, p.524 ; Mols 1949. 1436.
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de l'obédience de Pise futréhabilité en tant que apostolicam cancellariam regens  et 
nommé prévôt à Liège (1418). Entre 1418 et 1419 il tira les revenus de l’évêché 
de Brixen.14 Après la cloture du concile de Constance Branda administra l’évêché 
de Lisieux entre le 19 juin 1420 et le 12 avril 1424.15 Quant au cardinalat, le 14 
mars 1431 il fut transféré au titre de Porto et St Rufinus16 qu’il quitta dix ans 
après pour devenir cardinal-évêque de S. Sabina.17
Branda Ier di Castiglione et l’Europe Centrale, 1410–1414
Près de cette riche carrière ecclésiastique les activités complexes de Branda, qui 
s’étendait des affaires diplomatiques en passant par la juridiction aux questions 
de la foi et la discipline des clercs, étaient non négligeables. Peu après l’entrée 
au service pontificale, en 1401 il reçut un mandat judiciaire, il dut mettre fin à 
Cologne et à Liège à un débat qui opposait Guillaume de Momalle et Thierry 
de Nieheim.18 Deux ans plus tard (12 juin 1403) c’est le premier contact avec la 
Hongrie, quand Boniface IX lui confia la charge de collecteur pour la Hongrie 
et la Transylvanie.19
Participant actif des événements du Grand Schisme d’Occident, il é- 
tait présent en juillet 1407 aux pourparlés visant à élucider les conditions de 
la rencontre des papes prévue à Savona. Après avoir abandonné Grégoire XII 
il alla à Pise (mars 1409) pour travailler à l’union de l’Église où il assista au 
moins à deux sessions du concile. Adhéré à Alexandre V, sa première mission en 
Lombardie (1410) resta infructueuse, comme on l’a vu.20
À partir de 1410 il était en mission en Europe Centrale pendant quatre 
ans presque sans interruption. Ses activités s’étendait au sens géopolitique à la 
Hongrie et la Pologne auxquelles s’ajouta en 1413 l’Italie du Nord et l’Empire.21 
Les différents aspects relevés par les chercheurs cités ne forment pas une image 
cohérente qui permettrait de les interpréter dans toutes leurs compléxités. Ne 
s’intéressant pas forcément à tous ses éléments, plusieurs aspects importants 
14  Eubel, Hierarchia, I, 147, note nr. 14.
15  Eubel, Hierarchia, I, 304 ; Mols 1949. 1440.
16  Eubel, Hierarchia, I, 37, vol II, p.60 ; Mols 1949. 1440.
17  Eubel, Hierarchia, II, 26, 60 ; Mols 1949. 1441.
18  Mols 1949. p.1434-1435. en formulant une hypothèse que l’affaire soit traitée auparavant par 
Branda en tant qu’auditeur (1395). 
19  ZsO vol II, t. 1, nr. 2512 ; Mols 1949a. 1435.
20  Mols 1949a. 1435.
21  Mols 1949. p.1435–1437.
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furent négligés qui permettent de mieux comprendre et présenter les différentes 
perspectives de la longuer présence d’un envoyé pontifical.
Avant d’entrer aux détails, il faut bien préciser le processus de l’envoi, les 
mandats et les autorisations reçues, les facultés concédées et enfin les activités 
réalisées. Malheureusement la sensibilité à la distinction des types de envoyés 
pontificaux fait défaut aux études citées, Branda y est toujours qualifié « légat », 
un terme qui nous invite bien à le préciser. Il pose également problème 
l’interprétation de ses actes qui n’est point structurée par manque de reconstitution 
des relations qui se dessinent entre mandats, autorisations, facultés d’une part et 
des dispositions de Branda d’autre part.
Le table ici présenté montre à première vue la complexité des activités de 
Branda et permet de reconstituer son tissu structural (Table I).
Avant tout, il faut bien préciser que Branda ne reçut aucune autorisation 
légataire avant l’été de 1411, de plus, durant les mois qui précédaient octobre de 
cette même année, une variété de désignations s’appliquait pour lui : légat, nonce 
sans aucune référence à la plus haute qualité des envoyés pontificaux qui était  le 
legatus a latere.22 Bien que Jean XXIII l’ait créé cardinal-prêtre de St Clément au 
25 mai ou au 6 juin de 1411,23 il n’obtint son autorisation de legatus a latere qu’au 
12 octobre 141124.
Au 1er août Branda fut envoyé muni d’un mandat général visant à la 
réforme spirituelle de l’église locale et au renforcement de la collecte des revenus 
pontificaux. Le cadre géopolitique ne fut pas aussi bien défini, il consistait à la 
Hongrie et les royaumes soumis à l’autorité de Sigismond de Luxembourg.25 
En réalité cette autorisation s’étendait alors au royaume magyar puisque c’était 
en septembre de 1410 que Sigismond se déclara roi des Romains ce qui fut 
approuvé seulement l’année suivant, après la mort de son concurrent, Jodok. En 
même temps le pape confia a Branda une autre tâche, celle de l’enquête de la 
22  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 22–24.
23  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 21.
24  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 25.
25  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 1.
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fondation d’un studium generale en Hongrie qui rejoignait bien évidemment la 
requête même du roi hongrois.26
D’autres mandats de Jean XXIII entrent plus en détails portant sur les deux 
axes majeures d’action de son envoyé. Il autorisa Branda d’une part de consolider 
l’église hongroise aux confins des schismatiques et des infidèles, dévastés par 
les Tartares, etc. en chargeant un nouveau effectif des pasteurs, curés de la cure 
des âmes.27 D’autre part le pape lui demanda à plusieurs reprises la mise en 
fonction de la collecte des revenus pontificaux, soit en général, soit par rapport 
aux bénéfices vacantes, tout en insistant en même temps sur la révocation des 
dispositions des « antipapes », c’est-à-dire des papes des autres obédiences.28 
Suivent après des facultés qui permettaient à cet envoyé de renvoyer des 
péché, de distribuer des indulgences, d’utiliser des insignes pontificaux et de 
gérer sa propre procuration de revenus.29 Elle se concentre soit autour des 
premiers mandats en août de 1410, soit à la fin de cette même année où Branda 
est arrivé en personne en Hongrie.30
Au début de 1411 Jean XXIII a réitéré un des ses deux mandats initiaux qui 
prévoyait une fois de plus l’importance de la collecte des revenus pontificale.31 
Ensuite, après plusieurs mois de silence, apparaissaient les propres actions de 
Branda dans lesquelles, par la suite de sa promotion au cardinalat,32 il s’intitulait 
une fois légat et une fois nonce du pape ;33 en plus il fut nommé légat dans un 
mandat de provision de bénéfice du pape34. Cette autorisation, y compris les 
26  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 2. La Hongrie était en défaut des centres de formations universitaires depuis 
la fin du xive siècle bien qu’un studium generale se soit établi à Pécs en 1367 et un autre à Óbuda 
en 1395 qui n’étaient pas actifs voire disparus au tournant du siècle. Cf. ZsO II/2. nr. 7801. Cf. : 
Kinga Körmendy, ’La formation universitaire des chanoines cathedraux d’Esztergom aux xive et 
xve siècles’, in Marie-Madeleine Cevins and Jean-Michel Matz (eds.), Formation intellectuelle et 
culture du clergé dans les territoires angevins (vers 1246– vers 1480), Rome 1988. p.79–87; Tamás 
Fedeles, ’Studium generale Quinqueecclesiense’, in Tamás Fedeles, Gábor Sarbak and József 
Sümegi (eds.), A pécsi egyházmegye története I. A középkor évszázadai (1009–1543), Pécs 2009. 
p.557–572.
27  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 5.
28  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 3–4, 6–7.
29  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 8–12, 14–18.
30  À la fin d’octobre Branda aurait passé près de Venise. Cf. : ZsO vol II, t. 2, nr. 8010.
31  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 19.
32  Au 5 mai ou 6 juin, il fut promu au titre de cardinal-prêtre de St Clément. La première date 
est proposé par Girgensohn (Girgensohn 1977–1999, col. 1562.), l’autre par Eubel, Hierarchia, 
p.33, 41. Cf. Tableau I, nr. 21.
33  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 23–24.
34  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 22.
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titres utilisés, le caractère de ses activités affirment sans équivoque que Branda 
était considéré comme legatus missus.
Et c’est seulement en octobre de 1411 qu’il reçut une deuxième autorisation 
légataire, cette fois-ci en tant que legatus a latere. La substance de sa mission ne 
changeait néanmoins, elle consistait toujours à la réforme de l’église à laquelle 
s’ajoutait l’union de l’Église en plein schisme.35 Complétée par une autorisation 
de procuration et une faculté de collation de bénéfices, les activités de Branda y 
correspondaient parfaitement jusqu’au début de mars 1412.36
Avant il n’était pas chargé de mission diplomatiques, à l’exception d’une 
seule occasion en 1410 où il fut mentionné pour la première fois dans les 
querelles du roi de Pologne, Ladislas II de Jagellon et l’Ordre Teutonique.37 
Arrivé en Hongrie, au début de mars en 1411 Branda reçut un mandat direct qui 
lui demanda d’obliger l’Ordre Teutonique et le roi de Jagellon de faire respecter 
le traité conclut à Toruń.38
Bien que Branda soit revêtu d’une autorisation a latere, celle-ci ne s’étendait 
point à participer aux négociations qui visaient à mettre fin aux tensions des deux 
parties. Pourtant, l’itinéraire du légat alimente une hypothèse d’après laquelle 
il prenait parti de ces négociations par défaut. Les controverses de l’Ordre 
Teutonique et des Jagellons préocuppait apparamment le pape, il envoya déjà en 
mars de 1411 son propre neveu, Loisis de Tortellis, suivi en octobre par Conrad, 
prévôt de Wrocław. La première mission restant inaccomplie, avant l’arrivée du 
deuxième c’était le roi Sigismond de Luxembourg qui essayait de mettre fin 
aux tensions qui opposaient alors son royaume et la Pologne (négociations de 
Sramowce, novembre 1411).39 Du début de mars en 1412 Branda était présent 
dans la région ou l’entrevue du roi Sigismond et Ladislas II de Jagellon aura-
it dû lieu. Depuis le début de cette année Branda se trouvait dans l’entourage 
de Sigismond ce qui explique sa présence aux préparatifs de la rencontre de 
Lublo.40 Ainsi il acta à Leutscha au 4 mars,41 cinq jours plus tard il était l’un de 
35  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 25.
36  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 26–27, 29–30.
37  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 13. La lettre du pape Jean XXIII adressée aux frères de l’ordre demanda 
à eux at au roi polonais de respecter le traité qui avait été conclu devant son nonce envoyé en 
Hongrie. Le texte est particulièrement clair sur ce point, Branda servait de garantir le maintien 
du compromis, mais il fut envoyé uniquement en Hongrie et aux pays soumis à Sigismond de 
Luxembourg qui ne comprenait pas la Pologne.
38  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 20.
39  C. Tóth 2014. p.341–342.
40  Mols 1949. 1436.
41  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 31.
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ceux qui assurèrent le sauf-conduit de Ladislas II de Jagellon à Lublo42. Il était 
même présent à Cassovie (26 mars) à l’entourage du cortège royal43 et enfin à 
Buda (24 août) où le roi Sigismond mit fin aux conflits par une acte judiciaire 
solennelle44. Grâce à son service Sigismond confirma au 4 septembre 1412 toutes 
les privilèges de la famille du légat Castiglione.45
Malgré son mandat initial dans lequel la réforme spirituelle jouissait d’une 
grande importance, l’activité réelle du légat Branda passait lentement à la 
diplomatie. Même si son implication dans les négociations de paix entre l’Ordre 
Teutonique et la Pologne semblait une improvisation, puisque les envoyés prévus 
du pape ne sont jamais arrivés, les actes de Branda qu’il eut en Hongrie avait 
de moins en moins le caractère de réforme, elle se limitaient d’une part à la 
juridiction.46 D’autre part il était de plus en plus actif en tant que diplomate du 
roi Sigismond.
Le légat qui devint entre-temps admininstrateur de l’évêché de Veszprém,47 
entra apparemment au service du roi, il gérait entre autres les négociations 
avec la République de Venise depuis l’hiver de 1412 jusqu’au milieu de l’été de 
1413. Il prenait part aux préparatifs qui précédaient la trêve de Castelleto, il 
était présent d’une façon permanente dans la région de l’Aquilée et de l’Istrie 
pendant ces mois.48 Cette nouvelle tâche justifia enfin l’extension territoriale 
de son autorisation légataire qui couvrait désormais la Lombardie et l’Empire 
(Lombardia et Alemannia). Tout cela montrait une fois de plus sa complicité à 
la diplomatie de Sigismond de Luxembourg.49 Après les longs mois de services 
dipomatiques il regagna la Hongrie en automne de 1413, 50 il y hiverna pour 
42  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 32.
43  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 33.
44  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 35. Il était à Buda déjà en juillet. Cf. Tableau I, nr. 34 ; Mols 1949. 1435-1436.
45  DF 287861 ;  ZsO III. nr. 2620.
46  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 29–30, 33–34.
47  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 36. Ier septembre 1412 ; Mols 1949. p.1436.
48  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 40, 42–51. Cf. : Mols 1949. p.1436. Fraknói 1901. p.329. Ajoutons que deux 
autres représentants pontificaux – Bertold d’Orsini et Philippe del Bene – avait également un rôle 
important dans cette accte diplomatique. Il n’est pas du hasard que Bertold était présent comme 
témoin (avec un autre ambassadeurs du pape) à l’acte solennelle de Sigismond de Luxembourg qui 
eut lieu au 25 août 1412 à Buda : „comite Bertoldo de Ursinis de Urbe, comite Soanensi, Hugone 
de Heruorst, ambasiatoribus domini pape”. Fejér, CD. X/5. p.288.
49  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 49–50. Cf. : Mols 1949. 1436.
50  Selon Mols en août : Mols 1949. p.1436.
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quitter le royaume au milieu de l’année prochaine avec le roi qui se dirigeait alors 
au Concile de Constance.51
Branda eut donc sans aucune doute une charge diplomatique, mais qui lui 
a été contribué d’abord éventuellement, en tant que suite logique d’un imprévu 
qu’imposait le manque des représentants pontificaux lors des négociations 
entre l’Ordre Teutonique, Ladislas II de Jagellon présidées par Sigismond de 
Luxembourg. Il est fort probable que le succès du traité de Lublo permettait à ce 
dernier de profiter bien des qualités de négociateur de Branda dans les affaires 
qui opposait la Hongrie et Venise.
Les activités de Branda et sonn deuxième sérour en Hongrie, 1423–1424
Pendant la décennie qui sépare sa première et deuxième présence en Hongrie, 
Branda vit des années très chargées. En 1414 il accompagna Sigismond en Italie, 
il y fut compté parmi les cardinaux qui, en concert avec Jean XXIII, acceptèrent 
la convocation du Concile de Constance. Branda y jouait un rôle important, 
d’abord comme un des messagers de Jean XXIII, ensuite, après la fuite de ce 
dernier, il s’efforçait de le rappeler. Au 2 avril 1415 Branda regagna Constance, 
il était présent pendant tout le concile sans compter quelques absences (decem-
ber 1415 – janvier 1416, juillet-août 1416, janvier-février 1417), et fit sa vote 
à l’élection de Martin V qui lui rendit le titre de chancelier du pape (1418).52 
Durant ces années il était très actif dans la diplomatie, notamment en France 
et en Angleterre qui lui attribue la haute confiance de Sigismond. Grâce à lui, 
Branda reçut de nouvelles autorisations légataires en Europe-Centrale.53
Mais avant de s’y rendre, il accompagna Martin V au retour à Rome (1419) et 
séjournait en Italie presque deux ans. Au 13 avril 1421 le pape lui confia la charge 
de lancer la croisade contre les Hussites (Utraquistes) qui restait infructeuse, 
Branda se retourna à Rome en octobre de cette même année. Entre 1420 et 1424 
il était l’adminstrateur de l’évêché de Lisieux, succédé par son neveu, Zenon de 
Castiglione ce qui devait au fait que Branda n’était jamais présent en personne à 
Lisieux.54 En 1422 il fut envoyé dans l’Empire en tant que réformateur général, 
une tâche qu’il porta entre le 22 mars et 3 mars 1425. Durant ces trois ans il 
lançait des réformes en Bavière (à Ratisbonne et Nurenberg) ou à Würzburg, 
ou bien dans le province de Mayence, il travaillait en compagnie de Sigismond 
51  Cf. Tableau I, nr. 52–57. Pendant cette période Branda s’occupait surtout des affaires de l’évêché 
de Veszprém qui lui avait confié au titre d'administrateur.
52  Mols 1949. p.1437.
53  Mols 1949. p.1437.
54  Mols 1949. p.1440.
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pour mettre fin aux conflits des princes allemands, et il est arrivé à convaincre le 
prince de Brandenbourg d’entreprendre les armes contre les Utraquistes. Il invita 
au printemps de 1432 même la Pologne à cette croisade prévue en Bohême.55 
C’est dans le cadre de ces événements qu’on retrouve Branda en Hongrie pour 
la deuxième fois.
La croisade n’était pas le seul sujet qui préoccupait la papauté, des tensions 
risquaient d’éclater entre l’Ordre Teutonique et la Pologne sans parler de l'activité 
intensifiée de la Lithouanie. La crise politique et religieuse en Bohême incitait 
les parties à arranger leurs conflits et rassurer leur front contre les Utraquistes. 
Cependant ce n’était pas Branda qui eut le mandat de Martin V pour mener des 
négociations entre l’Ordre Teutonique et la Pologne, mais un nonce pontifical, 
Ferdinand de Palacios, évêque de Lugo qui avait eu déjà une charge en 1418–
1419. En 1423 Martin V a réitéré son mandat à Palacios qui participait aux 
négociations polono-hongroises au printemps de 1423. Branda était présent, lui 
aussi, présent en Hongrie, au moins en automne de cette même année. Selon 
Fraknói Branda fut présent aux négociations mentionnées en compagnie de 
Palacios ce qui n’est pas évident puisqu’aucune source pertinante ne l’approuve.56 
Il est évident en revanche que Branda assista au couronnement de la reine 
de la Pologne, Sophie – une acte symbolique de la paix entre la Pologne et la 
Hongrie57 – qui eut lieu au 6 mars 1424. Il est fort probable que Branda qui 
avait une autorisation de « reformator generalis » dans l’Empire qui se comb-
inait avec la préparation de la croisade contre les Utraquistes n’en avait pas pour 
la Hongrie, sa présence ici semble beaucoup plus d’un passage au marge de sa 
mission principale. La raison de ce détour était tout à fait raisonable : la mission 
de Palacios fut confortée par Martin V qui se servait d’un envoyé bien connu et 
respecté dans l’entourage de Sigismond: Branda de Castiglione.
Les dernières années
En ce qui concerne les dernières années de ce précieux légats, la période de 1425–
1431 est très peu connue. Il était en Italie et travaillait pour les négociations entre 
Florence, Milan et Venise, mais il s’efforçait de donner une impulsion culturelle à 
sa ville natale, Castiglione où il fonda une collégiale. 58 
55  Mols 1949. p.1438–1439.
56  Fraknói 1902. p.4 et note nr. 10.
57  Le roi Sigismond fut également invité ce qui laisse penser que sa présence confortait l’alliance 
contre les Utraquistes. Cf. : C. Tóth 2014. p.352–355 ; Mols 1949. p.1440.
58  Mols 1949. p.1440, 1442–1443.
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Depuis 1431 il rentra à la première ligne de la réforme et de l’union de 
l’Église. Au 14 mars 1431 il changea son titre de cardinalat de St Clément 
et devint cardinal-évêque de Porto et S. Rufin.59 Après avoir conclu certaines 
affaires en Italie du Nord, il se rendit à Bâle et participait activement aux travaux 
du concile qu’il présida entre 18 septembre et 13 octobre 1433. Il se montrait 
un partisan d’Eugène IV même pendant la sécession de Bâle-Ferrara-Florence, 
de plus, il souscrit les actes de l’union conclues avec les Grecs, Armeniens et les 
Coptes (6 juillet, 22 novembre1439, 4 février 1442).60
Entre-temps il fut transféré au titre du cardinal-évêque de Ste Sabine.61 Au 
15 août 1442 il s’appara pour la dernière fois en qualité officielle, notamment à 
la réception du roi René à Rome d’où il retourna à Castiglione et mourut au 3 
ou au 4 février 1443.62 Branda di Castiglione a légué une patrimoine riche, soit à 
Castiglione, soit à Pavie où la collégiale et la bibliothèque étaient généreusement 
dotées par Branda.63
En somme, la relation de Branda di Castiglione et la Hongrie était très 
complexe. Bien qu’il fût présent en Hongrie à deux reprises (1410/1411–1414 et 
1423–1424), son activité ne se limitait pas à la diplomatie. Bien au contraire, en 
1410 il fut envoyé en tant que réformateur général chargé en même temps de la 
collecte des revenus pontificaux. Les autres envoyés de Jean XXIII étant bloqués, 
Branda eut alors une autorisation secondaire, la gestion des négociations entre 
l’Ordre Teutonique et la Pologne en concert avec le roi hongrois, Sigismond de 
Luxembourg. Grâce à celle-ci, il devenait de plus en plus un diplomat préféré du 
roi des Romains dans les négociations avec Venise et même durant le Concile de 
Constance. Plus tard, il reprenait sa première entreprise, la réforme de l’Église qui 
lui contribuait une longue et fructueuse mission dans l’Empire au marge de laquelle 
il se retourna en Hongrie en 1423–1424 pour travailler à la préparation de la 
croisade contre les Utraquistes. Il s’impliquait là de nouveau dans des négociations 
diplomatiques seulement pour épauler un nonce pontifical, Ferdinand de Palacios 
chargé de constituer l’alliance de la Pologne, la Lithuanie, l’Ordre Teutonique et 
les royaumes de Sigismond de Luxembourg qui comprenait alors non seulement 
la Hongrie mais l’Empire aussi. Les activités de Branda en Hongrie, au moins ses 
actes de 1411–1412 affirment qu’il était avant tout un agent de la réforme mais il 
pouvait être utile en cas échéant dans la diplomatie ce qui s'imposait de plus en 
plus lors de sa première mission en Hongrie.
59  Mols 1949. p.1440.
60  Mols 1949. p.1441.
61  Mols 1949. p.1441.
62  Mols 1949. p.1442.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The itinerary and seals of Władysław I
Ádám Novák
Additions to the itinerary and seals of King Władysław I of 
Hungary in the light of recent Hungarica research1
Introduction
In July 17, 1440, in Székesfehérvár, Władysław III of Poland was crowned King 
of Hungary. He was the first Jagiellonian King of Hungary, but not the first who 
ruled both countries by personal union. In my paper I wish to provide some 
additions to the well-documented history of the short reign of King Władysław. 
The King’s itinerary and seal usage had been compiled much earlier, however back 
then Ferenc Dőry,2 Lajos Bernát Kumorovitz3 and Stanislaw Sroka,4 who had no 
access to the Database of the archival sources of the Middle Ages in Hungary5. 
Moreover during my research as a member of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences - University of Debrecen ‘Lendület- Hungary in the Medieval Europe’ 
Research Group I discovered sources that can complement to what we already 
know about the itinerary and chancery of King Wladyslaw.
I mainly rely on the collection of my research trip in Warsaw in the first 
week of December, 2014. My primary aim was to inspect the polysigillic 
diplomas of the Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie Zbiór Dokumentów 
pergaminowych6 catalogue, but further on, I discovered historically important 
but not yet microfilmed charters. In my recent study I have focussed on the 
1  This article is supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences - University of Debrecen 
‘Lendület’ Research Group ‘Hungary in  Medieval Europe’.
2  Ferenc Dőry, ‘I Ulászló magyar király pecsétjei’ [The seals of Władysław I of Hungary], Turul 
36 (1918–21), 32–3. [hereinafter: Dőry 1918–21]
3  Lajos Bernát Kumorovitz, ‘A magyar királyi egyszerű és titkospecsét használatának alakulása 
a középkorban’ [The development of the simple and secret seal usage of Hungarian Kings in the 
Middle Ages], in Dávid Angyal (ed.), A Gróf Klebelsberg Kuno Magyar Történetkutató Intézet 
évkönyve, Budapest 1937, pp.69–112. [hereinafter: Kumorovitz 1937]
4  Stanisław Sroka, ‘I Ulászló itineráriuma (1440–1444)’ [The itinerary of Władysław I of 
Hungary], Történeti tanulmányok: a Kossuth Lajos Tudományegyetem Történelmi Intézetének 
kiadványa 4 (1995), 21–48. [hereinafter: Sroka 1995]
5  György Rácz (ed), A középkori Magyarország digitális adatbázisa [Database of the archival 
sources of the middle ages in Hungary (DL–DF 4.2.) CD–ROM], Budapest 2003. Online from 
2009: György Rácz, (ed), Collectio Hungarica Diplomatica. http://mol.arcanum.hu/dldf. Magyar 
Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltár Diplomatikai Levéltár–Diplomatikai Fényképgyűjtemény 
[National Archive of Hungarian National Archives Diplomatic Archives – Diplomatic Photo 
Collection] [hereinafter: MNL OL DL–DF]
6  Hereinafter: AGAD, Dok. Perg.
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diplomas issued by Władysław I as King of Hungary. Through my search for 
polysigillic diplomas issued between 1439 and 1457,7 in the Haus-, Hof- und 
Staatsarchiv and in the Arhiv Republike Slovenije I found four diplomas sealed by 
King Władysław and his barons. At first, I am bringing forward the additions 
for the King’s itinerary, and then describing and examining his seals.
History of Hungarica research
The importance of Hungarica was recognized as soon as the nineteenth century 
and by the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it was working in an 
organized conditions. The milestones were the launch of a series of thematic 
source documents; and in the 1920s, the build-up of the institutional system of 
the Collegium Hungaricum. The Treaty of Trianon – among others – overwrote 
this research. The documents of the Upper-Hungarian cities and the well-
guarded family archives became Hungarica materials too. By the development 
of new technological methods – microfilm was used. It made possible to record 
more archival material in a short time, in its investigate. Antal Fekete Nagy 
and Bálint Ila were the first to use this method in 1935, while researching the 
archives of the Szepes (Spiš) chapter, which was a place of authentication (locus 
credibilis) in the Middle Ages. From that point on the Hungarica research was 
carried out in shorter or longer research trips, using microfilm technique. Its 
complete process can be traced back through the papers of Iván Borsa and István 
Kollega Tarsoly published in the Levéltári Szemle.8 The result is publicized in the 
MNL OL DF database dreamed up by Borsa, and made by György Rácz.
Poland was the destination of Hungarian Hungarica researchers many 
times.9 They were made microfilm copies of the materials of the local archives, 
museums, and libraries too, which (the ones from the medieval era) became part 
of the MNL OL DF database. The most important part of this is the collection 
of parchment charters in the Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie. 
7  Ádám Novák, ‘Egy kutatási program első eredményeinek bemutatása – Sokpecsétes oklevelek 
1439 és 1457 között’ [Presenting the first results of a research program – Polysigillic diplomas 
from 1439 to 1457], in Judit Gál et al. (eds.), Micae Mediaevales IV, Budapest 2015, pp.199–212.
8  Iván Borsa, ‘A magyar medievisztika forráskérdései’ [The source related questions of Hungarian 
medievalitics], Levéltári Közlemények 44–45 (1974), 114.; Idem, ‘A hungarikakutatás aktuális 
kérdései’ [The relevant questions of Hungarica studies], Levéltári Szemle 36:2 (1986), 8–13.; István 
Kollega Tarsoly, ‘Levéltári hungarika kutatás’ [Archival Hungarica research], Levéltári Szemle 
42:2 (1992), 40–52. [hereinafter: Kollega Tarsoly 1992]
9  For accounts see: Istvánné Fábián, ‘Lengyel levéltárakban’ [In Polish archives], Levéltári Szemle 
20 (1970), 233–40.
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The research of this was conducted by Péter Tóth in the 1980s.10 Through his 
selection 82 charters were filmed, which is newly researchable online in black 
and white microfilm.11
During my stay in Warsaw I discovered that many charters related to 
Hungary escaped the attention of previous researchers. The reason for this is that 
the concept of the Hungarica was and still is unclear. István Kollega Tarsoly even 
cites the relating decree of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in his work.12 
However, these categories are quite vague and it is of times the researchers call 
to define something as “Hungarica”. The number of the relevant but missed 
charters, of course, is not too high. I found only 4 diplomas from the age of 
King Sigismund, which were not microfilmed.13 Three of these were included 
in the Zsigmond-kori Oklevéltár.14 From its third volume, the editors used 
the manuscript of Elemér Mályusz, complete with the initially blue-labelled 
catalogue of the Diplomatic Archive and the Diplomatic Photo Collection and 
later on the MNL OL DL–DF database. The main principle of editing the 
subsequent volumes have been based on the latter,15 so the missing diploma 
– even if it had been already published – was not included in the Oklevéltár.16 
Therefore, it is important to draw the attention of the researchers to unknown 
charters, so these could be included in the MNL OL DL–DF database. 17
The Hungarian Academy of Sciences ‘Lendület’ research programs working 
with early modern sources pointed out that this may be the right form of a 
10  Péter Tóth shared his experience with me personally. His statements, comments, and assistance 
in preparing this paper are gratefully acknowledged.
11  MNL OL DL–DF database, accessed 15 September 2015.
12  Kollega Tarsoly 1992, 45–6.
13  27 April 1410: AGAD, Dok. Perg. 36.; 21 June 1410: Ibid., 62.; 26 March 1412: Ibid., 67.; 19 
March 1423: Ibid., 5565.
14  ZsO II. 7525, 7709.; ZsO III. 1902.
15  See the prefaces of ZsO III. and V.
16  Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia. Pomniki dziejowe wiekóv srednich 
do objasnienia rzeczy polskich sluzace. I–XIX, Cracoviae 1874–1927, XII. 127. reg. According to this 
it seems certain that King Sigismund waited for the King of Poland and his retinue in Ófalu since 
19 March 1423.
17  For the importance of documenting unknown charters and the history of Hungarica research 
see: Richárd Horváth, ‘Újonnan előkerült középkori oklevélszövegek a Győri Egyházmegyei 
Levéltárban’ [Recently discovered diploma texts from the Archive of Győr Bishopric], Levéltári 
Szemle 54:3 (2004), 3–13.
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systematic source-surveying work.18 Our HAS–UD ‘Hungary in medieval 
Europe’ Lendület Research Group also hold it as a passable way. Therefore, we 
are trying to publish every result of the ‘Hungarica’ research we have carried out. 
For this, the best technical realization is a digitalized database accessible online, 
which now is in a beta testing phase. We hope that it will be available for the 
public in 2016.19 Its advantage of is that not only the texts and descriptions can 
be investigated, but the images of the charters and seals as well. As a part of the 
project, the Hungarian-related charters kept in Warsaw will also be published.
Additions to the itinerary of King Władysław I
A group of diplomas issued by King Władysław I found in the Zbiór 
Dokumentów pergaminowych amounts to 77 pieces. The contents of these are 
not related to Hungary, as in most cases they are addressed to Polish persons, 
arranging Polish matters, and the Polish royal seal hangs on them, however, it is 
indisputable that these documents were issued by the elected and crowned King 
of Hungary operating in the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary. I think this 
fact alone classify them as Hungarica material. They can be used directly in the 
preparation of the royal itinerary and in the study of seal usage. In the ’80s Pál 
Engel pointed out that the Hungarian mediaeval studies has a shortcoming: 
the royal itineraries are either inaccurate or non-existent.20 He puts together the 
itineraries of governor János Hunyadi, and Sigismund of Luxemburg, thereby 
recovering a huge gap. His work was followed up by Norbert C. Tóth with the 
itineraries of the Queens.21 Although Sroka’s work was not yet made on the 
basis of the MNL OL DL–DF database, its source-base is extensive, leaves only 
small gaps. The thoroughness of his collection is confirmed by the fact that the 
database can complete it with only thirteen data. Another nine data came from 
foreign archives, mostly from the charters of Władysław which are kept in the 
aforementioned archive in Warsaw.
18  E.g. see the publication of the MTA-PPKE ‘Lendület – Church History’ Research Group: 
†József Lukcsics et al. (eds.), Cameralia Documenta Pontificia de Regnis Sacrae Coronae Hungariae 
(1297–1536). I: Obligationes, Solutiones. (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae, I/9), Budapest/Roma 
2014.
19  http://lendulet.memhung.unideb.hu:8080/momentum-web/Momentum_web.html 
20  Pál Engel, ‘Hunyadi János kormányzó itineráriuma (1446–1452)’ [The itinerary of Governor 
János Hunyadi], SZ 118: 5 (1984), 974–97.
21  Pál Engel and Norbert C. Tóth, Itineraria regum et reginarum (1382–1438) Subsidia ad 
historiam medii aevi Hungariae inquirendam I: Királyok és királynék itineráriumai (1382–1437), 
Budapest 2005.
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Sroka chose July 17, 1440 as the starting point of the King’s itinerary, the 
date of his coronation in Székesfehérvár. The Warsaw-diplomas, the MNL OL–
DL DF sources, and the data of the historian Jan Długosz make it possible to 
compile the itinerary of King Wladyslaw from his election in Krakow up to his 
coronation in Székesfehérvár. As its starting date we choose the 8th of March, 
1440 when in his charter confirmed by the seals of Polish magnates he accepts 
the conditions of the Hungarian ambassadors.22 However, it is interesting that in 
a diploma issued on March 2 he already calls himself elected King of Hungary. 
With regard to the authenticity of diplomas, there can be no doubt. In terms of 
its content – mortgage loan – it does not belong to those diplomas, which should 
be faked. In appearance it is also identical to other Polish chancery diplomas of 
the era. Although its seal is now lost, this fact cannot be decisive due to the dire 
fate of Polish charters. It can be concluded that the Hungarian ambassadors 
arriving to Krakow in the last week of February managed to convince the King 
about the acceptance of the Hungarian throne nearly a week earlier.23 So the 
unanimous opinion of the contemporary sources and the modern literature, that 
is, to accept the Hungarian throne was a huge dilemma for the King and the 
Polish magnates, may be even more correct.24
22  DL 39 291.
23  One of the ambassadors, János Perényi, Master of the Treasury dates his diploma on the 
February 17 in Prešov (Eperjes). DF 213 043.
24  Tamás Pálosfalvi, ‘A Rozgonyiak és a polgárháború (1440–1444)’ [The Rozgonyis and the 
civil war], SZ 137: 4 (2003), 897–928. [hereinafter: Pálosfalvi 2003]
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The itinerary of Władysław I King elect from Krakow to Székesfehérvár
2 March 1440 Kraków25 15 May 1440 Eger26
4 March 1440 Kraków27 19 May 1440 Pest28
8 March 1440 Kraków29 22 May 1440 Buda30
17 March 1440 Kraków31 31 May 1440 Buda32
5 April 1440 Kraków33 15 June 1440 Buda34
9 April 1440 Kraków35 17 June 1440 Buda36
19–20 April 1440 Sącz (Szandec)37 27 June 1440 Buda38
25 April 1440 Kežmarok (Késmárk)39 29 June 1440 Buda40
27 Apri1 1440 Kežmarok (Késmárk)41 1 July 1440 Buda42
4 May 1440 Kežmarok (Késmárk)43 13 July 1440 Buda44
5 May 1440 Spišská Nová Ves (Igló)45 15 July 1440 Buda46
9 May 1440 Rozhanovce (Rozgony)47 17 July 1440 Székesfehérvár48
25 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 357.
26 Sándor SZILÁGYI (ed.), A magyar nemzet története, Budapest 1894. IV., Book I, Chapter II. 
Based on Długosz. http://mek.oszk.hu/00800/00893/html/ – last accessed 15 September 2015.
27 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 378.
28 PÁLOSFALVI 2003, 906. Based on Długosz.
29 DL 39291.; DF 276 142.; Ibid., 288 388.
30 PÁLOSFALVI 2003, 906. Based on Długosz.
31 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 6625.
32 Ibid., 4856.
33 Ibid., 8499.
34 DL 13 554.
35 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 355, 4722.
36 DL 13 555.  
37 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 7283, 452.
38 DL 49 078. 
39 Ibid., 5107. Stanisław SROKA, Dokumenty polskie z archiwów dawnego Królestwa Węgier 
[Polish documents from the archives of the Kingdom of Hungary], Kraków 1998–2000, 197.
40 DL 44 295. 
41 Ibid., 13 539.
42 Ibid., 59 262.
43 DF 272 930.  
44 DL 65 537.
45 DF 281 452., 281 474., 281 735.
46 DL 80 727.
47 PÁLOSFALVI 2003, 906. Based on Długosz.
48 DF 289 009.
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The King’s itinerary after his coronation are supplemented by the following 
data:49
Additions for the itinerary of King Władysław I
8–9 January 1441 Buda50 31 January 1443 Buda51
15 March 1441 Márványkő52 8 April 1443 Buda53
21 March 1441 Németi vár alatt54 25 May 1443 Buda55
3 April 1441 Szentmárton56 13 June 1443 Buda57
12 April 1441 Szombathely58 15 June 1443 Buda59
8 Nov. 1441 Csepel60 18 Oct. 1443 Near Belgrad(Nándorfehérvár)61
31 Dec. 1441 Buda62 19 Jan. 1444 Sabar – Rácország63
28 Jan. 1442 Between Trnava (Nagyszombat) and Bratislava (Pozsony)64 28 Jan. 1444 Buda65
4 April 1442 Trnava (Nagyszombat)66 23 June 1444 Buda67
2 July 1442 Buda68 8 July 1444 Buda69
11 Oct. 1442 Buda70
49  My additions do not change the judgement of the events of the reign of King Władysław. 
However, the cumulative nature of historiography requires one to strive to be as comprehensible 
as possible and collect and arrange all known data.
50 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4855.; 631.
51 Ibid., 424.
52 DL 13 612.
53 Ibid., 47 696.  
54 DF 279 632.
55 DL 44 346.
56 Ibid., 92 916.
57 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 6634.
58 DF 293 348.
59 Ibid., 275 714. 
60 Ibid., 286 209.
61 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4867.
62 DF 262 896.
63 DL 44 357.
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Seal usage of King Władysław
According to the literature and the known seal-material Władysław III of 
Poland used three different seals, and after his election for the Hungarian throne 
two others were added.
(0) In the literature appears a very similar seal to the next one, that is the 
Polish secret seal – it holds just a few differences from it. The escutcheon is 
round base, not heater, and the field lacks the floral ornament. Its minuscular 
inscription is:
*wladislavs•dei•gracia•rex•polonie•etcetera.71
After his election this seal disappears, so presumably it was replaced at the 
beginning of 1440 to the first seal.
(1) The Polish royal secret seal. He uses it till the end of his reign. Roughly 
33 mms in diameter, the colour of the wax is red. An escutcheon is visible in its 
field, in its first and fourth quarters a Polish eagle is displayed, wings elevated; 
in the second and third quarters Lithuanian chevalier on horse. Literature 
presumes the Jagiellonian cross patriarchal on the shield of the chevalier. Above 
the escutcheon are floral ornaments. Its minuscular inscription is:
*wladislavs•dei•gracia•rex•polonie•etcetera.72
This seal remains in use in the Polish secret chancery until the end of his life.
64 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 428.
65 Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Galgóc Archive of the Erdődy family, 347. (Based on the ab-
stracts of Béla Iványi)
66 AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4728.
67 Ibid., 433.
68 DF 269 991.
69 DL 27 504. 
70 Ibid., 35 961.
71  From January 1440: AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4852.
http://www.agad.archiwa.gov.pl/prezentacje/pieczecie_krolewskie/4852.jpg – last accessed 15 
September 2015. See: Marian Gumowski, Pieczęcie królów polskich, Kraków 1919, p.17., no. 24. 
[hereinafter: Gumowski 1919]
72  From 9 April 1440: AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4722.
http://www.agad.archiwa.gov.pl/prezentacje/pieczecie_krolewskie/4722.jpg – last accessed 15 
September 2015. See: Gumowski 1919, 17., no. 23,
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 (2) The next one is presumably his Polish royal middle – or bigger – seal. Its 
wax is red coloured, approximately 46mms in diameter. Armorial bearings are 
visible in its field as well, in the first and fourth quarters a Polish eagle is displa-
yed, wings elevated, in the second quarter Lithuanian chevalier on horse, in the 
third quarter Moldavian bull’s head. It is worth noting that a smaller shield is 
placed above the larger one. We can see a cross patriarchal appearing in it. But 
since the hill of three mounds is absent from the base, and concerning that 
Władysław had used this seal previous to his enthronement, we must assume it 
signifies the Jagiellonian cross patriarchal, not the Hungarian. The field is filled 
with rich floral ornament. Its minuscular inscription is:
S’wladislai’ter(tio)’dei’gra(cia)’reg(i)’polo(nie)’ litw(anie)’p(ri)ncip’sup(?)
m’et’he(re)d(is)’russie’etcet(era).73
Its use in the Polish Chancery remained demonstrably until October 1442.74
(3) His first Hungarian royal seal appears at first after his enthronement 
in Székesfehérvár. Its wax is red, approximately 50mms in diameter. In its 
escutcheon is the first quarter the Árpád stripes, in the second Polish chevalier 
on horse, in the third Lithuanian chevalier on horse, in the fourth Hungarian 
cross patriarchal on hill of three mounds. Its minuscular inscription is:
S•wladislaus•dei•gracia•hungarie•polonie•dalmacie•croacie•(e)tc(etera)•rex.75
Its last use is known from the July 23, 1444.76
(4) The seal appearing in the September 19, 1444, can be visualized 
by the reconstruction drawing of Ferenc Dőry. The wax is also red coloured, 
approximately 57mms in diameter. Escutcheon party per pale, stripes of the 




73  From 21 September 1440: AGAD, Dok. Perg. 3346.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/60/AGAD_Pieczec_Wladyslawa_III_
Warnenczyka.png – last accessed 15 September 2015. See: Gumowski 1919, 17., no. 21.
74  AGAD, Dok. Perg. 4862.
75  From 1 September 1443: DL 88 185. See: Ferenc Dőry, ’Magyarország címerének kialakulása’ 
[The evolution of the coat of arms of Hungary], Turul 35 (1917), 24.; Dőry 1918–21, 32. and 
Kumorovitz 1937, 108. 
76  DL 13 791.
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Dőry, along with the literature, unequivocally sees the Hungarian cross 
patriarchal on the right side of the escutcheon. The presence of the hill of three 
mounds is undoubted, however I would not reject the possibility that it is being 
the mixture of the Jagiellonian and Hungarian charges, a hybrid.77
(5) We should also mention the „great seal” of Polish King Władysław III, of 
which has only a single known copy.78 The seal hangs on the polysigillical charter 
about the acceptance of the terms of the Hungarian Kingship must belong to 
King Władysław, since it hangs in the middle, in the most prestigious location. 
The red wax impression is approx. 53 mms in diameter. In the escutcheon’s dexter 
base point letter W, in honour a haloed figure with crosier, in his right a crowned 
man, in his left a woman. Its majuscular inscription is:
SIGILLUM•S•MARIE•DEI•ET•APOSTOLICE•SEDIS•GRATIA•
POLONIE•REGIS.79
Change of seals or reform of the chancery?
From the itinerary of Sroka we know that until the July 23, 1444 we does not 
need any special research to determine King Władysław’s exact location using 
his charters.80 But on August 1 of the same year, the King left Buda. From the 
work of Jan Długosz we know that the King was in Szeged, preparing for a war 
from which he never came back to Buda.81 From September 7, we regularly find 
charters issued in the name of the King, but dated in Buda.82 These are mostly 
involved in litigation, which means that the King formed his great chancery in 
the summer of 1444, and had made a new seal for it. Following Ferenc Dőry, 
83 Lajos Bernát Kumorovitz84 assumed that the seal change took place between 
77  Dőry 1918–21, 32. 
78  DL 39 291.
79  See: MNL OL Pecsétmásolat gyűjtemény [Seal copy collection] V8. 559.
80  Sroka 1995, 40.
81  Ibid.
82  DL 75 878.
83  Dőry 1918–21, 32.
84  Kumorovitz 1937, 109.
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July 23 and September 19, 1444. However, in my opinion, it is not only a change 
of the seal, but also the establishment of a new chancery.85
The King demonstrably kept with himself the Polish royal secret chancery 
in the campaign, because his secret seal appears on several diplomas issued in 
Várad/Oradea. 86 For the journey of the Hungarian secret chancery is proved by 
five charters, which are kept in Romania today. 87 That is why, that publishing 
after the Paris (Trianon) Peace Treaty (1920), Kumorovitz and Dőry could not 
use them in their work, their existence is only discovered by archival research, 
as well as the Diplomatic Photo Collection of the MNL OL. Nowadays these 
diplomas can easily be found in the MNL OL-DL DF database. Until now, I 
received my requested photos of the diplomas and seals only from the Direcţia 
Judeţeană Brașov a Arhivelor Naţionale.88 Based on this photo there can be no 
doubt that King Władysław took his old seal with him to the campaign. This 
means, that based on the success of his long campaign, and the results of the 
national assembly held in spring 1444, he successfully consolidated his power, 
and established a constantly working Hungarian greater chancellery in Buda, 
which gained a new – larger – seal. But for himself and for the Hungarian secret 
chancellery he kept the old seal, engraved after his coronation. The other four 
Romanian diplomas’ seal-pictures can confirm this theory, however, in this study 
I cannot present them.89
85  All the more, because diplomas were issued with it even in 1445, after the death of King 
Władysław. See: DF 211 778.; Ibid., 222 208.; Ibid., 222 205.; DL  97 188.; DF 222 214.; DL 
13 817.; DF 249 248.; Ibid., 249 249.; Ibid., 285 742.; DL 88 194.; Ibid., 90 975.; DF 200 456.; 
DL 74 081.; Ibid., 39 561.; DF 250 253.; DL 39 562.; Ibid., 80 829.; Ibid., 80 846.; Ibid., 13 835.; 
Ibid., 13 836.; Ibid., 65 889.  It is important to note that the text of the diplomas cannot help in 
this question, we must confine ourselves to the examination of the seals.
86  AGAD, Dok. Perg. 453, 447.
87  DF 278 450.; 246 914., 281 161., 281 109., 280 991. 
88  Brașov County State Archive. DF 246 914. The slightly blurred but clearly identifiable third 
seal. 
89  I have already contacted the Cluj County State Archive and the Historical Museum in 




Polysigillic diplomas of King Władysław
This sigillographic research also shows the need for a comprehensive and complete 
seal index of the complete medieval diplomatic material. The framework of this 
study cannot include this, not even the seal index of King Władysław. Its reason 
is that the Diplomatic Photo Collection often leaves in doubt the mere existence 
of the seals, and we can very rarely obtain any information about their looks. 
However, my research dedicated to the so-called polysigillic diplomas covers 
the period of the reign of King Władysław, so it is in my intent to publish the 
description of the polysigillic diplomas kept in archives abroad, and in this way 
I would like to contribute for a future seal index of the King.
190
Date: 8 March 1440
Place: Kraków
MNL OL number: DL 39 291
Abstract: King Władysław with the consent of the magnates confirms King 
Albert’s donations to his wife, Queen Elizabeth. 
Description: Originally 25, now only 16 seals hang from parchment tags. In 
the middle the great seal of Władysław III, King of Poland, on its both sides 
seals of Polish magnates: on the left seven (one red and six green), on the right 
eight (three red, five green) seals. Their description is in the MNL OL DL–DF 
database.
291
Date: 15 June 1440
Place: Buda
MNL OL number: DL 13 554
Abstract: King Władysław and his Polish and Hungarian supporters grant salvus 
conductus to the followers of László Garai, János Kórógyi and Queen Elizabeth. 
Description: Originally 18, now only 15 seals (in a row) hang from parchment 
tags. In the middle (the ninth) Władysław III, King of Poland’s greater seal, on 
the right Polish, on the left Hungarian magnates’ seals. Out of the remaining 
90  Published in: Sroka 1995, 168.
91  Published in: Márton György Kovachich, Supplementum ad Vestigia Comitiorum apud 
Hungaros: ab exordio regni eorum in Pannonia, usque hodiernum diem Celebratorum, Buda 1798, I. 
p.492.
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Hungarian seals two red wax seals belong to prelates, four green wax seals belong 
to barons. Their distance from the King’s seal follows the order of their owner’s 
dignity. We can assume that the lost seals belonged to László Pálóci seneschal 
(2nd) and János Marcali count (comes) of Somogy (3rd). The impressions are 
strongly blurred. Their description is in the MNL OL DL–DF database.
Assumed order of the sealing persons: János Ország (1st), János Perényi jr. (4th), 
Matkó Tallóci (5th), Jakab bishop of Szerém (Syrmia) (6th) Lőrinc Hédervári 
(7th), János bishop of Zengg/Senj (8th), King Władysław (9th) Polish magnates 
(10th–18th).
3.92
Date: 17 April 1441
Place: Szombathely
MNL OL number: DF 287 160
Memoria Hungariae: MH 22001–22009.93
Original number: Arhiv Republike Slovenije Sector for the protection of the 
oldest records no. 4996.
Abstract: The magnates consent that Władysław donates the bishopric of Zagreb 
to Péter Kottrer.
Description: Originally 9, now only 7 seals hang (in a row) from written 
parchment tags. In the middle is the first secret seal of Władysław I, King of 
Hungary. On the left three red wax seals of prelates, on the right three green wax 
seals of barons. The seals of Imre Marcali (1st) and Simon Pálóci (8th) are lost. 
The seals are heavily damaged.
Assumed order of the sealing persons: Péter, bishop of Csanád/Cenad (2nd), 
János, bishop of Várad/Oradea (3rd), Simon, bishop of Eger (4th), King 
Władysław (5th), Miklós Újlaki (6th), Matkó Tallóci/Talovac (7th), Mihály 
Ország (9th).
494
Date: 18 April 1441
Place: near Szombathely
MNL OL number: DL 13 619
92  Published in: Vilmos Fraknói, Oklevéltár a magyar királyi kegyuri jog történetéhez [Diplomatic 
archive for the history of Hungarian Royal patronage], Budapest 1899, pp.20–1.
93  „Magyarország a középkori Európában” c. adatbázist (verziószám: 2.1.2.1.) http://lendulet.
memhung.unideb.hu:8080/momentum-web/Momentum_web.html – last accessed 11 May 2016.
94  Published in: Norbert C. Tóth, ‘Oklevelek Simontornya középkori történetéhez (1264–1543)’ 




Abstract: King Władysław donates the castle of Simontornya and its belonging 
estates to Simon Rozgonyi, bishop of Eger, supreme chancellor, for his and his 
brothers’ services. 
Description: Originally three seals were placed on the diploma, now all lost. The 
assumed order of the seals: in the middle (2nd) the Hungarian royal seal of King 
Władysław, on the left (1st) (based on its size) the green wax seal of Miklós 
Újlaki, voivode of Transylvania, on the right the green wax seal of master of the 
treasury Mihály Ország.
5
Date: 19 April 1441
Place: Szombathely
MNL OL number: DF 287 162 and DF 258 346
Memoria Hungariae: MH 22010–22020.
Original number: Arhiv Republike Slovenije Sector for the protection of the 
oldest records Nr. 4998.
Abstract: Diploma of King Władysław I and his magnates. 
Description: The diploma included two times in the MNL OL DF database: there 
is a microfilm picture of the original charter taken in Vienna (DF 258 346.), and 
a later picture of a xerox copy (DF 287 162). Originally ten, now only nine seals 
(in a row) hang on parchment tags. In the middle (5th) the Hungarian royal seal 
of King Władysław I, on the left three red wax seals of prelates and a green wax 
seal of a baron. On the right four green wax seals of barons. We assume that the 
lost green wax seal (the 10th) belonged to Mihály Ország, master of the treasury. 
The seals are heavily blurred.
Assumed order of the sealing persons: Imre Marcali (1st), Péter, bishop of Csanád 
(2nd), János, bishop of Várad/Oradea (3rd), Simon, bishop of Eger (4th), King 
Władysław (5th), Miklós Újlaki (6th), Matkó Tallóci (7th), Simon Cudar (8th), 
Simon Pálóci (9th).
695
Date: 19 April 1441
Place: Szombathely
MNL OL number: DF 258 347 and DF 287 161
Original number: Arhiv Republike Slovenije Sector for the protection of the 
oldest records no. 4999.
Memoria Hungariae: MH 22021–22031.
95  Published in: István Katona, Historia critica regnum Hungariae stirpis Arpadianae, ex fide 
domesticorum et exterorum scriptorum concinnata, Buda 1779–82, VI/XIII. pp.150–3.
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Abstract: King Wladyslaw promises the transfer of some charters to Ulrich of 
Celje.  
Description: The diploma included two times in the MNL OL DF database: there 
is a microfilm picture of the original charter taken in Vienna (DF 258 347.), and 
a later picture of a xerox copy (DF 287 161.). Originally ten, now only nine seals 
(in a row) hang on parchment tags. In the middle (5th) the Hungarian royal seal 
of King Wladyslaw I, on the left three red wax seals of prelates and a green wax 
seal of a baron. On the right four green wax seals of barons. We assume that the 
lost green wax seal (the 10th) belonged to Mihály Ország, master of the treasury. 
The seals are heavily blurred.
Assumed order of the sealing persons: Imre Marcali (1st) Péter, bishop of 
Csanád (2nd), János, bishop of Várad (3rd), Simon, bishop of Eger (4th), King 
Władysław (5th), Miklós Újlaki (6th), Matkó Tallóci (7th), Simon Cudar (8th), 
Simon Pálóci (9th).
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Date: 16 August 1442
Place: Buda
MNL OL number: DF 258 234
Original number: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv AUR 1442 VIII 16.
Memoria Hungariae: MH 21061–22089.
Abstract: King Władysław and the Hungarian states grant salvus conductus to 
Queen Elizabeth.
Description: There are 32 cut marks on the diploma for the parchment tags, but 
in my opinion two of these, the 14th and the 22nd were not used. Now 29 seals 
hang on the charter, and a separated one (which was probably the 8th or the 
32nd) is kept beside it. In the middle (21st) there are the Hungarian secret seal 
of King Władysław, on its both sides the seals of Polish and Hungarian prelates, 
barons and envoys in order of their dignity. Out of the intact seals three red wax 
seals belong to prelates (two Hungarian and one Polish) and one to a baron. The 
1st and 39th are natural colour, the remaining 22 are green. Most of them are 
blurred and broken.
The seals of the Hungarian prelates and barons are the following: József, bishop 
of Bosnia (16th), János, bishop of Várad (19th), King Władysław (21st), Miklós 
Újlaki, voivode of Transylvania (24th), Matkó Tallóci, ban of Dalmatia, Croatia 
and Slavonia (25th), László Pálóci seneschal (26th), István Bátori, former judge 
royal (27th), János Marcali count of Somogy (28th), László Losonci (29th).
96  Published in: József Teleki, Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon. Oklevéltár [The Age of the 
Hunyadis in Hungary], Pest 1853, X. pp.118–20.
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Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions
Paul Srodecki 
‘Universe christiane reipublice validissima propugnacula‘ –
Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions around 1500
Against the backdrop of the Ottoman threat, a very common motif in the 
diplomatic language of the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period was 
the topos of a Christian Occident surrounded by innumerable enemies of the 
faith and protected by lands such as Poland, Hungary, and Livonia, stylized as 
‘bulwarks of Christianity’. The emergence of this notion and the corresponding 
ideology was connected with the political and religious situation of the time. 
The presumed existence of an antemurale implies the existence of a murus, and 
of an area protected by it. This was believed to be inhabited by members of the 
Christian community. This western Respublica Christiana – subordinated to the 
secular power of the Emperor and the spiritual power of the Pope – bordered on 
heathen, Muslim and schismatic countries to the East. 
This contribution seeks to take a closer look at the medial diffusion of the 
East Central and South Eastern European ‘bulwark’ topoi under the dynasty of 
the Jagiellonians in the rest of Europe at the threshold of the Middle Ages and 
the Early Modern period. Relevant single-leaf prints, frontispieces, woodcuts 
and copperplate engravings representing the respective outpost-countries as 
antemuralia Christianitatis ensured that the bulwark idea was also spread beyond 
the circles of humanistic scholars. Thanks to the new technique of printing, 
numerous writings were circulated (the so called Turcica) which focussed on the 
Ottoman expansion and on the role which Hungary and Poland in particular had 
to fulfil in the defence of Latin Christianity. The development of the printing 
press meant that a far larger public could now be reached, and the Turkish Wars 
belonged, alongside the Italian Wars of the early sixteenth century, to the mili-
tary events which awakened the greatest interest among the European public.1
***
* This paper was written as part of the research project ‘The Collective Identities in the Social 
Networks of Medieval Europe’ (IRP), which is conducted by the Department of History and 
Centre for Research in Medieval Society and Culture VIVARIUM, Faculty of Arts, University 
of Ostrava.
1 For the bulwark topoi in East Central Europe see: Paul Srodecki, Antemurale Christianitatis. 
Zur Genese der Bollwerksrhetorik im östlichen Mitteleuropa an der Schwelle vom Mittelalter zur Frühen 
Neuzeit, Husum 2015. [hereinafter: Srodecki 2015]
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Regardless of Poland’s slowly declining status in the Northern Black 
Sea Region in the second half of the fifteenth century, the use of the bulwark 
rhetoric as a diplomatic instrument experienced a new popularity. The spread 
of Jagiellonian dominion to cover almost the entirety of East Central Europe 
contributed substantially to this: Under the rule of Casimir IV’s sons, the 
Jagiellonians ruled in the kingdoms of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia as well as 
in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania – the ancestral homeland of the dynasty. As 
Polish and Hungarian fiefdoms, Prussia, Courland and Moldavia were as much 
a part of the Jagiellonian domains as Livonia, a land fiercely contested between 
Poland, Muscovy and Sweden. By the year 1500, the so-called ‘Jagiellonian 
Europe’ was on a par with such powerful Renaissance dynastic dominions as 
those of the Habsburgs or the Valois.2 
Despite John I Albert’s failed Moldavia crusade and Pope Alexander VI’s 
unsuccessful calls for a crusade against the Ottomans the use of the bulwark 
topos within Jagiellonian diplomacy increased at the turn of the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries. Of particular note is the unified position and solidarity which 
John I Albert and Vladislaus II demonstrated to the broader world following the 
settlement of the dispute over the principality of Moldavia. Both rulers, together 
with their younger brother Alexander of Lithuania, subsequently worked very 
closely together and exchanged useful information. Polish and Hungarian 
diplomats often appeared together as a unified front, and jointly represented the 
Jagiellonian lands to the outside world.3 
The diplomatic cooperation of this period is closely associated with one 
name in particular, that of the ethnic German Nikolaus von Rosenberg (Polish – 
2  Almut Bues, Die Jagiellonen. Herrscher zwischen Ostsee und Adria, Stuttgart 2010, pp.128–52.; 
Krzysztof Baczkowski, ‘Die sogenannte Jagiellonen-Idee in der Innen- und Außenpolitik der 
Dynastie im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert’, Berichte und Beiträge des Geisteswissenschaftlichen Zentrums 
Geschichte und Kultur Ostmitteleuropas (1997), 37–56. [hereinafter: Baczkowski 1997a.] ; Idem, 
‘Der jagiellonische Versuch einer ostmitteleuropäischen Großreichbildung um 1500 und die 
türkische Bedrohung‘, in Ferdinand Seibt and Winfried Eberhard (eds.), Europa 1500. 
Integrationsprozesse im Widerstreit: Staaten, Regionen, Personenverbände, Christenheit, Stuttgart 
1987, pp.433–444.; Idem, ‘Europäische Politik der Jagiellonen’, in Gottfried Stangler and 
Franciszek Stolot (eds.), Polen im Zeitalter der Jagiellonen 1386–1572, Schallaburg 1986 (Katalog 
des Niederösterreichischen Landesmuseums, Neue Folge, 171), pp.56–65.
3  Krzysztof Baczkowski, ‘Węgierskie pośrednictwo pokojowe w konflikcie litewsko-
moskiewskim w początkach XVI wieku’, in Marian Biskup and Zenon Hubert Nowak (eds.), 
Balticum. Studia z dziejów polityki, gospodarki i kultury XII–XVII wieku. Ofiarowane Marianowi 
Biskupowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, Toruń 1992, pp.37–48.
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Mikołaj Rozembarski).4 In him the Jagiellonians had a very skilled diplomat who 
represented both John I Albert and Vladislaus II, in particular at the Imperial 
Diets in Germany. Rosenberg’s speeches at the German Reichstage concerning 
the fight against the Turks and their allies were based – following Enea Silvio 
Piccolomini’s ‘Türkenreden’ – on antemurale ideas, and they clearly demonstrate 
the changes in the diplomatic liaisons of the Jagiellonians by the year of 1500. 
At the Reichstag in Freiburg in July 1498 the Polish envoy had still only asked 
for subsidies and military aid for Poland alone, which – plagued by Tatar raids 
and confronted by the growing power of the Ottomans in South Eastern Europe 
– had ‘always stood out as the unique bulwark of the Christians’.5 According to 
Rosenberg the South Eastern border regions of the Polish kingdom which had 
been devastated by the infidels could not withstand the growing attacks on their 
own for much longer. The collapse of the Polish defensive system would finally 
open the gates to the core lands of Latin Christianity for the enemies of the 
faith:
‘Non enim dubium est sacram vestram Majestatem [Maximilian I] minime latere, 
quomodo aliquando Gothi, Hunni, Tartari, cæteræque ignotæ Scythicæ gentes, non 
prius in Pannonias, Germaniam, & Italiam, ac deinceps in alias finitimas prouincias 
irrupere, nisi fractis & contritis regionibus Poloniæ regni, vt sic facilior illis aditus 
cæteras regiones inuadendi pateret.‘6 
Two years later, the tone of Rosenberg’s speeches had changed considerably: 
At the Reichstag in Augsburg the diplomat already depicted Poland and Hungary 
as two equal-ranking bulwarks of the Western world, which King Maximilian 
I and the German Princes could not afford to abandon, due to their protective 
function for the Holy Roman Empire: ‘non permittente duo ista non sua solum 
sed et universe christiane reipublice validissima propugnacula ab hoste hoc sevissimo 
amplius opugnari, quod utique non sine multorum finitorum pernicie atque ruina 
4  Mikołaj Rozembarski / Nikolaus Rosenberg originated from the village Rozembark/Rosenberg 
which was situated in the settlement area of the so-called ‘Walddeutsche’. See: Zofia Kowalska, 
Mikołaja Rozembarskiego traktat z roku 1499 o pochodzeniu Tatarów. Studium krytyczne i edycja 
traktatu, Kraków 1993 (Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Varia, 317), pp.9ff. [hereinafter: Kowalska 1993]
5  ‘... quod semper singulare Christianorum propugnaculum extitit.’: in Rerum Germanicarum Scriptores, 
ed. Marquard Freher and Burkhard Gotthelf Struve, Argentorati, 1717. II. p.486. [hereinafter: 
RGS] See: DRTA, VI. p.657; RI XIV, 2,1.392., no. 6404. Also see: Krzysztof Baczkowski, 
‘Państwo polsko-litewskie w koncepcjach politycznych Maksymiliana I’, Prace Historyczne 121 
(1997), 21–35, here 25ff. [hereinafter: Baczkowski 1997b.]
6  RGS, II. 486f. See: DRTA, VI.657; RI XIV. 2,1.392., no. 6404. See: Baczkowski 1997b, 25ff.
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posset contingere.’7 Rosenberg’s speeches, delivered in impeccable Latin shaped 
by humanist rhetoric, were highly appreciated throughout the Reich, and were 
printed well into the eighteenth century in various compendia of Reichstag 
speeches.8 
Between his speeches in Freiburg and Augsburg Rosenberg published two 
highly interesting treatises in which he outlined both the Turkish and the Tatar 
threat. The memorandum Contra Turcos et Asianos adhortacio was addressed to the 
Holy See and all European rulers. It aimed, through a series of overstatements, 
to convince Latin Christianity of the situation ad salutarem expeditionem against 
the Muslim enemies of the faith.9 In the absence of contemporary accounts, it 
is not known if this call for holy war ever reached a broader public. Rosenberg’s 
second work from this period was the Explanatio compendiosa de situ, moribus 
et diversitate Sciticarum gentium, published in 1499, a largely pejorative tract 
concerning the origins and barbarity of the Tatars. Although dedicated to the 
King of the Romans, Maximilian I., the Explanatio compendiosa received positive 
resonance amongst humanist circles and was subsequently well-known to many 
East Central and West European scholars such as Stanislav Thurzó or the prin-
ter Johannes ‘Oporinus’ Herbst from Basel. The historiographic and geographic 
description contains explicit appeals to Maximilian which aimed to stir him and 
thus the Holy Roman Empire into providing active aid against the Tatars and 
Ottomans. In this, as in his other works, Rosenberg did not hold back on exalted 
bulwark adscriptions, and he warned the Habsburg ruler of the consequences 
of the impending doom of Poland and Hungary, the ‘two Christian redoubts’ 
7  August Sokołowski et al. (eds.), Codex Epistolaris Saeculi Decimi Quinti, Cracoviae 1894, 
III. p.476., no. 456, [hereinafter: CESDQ] See: Janusz Smołucha, Papiestwo a Polska w latach 
1484–1526. Kontakty dyplomatyczne na tle zagrożenia tureckiego, Kraków 1999, pp.71ff.; Krzysztof 
Baczkowski, ‘Argument obrony wiary w służbie dyplomacji polskiej w XV wieku’, in Wojciech 
Iwańczak (ed.), Ludzie, kościół, wierzenia. Studia z dziejów kultury i społeczeństwa Europy Środkowej 
(średniowiecze – wczesna epoka nowożytna), Warszawa 2001, pp.195–212, here 212.
8  Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, ‘Die Wahrnehmung des Reichstags in Polen-Litauen. 
Mitteleuropäische Kommunikationsstrukturen und die polnischen Gesandtschaften zum 
Reichstag 1486–1613‘, in: Maximilian Lanzinner and Arno Strohmeyer (eds.), Der Reichstag 
1486–1613. Kommunikation – Wahrnehmung – Öffentlichkeiten, Göttingen 2006 (Schriftenreihe 
der Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 73), pp.405–
437, here 408f.
9  Zofia Kowalska, ‘Die Wiener Handschrift mit dem Traktat Mikołaj Rozembarskis „Explanatio 
compendiosa“ von 1499‘, Studia Mediewistyczne 28 (1992), 69–88., esp. 76.; Kowalska, 1993, 15.
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which alone could preserve the Roman-German Empire from extinction at the 
hands of the Ottoman-Tatar hordes.10 
Rosenberg’s oratorical and written work is representative of the notable 
increase in the use of the bulwark rhetoric towards the end of the fifteenth 
century. The image of Poland as a country beset by enemies of the faith on 
all sides particularly flourished at the turn of the Middle Ages and the Early 
Modern Period. At this time, the war of faith in the East of Europe found its 
way into sacral poetry. For example, shortly after the Tatar invasion of 1498, 
the Bernadine monk Ładysław of Gielniów wrote his liturgical acclamation 
Cantus contra paganos, in which he called upon Jesus Christ for help against 
the infidels, and this remained popular in Bernadine Franciscan masses up into 
the seventeenth century.11 Various other elegies written by 1500 demonstrate 
a similar structure, such as the Tractatus de martyrio sanctorum (first printed in 
March 1499) or the anonymous prayers Pieśni Sandomierzanina, also attributed 
10  Mikołaj Rozembarski, ‘Explanatione compendiosa de situ , moribus et diversitate Sciticarum 
gentium anno MCDXCIX scripta‘, in Kowalska 1993, pp.47–65, here 65: ‘Unde etiam tua clementia 
[Maximilian I] clarius intelligere poterit, quid quantumque oneris duo illa christianitatis propugnacula 
Poloniae videlicet et Ungarie regna prae ceteris ferant, ruinae atque exitio propinquiora, pro quorum 
praesidiis atque conservatione nisi universi christicolae, sed potissimum Germania conspirent, profecto 
ruina sua finitima secum omnia in precipitium trahi, necessarium ac consequens erit, nisi id divina pietas 
avertat.’ See: Zofia Kowalska, ‘Bitwa legnicka i sprawy tatarskie w XV-wiecznej dyplomacji polskiej 
na dworze Maksymiliana I (w świetle traktatu Mikołaja Rozembarskiego z roku 1499)’, in Wacław 
Korta (ed.), Bitwa Legnicka – Historia i tradycja, Wrocław/Warszawa 1994 (Śląskie sympozja 
historyczne, 2), pp.151–161.; Krzysztof Baczkowski, ‘Stellenwert des polnisch-litauischen 
Staates in der Politik Maximilians I.‘, in Józef Buszko and Walter Leitsch (eds.), Österreich 
– Polen. 1000 Jahre Beziehungen, Kraków 1996 (Studia Austro-Polonica, 5; Prace Historyczne, 
121), pp.23–42.; Carlos Gilly, Die Manuskripte in der Bibliothek des Johannes Oporinus. Verzeichnis 
der Manuskripte und Druckvorlagen aus dem Nachlass Oporins anhand des von Theodor Zwinger und 
Basilius Amerbach erstellten Inventariums. Hommage à François Secret, Basel 2001 (Schriften der 
Universitätsbibliothek Basel, 3) p.124.; Martin Rothkegel (ed.), Der lateinische Briefwechsel des 
Olmützer Bischofs Stanislaus Thurzó. Eine ostmitteleuropäische Humanistenkorrespondenz der ersten 
Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts, Hamburg 2007 (Hamburger Beiträge zur neulateinischen Philologie, 
5), p. 146.
11  Wincenty Morawski, Lucerna perfectionis christianæ, sive vita B. Ladislai Gielnovii, Varsaviæ 
1633, p. 70: ‘IESUS Nazarænus Rex ludæorum exurgat & conterat gentes Paganorum, & præstet 
victoriam populo Christianorum, ut laudetur Omnipotens Deus in sæcula sæculorum Amen.‘ See: 
Aleksander Brückner (ed.), Średniowieczna pieśń religijna, Kraków 1923 (Biblioteka Narodowa, 
Seria I, 65) p.72.; Juliusz Nowak-dłużewski and Mirosław Korolko (eds.), Polskie pieśni pasyjne. 
Średniowiecze i wiek XVI, Warszawa 1977, I.pp.23f.; Wiesław Wydra, Władysław z Gielniowa. Z 
dziejów średniowiecznej poezji polskiej, Poznań 1992. [hereinafter: Wydra 1992]
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to Ładysław of Gielniów by most Polish literary historians.12 Additionally, the 
bulwark description was also mixed with the threatening scenario of the imminent 
collapse of the Polish outpost in the political rhetoric of the Jagiellonian era: A 
perennial motive was the outlining of the almost hopeless fight against ‘Turcken, 
heiden ader Tattern, wider welche man sich als widder die heuptfinde gemeiner 
cristenheit mus erweren und fechten.’13 Depending on the intent and purpose 
of this rhetoric, this argumentation tended to be combined with a request, a 
demand, a threat or – in panegyric court poetry – with ostentatious reference to 
one’s own might. 
In the subsequent period, the Jagiellonians increasingly underlined the 
specific status – in their eyes – of the Polish Crown as a bulwark of Latin 
Christendom. One can find numerous examples for this in particular in the 
reign of John I Albert’s successor, his brother Alexander. A letter from October 
1502, sent to the Habsburg Maximilian, may be taken as emblematic of the 
Jagiellonian bulwark rhetoric in the early sixteenth century: Alexander, who as 
Grand Duke of Lithuania had also ascended the Polish throne following the 
death of John Albert one year before, described his dominion, the ‘dominia Regni 
nostri, as imperii Germaniae antemuralia.’ Of special interest here, is the emphasis 
on the entire territory of the Jagiellonians – that is to say not only on Poland 
as had been the case in the past – as a bulwark of Germany. Here, therefore, 
antemurale is primarily equated with the Jagiellonian (respectively Alexander’s) 
dominion. Remarkably, Alexander did not place the fight against the Muslim 
world in the first rank of the Jagiellonian defensio fidei, but rather the war against 
the schismatic East. Thus he warned Maximilian in his letter that his lands, 
which had been heavily affected by the constant wars against the Ruthenians, 
Muscotives and Moldavians, could only continue the holy war ‘contra paganos’ 
with the aid of their neighbours to the West. Were this antemurale to be taken 
12  ‘Tractatus de martyrio sanctorum’, in August Bielowski (ed.), Monumenta Poloniae Historica, 
Lwów 1878, III.253–254; Stefan Vrtel-wierczyński (ed.), Średniowieczna poezja polska świecka, 
Wrocław 19523 (= Biblioteka Narodowa, Seria I, 60) pp.51–9. See: Aleksander Brückner, Dzieje 
literatury polskiej w zarysie, Warszawa 1908, I. p.55; Juliusz Nowak-dłużewski, Okolicznościowa 
poezja polityczna w Polsce. Średniowiecze, Warszawa 1963, p.144.; Wydra 1992, 90ff.; Jadwiga 
Krzyżaniakowa, ‘Polska – “antemurale christianitatis” – Polityczne i ideologiczne podstawy 
kształtowania się idei’, in Krzysztof Kaczmarek and Jarosław Nikodem (eds.), Docendo discimus. 
Studia historyczne ofiarowane Profersorowi Zbigniewowi Wielgoszowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę 
urodzin, Poznań 2000 (Publikacje Instytutu Historii UAM, 32), pp.295–315, here 314.
13  Paul Pole, ‘Preussische Chronik’, ed. Max Töppen, in Theodor Hirsch et al. (eds.), 
Scriptores rerum Prussicarum. Die Geschichtsquellen der preussischen Vorzeit bis zum Untergange der 
Ordensherrschaft, Leipzig 1874 (reprint Frankfurt a. M. 1965), V. pp.173–314, here 274.
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by the enemies of the faith, the borders would be open to the East, and not only 
Poland but the whole of Latin Christianity would fall.14 
Also quite impressive is the letter of another Jagiellonian from September 
1502. In this, Frederick, who as archbishop of Gniezno and bishop of Cracow 
held the two most important spiritual offices in the kingdom, attempted in the 
name of the Polish clergy to convince Helena, Alexander’s wife and daughter of 
the Grand Duke of Moscow Ivan III, to act as a mediator between her father 
and her husband. Compared to Alexander’s argumentation towards Maximilian 
outlined above, Frederick twisted the anti-Moscow bulwark rhetoric of 
his brother right around. The Primate of Poland cleverly presented the war 
between the Catholic Poland-Lithuania and the Orthodox Grand Duchy of 
Moscow as a fight ‘inter christianos principes’, which could only be harmful to the 
‘propugnaculum religionis nostrae’. Rather, he argued, there should be peace and 
harmony between these two Christian rulers, so as not to weaken the Christian 
(in this case the Latin and Greek) world: 
‘Et propterea, etsi spectet ad omnes christianos dominos optare et cooperari pro viribus, 
ut pax et concordia sit inter religionis nostrae principes, ne sanguis fidelium cum 
aliqua eiusmodi religionis nota armis propriis diffundatur, tamen potissimum inte-
rest cogitare de his incommodis eos, quibus imprimis ab ipso Salvatore nostro onus 
studium.’15
Whilst Alexander emphasised the antagonism between the rightful Latin 
Christianity and the misled Eastern schismatics in his letter to Maximilian, 
reducing the enemies of the faith solely to the latter without mentioning the 
Tatars and Ottomans as he had done in the preceding years, his brother now 
expressly underlined the commonalities between the two confessions, and 
between Poland-Lithuania and Moscow more generally. The disparity between 
Alexander and Frederick’s letters once again shows the flexibility with which the 
bulwark motive was used as an adjustable instrument of diplomatic language in 
order to achieve specific political goals.16 
However, it was not only in foreign policy or inter-dynastic correspondences 
that the antemurale allegory was a proven tool of political rhetoric. This line of 
argument was also used intensively by the Jagiellonian court in its negotiations 
with the estates. In December 1502, for example, at a convention in Vilnius, the 
royal envoy Jan Karwowski asked the assembled Polish and Lithuanian nobility 
14  Akta Aleksandra, 170–171., no. 118.
15  Ibid., 144., no. 104. 
16  Srodecki 2015, 247–255.
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as well as the Prussian estates in the name of Alexander for financial support in 
the defence of Red Ruthenia, which had to struggle with perpetual Tatar raids. 
At the same time Karwowski strongly insisted that several legations be sent 
to the Holy Roman Empire and to the rest of Latin Christianity, in order also 
to gain support there in the fight against Ottomans, Tatars and Wallachians. 
The royal envoy openly made use of the bulwark motive in his urgent demand 
for aid. As in the previous examples Karwowski concluded his argumentations 
with the well-known threatening scenario in which Poland, ‘Regnum istud 
dicatur antemurale’, without external support, could no longer resist ‘hostibus 
populosissimis et potentissimis Turcis, Tartaris et scismaticis’ any longer:
‘Verum consultius esset, ut V. D. I. interim cum consiliariis universis conveniret et 
decerneret, ut legarentur nuntii ad Romanorum etc. regem, ad electoresque Imperii et 
per Germaniam, quibus exponeretur haec quae isti Regno a paganis infertur violentia, 
captareturque per querimoniam illorium benivolentia. Quatinus, dum Regnum istud 
dicatur antemurale illorum esse et ruibundum fuerit, auxilia praestent contra paganos 
nobis, nobis inquam, qui per tot centena praeteritorum temporum viribus, sanguine et 
opibus nostris antemurale illud defendere consuevimus etc.’17
 
Alexander also knew how to detach the outpost rhetoric from the image of 
an all-Christian rampart and to relate to particular selected countries. In a letter 
to Pope Julius II from December 1504, for instance, the Jagiellonian stylised 
Poland as ‘Almaniae antemurale’. Alexander portrayed the infidel supremacy – 
consisting of Tatars, Ottomans, Wallachians and not least Muscovites – which 
Poland had to stave off ‘ad commune christianitatis bonum et ad suam filiorumque 
salutem’. The costs for these defensive tasks, which Alexander calculated 
at 100,000 Hungarian golden guilders, would exceed by far the financial 
possibilities of the kingdom, while the rest of Latin Christianity, above all the 
Holy Roman Empire, would not be involved in the expenses. Alexander referred 
to the widespread carelessness and impulses which used to exist amongst the 
Polish public when the Ottoman threat was far away from the Polish frontiers.18 
Since its foundation, Poland had always been a bastion of the Reich, but it had 
17  Akta Aleksandra, 205–206., no. 135. See: Marian Biskup, ‘Czasy Jana Olbrachta i Aleksandra 
Jagiellończyka (1492–1506)’, in Marian Biskup (ed.), Historia dyplomacji polskiej. Vol. 1, połowa X 
w.–1572, Warszawa 1982, pp.531–86, here 557–9. [hereinafter: Biskup 1982]
18  Akta Aleksandra, 443., no. 270.: ‘Turcorum potestas olim aliena incognitaque nobis fuit, sed cum 
Constantinopolis et regna Graecorum intercepta erant, attrivit potentia Turci Ungariae et Croaciae 
regna, fregit potentiam Walachi, cuius castra duo praecipua, Moncastrum [Cetatea Albă] et Licostomum 
[Chilia] recepit, vi penetrare contendit ad summam Regni nostri, prout nonnunquam iam tentarunt et 
penetrare et debellare Regnum.‘
65
Jagiellonian Europe in bulwark descriptions
never had received any aid in its fight against the enemies of the faith from 
the German princes. On the contrary, rather, it had always had to defend itself 
against German inference and assaults.19 Finally, Alexander also alleged that 
Maximilian, together with the German princes, would enter surreptitiously 
into a relationship with Moscow directed against Poland, which was, after all, 
‘the bulwark of the German princes’: ‘Ex parte Imperii, quorum principes Ordini 
Prutenorum patrocinari consueverunt et nulla unquam auxilia tribuunt illi Regno, 
quod velud antemurale est principum Germanorum, imo etiam principes Imperii 
nonnunquam patrocinantur schismaticis illis contra regem nostrum.’20 
The noticeable increase in the use of the antemurale term in diplomatic 
language under Alexander is to a large extent connected to the person of 
Jan Łaski the Elder. Initially as royal secretary and then, from 1503, as great 
chancellor of Poland he was mainly responsible for the written correspondence 
of the Jagiellonian courts in Cracow and Vilnius. As early as 1500, the royal 
chancellery of John I Albert used the antemurale allegory to praise Poland 
and Venice as the antemuralia of Christianity.21 Under Łaski’s leadership, the 
bulwark concept rapidly established itself as a favourite tool of Polish diplomacy, 
replacing older outpost motifs such as scutum, clipeus, murus or propugnaculum. 
The success of the antemurale idea is also reflected in its adoption by the Polish 
nobility – a development which foreshadowed the aristocratic self-perception of 
the seventeenth century, in which the Polish nobility, the szlachta, in particular 
saw themselves as the real rampart of Poland and Christianity. At a court mee-
ting in Radom at the beginning of July 1505, for instance, representatives of the 
nobility announced to the Bohemian delegates in the name of Alexander that 
Poland was ‘illorum contra paganos antemurale’.22 
19  Ibid., 444., no. 270,: ‘Animus est ad belligerandum optimus et militum regnicolarum ingens 
multitudo, tamen quia propter oppignorata bona regalia, praeter statum R. Maiestati dignum, Regnum 
illud omnino exhaustum vel expilatum fuerit pro defensione, quam velut partium Almaniae antemurale 
ab initio Regni in humeris gestavit, pro quo nulla provincia principum Almaniae auxilia aliqua praebuit 
unquam, et sicut per tot annorum centena molem illam belli sustinuit, sic necessario succeccive impendendo 
iam tandem lacessitum deficere incipit, et omnino tam diuturna belli continuatio communem Regno 
inopiam intulit.‘
20  Ibid., 446., no. 270.
21  Letter dated November 12, 1500, Sanuto, col. 1191f.: ‘Nec minus doleo, quod christiani principes 
vigilantes dormiunt, et periculis exitialibus nec provident ne succurrunt, et non considerant quod, dum 
hæc duo antemuralia, videlicet regni mei vires jam diuturnis intranquillitatibus debilitatæ non solum 
ab hoste uno, sed a pluribus, et inclyti Dominii venetorum, confracta fuerunt, ipsos omnino in suis 
dominiis nunquam futuros nec quietos nec securos‘. See: Marian Biskup, ‘Die polnische Diplomatie 
in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. und in den Anfängen des 16. Jahrhunderts‘, Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas 26 (1978), 161–178, here 178; id. 1982, 579f.
22  Akta Aleksandra, 494., no. 292. 
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However, self-conceptions which attribute a bulwark position to their own 
estate are rarely found within the Polish szlachta at the threshold of the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries. When dealing with the crown, one of their main strategies 
was to appeal to patriotic feelings and duties. The Field Crown Hetman Piotr 
Myszkowski gave perhaps the clearest expression to this argumentation when 
he asked John I Albert in September 1499 for financial and military support ‘pro 
defensione reipublice et eciam iusticie terrestris’ and for the defence of the faith.23 
Valuable evidence of the reception of the external image of the domus 
Iagiellonica as defenders of the faith in the Christian occident is provided 
by a letter to Alexander from the Cardinal of Santa Croce in Gerusalemme, 
Bernardino López de Carvajal. In May 1501, the cardinal emphasised the 
importance of the Jagiellonians for the spreading of the Catholic faith at the 
Eastern peripheries of Latin Christianity and outlined his appreciation of the 
attempts of the Grand Duke of Lithuania for unification with the Orthodox in 
Ruthenia. The Jagiellonians, this dynasty ‘ex Lithwanie ducibus’, played a crucial 
role for the countries further to the West, since the growth of the faithful and 
the extension of Christian power would strengthen this ‘invincible shield against 
the Turks and Tatars‘. It is notable that López de Carvajal summarized the 
different Jagiellonian territories into one dominion: According to the cardinal, 
the offspring of the domus Iagiellonica would dominate the whole of East Central 
Europe since, as well as being Grand Dukes of Lithuania, they were also kings of 
Poland, Hungary and Bohemia. Furthermore, the Jagiellonian dominion would 
also include ‘universe Rosolane provincie […] et Sarmatie etiam’ and would even 
extend beyond the Don river.24 
Similarly to Poland under John I Albert and Alexander, the bulwark rhetoric 
in Hungary also experienced an upturn around 1500. Proof for this can be found 
in the increasing use of the terms antemurale or propugnaculum in diplomatic 
correspondences at the time – especially between the court in Buda and the Holy 
See. One impressive document completely studded with bulwark allegories is the 
letter sent by Vladislaus II to Pope Innocent VIII on June 20th 1492, in which the 
Bohemian-Hungarian king warned the Pope of the impending loss of Belgrade 
to the Ottomans. Vladislaus described Belgrade and the adjacent fortified towns 
23  Anatol Lewicki (ed.), Listy i akta Piotra Myszkowskiego, generalnego starosty ziem ruskich króla 
Jana Olbrachta, Kraków 1898, p.57., no. 55.
24  CESDQ, III. 494., no. 474.: ‘Pergat itaque excellentia vestra in sanctissimo suo instituto seminandi 
unitatem vere fidei in omnibus dominiis suis, nam hoc pre ceteris erit scutum inexpugnabile contra Tartaros 
ac Turcas, quo protectus cum sua singulari prudentia et fidelium suorum militum robore, et eius fratrum 
aliorumque christianorum auxiliis, futurum spero, ut sicut ex Lithwanie ducibus brevi tempore, suscepta 
recta fide, Polonie Bohemie et Hungarie reges dati sunt, ita universe Rosolane provincie dominatus et 
Sarmatie etiam trans Tanaim imperium, cum animo augende recte religionis, vobis eventurum est, quod 
faustum et felix deus disponat.’
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of the South-Hungarian fortification belt as strategically very important outposts 
‘a quibus salus regni huius et universe pene christianitatis dependet.’25 Were Belgrade 
to be conquered by the infidels, the Jagiellonian claimed, then the enemies of the 
Christian faith could invade deep into the interior of the Hungarian kingdom. 
Who then should be ‘the wall and shield of the Catholic Church and the Christian 
people?’ Hungary, ‘utpote antemurali et scuto indubitato huius orbis parti’, must be 
helped at once to repulse the Ottomans – otherwise the consequences for the 
whole of Christendom would be unforeseeable and dramatic.26 Even if he failed 
to gain external support, however, Vladislaus himself, encouraged by the ‘shield 
of faith’, would still march on his own against the superior foe and carry out his 
duty as a defender of the faith.27 
In the same year, and in similar terms, another Hungarian delegation 
declared Vladislaus’ readiness for religious war at the Habsburg court in Vienna. 
Hungary had protected the rest of Christianity as a ‘shield and forewall’ from 
the incessant Ottoman attacks for over a hundred years. Therefore, following 
in this tradition of his predecessors on the Hungarian throne, Vladislaus felt it 
to be no less than his duty to launch an anti-Turkish crusade. However, should 
he fail to acquire the financial resources he asked of the Habsburg Maximilian, 
this venture could only end in failure for the Jagiellonian king.28 The argument 
of the Christian antemurale and the offer to the Roman-German king to join a 
Hungarian led ‘cruciata’ as a ‘concapitaneus’ were linked, as in the other examples 
described above, to precise pecuniary claims. Furthermore, the Jagiellonian 
bulwark rhetoric had one further additional effect, in that it introduced this 
motif into the inner-dynastic discourse of the Habsburgs. The instructions of 
Emperor Frederick III and his son Maximilian in the summer of 1493 to the 
Habsburg diplomats sent to the Pope to procure support for a crusade against 
the Ottomans provide an interesting example in this respect. For their part, the 
Habsburgs demanded both financial as well as military aid from the Holy See 
and other Christian rulers. In so doing, Frederick and Maximilian spread the 
bulwark allegory to the Habsburg dominion: the heavy raids and incursions by 
25  Ferdo Šišić (ed.), ‘Rukovet spomenika o hercegu Ivanišu Korvinu i o borbama Hrvata s 
Turcima (1473–1496)’, pt. 1, Starine 37 (1934), 189–344, here 388., no. 96.
26  Ibid., , p.389., no. 96.: ‘Nam si arcem illam regnum hoc ammittet, facile postea hostis ille ad viscera 
regni penetrabit facileque omnia sue dicioni subiiciet; quod si fiet, non video certe, quo tandem muro et 
clipeo catholica ecclesia et plebs christiana in hac orbi sparte defensabitur.’
27  Ibid., p.388–389., no. 96.: ‘Ego vero, pater beatissime, tametsi in hoc principio mee assumpcionis, non 
possum non magnopere moveri et ex visceribus turbari, tanta hostis potencia totque eventuris periculis, 
tamen pro virili mea et relicta facultate regni huius rebus fidei et religionis catholice non deero, sed me 
tanto hosti cum dei auxilio opponam et per hos dies, scuto fidei munitus, contra illum proficiscar.’
28  RI XIV, 1,1-2.16., no. 141.
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the Ottomans, it warned, these ‘illusiores et hostes domini nostri Jesu Christi et 
sue sancte sedis’, would increase day by day. Interestingly the ‘terras et dominia 
hereditaria’ of the Habsburgs are described in the letter as a part of a Christian 
defensive belt against the Ottomans. Together with Hungary they constitute 
the ‘clipei et antemuralia christianitatis’. Hence, the Hungarian requests for help 
bound to financial demands were adopted by the Habsburgs, extended through 
their own bulwark topoi, cleverly utilized for their particular material interests 
and passed on to a further authority of Latin Christianity, that is the Pope.29 
The gradual consolidation of this antemurale discourse (and the simultaneous 
displacement of older defensio fidei motifs) in diplomatic correspondences 
between the Jagiellonians, the Holy See – as well as Venice – and, to a lesser 
extent, the Habsburgs at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was also 
reflected in the papal replies. In the course of Alexander VI’s repeated calls for a 
crusade in September 1500 Adriano Castellesi, papal secretary and humanistic 
writer, flatteringly praised Vladislaus as a ruler dedicated solely to piety and full 
of religious zeal. Like no other, he would fit these qualities to the Hungarian 
throne, for this kingdom had always been the ‘forewall of Christianity’. The Holy 
See put all their hopes of the ‘defence and protection of the Christians from the 
Turks’ in him.30 Similar phrases had already been used by Alexander himself 
in June of the same year, when he tried to convince the French King Louis 
XII to participate in an anti-Turkish campaign led by the Hungarians, who, 
adjacent to the fierce Muslim world, were ‘propugnaculum quoddam et antemurale 
Christianitatis in ea parte.’31 
In both the Polish and the Hungarian cases, the Jagiellonian use of the 
bulwark topoi around 1500 needs to be regarded in the context of a European-
wide antemurale discourse at that time. Beside the Jagiellonians and the 
papacy, both the Habsburgs, as mentioned above, and Venice in particular used 
the bulwark motif as an important part of panegyric self-presentation. The 
hereditary Habsburg lands were often described by Austrian propaganda in 
29  DRTA V,1,1, no. 1, p. 91.: DRTA, V,1.91., no 1.
30  Letter dated September 28 1500, printed in Sanuto, col. 957-959: ‘Sed cum potentia, robore 
militum, situ ac positione, regnum istud semper christianorum antemurale ac præsidium fuerit, in tua 
majestate, quæ suos antecessores reges pietate ac religione non solum æquat sed facile antecellit, spes omni 
nostra in re hac sita ac locata consistit.’
31  Letter dated June 30 1500: Ibid., col. 436-437: ‘Nos itaque videntes regem illum ac pannonias 
gentes turcis ipsis confines esse propugnaculum quoddam et antemurale christianitatis in e aparte et ad 
turchas disturbandos maxime opportunas, decrevimus statim cum ipsis venerabilibus fratribus nostris 
ad majestatem tuam scribere, et ad eam de tota rerum summa et societatis conficiendæ rationem referre.’ 
Same rhetoric towards the French king can be found in Alexander’s letter from June 1 1500: RI 
XIV, 3,2.863., no. 14160. 
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the Late Middle Ages as ‘schilt der cristenheyt’, i. e. ‘shield of Christianity’.32 At 
the same time, numerous examples of the propagation of the antemurale sta-
tus through the Venetian Signoria can also be found. The maritime republic 
continually emphasized its contribution ‘ad propugnationem sancte ecclesie et 
nominis christiani.’33 Playing with the Turkish threat, the Venetians, for instance, 
wrote to Pope Alexander VI in late summer 1500 about the supposed fragility of 
the ‘Venetian forewall’: ‘Fractum est ac dissipatum antemurale illud, quod infidelium 
rabiem a Christianis ceruicibus auertebat; quod Italiam ipsam ab eorum impetu tutam 
securamque reddebat.’34 
During the Italian Wars of the Renaissance in particular, the bulwark 
argument was established as a widespread motive of diplomatic speech. 
Superficially considered as an allegory for the states fighting the Ottomans, in 
a time of changing coalitions fighting for superiority in Italy it soon became a 
welcome rhetorical tool for pursuing one’s own dynastic interests and gained 
currency not only in the afore mentioned courts in Cracow, Buda, Venice, 
Vienna and Rome, but also in Paris, and even in London.35 The examples from 
1500 listed above, in which Pope Alexander VI pointed out to the French king 
Hungary’s importance as a Christian outpost, the Signoria complained about 
the menacing condition of their ‘crumbling forewall’, and Jan Łaski stylized, 
in the name of John Albert, both Poland and Venice as antemuralia of Latin 
Christianity, mirror these efforts to form an alliance under the guise of an anti-
Turkish crusade. In this, both the Holy See and Venice played an important 
role as communication centres of European defence against the Ottomans and 
32  DRTA VI.747., no. 120. See: Christina Lutter, Selbstbilder und Fremdwahrnehmung 
des habsburgischen Kaisertums um 1500 am Beispiel der venezianisch-maximilianischen 
diplomatischen Kommunikation, in Heinz Duchhardt and Matthias Schnettger (eds.), 
Reichsständische Libertät und habsburgisches Kaisertum, Mainz 1999 (Veröffentlichungen des 
Instituts für Europäische Geschichte Mainz. Beiheft, 48), pp.25–42.
33  Ferdo Šišić (ed.), ‘Rukovet spomenika o hercegu Ivanišu Korvinu i o borbama Hrvata s 
Turcima (1473–1496)’, pt. 2, Starine 38 (1937), 1–180, here 16–17., no. 121. 
34  Letter dated September 9 1500: Sanuto, col. 750. According to Sanuto similar appeals ‘ad 
tutellam et propugnationem nominis Christiani’ were sent at the same time to Maximilian I, Francis 
I of France, the Catholic Monarchs of Spain, Vladislaus II, John I Albert, James IV of Scotland, 
Henry VII of England, Manuel I of Portugal, Frederic I of Naples, Philip I of Castile and the 
electors of the Holy Roman Empire.
35  Srodecki 2015, 255–262.
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– depending on the international political climate – followed the Jagiellonians 
in propagating bulwark ideas in the rest of the occident.36 
A potential pact between Venice and the Jagiellonian propugnacula 
established a welcome basis for the Signoria for further panegyric propaganda, as 
the mercantile republic emphatically declared itself to be the maritime rampart 
of the whole of Christiandom. A cooperation with the land bulwarks of Poland 
and Hungary could only strengthen this image. After all, of all the Christian 
countries praising themselves as defenders of the Christian world, it was only 
Venice who was actually engaged in real conflict with the Ottomans at the end 
of the fifteenth century – a conflict that finally led to the loss of several bases in 
Greece.37 Besides Venice it was especially the Roman Curia under Alexander VI 
which eagerly endeavoured to include the Jagiellonians into the Holy League 
(which around 1500 was directed against the Habsburgs). Alexander’s poli-
cy towards Italy aimed at the establishment of his own dynasty, and his fairly 
close relationship to Bayezid II casts doubts upon the seriousness of the pope’s 
crusade plans of the 1490s. At that time, the Borgia was regularly receiving 
a significant annual payment from Constantinople for Bayezid’s brother Cem, 
the pope’s Turkish hostage, and he secretly avoided joining any real campaigns 
against the Ottomans.38 In their correspondences they often underlined their 
mutual amity and willingness to help each other, most certainly following the 
French king Charles VIII’s invasion of Italy in 1494.39 
Against this background, the Borgia’s anti-Ottoman appeals of that time 
should perhaps be seen as mere rhetoric, which – as was the case with other 
36  Achille Olivieri, ‘La lettera diplomatica e l’Oriente (1507–1508). Venezia, il Sophi, il Turci’, 
in Sergio Perini and Federico Seneca (eds.), Tempi, uomini ed eventi di storia veneta. Studi in 
onore di Federico Seneca, Rovigo 2003, pp.197–208.; Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, ‘L’Italia, Venezia e 
la Porta. Diplomazia e letteratura tra umanesimo e rinascimento’, in Franziska Meier (ed.), Italien 
und das Osmanische Reich, Herne 2010, pp.57–74.
37  See: Robert Finlay, ‘Crisis and Crusade in the Mediterranean. Venice, Portugal, and the Cape 
Route to India (1498–1509)’, Studi Veneziani 28 (1994), 45–90.; Ovidiu Cristea, ‘Venise et le 
problème du concours militaire ottoman au temps du règne de Bayezid II’, in Annuario dell ’Istituto 
Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica 6 –7 (2004–5), pp. 313–319.
38  Christine Isom-verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel. The Ottoman and French Alliance in the 
Sixteenth Century, London/New York 2011 (Library of Ottoman Studies, 30), pp.82–113. 
[hereinafter: Isom-verhaaren 2011]
39  Heinrich Heidenheimer, ‘Die Correspondenz Sultan Bajazets II. mit dem Papst Alexander 
VI’, in Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 5 (1882), 511–573.; Józef Garbacik, ‘Tajne układy papieża 
Aleksandra VI z sułtanem Bajazetem II z r. 1494’, in Józef Garbacik et al. (eds.), Mediaevalia. W 
50 rocznicę pracy naukowej Jana Dąbrowskiego, Warszawa 1960, pp.319–328.; Charles A. Frazee, 
Catholics and Sultans. The Church and the Ottoman Empire 1453–1923, Cambridge 1983 (reprint 
2006), pp.18–22.; Isom-verhaaren 2011, 89. See: Christine Shaw, ‘Alexander VI and the French 
Invasion of 1494’, Iacobus 25–26 (2009), 197–222.
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Christian rulers involved in the Italian wars – sought to distract attention from 
his real political goals in Italy by means of propaganda. At the end of May 1500 
the pope issued several bulls for collecting crusade tithes in East Central Europe. 
In the old crusade tradition the Borgia granted indulgences to those who would 
take the cross or support a crusade monetarily. In fact, the money collected thereby 
was meant to finance Alexander’s own dynastic plans in the Romagna. The most 
famous of his crusade bulls was Quamvis ad amplianda from June 1st 1500. In 
his call ‘pro sancta expedition contra Turcos’ the Pope described the Jagiellonian 
dominion as a single large outpost of Latin Christianity, whose pious residents 
would fight on various fronts in the South East and East of Europe against 
the enemies of the faith. Primarily, however, it was the Jagiellonians whom 
Alexander flattered the most. He praised both brothers, Vladislaus II and John 
I Albert, as ‘tanquam validissima fidei christiane et hoc tempore tanto imminenti 
periculo oportuna propugnacula. Only they were able to lead a successful expeditio 
contra prefatos Turchos, qui validissimum exercitum terra et mari et in diversis locis 
adversus ipsos christianos preparaverunt.’40 
In a further letter, sent separately only to John Albert, Alexander more 
clearly made use of the dynastic argument, whilst underlining the panegyric 
image of the faith-defending domus Iagellonica and encouraging the Polish king 
to emulate his ancestors, ‘qui pro regni sibi commissi situ robore militarique virtute 
propugnaculum ac antemurale cristianorum adversus ipsorum Turcorum impetus 
esse consueverunt.’41 However, Alexander’s calls for an anti-Turkish crusade were 
blatantly inconsistent with his political actions, since it was he who – after 
some smaller skirmishes in the Hungarian-Ottoman border region – arranged 
a ceasefire with the Sublime Porte in October 1502 and induced both Hungary 
(February 1503) and Venice (May 1503) to do the same.42 
Even if a large-scale anti-Turkish crusade around 1500 already failed during 
the initial planning stage and in the face of the actual goals of the European 
powers in Italy, the Jagiellonians themselves, especially the Hungarian branch 
of the dynasty, did not set aside the idea of an armed campaign against the 
Ottomans. Vladislaus II, who was facing strong magnate opposition in Hungary, 
linked a prestigious crusade to the strengthening of royal power and hoped 
40  Augustin Theiner (ed.), Vetera Monumenta historica Hungariam Sacram illustrantia, Romae 
1860 (reprint Osnabrück 1968), II.548, no. 731. [hereinafter: VMHH]
41  CESDQ III.483. no. 460.
42  Krzysztof Baczkowski, ‘Próby włączenia państw jagiellońskich do koalicji antytureckich 
przez papieża Aleksandra VI na przełomie XV/XVI wieku’, Nasza Przeszłość. Studia z dziejów 
Kościoła i kultury katolickiej w Polsce 81 (1994), pp. 5–50, here 46–49; Smołucha 1999, pp. 91ff.; 
Andrzej Dziubiński, ‘Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko-tureckie w latach 1500–1572 w kontekście 
międzynarodowym’, Wrocław 2005 (= Monografie na rzecz nauki polskiej), pp. 11ff.
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thereby to divert attention from internal political tensions. His efforts finally led 
to the intended crusade of 1514 which eventually ended in a peasant revolt led by 
György Dózsa. Remarkably, both in the run-up to and during this unfortunate 
campaign, both Vladislaus and the Holy See under Pope Leo X propagated the 
bulwark image of Hungary and the Jagiellonians. Once again, the Jagiellonian 
lands in Hungary and Poland were described as one large ‘bulwark’ defending 
the rest of Europe from Ottomans, Tatars and Muscovites.43 
The bulwark motive also played an important role in the inner-dynastic 
communication between Vladislaus and his youngest brother Sigismund, and 
served to strengthen the so-called ‘Jagiellonian idea’.44 In a letter from 1512, 
for instance, the latter reminded the Hungarian cardinal and archbishop of 
Esztergom Tamás Bakócz of the status of Hungary and Poland as antemuralia.45 
This view of a Jagiellonian bulwark dominion was also propagated externally 
under Sigismund. A remarkable example of this self-description is Wawrzyniec 
Międzyleski’s memorandum Descriptio potentie Turcie, which the diplomat 
announced in September 1514 in Rome. Beside the epideictic praising of 
his master, whom he described as ‘velut antemurale Christianorum’ against the 
unbelievers and schismatics, Międzyleski presented the picture of a defensive 
belt consisting of Poland, Hungary and Lithuania, protecting the Holy Roman 
Empire in particular from destruction at the hands of the enemies of the faith.46 
The years between the failed György Dózsa uprising of 1514 and the battle of 
43  VMHH II.594f, no. 800.; Victor Kenéz and László Solymosi (eds.), Monumenta rusticorum 
in Hungaria rebellium anno MDXIV, Budapest 1979 (Magyar Országos Levéltár Kiadványai, 
II. Forráskiadványok, 12), pp.28-32, 36-37., no. 1-2. and 6., See: Péter E. Kovács, ‘Ungarn im 
Spätmittelalter (1328–1526)‘, in István György Tóth (ed.), Geschichte Ungarns, Budapest 2005, 
pp. 145–223., here 217.; János M. Bak, Königtum und Stände in Ungarn im 14.–16. Jahrhundert, 
Wiesbaden 1973 (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, 6), p.69; Leopold 
Kupelwieser, Die Kämpfe Ungarns mit den Osmanen bis zur Schlacht bei Mohács, 1526, Wien/
Leipzig18992, p.196.
44  Baczkowski 1997a.
45  AT II.  no. 17. p 13.; AT II.13., no. 17.
46  AT III. 170., no. 230.: ‘Qui quidem Turca per ipsos utriusque colonie Tartaros debilitat loca, que 
invadere vult, deinde electos mittit Turcas, qui reliquum explent, aut devastando aut occupando, quo 
pacto contra predicta regna et Valachiam procedere consuevit, ac contra Germaniam jam diu processisset, 
si Poloni, Lithuani et Hungari eisdem Turcis et Tartaris non resisterent ac feliciter regnante Ser. 
Rege Sigismundo aliquotiens non essent acriter profligati.’ See: Jan Maćkowiak, ‘Wawrzyniec 
Międzyleski jako autor memoriału pt. “Desxriptio potentie Turcie” o Tatarach krymskich z 
1514 roku’, in Grzegorz Błaszczyk and Artur Kijas (eds.), Litwa i jej sąsiedzi od XII do XX 
wieku. Studia oferowane Jerzemu Ochmańskiemu w sześćdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, Poznań 1994, 
pp.87–94; Wojciech Hensel and Barbara Majewska, ‘Turcja’, in Julian Krzyżanowski and 
Czesław Hernas (eds.), Literatura polska. Przewodnik encyklopedyczny, Warszawa 1990, II. p.106.; 
Krzysztof Baczkowski, Międzyleski Wawrzyniec h. Jastrzębiec, Polski Słownik Biograficzny 31 
(1976), 45–47.
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Mohács in 1526 are characterized by a lively diplomatic interaction between 
the Jagiellonian courts in Cracow and Buda (respectively Prague). Here, once 
again, the Turkish threat and the invocation of the Jagiellonian bulwark topoi 
were the most important issues. Although the Hungarian defeat at Mohács and 
the war which followed between János Zapolya and the Habsburgs signalled the 
falling apart of the medieval kingdom of Hungary, the bulwark picture survived 
in Hungarian society – as it also did in Poland following the dying out of the 
dynasty in 1572. 
Regardless of the dynastic cooperation in the diffusion of the Jagiellonian 
bulwark images, the internal reception of this rhetoric differed greatly between 
Poland and Hungary. As early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, the 
Hungarian nobility, the ‘nemesség’, started to adopt the antemurale topos for 
their own purposes – partly to gain increased prestige, partly to gain political 
advantages. István Werbőczy clarified this new aristocratic self-confidence like 
no other in his Tripartitum opus iuris consuetudinarii inclyti regni Hungariae, 
which was presented at an assembly in Buda 1514 and first printed in Vienna 
three years later. Werbőczy equated the nemesség with the Hungarian people and 
emphasized its role in defending Christendom – without mentioning the king 
or the ruling Jagiellonian dynasty: 
‘Thereafter [after the conversion to Christianity] no country or people (I say 
ungrudgingly) guarded more determinedly or more constantly the protection and 
expansion of the Christian commonwealth than the Hungarians. Being well trained 
through many hard-fought battles against the barbarous Mohammedan pest, they 
have for more than a hundred and forty years (not counting earlier times) time and 
time again in attack and counterattack waged to their enormous credit the bloodiest 
wars against the savage Turks. They kept the rest of Christendom safe and unharmed 
at the cost of their blood, life and wounds (lest the enemy’s rage flood further as across 
broken levees), with such courage and natural vigour that they virtually lived under 
arms.’47
47  István Werbőczy, Tripartitum opus iuris consuetudinarii inclyti regni Hungariae, ed. János M. 
Bak et al., Budapest/Idyllwild 2005 (The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, 5), pp.12-
13: ‘Nec gens aliqua postmodum aut natio (absit invidia verbo) pro reipublicæ Christianę tutela & 
propagatione acrius aut constantius ipsis Hungaris excubuit. Qui cum omni Machometicæ fœditatis 
barbariæ in variss ancipitisbusque preliis diu ac multum cum ingenti sua laude versati & (ut vetustiora 
præteram) annos circiter centum supra quadraginta nunc oppugnantes, nunc repugnantes cum immanibus 
Thurcis cruentissima bella gessere. Et per eorum sanguinem, cędes ac vulnera reliquam Christianitatem 
(ne hostilis rabies velut fractis obicibus remotius sese effunderet) tutam icolumnemque reddiderunt, ea 
fortitudine roboraque naturæ ut plerumque in armis vitam degerent.’
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A similar development cannot be found among the szlachta, until the second 
half of the sixteenth century. However, in Poland the adoption of the bulwark 
rhetoric by the nobles was to have a major effect in the long run, and the szlachta’s 
perception of themselves – rather than of the current ruler – as a Christian 
forewall was to belong to the ideological fundaments of the Rzeczpospolita 
Obojga Narodów, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.48 




Die moldauische Politik der Jagiellonen
Katarzyna Niemczyk
Ein Paar Bemerkungen zur moldauischen Politik der Jagiellonen 
an der Wende des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts
Die Frage der Moldau war einer der wichtigsten Aspekte der polnischen 
Außenpolitik an der Wende des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts. Diese war aber von 
vielen Faktoren abhängig, unter anderem von den Relationen zur Türkei, aber 
auch zu anderen Nachbarstaaten, sowie von der Innenpolitik des Königs. Das 
beste Beispiel dafür ist die Änderung der moldauischen Politik während der 
Regierungszeit von Johannes Albrecht und Alexander. Das Ziel dieser Artikel 
ist ein paar Bemerkungen über Johannes Albrecht und dessen moldauische 
Politik geben und weiterhin auch erklären, warum die Politik während der 
Regierungszeit des Alexanders geändert wurde.
Johannes Albrecht befand sich unter einem starken Einfluss von Filippo 
Buonaccorsi und wollte um jeden Preis den Krieg gegen die Türkei führen.1 Das 
war sein großes Ziel und diesem unterordnete er seine Politik. Er bemühte sich, 
die Koalition gegen die Türkei zu bauen und nachdem dies nicht zum Stande 
1  Jan Krukowski, ‘Jan Długosz jako wychowawca synów Kazimierza Jagiellończyka’ [ Johannes 
Dlugossius als Tutor den Söhnen des Kazimir IV] Rozprawy z dziejów oświaty 23 (1980), 11.; Józef 
Garbacik, ‘Jan Olbracht’ [ Johannes Albrecht], in Mieczysław Horoch und Paweł Jarosiński 
(eds.), Polski Słownik Biograficzny, (1962–1964), X. 405–6.; Józef Garbacik, ‘Kallimach jako 
dyplomata i polityk’ [Philippus Callimachus als Diplomat und Politiker], Rozprawy Wydziału 
Historyczno - Filozoficznego Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności Serie 2, 46:4 (1948), 37–9, 46.; Janusz 
Smołucha, ‘Kilka uwag na temat wyprawy czarnomorskiej Jana Olbrachta w 1497 r.’ [Ein paar 
Bemerkungen zur Expedition von Johannes Albrecht in der Jahre 1497], Studia Historyczne 40:3 
(1997), 413. [Weiterhin: Smołucha 1997]; Fryderyk Papée, Jan Olbracht [ Johannes Albrecht], 
Kraków 1936, p.63. [Weiterhin: Papée 1936]; Olgierd Górka, ‘Białogród i Kilia a wyprawa 
czarnomorska 1497 r.’ [Akkerman und Kilia sowie Die Frage der Schwarzes See - Expedition aus 
dem Jahr 1497], Sprawozdania z posiedzeń Towarzystwa Naukowego Warszawskiego [Bericht aus 
dem Treffen des Wissenschaftsvereines in Warschau] 25 (1932), 68. [Weiterhin: Górka 1932]
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gekommen war, entschied er sich dafür, das Problem alleine zu lösen.2 Vor allem 
wollte er Kilia/Kilya und Akkerman/Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi erobern. Ihm war 
es aber klar, dass in diesem Plan auch die Moldau in Rücksicht genommen wer-
den muss. Der kämpferische König wollte also auch die Sache der Moldau mit 
Hilfe von Gewalt lösen. Ein Beispiel dafür: das Treffen in Levoča.3 Laut Liborius 
Naker gab es ‘Gerüchte’, dass dem polnischen König die Expedition gegen die 
Türkei auch dazu dienen sollte, für seinen Bruder – Sigismund den Thron in 
2  Johannes Albrecht bemühte sich sehr darum, den Kaiser Maximilian zu dieser Idee zu 
gewinnen. Der war aber mit dem Kampf gegen die Schweizer beschäftigt und hatte für den 
Krieg gegen die Türkei keine Lust. An Landtagen in Freiburg, Worms und Köln, führten Mikolaj 
aus Rozenberg und Watzenrode Gespräche in dieser Sache im Namen des polnischen Königs, 
Siehe: Teki Naruszewicza in Czartoryski Bibliothek in Krakau [Weiterhinhin: TN] 23, s. 815–
28 = Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych in Warschau [Weiterhin: AGAD], Libri Legationum 
[Weiterhin: LL] 22, k. 332–5.; Józef Garbacik (Hrsg.), Materiały do dziejów dyplomacji polskiej z 
lat 1486–1516 (Kodeks Zagrzebski) [Materiellen zur Geschichte der polnischen Diplomatie aus den 
Jahren 1486–1516 - so genannte Zagrzebski Gesetzbuch], Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków 1966, no. 
26. [Weiterhin: Garbacik 1966]; Krzysztof Baczkowski, ‘Europa wobec problemu tureckiego w 
latach 1493–1495’ [Europa gegenüber der osmanischen Gefahr in der Jahren 1493–1495], Studia 
Historyczne 40:3 (1997), 518–9, 521–2. [Weiterhin: Baczkowski 1997]; Hermann Wiesflecker, 
Kaiser Maximilian I. Das Reich, Österreich, und Europa an der Wende zu Neuzeit, München 1975, 
II. pp.157–8, 297, 299–305.; Heinrich Ulmann, Kaiser Maximilian I auf urkundlicher Grundlage 
dargestellt, Stuttgart 1891, II. pp.603, 623–4.; Johannes Albrecht vorbereitete sich auch auf dem 
Krieg gegen die Türkei. Er schickte polnischen Bote: Mikolaj Strzyżowski nach Konstantinopel 
und forderte vom Sultan die Tataren aus dem Bereich von Akkerman zurückzuziehen ( Józef 
Szujski (Hrsg.), Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, Kraków 1876, I. p.444. [Weiterhin: Szujski 
1876]. Da die Forderung unmöglich zur Realisierung war, diente die eher dazu einen Vorwand zu 
bekommen, gegen die Türkei kämpfen zu dürfen. Krzeslaw von Kurozweki wurde hingegen zum 
Stefan der Große geschickt um ihn zum gemeinsamen Krieg gegen der Türkei zu überzeugen 
( Johannes Pistorius, Polonicae Historiae Corpus hoc est, Polonicarum rerum Latini recentiores et 
veteres scriptores, quotquot extant, uno volumine comprehaensi omnes, et in aliquot distributi Tomos, 
Basileae 1582, II. p.240. [Weiterhin: Pistorius 1582]; Bernard Wapowski, ‘Kroniki Bernarda 
Wapowskiego część ostatnia, czasy podługoszowe obejmująca (1480–1535)’ [Die Chroniken von 
Bernard Wapowski aus der Jahren 1480–1525], in J. Szujski (hrsg.), Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum, 
Kraków 1874, II. pp.22–5.) [Weiterhin: Wapowski 1874]. Siehe auch: Ilona Czamańska, 
Mołdawia i Wołoszczyzna wobec Polski, Węgier i Turcji w XIV i XV wieku [Moldau und Walachei 
gegenüber Polen, Ungarn und der Türkei in 14. Und 15. Jahrhundert], Poznań 1996, pp.167, 174–
5. [Weiterhin: Czamańska 1996]; Papée 1936, 127–8.; Górka 1932, 70–1.; Wojciech Kujawski, 
Krzesław z Kurozwęk jako wielki kanclerz koronny i biskup wrocławski [Krzeslaw von Kurozweki als 
Kanzler und Breslauer Bischof ], Warszawa 1987, p.73.; Stanisław Tarnowski , Żywot i śmierć 
Jana Tarnowskiego kasztelana krakowskiego i hetmana wielkiego koronnego [Das Leben und der Tod 
von Johannes Tarnowski: Krakauer Kastellan und Großhetman der polnischen Krone], Sanok 
1855, p.41.
3  Mehr zu diesem Thema schrieb ich in der Artikel: Katarzyna Niemczyk, ‘Moldau in polnischen 
und ungarischen Politik. Das Treffen in Levoca 1494’, Codrul Cosminului, 21:1 (2015), 101–14. 
[Weiterhin: Niemczyk 2015]
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Moldau zu gewinnen.4 Wenn man das Benehmen des Stefans des Großen 
während des Krieges 1497 analysiert, dann kann man vermuten, dass in diesen 
‘Gerüchten’ nicht alles falsch war.5 In solchem Plan müsste ja auch der derzeiti-
gen moldauischen Hospodar eine Rolle spielen. Es gibt auch Vermutungen, dass 
Johannes Albrecht den Stefan den Großen dazu zwingen wollte, gemeinsame 
Expedition gegen die Türkei zu führen. Falls er diese Angebote ablehnen würde 
(was fast sicher war), hätte Albrecht einen guten Vorwand, um seinen Staat 
anzugreifen.6 Diese Ideen stoßen jedoch auf Wiederspruch des Wladislaus II. 
4  Max Töppen (hrsg.), ‘Liborius Naker’s Tagebuch, über den Kriegszug des Hochmeisters Johann 
v. Tiefen gegen die Türken im Jahre 1497’, in Theodor Hirsch et al. (Hrsg.), Scriptores Rerum 
Prussicarum, Bd. 5 (1874), V. p.312.; über solches Vorhaben erwähnt auch Marcin Kromer, 
Kronika polska Marcina Kromera biskupa warmińskiego ksiąg XXX dotąd w trzech językach, a 
mianowicie w łacińskim, polskim i niemieckim wydana, na język polski z łacińskiego przełożona przez 
Marcina z Błażowa Błażowskiego i wydana w Krakowie w drukarni M. Loba r. 1611., Sanok 1857, 
p.1328. [Weiterhin: Kromer 1857]
5  Ein Beispiel dafür bildet das Verhalten des Wladislaus II. Der ungarische König gab zwar 
seine Zustimmung für die Übernahme der Kilia und Akkermann durch Polen und Litauen, 
unterstrich aber deutlich, dass es keine Rede vom Krieg gegen den moldauischen Hospodar 
sein darf. Warum sollte er das machen, wenn sein Bruder die oben gemeinten Vorhaben nicht 
gehabt hätte? Außerdem, verpflichtete der ungarische König sogar Johannes Albrecht dazu, jeden 
Schritt gegen Kilia und Akkerman mit dem Stefan dem Großen absprechen zu müssen, Siehe: 
Pistorius 1582, 240.; Garbacik 1966, 25., no. 13.; Szujski 1876, III., no. 446. – dort gibt es die 
Korrespondenz zwischen Johannes Albrecht und Wladislaus II.; Siehe auch: Papée 1936, 66.; 
Zdzisław Spieralski, ‘Die Jagiellonische Verbundenheit bis zum Ende des 15. Jahrhundert’, Acta 
Poloniae – Historica 41 (1980), 80. [Weiterhin: Spieralski 1980]; Id., ‘Po klęsce bukowińskiej 
1497 roku. Pierwsze najazdy Turków na Polskę’. [Nach der Niederlage in Kozmin 1497. Erste 
türkische Angriffe auf Polen], Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości 9:1 (1963), 46. [Weiterhin: 
Spieralski 1963]; Smołucha 1997, 413–4.; Górka 1932, 69.; Fryderyk Papée, ‘Zagadnienia 
Olbrachtowej wyprawy z 1497 r.’ [Die Frage der Expedition aus dem Jahr 1497], Kwartalnik 
Historyczny 47:1 (1933), 19–20. [Weiterhin: Papée 1933]; Papée 1936, 68–70.; Baczkowski 
1997, 314, 320–322.; Zygmunt Wojciechowski, Zygmunt Stary (1506–1548) [Sigismund I. 
(1506–1548)], Warszawa 1979, pp.78–9. [Weiterhin: Wojciechowski 1979]; Olgierd Górka, 
‘Nieznany żywot Bajezida II źródłem dla wyprawy czarnomorskiej i najazdów Turków za Jana 
Olbrachta’ [Unbekannte Lebensgeschichte des Bayezids II. als die Quelle zur Geschichte des 
Schwarzes See - Expedition und türkischen Angriffe während der Regierungszeit des Johannes 
Albrecht], Kwartalnik Historyczny 52 (1938), 399. [Weiterhin: Górka 1938]
6  Janusz Smołucha, Papiestwo a Polska w latach 1484–1526. Kontakty dyplomatyczne na tle 
zagrożenia tureckiego [Papstamt und Polen in der Jahren 1484–1526. Diplomatische Kontakten 
während der Zeit der osmanischen Gefahr], Kraków 1999, p.63.; Spieralski 1963, 46.; 
Smołucha 1997, 413–4.; Marek Plewczyński, Wojny Jagiellonów z wschodnimi i południowymi 
sąsiadami Królestwa Polskiego w XV wieku [Die Kriege der Jagiellonen gegen die Ost- und Südost 
Nachbarstaaten im 15. Jahrhundert], Siedlce 2002, p.131. [Weiterhin: Plewczyński 2002]; 
Anatol Lewicki, ‘Król Jan Olbracht. O klęsce bukowińskiej 1497 r’ [König Johannes Albrecht. 
Über die Niederlage in Kozmin 1497], Kwartalnik Historyczny 7 (1893), 1–15.
80
Katarzyna Niemczyk
und wurden abgelehnt.7 Die lösten trotzdem große Probleme aus. Alle Ideen aus 
Levoča sollten zwar streng geheim bleiben, jedoch nahm der Freund von Stefan 
dem Großem: Bartolomeus Drágffy de Belthewk an dem Treffen teil und als er 
die Pläne des polnischen Königs kennenlernte, entschied er sich dafür, seinem 
Freund davon zu benachrichtigen.8 Seit dieser Zeit reagierte der moldauische 
Herrscher sehr misstrauisch gegenüber jeder polnischen Bewegung.9 Ob man 
der Krieg gegen Moldau jedoch als Hauptziel der Expedition 1497 nennen darf, 
lässt sich streiten. Meiner Meinung nach, wollte Johannes Albrecht hauptsäch-
lich gegen die Türkei kämpfen und die Sache der Moldau gelegentlich lösen. 
Es wurde ja ein polnische Bote: Mikolaj Strzyżowski nach Konstantinopel ge-
schlickt um zu fordern die Tataren aus dem Bereich von Akkerman zurückzu-
ziehen.10 Diese Forderung war so unrealistisch, dass die eher als Vorwand dienen 
sollte, um die Türkei angreifen zu können.11 Wenn Johannes Albrecht nur gegen 
der Moldau kämpfen wollte, warum würde er so etwas machen und dadurch die 
Relationen zur starken Türkei so verschlechtern?12
Während des Krieges 1497 probierte Johannes Albrecht noch den moldau-
ischen Hospodar: Stefan den Großen, zur Zusammenarbeit zu zwingen und 
griff Sucava/Suceava an, jedoch ohne Erfolg. Zum Schluss erlitt er (1497) große 
7  Pistorius 1582, 240.; Garbacik 1966, 25., no. 13.; Spieralski 1980, 80.; Spieralski 1963, 
46.; Smołucha 1997, 413–4.; Górka 1932, 69.; Papée 1933, 19–20.; Papée 1936, 68–70.; 
Baczkowski 1997, 314, 320–2.; Wojciechowski 1979, 78–79.
8  Diese Vermutungen ergeben sich daraus, dass Stefan der Große auf jeden Fall von die Pläne 
des Johannes Albrechts wusste, also musste ihn jemand, der am Treffen in Levoča teilgenommen 
hatte, darüber benachrichtigen. Von daher gibt es Vorschlagen, dass es der Drágffy sein musste. 
Kromer 1857, 1328., erwähnt zum Beispiel, dass Stefan der Große vom ‘Boten’ und ‘ungarischem 
Adel’ vor Albrechts Pläne gewarnt wurde.
9  Szujski 1876, no. 427.; Spieralski 1963, 47.; Smołucha 1997, 414.; Górka 1938, 400.; 
Papée 1936, 67.; Lucjan Fac, ‘Południowo - wschodni teatr działań wojennych w latach 1497–
1509’ [Kriegerische Handlungen auf der Südöstliche Grenzen in der Jahren 1497–1509], Rocznik 
Przemyski 43:1 (2007), 62. [Weiterhin: Fac 2007]
10  Szujski 1876, III. 444.; Czamańska 1996, 167.; Smołucha 1997, 415.
11  Solche Vermutungen hatte schon Czamańska 1996, 167.; Johannes Albrecht lehnte auch den 
Vorschlag des Mehmeds (Sohn von Sultan) ab, was seine Vermittlung zwischen Mengli Girej und 
Litauer betraf, siehe: Czamańska 1996, 168.
12  Mehr zu diesem Thema: Niemczyk 2015, 101–14.
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Niederlage bei Kozmin.13 Nach der Niederlage war Johannes Albrecht total nie-
dergeschlagen. Seine Ziele und Ideen die er so stark verfolgte, wurden zerstört. 
Sogar sein Bruder Friderik appellierte an Johannes Albrecht, damit er seine 
Kräfte sammelte, weil er ja ein König sei und die Verantwortung für den Staat 
trage. Frederik bat auch die Mutter darum, damit sie ihren Sohn ermahnte.14 
Das war umso wichtiger, dass nach diesem Krieg ein neues Problem ins Licht 
kam. Das war die Frage des Pokutiens. Es war ein Gebiet, das zwischen Polen 
und Moldau lag. Es war kein neues Problem jedoch erst nach der Schlacht bei 
Kozmin gewann es an Bedeutung. Schon im Jahre 1388 lieh Wladislaus Jagiello 
– damaliger König von Polen – von moldauischen Hospodar das Geld, das er 
für den Krieg gegen die Kreuzritter brauchte, dafür verpfändete er Pokutien.15 
Das Geld wurde aber nicht zurückgezahlt16. Deswegen betonte Moldau immer 
wieder seine Rechte auf Pokutien. Erst aber nach der Allianz 1499 ist Stefan der 
Große stark genug geworden um das Gebiet zurück zu fordern.17 Während der 
13  Ioan Bogdan (Hrsg.), ‘Letopiseţul dela Bistriţa 1359–1506’, in Cronice inedite atingătoarede 
istoria romînilor, Bucureşti 1895 (sog. Bystrzycki Chronik) p.60.; Wapowski 1874, p.116., gab das 
falsche Datum der Schlacht bei Kozmin: 17 Oktober. Das erklärte aber schon O. Górka; Siehe: 
Górka 1932, 74–6.; Górka 1938, 405–9.; mehr zu diesem Thema, siehe.: Plewczyński 2002, 
140–148.; Spieralski 1963, 52–3.; Emil Fischer, Koźmin, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des polnisch-
moldauischen Konflikts 1497, Berlin 1903, pp.14–5.; Fac 2007, 62.; J. Demel, Die Geschichte des 
Rumäniens, Wrocław 1986, p.137. 
14  Bibliothek PAN in Kórnik - Polen, rkps 207, k. 62v–63v.; Papée 1936, 150.; Natalia 
Nowakowska, Królewski kardynał. Studium kariery Fryderyka Jagiellończyka (1468–1503) 
[Königlicher Kardinal. Zur Kariere des Friedrichs Jagiellon] Kraków 2011, p. 59.
15  Außer Pokutien wurde auch halicki - Gebiet verpfänden: Володимир Poзoв, Українські 
грамоти, Kиїві 1928, I., no. 19.; es wurde letztendlich nicht 4000 Rubel sondern 3000 geliehen, 
siehe. Vladimir Antonovič Uljanickij (Hrsg.), Materiały dla istorii vzaimnych otnošenij Rossii, 
Polši, Moldavii, Valachii i Turcii v XIV–XVI w, Moskwa 1887, no. 3. [Weiterhin: Uljanickij 
1887]; Czamańska 1996, 57, 145.
16  Uljanickij 1887, no. 13, 22.; Antoni Borzemski, ‘Sprawa pokucka za Aleksandra’ [Das 
Problem des Pokutiens unter der Regierung von Alexander], Przegląd Powszechny 24:10 (1889), 
173. [Weiterhin: Borzemski 1889]; 1400 Iwan - der nächste moldauische Herrscher betonte, 
dass Wladislaus Jagiello immer noch verschuldet ist; 1411 hatte Wladislaus Jagiello schon 1000 
Rubel Schuld und verpflichtete sich, dass er diese Summe in zwei Jahren zurückzahlt. 
17  Aleksander Walerian Jabłonowski, Sprawy wołoskie za Jagiellonów: akta i listy [Die Probleme 
der Walachei in der Zeit der Jagiellonen. Akten und Briefe. Akten der polnischen Krone], Warszawa 
1878, no. 23. [Weiterhin: Jabłonowski 1878]; Zdzisław Spieralski, ‘Z dziejów wojen polsko - 
mołdawskich. Sprawa pokucka do wstąpienia na tron Zygmunta I.’ [Zur Geschichte der polnisch- 
moldauischen Kriege. Das Problem des Pokutiens bis zum Regierungsantritte des Sigismund 
I.], Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, 11:1 (1965), 77–9. [Weiterhin: Spieralski 1965]; 
Spieralski 1963, 58.; Johann Nistor, ‘Die Moldauischen Ansprüche auf Pokutien’, Wien 1910 
(in: Archiv für österreichischen Geschichte, Bd. 101, 1), p.58. [Weiterhin: Nistor 1910] - der Autor 
war überzeugt, dass schon damals Pokutien an Moldau angeschlossen wurde.
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Regierungszeit des Johannes Albrecht wurde das Problem jedoch nicht gelöst. 
Am 17. Juni 1501 kam der König ums Leben.18 
Diese Sache wurde also seinem Nachfolger Alexander gelassen. Er änderte 
aber deutlich die polnische Politik gegenüber der Türkei und demzufolge auch 
gegen Moldau. Der König machte das aus verschiedenen Gründen, die ich hier 
kurz darstelle. 
Dadurch dass Alexander den polnischen Thron übernahm, wurde Polen 
in den Konflikt zwischen Litauen und Moskau verwickelt. Das forderte von 
Polen ein großes Engagement sowohl aus der politischen, als auch aus der mi-
litärischen Sicht. Der König musste ja viel Zeit in Litauen verbringen, dar-
über hinaus wurde Polen dazu verpflichtet, die Militärkräfte oder zumindest 
das Geld nach Litauen zu schicken. Jedoch hatte Polen schon damals große 
Probleme mit eigener Armee und mit der Verteidigung eigener Grenzen. Das 
war kein neues Problem, doch wegen dieser neuen Situation und wegen der 
neuen Herausforderungen vergrößerte es sich riesig. Ich gebe ein paar Beispiele 
von Problemen der polnischen Armee um die Situation von Aleksander besser 
darstellen zu können. 
Damalige militärische Lage Polens war wegen der Verteidigungsorganisation 
sehr problematisch. Der sogenannte Volkssturm war schon damals sehr ineffi-
zient, und die Adligen verweigerten sich, an einem Krieg teilzunehmen. Aus 
diesem Grund, schon nach der Niederlage bei Kozmin (1497) ordnete der ver-
ärgerte Johannes Albrecht an, dass jedem der Militärdienstpflicht nicht erfüllt, 
das Vermögen beschlagnahmt werden sollte. Aus diesem Grund stiftete er in 
Krakau ein Gericht unter der Führung von Mikolaj Kamieniecki und Marcin 
Borzymowski.19 Auf Volksturm konnte man sich nicht verlassen. Wenn es zum 
Beispiel zum Angriff der Tataren kam, sammelte sich der polnische Volksturm 
(wenn überhaupt) meistens so lange, dass die Tataren polnische Gebiete schon 
18  Papée 1936, 197–8.
19  Mehr zu diesem Thema, siehe: Katarzyna Niemczyk, ‘Wojskowa emanacja władzy królewskiej 
w osobie hetmana na przełomie XV i XVI wieku’ [Hetman als militärischer Vertreter des Königs 
an der Wende des 15. Und 16. Jahrhunderts] (im Druck a); Siehe auch.: S. Kutrzeba (Hrsg), 
‘Akta procesów o dobra skonfiskowane z powodu niesłużenia wyprawy z r. 1497’ [Akten aus 
Prozessen über Beschlag genommenen Vermögen wegen der Verweigerung der Teilnahme an 
der Expedition 1497], Archiwum Komisji Historycznej 9 (1902), no. 343, 347, 349, 357, 361, 373, 
376, 378, 381, 383, 385–94, 396, 400, 401, 404, 417, 465, 466, 481, 500, 502, 509, 547, 549, 551.; 
Starodawnego Prawa Polskiego Pomniki [SPPP] 2. ed. Antoni Zygmunt Helcel. Kraków 1870. 
no. 4487.; Teodor Wierzbowski (hrsg.), Matricularum Regni Poloniae Summaria, Warszawa 
1905–1909, IV.I., no. 838, 841, 843; mehr zum Thema der Organisation des Landsturms, siehe: 
Kazimierz Hahn, Pospolite ruszenie wedle uchwał sejmikowych ruskich od XVI do XVII wieku [Die 
Organisation des Landsturms laut den Beschlüsse des Sejmik von 16. bis zum 17 Jahrhunderts], 
Lwów 1928, pp.22–35.
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beraubten und nach Hause zurückkamen.20 Polen benötigte also eine feste 
Armee, die ständig die südöstliche Grenze verteidigen könnte. 
Ein zusätzliches Problem bildete aber auch die finanzielle Frage: für eine 
feste Armee brauchte man doch Geld, und die Staatkasse war leer. Da der König 
über keine ausreichende Summe verfügte, fehlte es an einer festen Armee, wel-
che vor allem die südöstliche Grenze verteidigen könnte. Ein Beispiel dafür: 
am 31. Oktober 1501 bekam König Alexander einen Brief vom Stanislaus von 
Chodcza (der Starost von Lemberk/Ľviv), dass ihm nur fünfhundert Ritter zur 
Verfügung stehen, und das viel zu wenig sei, um die südöstliche Grenze vertei-
digen zu können.21 Als die Armee sehr schlecht bezahlt wurde, gab es immer 
wieder Proteste und Konflikte. Zum Beispiel, kam im Jahre 1504 zu so einem 
Protest: die Rittmeister, die für die Verteidigung den südöstlichen Grenzen ver-
antwortlich waren, forderten das ausstehende Gehalt.22 Alexander hat nicht nur 
ganz leere Staatkasse gelassen, sondern auch eine große Schuld, die über 170.000 
Zloty betrug, und welche die Unterhaltungskosten der festen Armee bildeten.23
Wie ernst das Problem war, zeigte der Versuch des Königs, die zusätzlichen 
Militärkräfte zu finden. Er versuchte, die Militärdienstpflicht durch eine Steuer 
zwecks Finanzierung der festen Armee zu ersetzen. Das bereitete aber weite-
20  Ein Beispiel dafür: der Angriff aus dem Jahr 1498. Mehr dazu: Katarzyna Niemczyk, 
Kamienieccy herbu Pilawa. Z dziejów kariery i awansu szlachty polskiej na ziemiach ruskich do połowy 
XVI wieku [Kamieniecki Geschlecht des Wappens Pilawa. Zur Karriere und Geschichte der 
polnischen Adel an der Rothreußen bis zum Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts] (im Druck b); Eadem, 
‘Red Ruthenia and the risk of Moldovan and Tatar attacks at the breakthrough of the 15th and 
16th century’, in: (hrsg.) L. Zabolotnaja, Dialogul civilizatiilor. Interferente istorice se culturale/ 
Dialogue of civilisations. Historical and cultural interferences, Kiszyniów 2015, p. 94-100 [Weiterhin: 
Niemczyk 2015 b]; Tadeusz Korzon, Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce [Die Geschichte der 
Kriege und des Militärwesens in Polen]. Lwów/Warszawa/Kraków 1923, I. p.230.
21  Stanislaus von Chodcza beklagte sich auch über Wladislaus II. Der ungarische König solle, 
mit Moldau kollaborieren statt Polen zu helfen, siehe: Akta Aleksandra, no. 120.; Renata Trawka, 
Kmitowie. Studium kariery politycznej i społecznej w późnośredniowiecznej Polsce [Kmitowie. Zur 
Kariere und Geschichte des Adels im Spätmittelalter in Polen], Kraków 2005, p.263. [Weiterhin: 
Trawka 2005]; Die Antwort des Wladislaus II., siehe: Akta Aleksandra, no. 123.
22  Die Verhandlungen des Alexanders mit den Rittmeistern wurden am 3. August beendet. Es 
wurde entschieden, dass das Geld zwischen 15. September 1504 und 9. March 1505 ausgezahlt 
wurde. Siehe: Fryderyk Papée, Aleksander Jagiellończyk, Kraków 2006, p. 97. [Weiterhin: Papée 
2006] Siehe auch: Metryka Koronna [Weiterhin MK] in AGAD 19, k. 161.; Teodor Wierzbowski 
(hrsg.), Matricularum Regni Poloniae Summaria, Warszawa 1907, III., no. 1587, 2728. [Weiterhin: 
Wierzbowski 1907]; MK 22, k. 58.; Akta Aleksandra, no. 313; Niemczyk, (im Druck b)
23  Ludwik Kolankowski, ‘Roty koronne na Rusi i Podolu 1492–1572 r.’ [Polnische Rotten in 
Rothreußen und Podolien 1492–1572], in Kazimierz Hartleb und Kazimierz Tyszkowski 
(Hrsg.), Ziemia Czerwieńska 1:1, Lwów 1935, pp.143–144. [Weiterhin: Kolankowski 1935]; 
Janusz Sikorski (Hrsg.), Zarys dziejów wojskowości polskiej do roku 1864 [Die Geschichte des 
polnischen Militärwesens bis zum Jahre 1864. Ein Überblick], Warszawa 1965, I.300.
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re Schwierigkeiten. Die Adligen wollten die Steuer nicht zahlen, aber wehrten 
sich gleichzeitig gegen den Militärdienst. Das verursachte zwei Probleme, es gab 
nach wie vor keine ausreichende Armee und der König musste das Geld für die 
feste Armee leihen, was seine Verschuldung nur noch vergrößerte. Alexander 
probierte also auch den Bauern dazu verpflichten, am Krieg teilzunehmen. Von 
daher hat er 1502 ein entsprechendes Gesetz verkündet, das aber nicht in Kraft 
gekommen ist.24 Der nächste Versuch, die Situation des Landes zu retten, war 
im Jahre 1503 die Gründung des neuen Amts: des Hauptmanns der polnischen 
Krone.25 Als erste Person übte Mikolaj Kamieniecki dieses Amt aus. Da der 
König viel Zeit in Litauen wegen des Konflikts mit Moskau verbrachte, konnte 
er selbst der Verteidigung der polnischen Grenzen nicht organisieren und nicht 
überwachen. Er brauchte jemanden, der ihn im dieser Sache vertreten könnte. 
Das sollte der Hauptman sein.26
Ein anderes Problem bildete die unterschiedliche Meinung der Einwohner 
von Großpolen und Kleinpolen betreffs der moldauischen Politik. Die 
Einwohner von Großpolen waren eher der Meinung, dass Pokutien so weit 
weg lag, dass man keine Zeit und kein Geld dafür verschwenden sollte und 
die Sache möglichst schnell gelöst werden muss, ohne Rücksicht auf eventuel-
le Verluste; die Einwohner von Kleinpolen glaubten dagegen, dass es ein ganz 
wichtiges Problem ist, und sie wollten auf keinen Fall Pokutien verlieren. Das 
24  AGAD, LL I. k. 71–72v = Akta Aleksandra, no. 133.; TN 26, no. 23; Kolankowski 1935, 
143–44.; mehr zur diesem Thema: Jan Gerlach, Chłopi w obronie Rzeczpospolitej. Studium o 
piechocie wybranieckiej [Die Bauern als Verteidigern des polnischen Staates. Zur Geschichte 
der ‘piechota wybraniecka’ in Polen], Lwów 1939, pp.29–31.; Franciszek Piekosiński, Laudum 
wojnickie ziemi krakowskiej z r. 1503 [Das Gesetz aus Sejmik in Wojnicz in krakauer Gebiet aus 
dem Jahr 1503], Kraków 1897, pp.270–9.; Alexander Kraushar, Z dziejów pospolitego ruszenia 
w dawnej Polsce (Quatuor quintum) [Zur Geschichte des Landsturms in Polen]. Warszawa 1928, 
pp.92–106.; Jerzy Ochmański, ‘Organizacja obrony w wielkim księstwie Litewskim przed 
napadami Tatarów krymskich w XV–XVI w.’ Studia i Materiały do historii Wojskowości  5 (1960), 
396.; Zdzisław Spieralski, ‘Geneza i początki hetmaństwa w Polsce’ [Genese der Hetmanswürde 
in Polen], Studia i Materiały do Historii wojskowości 5 (1960), 336.; Trawka 2005, 265. [Weiterhin: 
Spieralski 1960]
25  Akta Aleksandra, no. 154.; Michał Bobrzyński, ‘Sejmy polskie za Olbrachta i Aleksandra’ 
[Polnische Volksvertretung (s.g. Sejm) während der Regierungszeit des Johannes Albrechts 
und Alexanders], in Michał Bobrzyński (Hrsg.), Szkice i studia historyczne, Kraków 1922, I. 
p.228. [Weiterhin: Bobrzyński 1922]; Spieralski 1960, 336.; Marek Plewczyński, ‘Naczelne 
dowództwo armii koronnej w latach 1501–1572’ [Die Führung der polnischen Armee in der Jahren 
1501–1572], Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości 34 (1988), 43. [Weiterhin: Plewczyński 
1988]; Niemczyk, (im Druck b); Katarzyna Niemczyk, ‘Kilka słów do genezy i początków 
hetmaństwa w Polsce’ [Ein paar Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der Hetmanswürde in Polen], in 
Jerzy Sperka, Bożena Czwojdrak (Hrsg.), Średniowiecze polskie i powszechne  (6/10), Katowice 
2014, pp.319–33.; siehe auch: Niemczyk, (im Druck a)
26  Ibid.
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löste Konflikte aus und verschlechterte noch mehr die polnische Stabilität und 
Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten.27 
Nicht ohne Bedeutung war auch die Meinung des Wladislaus des II., der 
ein absoluter Gegner des Konflikts sowohl mit der Türkei, aber auch mit der 
Moldau war.28 
Diese alle oben genannten Faktoren verursachten die Änderung der 
Politik gegenüber Moldau. Polen hatte damals genug Probleme und die 
Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten waren nicht ausreichend um einen neuen Krieg zu 
führen. Die höchste Priorität war also die Sicherheit der südöstlichen Grenzen. 
Polen brauchte keinen Krieg, weder gegen die Türkei, noch gegen Moldau zu 
führen. Der neue König, der mit diesen Problemen rechnen musste, suchte also 
andere Lösungen als der Krieg um die Frage Pokutiens aufzuklären. In der 
Regierungszeit des Alexanders, kann man zwei Phasen in seiner Politik gegen-
über Moldau unterscheiden. Die eine ist die Amtszeit des Stefans des Großen in 
Moldau und die zweite betrifft die Herrschaft von Bogdan dem III. Die Politik 
gegenüber Stefan, der immer wieder forderte, einen polnischen Boten nach 
Moldau zu schicken, um das Problem Pokutiens zu lösen, bestand darin auf die 
Zeit zu spielen. Pokutien blieb ja beim Polen und es gab keinen Grund dafür, die 
Verhandlungen mit Moldau zu führen. Das war aber nicht ein einzelner Grund 
dafür, warum Polen auf die Zeit spielte. Stefan der Große war damals nämlich 
schon 70 Jahre alt, und das erwog die Hoffnungen, dass er in kurzer Zeit stirbt 
und vielleicht sein Nachfolger eher kompromissbereit wird.29 Das war aber keine 
glückliche Politik, weil der Stefan keine Lust dafür hatte, und wenn die polni-
schen Boten zum geplanten Kongress nicht gekommen waren, annektierte er 
27  Die Bewohner des Großpolens schickten zum König ihren Bote: Jan Bochotnicki, der forderte 
vom König der Konflikt um Pokutien möglichst schnell zu lösen ohne Rücksicht auf mögliche 
Verluste. AGAD, LL I, k. 35v–36v = Akta Aleksandra, no. 96. ac; Die antwort des Alexanders, 
siehe: AGAD, LL I, k. 37–38 = Akta Aleksandra, no. 96. b. = Uljanickij 1887, 203–4.; Spieralski 
1965, 83.; Mehr zur diesem Thema: Katarzyna Niemczyk, ‘Problem Pokucia, spornego terytorium 
polsko-mołdawskiego w końcu XV i początku XVI wieku’ [Probleme des Pokutiens, des polnisch-
moldauischen Streit-Gebiets, am Ende des 15. Und zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts], Studia 
Historyczne 57:2 (2014), 163. [Weiterhin: Niemczyk 2014a]
28  Ibid. 164, 171.; Katarzyna Niemczyk, ‘Mołdawia w polityce dwóch Jagiellonów: króla 
polskiego Jana Olbrachta i króla Węgier Władysława (do roku 1501)’ [Moldau in der Politik des 
Johannes Albrechts und Wladislaus II.] in Henryk Walczak (Hrsg.), Wielowiekowe bogactwo 
polsko - rumuńskich związków historycznych i kulturowych. Suczawa 2014, pp.54–67.
29  Uljanickij 1887, 203–4.; Akta Aleksandra, no. 96. b.; Niemczyk 2014a, 163.; Spieralski 
1965, 82–3. Nistor 1910, 60.; Über das Gesundheitszustand von Stefan, siehe: Olgierd Górka, 
Kronika czasów Stefana Wielkiego Mołdawskiego (1457–1499) [Die Chronik aus der Zeit des 
Stefans der Große (1457–1499)], Kraków 1931, pp.5–6.; siehe auch: Spieralski 1965, 82.
86
Katarzyna Niemczyk
Pokutien im Jahre 1502. Der polnische Versuch, die Armee zu sammeln und das 
Gebiet zu verteidigen, blieb erfolglos.30
Nach dem Tod von Stefan dem Großen (2 Juli 1504) begann das nächste 
Kapitel in der Geschichte der polnisch-moldauischen Beziehungen.
Der Nachfolger von Stefan dem Großem - Bogdan der III - hatte nicht 
so starke Position, sowohl im eigenen Land als auch im Ausland. Er genoss 
nicht so großen Respekt und so große Anerkennung. Deswegen war auch sei-
ne Bereitschaft, den Krieg gegen Polen zu führen, nicht so groß.31 Ganz im 
Gegenteil, er versuchte eher einen Pakt mit Polen zu schließen um einen starken 
Verbündeten zu gewinnen. Er befürchtete vor allem einen starken Einfluss der 
Türkei auf seinem Land, und das schlimmste würde die Allianz zwischen Polen 
und der Türkei. Seine Befürchtungen waren umso stärker, dass Polen einen 
Boten (Bernard Goławiński) nach Konstantinopel schickte um die Meinung 
des Sultans zum eventuellen polnischen Angriff auf Pokutien kennenzuler-
nen.32 Auf dem Rückweg aus Konstantinopel, kam der polnische Bote noch 
nach Walachei, um den Hospodar dazu zu überzeugen, den Bogdan III. an-
zugreifen.33 Der moldauische Herrscher hatte also keine Wahl, und entschied 
sich dafür, Verhandlungen mit Polen zu führen. Pokutien wollte er zum diesen 
Zweck opfern. Er schickte also im Jahre 1505 seinen Boten nach Polen.34 Der 
Hospodar hatte denn einen Plan. Er wollte die Schwester von dem polnischen 
König heiraten.35 Bogdan wollte dadurch einen starken Verbündeten gewinnen 
und gleichzeitig das Gefahr der polnisch-türkischen Allianz vermeiden. Im 
30  Jabłonowski 1878, no. 23.; Spieralski 1965, 83.; ‘über die Verspätung der polnischen Boten’ 
als Hauptvorwand zur Annexion des Pokutiens schrieb: Fac 2007, 67–8. und Plewczyński 
1988, 150.; I. Czamańska als die Grunde für Annexion des Pokutiens sieht eher Verspätung 
des polnischen Bote: Iwanko. Er sollte zu spät zum verabredeten Treffen mit Stefan der Große 
kommen. Siehe: Czamańska 1996, 187–8.; siehe auch Niemczyk 2014a, 164.
31  Virgil Pâslariuc, Raporturile politice dintre marea boierime şi domnie în Ţara Moldovei în secolul 
al XVI-lea, Chişinău 2005, pp.17–39. 
32  AGAD, LL II. k. 18–20.; Akta Aleksandra, no. 261.; Acta et epistolae relationum Transylvaniae 
Hungariaeque cum Moldavia et Valachia, ed. A. Veress, vol. 1, Kolozsvar/Cluj 1914, nr 63. („Fontes 
rerum Transylvanicarum”); Spieralski 1965, 106.; Andrzej Dziubiński, Stosunki dyplomatyczne 
polsko - tureckie w latach 1500–1572 w kontekście międzynarodowym [Diplomatische Kontakte 
zwischen Polen und der Türkei in der Jahren 1500–1572 im Zusammenhang mit internationalen 
Beziehungen], Wrocław 2005, p.18.; Anthony Dolphin Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman 
dynasty, Oxford 1956, Table 28: Bayezid II and his Family. 
33  Akta Aleksandra, no. 262.; Spieralski 1965, 106.; Borzemski 1889, 375.; Niemczyk 2014a, 
155–74. 
34  Bobrzyński 1922, 244–57.; Papée 2006, 100.; Spieralski 1965, 108.
35  Akta Aleksandra, no. 257.; Wierzbowski 1907, no. 2048.; Spieralski 1965, 105–8.
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Tausch bat er Pokutien an.36 Das Angebot musste in Polen unbedingt erwo-
gen werden, weil die Möglichkeit Pokutien ohne Krieg zu gewinnen zu groß 
war. Doch die Königin – Elisabeth von Habsburg – wollte über Heirat ihrer 
Tochter mit Bogdan III. nichts hören. Die moldauischen Boten kamen also 
nach Moldau zurück und benachrichtigten den Hospodar über die Stellung 
der Königin. Der beunruhigte Bogdan entschied sich also dafür mit Stanislaus 
von Chodcza ‒ dem Mann der als Vertrauter der Königin galt – zu spre-
chen. Hospodar hoffte, dass Stanislaus von Chodcza ihm damit helfen kann, 
die Königin zum seinen Heiratsantrag zu überzeugen. Er schickte also zum 
Stanislaus einen Boten: Lukas Dracz und bat ein Zusammentreffen in Sucava 
an. Da dem polnischen König Alexander diese Idee gefiel, wurde polnischer 
Bote nach Sucava geschickt.37 Obwohl die Urkunden über das Zusammentreffen 
schweigen, können wir vermuten dass es erfolgreich war und der Antrag ange-
nommen wurde, d.h.: Bogdan sollte königliche Schwester Elisabeth heiraten 
und im Tausch sollte Pokutien an Polen angeschlossen werden. Der moldau-
ische Hospodar erfühlte also seine Versprechung und noch im September 1505 
gab er Pokutien Polen ab. Danach wartete er aber auf die Erfüllung der polni-
schen Versprechung, also auf die Vermahlung mit der königlichen Schwester.38 
Als die Königin Elisabeth von Habsburg in Zwischenzeit starb, sah alles danach 
aus, dass seine Pläne bald in Erfüllung gehen werden.39 Doch außer Königin 
gab es weitere Gegner dieser Heirat. Es gab vor allem die Adligen, die befürch-
teten, dass sich die Beziehungen mit der Türkei wegen der polnisch-moldau-
ischen Allianz verschlechtern können. Moldau befand sich ja in der türkischen 
Einflusszone.40 Der Gefahr war also groß. Der Tod des Alexanders im Jahre 
1506, der als großer Befürworter der moldauischen Heirat galt, kreuzte also 
Bogdans Pläne durch. Der Angriff der Tataren auf der Rothreußen gleich nach 
dem Tod des Königs (im September 1506), verstärkte die polnischen Adligen in 
ihrer Meinung, dass die gute Beziehungen mit der Türkei von großer Bedeutung 
für polnische Sicherheit sind.41 Die Heirat mit königlicher Schwester wurde 
36  Spieralski 1965, 103–9.
37  ADAD, LL II. k. 48–49.; Akta Aleksandra, no. 294.; Borzemski 1889, 378.; Spieralski 1965, 
108.
38  Akta Aleksandra, no. 298.; Borzemski 1889, 379.
39  Spieralski 1965, 109.
40  Eine feste Gegnerin dieser Heirat war auch die Braut – Elisabeth, die sollte sogar behaupten, 
dass sie eher ins Kloster gehe als diesen ‘ einäugigen Barbar’ heirate, siehe: Wapowski 1874, 62–3, 
279.; Spieralski 1965, 110.
41  Stanisław Herbst, ‘Kleck 1506’, Przegląd Historyczno - Wojskowy 7 (1934), 21–38.; Fac 2007, 
76–80.; Spieralski 1965, 111.
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also abgelehnt, Pokutien wurde jedoch nicht zurückgegeben.42 Doch Bogdan 
III. fühlte sich zu Recht betrogen. Er hatte ja seine Versprechung erfühlt und 
dann brach plötzlich die Polen den gegenseitigen Vertrag. Er wollte also selbst 
die gerechte Strafe zukommen lassen. Aus diesem Grund, noch im September 
1506 eroberte er Pokutien.43 Die polnische Antwort war sehr schnell. Es wurde 
feste Armee unter der Führung von Hauptmann Mikolaj Kamieniecki gesam-
melt und nach Pokutien geschickt. Doch ihm standen nicht viele Ritter zur 
Verfugung (2500),44 deswegen wollte er den Feind möglichst schnell angreifen 
um ihn überraschen zu können. Das war ihm gelungen. Schon drei Wochen 
nachdem Bogdan das Pokutien annektierte, also am 29. September, überschritte 
Kamienieckis Armee den Dnjestr.45 Er lies teils seiner Armee in Czesybiessy 
(liegt heutzutage in der Ukraine), wo sich der größte moldauische Widerstand 
befand und marschierte weiter nach Moldau.46 Zuerst wurde aber polnische 
Vorhut geschlagen, erst der Schlacht zwischen polnischen Hauptarmee und 
Hauptarmee der Moldau unter der Führung von so genannten Kopacz über den 
42  Ibid. 111. 
43  Ibid. 112.; Wojciechowski 1979, 85. ist der Meinung, dass die Angriffe des Bogdans auf 
Pokutien dazu dienen sollten, den Fürst Sigismund I. bei der Königswahl zu unterstützen; siehe 
auch Ludwik Finkel, Elekcja Zygmunta I. Sprawy dynastyi Jagiellońskiej i Unii Polsko-Litewskiej, 
Kraków 1910, p.158. [Weiterhin: Finkel 1910]
44  AGAD, ASK, oddz. 86, no. 6, k. 16, 17v, 18–19, 21, 23v, 25r–25v, 28v–29v, 32v, 42v, 45–46, 47v.; 
siehe auch: Spieralski 1965, 116.; Diese Zahl entsteht aus Kamienieckis Kostenabrechnung, 
siehe: AGAD, ASK, oddz. 86, no. 6, k. 6–16.; Spieralski 1965, 316.; Wapowski 1874, 276–9. und 
Maciej z Miechowa, Chronica Polonorum, Kraków 1521, p.378. bringen dagegen die Zahl 4000 
vor; ähnlich wie Marcin Bielski, Kronika polska Marcina Bielskiego nowo przez Joachima Bielskiego 
syna jego wydana, Kraków 1597, p.932. [Weiterhin: Miechowa 1521]; siehe auch: Finkel 
1910, 159; Ryszard Przybyliński, Hetman wielki koronny Mikołaj Mielecki (ok. 1549–1585) 
[Großhetman Mikołaj Mielecki (ok. 1549–1585)], Toruń 2003, p.24.; Katarzyna Niemczyk, 
‘Przyczynek do relacji polsko-mołdawskich w XVI wieku. Geneza konfliktu z 1506 r.’, in Polska i 
Rumunia. Wspólnie-obok-blisko, Suczawa 2015 [Weiterhin: Niemczyk 2015c], p.19–20.
45  Miechowa 1521, cap. 85, 377–9; Niemczyk, 2015, p.19–20.
46  Solche Schlussfolgerungen kann man aus Kamienieckis Rechenschaft folgern, siehe: AGAD, 
ASK, oddz. 86, no. 6, k. 53, 58.; Spieralski 1965, 118; Niemczyk, 2015c, p.19–20.
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polnischen Sieg entschied. Moldauische Armee wurde geschlagen und Pokutien 
zurück an Polen angeschlossen.47 
Zusammenfassung
Der Aleksander änderte also moldauische Politik stark, wegen der Probleme mit 
denen er rechnen musste: die Verwicklung in den Konflikt zwischen Litauen und 
Moskau, die Probleme mit Volkssturm, nicht ausreichende Menge der festen 
Armee, ständige Gefahr die den südöstlichen Gebieten durch die Angriffe der 
Tataren drohte. Anstatt den Krieg gegen den moldauischen Hospodar zu führen, 
suchte er andere Lösungen. Die Art und Weise wie der Vertrag mit Bogdan 
gebrochen wurde, war natürlich nicht gut. Daran trug der König aber keine 
Schuld. Er war einer der größten Befürworter der Heirat seiner Schwester mit 
dem moldauischen Herrscher. Für ihn konnte die Ehe viele Vorteile bringen. 
Damit wollte er die südöstlichen Grenzen in Sicherheit bringen. Erst nach 
seinem Tod wurde der Plan der Heirat abgelehnt. 
Obwohl der Vertrag mit dem Bogdan gebrochen wurde, war die Sache 
nicht gelöst und kam wieder ins Licht im Jahre 1509 dank dem Papst Julius II. 
Damals begann der neuen Kapitel im Kampf um Pokutien.
47  Wapowski 1874, 63.; Maciej Stryjkowski, Kronika polska, litewska, żmudzka i wszystkiej Rusi, 
Warszawa 1846, p.320.; Spieralski 1965, 118–9.; Pułaski, Kronika polskich rodów szlacheckich 
Podola, Wołynia i Ukrainy. Monografie i wzmianki [Chronik der polnischen Adelsgeschlechter aus 
Podolien, Wolhynien und der Ukraine], Warszawa 1911, I. p.210; Es ist gut möglich, dass der 
Name des moldauischen Befehlshabers: Kopacz (“Copacius”) nur als Spitzname interpretieren 
werden muss. Pârcălab Kopacz ist in keiner anderen Urkunde erwähnt.  Wahrscheinlich war Lucas 
Arbore dem wahren Befehlshaber der moldauischen Armee, sehe: V. Paslariuc, ‘Marea boierime 
moldoveană şi raporturile ei cu Bogdan al III-lea (1504-1517)’, in Ioan Neculce, Buletinul 
Muzeului de Istorie a Moldovei (Seria Nova), II-III, 1996-1997, p.15, Fußnote nr 172
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Habsburgs, Jagiellonians and Crusading: The Wallachian Case 
in the 1470s
Three Houses collided in East-Central Europe in the second half of the 15th 
century: two were established names (the Habsburgs and the Jagiellonians), 
while the third was in the making (the Hunyadi).1 The clash took on crusader 
shapes due to the expanding proximity of the Ottoman Empire, the tones and 
overtones of Papal propaganda and diplomacy, as well as the commercial and 
political interests of Venice.2 After the “miracle of Belgrade” (1456), Christian 
successes were rare, clearly outnumbered by Turkish victories.3 The surprising 
victory at Vaslui in January 1475 over the 50,000 strong (120,000 according 
to contemporary rumours) Ottoman army was consequently viewed with 
astonishment.4 The astonishment grew for the victor was a relative newcomer, 
Stephen III of Moldavia,5 and because Venice’s and Rome’s recent attempts to 
involve a major Greek rite power (Muscovy) in the war against Mehmed II had 
ended in bitter failure.6 Hence, Venice decided to make the most out of the 
success and presented yet another major crusader design.7
1  Though focused chiefly on two of the three houses, Karl Nehrings Matthias Corvinus, Kaiser 
Friedrich III. und das Reich. Zum hunyadisch-habsburgischen Gegensatz im Donauraum, München 19892, 
is still a useful outline of the age.
2  See most recently in these matters Paul Srodecki, Antemurale Christianitatis. Zur Genese der 
Bollwerksrhetorik im östlichen Mitteleuropa an der Schwelle vom Mittelalter zur Frühen Neuzeit (Historische 
Studien, 508), Husum 2015.
3  The standard work on the topic is Norman Housley’s Crusading and the Ottoman Threat. 1453-1505, 
Oxford 2012.
4  For instance, the sources recently published by Ioan-Aurel Pop, ‘La Santa Sede, Venezia e la Valacchia 
nella crociata antiottomana di fine Quattrocento’, in Sorin Şipoş, Dan Cepraga, I.-A. Pop (eds.), 
Textus Testis: Documentary Value and Literary Dimension of the Historical Text [Transylvanian Review, 
XX, suppl. 1], Cluj-Napoca 2011, pp.7–22.
5  Even though he had made a name for himself less than a decade earlier (in late 1467), through his 
confrontation with Matthias Corvinus (see in this respect also the documents published in Alexandru 
Simon, ‘Notes and Documents on the Southern Background of Matthias Corvinus’ Bohemian War’, 
Studia Mediaevalia Bohemica 4:2 (2012), 215–26.)
6  The documents collected 150 years ago by Enrico Cornet (Le guerre dei Veneti nell’Asia, 1470-1474. 
Documenti cavati dall’Archivio ai Frari in Venezia, Vienna 1856) are more than eloquent. A new modern 
scholarly approach is needed.
7  For such medieval projects, see the extensive contemporary information collected and analysed by 




Let us start with the passages. Passages from the “military half ” of the 
instructions for Paolo Morosini (the highly experienced diplomat sent to 
Rome8), written in Latin, as presented to the papal curia, after discussions based 
on the “financial half ” of the instructions, issued in Italian in order to facilitate 
negotiations:9
‘[…] Exercitus igitur hoc ordine conficiendus bellumque quatripartito 
inferrendum opera precium arbitrantur, quo celerrime maxima Europae parte 
pellendum hostem non dubitant. Polonous namque Serenissimus Rex [Casimir IV 
Jagiello] facile expertioribus bello Polonis ac Boemis [his son, King Wladislaw (II) 
Jagiello, future King of Hungary, ruled over (“half of ”) Bohemia (the “other half ” 
belonged to Matthias)]10] vigintiquinque millium conflabit exercitum, sumptoque 
simul Stephano Servie sive Mundavie Vayvoda [Stephen III of Moldavia] cum 
quinque millibus, transacto Danubio per Bulgariam [Bulgaria] per hostem invadant. 
Ungarie vero Serenissimus Rex [Matthias Corvinus] cum vigintiquinque millibus 
ex suis militia aptioribus et experist per Serviam [Serbia] et iuxta Bossinam [Bosnia] 
partier aggrediantur hostem [...].’ [March-April 1475 (undated copy of the pro-
ject)]11 
Paolo Morosini was not discussing huge numbers, going by other projects 
from the same year, 1475, according to which Matthias commanded over 100,000 
soldiers from Hungary, Wallachia and Moldavia.12 From this point of view too, 
8  For more data: Gino Benzoni, ‘Paolo Morosini’, Dizionario Bibliografico degli Italiani 48 (2012), 
sub voce.
9  For the “financial half ” (misplaced in Archivio di Stato di Milano, Milan (ASM), Archivio Ducale 
Sforzesco (A.D.S.), Venezia, cart. 381 Giugno–Dicembre 1493, fasc. 4. Settembre, nn) see Alexandru 
Simon, ‘Between the Cross and the Sultan: The Jews in Moldavia in the 1470s’, in Cristian Luca, 
Laurenţiu Rădvan and Alexandru Simon (eds.), Social and Political Elites in Eastern and Central Europe 
(15th-18th Centuries), (Studies in Russia and Eastern Europe, 13), London 2015, pp.145–56.
10  See in particular Antonin Kalous, ‘Italská politika, Matyás Korvín a české země’ [Italian Politics, 
Matthias Corvinus and the Czech Lands], Husitský Tábor 15 (2006), 149–75; Idem, Matyáš Korvín 
(1443–1490). Uherský a český král [Matthias Corvinus (1443-1490): King of Hungary and 
Bohemia], České Budějovice 2009.
11  ASM, A.D.S., Illyria, Polonia, Russia, Slavonia, cart. 640, fasc. 2. Raguza, nn [March-April 1475; 
edited under 1462 by Jovan Radonić in Đurađ Kastriot Skenderbeg i Albanija XV veku (istoriska iratha) 
[George Castriota Skanderbeg and Albania in the 15th c. (Historical Sources)] (Spomenik, 95), Belgrade 
1942, no. 226, p.128; for the correct date of the project (given also the Bohemian involvement), see 
Alexandru Simon and Cristian Luca, ‘Documentary Perspectives on Matthias Corvinus and Stephen 
the Great’, Transylvanian Review 17:3 (2008), 85–112, here 87–8.
12  Even though prompted to accept the military exaggerations, see also Mihai Berza’s ‘Der Kreuzzug 
gegen die Türken: ein europäisches Problem’, Revue Historique du Sud-Est Européen 19 (1942), 42–74, 
here 70–2).
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the Venetian project of spring 1475 featured several of the points Morosini had 
presented for the Republic at the Reichstag of Regensburg in mid-1471, when 
the idea of sending the Wallachians against the Sultan had also re-surfaced.13 
The major difference between the two presentations was that by 1475, following 
Matthias’s recent anti-Ottoman actions, Emperor Frederick III of Habsburg 
lost his primacy in the crusade.14 In parallel, the future Serenissima fuelled the 
tensions between Matthias (her “strange ally”) and Stephen III (whom she had 
promoted as an eastern crusader alternative), apparently also by further confusing 
their areas of interest. Serbia “awarded” (alongside Wallachia15) to Stephen III, 
who was an old Hunyadi target for Matthias as it had been for his father John,16 
who was promised (entire) royal Bulgaria as well (1444), which Venice now 
“granted” to Stephen, though less publicly.17 There were grounds enough both 
for the project’s success and for its failure, as Morosini well knew – even if only 
because he had passed through Moldavia at the time of the battle of Vaslui, 
13  ASM, A.D.S.,Ungheria, cart. 650. 1452 [1441]-1490, fasc. 3. 1467-1490, nn [Late August-
September 1464; the project was edited under 1471 in Iván Nagy, Albert B. Nyáry (eds.), Magyar 
diplomacziai emlékek. Mátyás király korából 1458-1490 [Monuments of Hungarian Diplomacy. The Age 
of King Matthias. 1458-1490] (Monumenta Hungariae Historica, IV, 1-4), II. [1466-1480], Budapest 
1876, no. 167, pp.230–7 [hereinafter MDE]; the error was noticed by Ludwig Von Pastor, The History 
of the Popes, IV. [1464-1471], London  19012, p. 81). The – real – documentary place of Hungary and 
the Wallachians in the context of the discussions at Regensburg can be found in Helmut WOLF 
(ed.), Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Friedrich III. [hereinafter DRTA, A, XV-XXII], VIII-2. 
Regensburg 1471, Göttingen, 1999, nos. 94–5, pp.323–7.
14  See for instance the information in Alexandru Simon, ‘Western and Eastern Riders of the Storm’, 
in Rudolf Gräf, Dumitru Ţeicu and Adrian Magina (eds.), Itinerarii istoriografice. Studii în onoarea 
profesorului Costin Feneşan [Historiographic itineraries: Festschrift for Professor Costin Feneşan], Cluj-
Napoca, 2011, pp.79–96, mainly 80–4.
15  In the autumn of 1473, Stephen rode into Wallachia against the Ottoman power as the ruler of 
Moldovalachia. For Stephen’s title: M. Berza (ed.), Repertoriul monumentelor şi obiectelor de artă din 
timpul lui Ştefan cel Mare [The Repertoire of Monuments and Artifacts from the Time of Stephen the 
Great], Bucharest 1958, no. 144, p.388).
16  For the peculiar and – eventually detrimental – circumstances of the promise, see Pál Engel, ‘János 
Hunyadi and the Peace of Szeged (1444)’, Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47:2 
(1994), 241–57.
17  The main sources were collected in Matei Cazacu, ‘Un voyageur dans les pays roumains et son 
Histoire de la Moldavie: Leyon Pierce Balthasar von Campenhausen (1746-1808)’, in Ovidiu Cristea 
and Gheorghe Lazar (eds.), Naţional şi universal în istoria românilor. Studii oferite profesorului Şerban 
Papacostea cu ocazia împlinirii a 70 de ani [National and Universal in the History of the Romanians: 
Festschrift for Professor Şerban Papacostea on his 70th Birthday], Bucharest 1997, pp.402–17, esp. 
pp.401–2.; Alexandru Simon, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Anti-Ottoman Warfare: Documents on the 
Case of Moldavia (1475-1477)’, Revue Roumaine d’Histoire 48:1-2 (2009), 37–53.
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and his testimony had fortified the credibility of the victory in Italy,18 used with 
Venetian exaggeration and disinformation (a year earlier, the Republic had even 
invented Turkish victories for her new favourite Stephen III of Moldavia19).
The regional developments marked by the Venetian proposal clearly signal 
earlier preparations and signify profounder contacts than usually assumed. Some 
are outlined by a set of instructions issued in the name of Emperor Frederick 
III of Habsburg almost two years prior to the speech delivered in Rome by 
Morosini.20
‘[The documents issued by the Habsburg chancery of Vienna on] VI 
Novembris 1473. Item litera passus pro patriarcha Anthioceno [Lodovico Severi] 
/ Item missiva ad consules et massarios in Caffa ad habendum eundem patriarcham 
recommisum, ut possit ire per certas eorum secure/ Item ad idem Principi Megerili 
Domino Tartarorum [Mengli Ghiray]. / Item ad idem ad Principem Persarum 
Domino Assembegk [Usun Hassan], / Item ad idem ad Archiepiscopum de Magno 
Novagarda [Feofil, Archbishop of Novgorod]. / Item ad idem ad Vanoida, in 
Walachia Capitaneo [Stephen of Moldavia]./ Item ad idem ad Aleca, Capitaneo 
de Plotzko [Plock, the capital of Masovia]. / Item ad idem ad Martinum Gostoldo, 
Capitaneo in Thino [Martin Gasztold, Voivode of Kyiv], / Item ad idem ad 
Kazimiro, Rege Polonie [Casimir IV];  dominus ad voluntatem domini imperatoris 
[Frederick III] dedit omnes predictas literas gratis patriarche predicto quia pauper 
fuit (6 November 1473).’
Frederick III hoped to avoid any contacts between Matthias Corvinus and 
Severi, Pope Sixtus IV’s envoy. Yet he failed. Alike in 1471, when Matthias’s 
dethronement seemed near, Stephen III too sided with the Hungarian king, not 
18  On the transmission of the news of the victory at Vaslui, see the data in Alexandru Simon, Ştefan cel 
Mare şi Matia Corvin. O coexistenţă medievală [Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus. A Medieval 
coexistence], Cluj-Napoca 2007, pp.568–9.; Idem, ‘The Crusader Background of the Ottoman Raid on 
Oradea’, Crisia 36 (2007), 113–39.
19  For instance: ASM, A.D.S., Venezia, cart. 361. 1474, fasc. 3. Marzo, nn (25 and 28 March 1474): 
reports edited and discussed along with other contemporary sources in Alexandru Simon, ‘Anti-
Ottoman Warfare and Crusader Propaganda in 1474: New Evidences from the Archives of Milan’, 
Revue Roumaine d’Histoire 46:1-4 (2007), 25–39, here 30–4.
20  Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Handschriftensammlung, Hs. W[eiss]. 529, f. 261r (6 
November 1473; in Heinrich Koller, Paul-Joachim Heinig and Alois Niederstätter (eds.), 
Regesten Kaiser Friedrich III. (1440-1493). RI XIII. supl. II-1.; P.-J. Heinig, Ines Grund (eds.), Das 
Taxregister der römischen Kanzlei 1471-1475 (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv Wien, Hss. weiss 529 und 
weiss 920), Vienna/Cologne/Graz/Weimar 2002, no. 3539, p.523. New archival researches are needed. 
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with Frederick III or Casimir IV.21 Additionally, he cleverly exploited the needs 
of both monarchs, so that – for instance – in 1473 Frederick III, legally co-ruler 
of Hungary since 1463 and hence the suzerain of Moldavia, still viewed him as 
“his man”, and so did Casimir IV as well, even though Stephen III repeatedly 
avoid paying homage in person to the Jagiellonian monarch.22
Still, as in most crusader shaped political matters of the age, the answers 
must be searched mostly in the southern parts of the continent, for the war at the 
time, especially after Matthias’s Bohemian involvement, was – as it had started 
out – a confrontation between Venice and Rome, on one side (even though 
relations between them were quite often tense) and the Ottoman Empire of 
Mehmed II, on the other side.23
In order to better understand the nature and the genesis of the relations 
between Stephen and Venice,24 two anonymous reports, both probably drafted 
in the summer of 1472 might be of relevance. The first one, a Florentine report 
on the finances and provinces of King Matthias,25 listed Wallachia as a province 
of the crown, an indication that Matthias, who quite possibly (in order to remain 
prudent in this context) viewed Wallachia as his, not only for royal reasons, but 
also for family (Hunyadi) reasons, was – at least – considering the possibility of 
dethroning the increasingly provocative Radu III of Wallachia, Mehmed II’s 
favourite and the brother of Vlad III Dracula, placed in “Hungarian custody” for 
the past decade26. The second one, equally preserved in the Milanese archives, 
focused more on Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as upon the Wallachian roots 
21  The fundamental study of Stephen’s political conduct remains Şerban Papacostea’s ‘Politica externă 
a lui Ştefan cel Mare: opţiunea polonă (1459-1472)’ [The Foreign Policy of Stephen the Great: The 
Polish Option (1459-1472)], Studii şi Materiale de Istorie Medie 15 (2007), 13–28.
22  Though particular, the perspective offered by the sources in Andrei Pippidi’s ‘Lettres inédites de 
Leonardo III Tocco’, Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes 32:1-2 (1994), 67–74, is relevant in these 
Wallachian issues.
23  Gyula Rázsó, ‘Die Türkenpolitik Mathias Corvinus’, Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum 
Hungaricae 32:1-2 (1986), 3–50. Though not flawless, the study remains relevant for the main 
coordinates of those decades.
24  On the relations in the 1470s see chiefly Ş. Papacostea, ‘Venise et les Pays Roumains au Moyen 
Age’, in Agostino Pertusi (ed.), Venezia e il Levante fino al secolo XV, I-2. Storia-Diritto-Economia, 
Florence 1973, pp.599–625.
25  Péter E. Kovács, ‘A leggazdagabb magyarok 1472-ben. Egy követjelentés és a valóság’ [The richest 
Hungarians in 1472. An embassy report and reality], Századok 139:2 (2005), 421–8, here 426–7.
26  See in this matter: Alexandru Simon, ‘Propaganda and Matrimony: Dracula between the Hunyadis 
and the Habsburgs’, Transylvanian Review 20:4 (2011), 80–90. We apologize for the number of self-
citations due to reasons of space.
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of Matthias Corvinus and their impact upon his political and stately status at 
the start of the 1470s.27
The main passages of Wallachian interest in the Florentine report on 
Matthias Corvinus’s power structure in 1472:
‘[...] <Le corone>/
La prima Dalmacia [Dalmatia] / La segonda Cornatia [Croatia] / La terza 
Boemnia [Bohemia] /
Le provincie /
Valacia [Wallachia], Transilvagnia [Transylvania], Sciavonia [Slavonia], 
Servia [Serbia], Bossnia [Bosnia], Raguzia [Ragusa], Moravia [Moravia], Silezia 
[Silesia] [...]’28
The main passages on Wallachia and Moldavia in the “Milanese report” on 
King Matthias:
‘[...] Li membri che spettano a questo regno sono la Valachia Grande e Piccola 
[Moldavia and Wallachia] [...]. La Valachia Grande e Piccola confina dalla banda 
del Greco [i.e. in the East] a Levant col Mar Maggiore [Black Sea]. Sul detto mar 
sono piu luoghi che spettano alla Valachia. Li principali sono Moncastro [Cetatea 
Albă], Licostomo [i.e. Chilia], Bailigo [Brăila, in Wallachia proper]. Confina 
Valachia da Sirocho [i.e. in the South/South-East] con la Bulgaria e la Servia, da 
Greco [meaning here also North-East] con Polonia e Tartaria, da Ponente [i.e. in 
the North/North-West], con Ungaria, verso Transilvania. [...] Un gran contrario 
di guesto re [Matthias Corvinus] e perche essendo lui disceso da Janus [ János/John/ 
Jancho Hunyadi], il qual non era Ungaro nobile, ma Valacho, non di troppo gentil 
parentella [...].’29
27  For further information on the matter: I.-A. Pop, ‘The Names in the Family of King Matthias: From 
Old Sources to Contemporary Historiography’, in Elek Bartha, Róbert Keményfi and Kata Zsófia 
Vincze (eds.), Matthias Rex 1458—1490. Hungary at the Dawn of the Renaissance (Ethnographica et 
folkloristica Carpathica, 17), Debrecen 2012, pp. 11-40.
28  ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, Ungheria, cart. 645. 1491-1536, fasc. [2.] 1492, nn. Because of this 
chronological misplacement, the document was overlooked in the 1800s.
29  ASM, A.D.S., Potenze Estere, Ungheria, cart. 645, fasc. 2, nn. The copy in the Biblioteca Ambrosiana, 
Milan, Codices, R 94, ff. 297r-306r, at ff. 298,r 304r, “entered” the collection signed by Nicolae Iorga, 
Acte şi fragmente privitoare la istoria românilor [Documents and fragments concerning the history of the 
Romanians], III. [1399-1499], Bucharest 1899, p.37.
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In 1472 tensions north of the Lower Danube were rising. Hungary and 
– especially – Moldavia were increasingly interested in an overthrow of Radu 
III. Stephen III had already begun his attacks on Wallachia. He had even burnt 
down Brăila, the only major commercial centre in the Danube area left for Radu 
III after Stephen had taken from him (and the sultan) Chilia in early 1465 
(previously taken by Radu from Matthias). Mehmed II could not allow Stephen 
to have his way.30 When Usun Hassan challenged Mehmed, the latter was 
seemingly focused on Wallachia. Domenico Malipiero, the official historian of 
the Venetian republic, an old politician,, and probably one of the best informed 
persons in the city of St. Mark at that time, recorded these matters.
‘[...] [Mehmed II] ha fatto mettere insieme tutta la zente ce l’ha possuto trazere della 
Grecia, della Valachia e d’altri paesi circonvicini [in order to defend his positions in 
Asia Minor against Usun Hassan] [...].’31 
As Domenico Malipiero was still active on political soil, on several occasions, 
valuable information (including data on Wallachia and Moldavia as well) became 
part of his chronicle only after it was “filtered” by the Venetian administration.32 
This matter is particularly relevant in this context for it seems that Mehmed II was 
about to send his troops against Stephen III, when Usun Hassan attacked, basically 
allowing Stephen III to marry (in September 1472) Mary of Mangop, from Crimean 
Theodoro.33 She was related to both Usun’s wife, and to Zoe Palaeologus, Ivan III of 
Moscow’s wife-to-be. They married in November the same year 1472.34. 
30  For the changes occurred in Stephen’s policy, see Ovidiu Cristea, ‘Prieten prietenului şi duşman 
duşmanului: colaborări militare moldo-otomane în timpul domniei lui Ştefan cel Mare’ [Friend to 
my friend, enemy to my enemy: Moldavian-Ottoman co-operations during the reign of Stephen the 
Great], in Putna, ctitorii ei şi lumea lor [Putna, her Ktitors and their world], Bucharest 2011, pp.75–84. 
Alike in spring 1465, when the tribute of Moldavia was elevated by 50% (from 2,000 to 3,000 ducats), 
but no further action was undertaken against Stephen.
31  [Domenico Malipiero (1428-1515/1516)], Annali veneti dall’anno 1457 al 1500 del Senatore 
Domenico Malipiero ordinati e abbreviati dal senatore Francesco Longo; Parte Ia e IIa degli Anali-Guerra 
co’Turchi-Guerre d’Italia (Archivio Storico Italiano, VII. 1), edited by Antonio Sagredo, Florence 1843 
[hereinafter Malipiero], pp.80–81. (A passage noticed by Papacostea.)
32  See also Giuseppe Gullino, ‘Domenico Malipiero’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani 68 (2007), 
sub voce.
33  For instance Aleksandr A. Vasiliev, The Goths in the Crimea, Cambridge, MA 1936, pp.235–9, 
248–51, 262–6.
34  E.g. Jonathan Harris, ‘A worthless prince? Andreas Palaeologus in Rome, 1465-1502’, Orientalia 
Christiana Periodica 61:2 (1995), 537–54; Thierry Ganchou, ‘Une Kantakouzène, imperatrice de 




We avoid discussing the case of Mary of Mangop for two major reasons. First, 
she is not recorded in any of the preserved contemporary sources discovered so 
far. She is directly mentioned only in a couple of Moldavian chronicles, all based 
mainly on the so-called Anonymous Chronicle of the Land of Moldavia35 and in a well-
informed Russian chronicle (The Chronicle of Hust).36 The rest of the (contemporary) 
information on Mary can be reduced to indirect, contextual sources, such as the one 
regarding John Tzamplakon, her uncle, Venice’s former Greek captain and Stephen 
III’s envoy to Venice37 in spring 1477 (out of these sources, the most important – in 
view of future researches – should be the Venetian administrative document, largely 
neglected so far, concerning the family of Stephen III that had arrived in Venice on 
the eve of Mehmed II’s Moldavian campaign of July-August 1476 and remained 
in Venice until after the campaign38). The second reason is the excessive extreme 
right-wing (whether more pan-Orthodox, pan-European or more nationalist 
ego-Romanian in essence) post-mortem Romanian use “experienced” by Mary of 
Mangop.39 Under such circumstances, any discussion of Mary’s case must be limi-
ted to the available data without further off-beat interpretations. New documents 
will eventually be discovered and scientific research will be resumed in this delicate 
matter as well.
Between Stephen III’s Wallachian victories in the first months of 1471 (the 
conflict between him and Radu III had re-started in 1469) and the events in 
the second half of 1472, an apparent truce seems to have been enacted between 
35  Sources edited and re-edited – under various forms – with minor changes since the 1890s until the 
early 2000s.
36  Hustinskaja lietopiś, in Scriptores Rerum Polonicarum II. Krakow 1874, Appendix, pp.302–15, here 
p.304.
37  In relation to the question of Stephen III’s Byzantine relatives by marriage, see also the text 
published in C[onstantin] N. Sathas (ed.), Documents inédits relatifs à l’histoire de la Grèce au Moyen 
Âge, V, Paris 1883, 211–2.
38  [A<lexandru>. D<imitrie>. Xenopol], ‘Un nou document privitor la Ştefan cel Mare’ [A New 
Document on Stephen the Great], Arhiva 18:7-8 (1907), 364 (re-published, without any reference, by 
Iorga in 1914).
39  For the “fantasy flics”, covered – depending on the audience – by excessive pseudo-scholarly 
knowledge, see “both species” in Ştefan Sorin Gorovei and Maria Magdalena Székely, Maria Asanina 
Paleologhina, o prinţesă bizantină pe tronul Moldovei [Mary Asanina Paleologhina, a Byzantine princess 
on the throne of Moldavia], Suceava 2006, passim; Iidem, ‘Les emblèmes impériaux de la princesse 
Marie Assanine Paléologuine’, Études Byzantines et Post-Byzantines 5 (2006), 49–87; Dan Ioan 
Mureşan, ‘La place de Girolamo Lando, patrician vénetien et titulaire du Patriarcat de Constantinople 
(1474-1497), dans la politique orientale del’Église de Rome’, Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e 
Ricerca Umanistica 8 (2006), 153–258; Idem, ‘Patriarhia ecumenică şi Ştefan cel Mare. Drumul sinuos 
de la surse la interpretare’ [The Ecumenical Patriarchate and Stephen the Great: The Tortuous Path 
between sources and interpretation], in Vasile V. Muntean (ed.), In memoriam Alexandru Elian. 1908-
2008, Timişoara 2008, pp.87–180.
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Moldavia and Wallachia, most likely following the Sultan’s intervention. It was 
at this moment that, also in view of his Crimean marriage, Stephen sent his and 
Evdochia Olelkovic of Kyiv’s first-born legitimate son, Alexander, as a hostage to 
Istanbul.40 Additional sources to Malipiero’s lines are therefore most needed. In 
comparison to him, Giovanni Maria Angiolello41 had fewer political constraints. 
A well-connected “old Ottoman resident” (he wrote his work after he returned to 
Europe), Angiolello recorded the battle order of Mehmed II’s army prior to his 
decisive confrontation with Usun Hassan in the summer of 1473. According to 
him, the Wallachians were under the command of Prince Mustafa, Mehmed II’s 
second born – and in those days also his favourite –son, to which Giovanni Maria 
Angioello too was attached. 
‘[...] Il terzo fu Mustafa [i.e. the commander of the third army core of the 
Ottoman host] secondo figliuolo, il quale medesimamente avea trentamila persone, 
tra le quali erano dodicimila Valacchi della Valachia Bassa [in the Middle Ages the 
name was used in the Italian environment for Moldavia in particular, not for 
Wallachia42], e d’essi era capitano uno ch’aveva nome Bataraba [14 months later 
Radu of Wallachia, from the Dracul branch of the Basarab dynasty, lost his 
throne to Basarab III Laiotă, from the rival branch Dan,43 supported by Stephen 
III (Basarab III was the brother of Wladislaw II, dethroned by Vlad III on the 
eve of the battle of Belgrade in 1456, when Vlad and Stephen betrayed John 
Hunyadi and had gone over to Mehmed44)], e questo colonnello avea da alloggiare 
alla sinistra del Turco [...].’45 
40  The edited dossier of these matters can be found also in Alexandru Simon, ‘Quello ch’ e apresso el 
Turcho. About A Son of Stephen the Great’, Annuario del Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica 
5-6 (2004-2005), 139–64.
41  For an overview: Franz Babinger, ‘Giovanni Maria Angiolello’, Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 
III (1961), sub voce. 
42  In these matters, see for instances the edited sources collected since the late 1960s in Adolf 
Armbruster’s synthesis Romanitatea românilor. Istoria unei idei [The Romanity of the Romanians: 
The History of an Idea], Bucharest 19932.
43  A. D. Xenopol, ‘Lupta dintre Drăculeşti şi Dăneşti’ [The Conflict between the Draculs and the 
Dans], Analele Academiei Române. Memoriile Secţiunii Istorice [The Annals of the Romanian Academy: 
The Memoirs of the Historical Class], 2nd ser. 30 (1907), 183–272. (It is still the main analysis of the 
disputes between the branches of the House of Basarab.)
44  For the sources, see Alexandru Simon, ‘Milanese Perspectives on the Hungarian Events of 1456’, 
in Valeriu Sârbu  and C. Luca (eds.), Miscellanea Historica et Archaeologica In Honorem Professoris Ionel 
Cândea, Brăila 2008, pp.249–60.
45  [Giovanni Maria Angiolello (c. 1451-c. 1525)] Donado Da Lezze, Historia Turchesca, ed. I[oan]. 
Ursu, Bucharest 1910 [hereinafter Angiolello], pp.44–6. Unfortunately, a much needed modern edition 
of the text has not been published so far.
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At the battle of Başkent, the Wallachian troops were stationed in a 
strategic position that implied a significant amount of trust from the Ottoman 
commander. The position is even more relevant if we compare it to the – 
secondary controlled– position held by Laiotă’s troops at the battle of Vaslui in 
January 1475. Deserted by Stephen in November 1474, Basarab III had gone 
over to the Turks, and still – at Vaslui – he changed sides at the decisive moment, 
significantly contributing to Stephen’s victory. A year later, back in the Ottoman 
camp, Laiotă with approximately 10,000 Wallachian soldiers, was held – at the 
battle of Războieni/Valea Albă at the end of July 1476 – by Sultan Mehmed II 
in a sort of enclosure in order to avoid new “Wallachian surprises”.46 Given these 
aspects, the explanation for the strategic position entrusted to the Wallachians at 
Başkent must be connected to their location (they were far away from their native 
lands on a foreign, strange, soil) and to their origins (most of these Wallachians 
were Radu III’s subjects, who had been loyal to Mehmed II since his youth). 
Consequently, unless Basarab III, Stephen’s man was not in command of all 
the troops sent from Wallachia and Moldavia to Asia Minor. He himself later 
wrote to the Transylvanian Saxon city of Braşov that he had spent some time 
with the Turks, while the repeated Ottoman “pardons” granted to him in 1474 
and 1475 indicate that he enjoyed a special relation with Ottoman authorities. 
It might further explain why Stephen III chose him as an alternative for Radu 
III in 1471, when it was still unclear how far Stephen was willing to go in his 
conflict with the Wallachian favourite of the sultan. The name of Basarab given 
by Angiolello to the commander of the Wallachians at Başkent  has to be linked 
with the one commonly used to designate a Wallachian political and military 
command between the Southern Carpathians and the Lower Danube.47 This 
would be – in classic manner – the safest interpretative option.
However, Pietro Caterino Zeno also used Basarab for the commander of 
the Wallachian forces. Equally an eyewitness of the battle of Başkent/Otlukbeli, 
on 11 August 1473 (earlier, at Tercan, Usun Hassan, seemed to have won a 
decisive victory), the Venetian envoy in the Orient, where he was well-connected 
(his wife, Violante, the daughter of Niccolò Crispo, Lord of Syros and Duke of 
the Archipelago, and of Valentia Eudoxia Comnena, was the niece of Theodora 
Kantacuzenos, Usun Hassan’s wife), simply wrote that: 
46  For a preliminary overview of these Wallachian and Moldavian political changes: Simon 2011, 
79–96.
47  See further Ovidiu Cristea and Nagy Pienaru, ‘Ţara Românească, Moldova şi Bătălia de la 
Başkent’ [Wallachia, Moldavia and the Battle of Başkent], Analele Putnei 8:1 (2012), 17–36, especially 
22–5.
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‘[...] Il terzo [the third army core of the Ottoman host led by] Mustafa 
parimente di trenta mila [30,000 soldiers], computati dodici mila Valacchi [12,000 
men] condotti da Basaraba lor Capitano, che venne in aiuto del Turco in quella 
Guerra. [It is highly noteworthy that Basarab was viewed as the captain of the 
Wallachians not only on that occasion ,and that he had come to aid the Ottoman 
Turks, not so much as a vassal, Pietro Caterino Zeno’s wording would have been 
different in that case, but as an ally] [...]’.48 
Zeno’s mission in Asia Minor (1471-1473) came to an end with Usun 
Hassan’s defeat. Zeno left for Poland and Casimir IV Jagiello and then for 
Hungary and King Matthias Corvinus (1474). Before retiring from diplomacy 
(he was awarded a seat in the Venetian Council of the Ten), Caterino Zeno 
played an important part in the Venetian-Ottoman negotiations of 1475 that 
led to the conclusion of a six months truce. Zeno was also the one to whom 
Mara Branković, Murad II’s widow, confided that the Turks had never suffered 
a greater defeat than at Vaslui.49 The “eastern trust” enjoyed by him puts his 
narrative in a different light.
A few aspects of the case of captain Basarab must therefore be emphasized. 
1. The name of the leader of the Walachian troops was a princely name, and 
it is therefore quite unlikely that Radu III, fearful for his rule, would have 
employed a captain who had a right to the throne (Mehmed II was a politician 
and could have removed Radu III from the throne, irrespective of their 
“friendship”, and replaced him with a more capable commander). 2. Stephen’s 
(forced) involvement in Asia Minor against Usun indicates that he was not fully 
determined/ capable of engaging the sultan while the latter faced his Muslim ne-
mesis. Hence, Stephen’s decision to attack Walachia after Usun Hassan’s defeat 
can be explained by chiefly three reasons: Venetian money, Venetian (and maybe 
also Roman and Hungarian) political promises and/ or threats (e.g. overrunning 
Moldavia with Tartars, ‘bought’ by Venice against the Ottomans since 1472) and 
the fact that Stephen’s downfall seemed inevitable once Radu III’s main army 
was back in Walachia and Venetian Scutari (attacked by the Rumelian Ottoman 
forces immediately after their victorious return from Asia Minor), was taken. 4. 
48  [Caterino Zeno], De i commentarii del viaggio in Persia di M. Caterino Zeno il K. & delle 
guerre fatte nell’imperio persiano, dal tempo di Ussuncassano, Venice, 1558, ff. 15v-16r. In this case as 
well, a modern edition is much needed. 
49  For the main information on him and his actions, see Laurence Lockhart, Raimondo Morozzo 
Della Rocca and Maria-Francesca Tiepolo (eds.), I viaggi degli ambasciatori veneti Barbaro e 
Contarini, Rome 1973, pp.12–3, 268-9, 299–300; Roberto Almagia, ‘Giosafat Barbaro’, Dizionario 
Biografico degli Italiani 6 (1964), sub voce, F. Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time, ed. William 
C. Hickmann, Princeton, 1978, pp.261–2, 305–6, 319–22, 326–7.
102
Alexandru Simon
In this last respect, in case we trust a report from autumn 147450 which stated 
that the ruler (Laiotă) enthroned by Stephen III in Radu III’s place was on good 
terms with the sultan since before his rise to the throne, and if we suppose that 
captain Basarab in Asia Minor was in fact Laiotă, who commanded Stephen ’s 
troops (Angiolello, who also accompanied Mehmed on his Moldavian campaign 
of 1476, clearly stated that these troops were from Walachia Bassa), a hypothesis 
becomes rather plausible: Stephen III thought of dethroning Radu III, without 
any major Ottoman consequences (at least until Stephen had more regional 
support), because he was to replace Radu III with a man (Basarab III Laiotă) 
who enjoyed Sultan Mehmed’s favour. Nonetheless, the Ottoman reaction 
quickly erased such possibility, although, if we are to confide in Magno and his 
sources, those eager to attack Stephen in the sultan’s name in 1474, were no elite 
soldiers.
Unfortunately many Venetian contemporary sources were lost throughout 
the centuries. Luckily, some of them were directly used by the official “spokesmen” 
of the Republic. The Wallachian issue of 1473 also comes up in the work of 
Magno. He was of the best informed Venetian historians, chiefly because he was 
able to use – almost a century after the events – the Venetian archives largely lost 
to flames in the 1570s.51 Magno stated that both Radu and Stephen sent troops 
to Mehmed for his campaign against Usun.
First, ad annum 1472 (probably in connection to the second half of the 
year), Stefano Magno wrote:
‘[...] Mahumet [Mehmed II] interim inteso la fuga del fiolo suo dall cittade del 
Coyno [Konya], et come riddutto era in Caucassus, dove fatti havea aminar tutta gente de 
Natolia [Anatolia] quello rittorno in Constantinopoli [...] et licencio le nave de Zenovesi 
che rettenute havea a Pera, lequal parti da Pera [...] et con grande celeritate tutta zente 
de Grecia commando parrere in la Natolia [...] et dimando aiudo de zente a i vaivoda 
signori de Valachia Bassa [Moldavia] et Alte [Wallachia], che li mandi piu zente pueleo, 
50  ASM, A.D:S., Potenze Estere, Turchia, cart. 647. 1455-1499, fasc. [2.], Corfu, nn (3 October 1474). 
‘[...] Lo Segnore de Volaquia Alta [Radu III] e morto, lo Segno<re> de la Velaquia Basa [Moldavia was also 
known as Lower Walachia or as Little Walachia/ Valachia Minor] et intrato dentro lo paise et a un Segnore a 
lo so modo [Basarab III], lo quale metra apertene a lo Turco, lo qualle ge ne mandato uno con grande pessansa 
lo aceterano, sera contento caxo que no se terne ara goera con lo Segno<re> da la Velaquia Basa et con quelo que o 
facto, laqualle cossa fosse teneamo no poria fare, ny atendere a l’armata que de sopra dicto e [...].’ Radu however 
died only in the early 1475 near (royal Hungarian) Făgăraş.
51  Magno (c. 1499-1572)’s manuscripts have returned to scholarly attention: Oliver-Jens Schmitt, 
‘Die venezianischen Jahrbücher des Stefano Magno (ÖNB Codd. 6215-6217) als Quelle zur 
albanischen und epirotischen Geschichte im späten Mittelalter (1433-1477)’, in Konrad Clewing 
and O.J. Schmitt (eds.), Südosteuropa von vormoderner Vielfalt und nationalstaatlicher Vereinheitlichung. 
Festschrift für Edgar Hösch, München 2005, pp.133–83, mainly 173–9.
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la mandoli el tribute d’anni 3 [fact confirmed by Ottoman chronicles52] [..] fo dicto 
havere in dicto persone 200m [200,000 men]. Fo dicto i vaivoda de Valacchia havessi 
promesso persone 12m [12,000 men] [...].’ 
Yet, less than two years later (in spring 1474), Wallachia and Moldavia were no 
longer loyal Ottoman tools.
‘[...] El signoro Turco [Mehmed II] intervine con detta la zente adi 21 mazo [21 
May] le fe provocans da Constantinopoli andar in Adrinopoli ad espedire el numero 
execrito in Valachia. Ma avanti l’esercito adunare, primi furono alquni Tambelani che 
vivano a quelli confini, i quali volve enver primi pavone con 15m [15,000 men] in nu-
mero persone in Valachia in lequal paese entradi, i Valachi, che messe s’havevanno insidiere 
deno fueri in un nebito, et occuparli tutti i passi, et revoli de lugo, de violi tutti a pelli. 
Questo se ha per lettera dal ultimo zugno [30  June] de Venetia,<e>de 10 luglio[10 July; 
Magno used dispacci from the 1470s as references] al qual lugo andado el domino 
Signore con grande viletudine [...].’53 
It is nevertheless difficult to tell which Wallachia was the Ottoman target. 
Moldavia had already been attacked in December 1473.54 It is more plausible that 
by June 1474 Wallachia had become a battlefield.
Magno revealed that there was much more to the Wallachian story of 1473. 
An – in fact invaluable – Ottoman source sheds additional light on the matter. 
Me’ali’s – still unedited – chronicle claimed that – after Mehmed II returned from 
Asia Minor to Istanbul (the return did not take place sooner than December 1473, 
after Stephen’s Wallachian campaign of November), the sultan ordered Isa Beg 
to enter Moldavia. An offspring of the Mihaloğlu family, of Serbian, and maybe 
also Wallachian (Basarab) princely origins,55 the latter successfully accomplished 
52  See also Mustafa Ali Mehmet, ‘Un document turc concernant le kharatch de la Moldavie et de la 
Valachie aux XVe et XVIe siècles’, Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes, 5:1-2 (1967), 265–74. (With 
a review of the question.)
53  The original text: Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna, Codices, [Stefano Magno] Annali 
veneti e del mondo [1443-1478] (=Cods. 6215-6217), I. Ad annum 1472, f. 499v; Ad annum 1473, ff. 561v, 
576v; Ad annum 1474, f. 585r..
54  Alexandru Simon, ‘În jurul bătăliei de la Vaslui (1474-1475). Consideraţii asupra relaţiilor dintre 
Moldova, Ţara Românească şi Regatul Ungariei’ [Around the Battle of Vaslui (1474-1475): On the 
Relations between Moldavia, Wallachia and the Hungarian Kingdom], Studia Universitatis Babeş-
Bolyai. Historia 49:2 (2004), 3–26, here pp.9–12, 14.
55  Alexandru Simon, ‘Descreşterea Moldovei sub Bogdan III şi ridicarea Ţării Româneşti sub Neagoe 
Basarab’ [The Decline of Moldavia under Bogdan III and the Rise of Wallachia under Neagoe Basarab], 
in Nicolae Caba (ed.), Sfântul voievod Neagoe Basarab. 1512-2012 [The Holy Voivode Neagoe Basarab. 
1512-2012], Bucharest 2012, pp.431–60, here p.435.
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his task together with 10,000 soldiers.56 The “Venetian style” relations57 between 
Stephen III and Prince Djem/Cem (and his entourage), in view of what seems to 
have been a “sketch” of a – failed – coup de palais, increased Mehmed’s anger.58 The 
fourteen year old Djem had been entrusted by his father with the defence of the 
European borders while he was away on campaign against Usun Hassan. Alike his 
father’s – still – Moldavian vassal, Djem had been in close contacts with the future 
Serenissima.59
In more than one respect, the events of 1473-1474, recall those of 1443-1444. 
Then Mehmed II became heir to the throne and afterwards even sultan with the aid 
of Mara Brankovic, and of her – possibly – relative, Skanderbeg, the latter engineered 
the assassinated Alaeddin Ali Çelebi, the favourite son of Murad II, who was under 
immense pressure from King Vladislaus I (III) Jagiello of Poland and Hungary and 
John Hunyadi, Voivode of Transylvania.60 To what extent, Mahmud Anghelović, of 
princely Serbian origins as well, and thrice Grand Vezir (the last time he had been 
removed from office by Mehmed II after his return to Istanbul at the end of 1473), 
was involved in the “conspiracies “of 1473-1474 (in spring 1474, Mustafa lost his 
life) remains unclear. He was certainly imprisoned (in May-June, after Mustafa’s 
death) and then executed ( July 1474). One of the main charges brought against 
him was that he had allowed (as in “had freed”) the Eflaki to move.61 Eflak was the 
Ottoman term for Wallachian (Wallachia proper was Kara Eflak/Black Wallachia). 
Another episode from Me’ali’s chronicle has to be recalled.62 Süleyman, Djem’s 
tutor (a lālā), went virtually mad when he saw a Moldavian envoy in Adrianople, 
where Djem resided. Rapidly informed about the outcome of Başkent, Stephen 
56  For the source and its peculiarities, see Mihail Guboglu, ‘Izvoare turco-persane privind relaţiile lui 
Ştefan cel Mare cu Imperiul Otoman’ [Turkish-Persian Sources on the Relations between Stephen the 
Great and the Ottoman Empire], Revista Arhivelor 59:2 (1982), 34–5; Cristea-Pienaru 2012, 30.
57  For such ties: Theoharis Stavrides, The Sultan of Vezirs: The Life and Times of Ottoman Grand Vezir 
Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453-1474), Leiden/Boston/Cologne 2001, pp.181–3. The ‘Djem case’ 
apparently predated the 1480s.
58  See N. Iorga, ‘Veneţia în Marea Neagră. III. Originea legăturilor cu Ştefan cel Mare şi mediul 
politic al dezvoltării lor’ [Venice in the Black Sea. III. The Origins of the Relations with Stephen 
the Great and the Political Environment of their Development], in Idem, Studii asupra evului mediu 
românesc [Studies on the Romanian Middle Ages], ed. Ş. Papacostea, Bucharest 1984, pp.230–96, at 
nos. 1-2, pp.251–2. (The study, with its appendix, was first published in 1914).
59  New researches in the Venetian archives, related to the documents published by Iorga, are of crucial 
importance.
60  For an overview: O.-J. Schmitt, Skanderbeg: der neue Alexander auf dem Balkan, Regensburg 2009, 
pp.87–9.
61  The relevant contemporary sources were quoted and discussed by Stavrides 2001, 183, 342.
62  In these matters: Guboglu 1982, 34–5; Cristea-Pienaru 2012, 30–1.
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had sent his men to Djem. Even if we presume that the news had reached him 
via the Black Sea, we cannot date the encounter in Adrianople prior to October 
1473, a month before Stephen III’s major attack on Wallachia. In return, it can be 
stated that Stephen III entered Wallachia some two weeks after his envoys, who 
had met with Süleyman, returned from the empire. Their encounter with Süleyman 
had been dramatic. When Stephen III’s envoys reached the court of Djem, news 
on Usun Hassan’s victory and Mehmed’s death had multiplied. At least this is the 
Ottoman version of the events; but similar information (stories) circulated also 
in the Italian environment. Süleyman had counselled Djem to proclaim himself 
sultan. Djem followed his advice. But Mehmed returned, Djem went into hiding 
for a while. He returned and was pardoned. After Mustafa’s death, Djem received 
his position at Konya, in Asia Minor. Süleyman and other councillors of Djem were 
however executed.63 Sultan Mehmed II showed no mercy.
Coincidences were few in number also in the 1470s. Because of the manner 
in which Me’ali’s chronicle “restructured”/ “reshaped data”, facts and events it is 
difficult to tell how much Stephen (and his men) and Süleyman knew of what 
had happened at Başkent when the meeting of Adrianople took place (the former 
probably knew more). At any rate, following Djem’s proclamation as Sultan, the 
arrival of the Moldavian envoys placed Süleyman in a highly difficult position. 
If Stephen had any doubts that he had to attack, the return of his envoys from 
Adrianople erased them. In early November, Stephen III entered Wallachia.64 The 
Ottomans immediately threatened Matthias.65 In February 1474, Ali burnt down 
Oradea.66 For Mehmed II it was clear that Stephen III had been acting with King 
Matthias’s support, who was coming out of his “crusader retirement” enabled – 
because of the Transylvanian rebellion and his Moldavian failure in 1467 – since 
spring 1468 by prolonged two year truces with the Sultan.67 Between the two 
63  In this matter, see the extensive analysis with further references in Cristea-Pienaru 2012, 30–1.
64  Cronica moldo-germană [The Moldavian-German Chronicle], in P[etre]. P. Panaitescu (ed.), 
Cronicile slavo-romne din secolele XV-XVI publicate de Ioan Bogdan [The 15th-16th Century Slavic-
Romanian Chronicles published by Ioan Bogdan], Bucharest 1959, pp.28–37, at p.29. (A propaganda 
work drafted around 1502 for Stephen’s Habsburg allies.)
65  József Gelciich [and Lajos Thallóczy] (eds.), Diplomatarium relationum reipublicae regasane cum 
regno Hungariae. Raguza és Magyarország összeköttetéseinek oklevéltára, Budapest 1887, no. 385, p.631. 
(The source was frequently neglected.)
66  Aurel Decei, ‘Incursiunea (Akîn) a lui Mihaloglu Ali Beg asupra Orăzii în anul 1474, pe temeiul 
istoriei lui Ibn Kemal’ [Ali Mihaloğlu Beg’s Raid (Akîn) of Oradea according to the Chronicle of Ibn 
Kemal], in Nicolae Edroiu (ed.), Sub semnul lui Clio. Omagiu Acad. Prof. Ştefan Pascu [Under Clio’s 
Sign: Festschrift for Ştefan Pascu], Cluj 1974, pp.291–306.
67  For the edited and unedited sources on the first years of the 1470s, see Alexandru Simon, ‘Between 
the Adriatic and the Black Sea: Matthias Corvinus and the Ottoman Empire after the Fall of 
Negroponte’, Radovi Zavoda za Hrvatsku Povijest 42:2 (2010), 359–75, especially pp. 367–72.
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main traditional Christian monarchs of the region, Frederick III and Casimir IV, 
who thought that they controlled Stephen and had Matthias cornered, the two 
“newcomers”, Matthias Corvinus and Stephen III, without officially breaking off 
relations with Mehmed II until the last months of 1473, had manoeuvred their 
own paths possibly since as early as the summer of 1471 when Stephen III had not 
endorsed the conspiracy68 and the Polish attack on Matthias.69
68  Seemingly the “Vitéz plot”, though poorly enacted, was more far-reaching than usually assumed, 
involving Venice too. New archival researches are required for the analysis of a series of events that 
included the Papal elections of 1471. 
69  E.g. Eudoxiu De Hurmuzaki, Documente privitoare la istoria românilor [Documents regarding the 
history of the Romanians], XV-1. Acte şi scrisori din arhivele oraşelor ardelene Bistriţa, Braşov, Sibiiu, 
1358-1600 [Documents and letters from Archives of the Transylvania cities of Bistriţa, Braşov and 




Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden
László Pósán
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden in der Zeit 
von Hochmeister Albrecht von Brandenburg (1511-1525)
Als Friedrich von Sachsen, der Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens, im Jahre 
1510 starb, reihte sich ein Kreis von politischen Unterstützern hinter Albrecht 
von Brandenburg (Hohenzollern), der von einigen Leitern des Deutschen 
Ordens zum Nachfolger des Hochmeisters auserwählt worden war. In diesem 
Kreis befand sich auch Vladislav II. von Jagiello, König der Ungarn und Böhmen, 
der eine aktive diplomatische Rolle in der Wahl des neuen Hochmeisters spielte: 
Er schrieb mehrere Briefe an die höheren Amtsträger des Ordens, worin er 
sie um die Unterstützung Albrechts bat.1 Über die Wahl des Hochmeisters 
korrespondierte er selbst mit seinem jüngeren Bruder Sigismund, dem polnisch-
litauischen König.2 Sie trafen sich persönlich am 17. März 1511 in Breslau in 
Schlesien, um über diese Sache zu unterhandeln.3 Etliche Gründe trugen dazu 
bei, dass der ungarisch-böhmische König in der Wahl des neuen Hochmeisters 
des Deutschen Ordens eine so aktive Rolle spielte. Einerseits gab es familiäre 
Gründe: Der Kandidat Albrecht von Brandenburg stammte aus der Ehe von 
dem brandenburgischen Kurfürsten Friedrich mit Sophia, der Schwester von 
Vladislav, mütterlicherseits war er Neffe sowohl des ungarischen als auch des 
polnischen Königs.4 Georg, der andere brandenburgische Neffe von Vladislav II 
und Bruder von Albrecht, kam schon 1505 nach Ungarn und erhielt sehr schnell 
eine wichtige einflussreiche Rolle am Hof. Er wurde auch der Adoptivsohn des 
Königs genannt.5 Das Haus von Brandenburg war ein fester Unterstützer von 
Kaiser Maximilian I. Es ist deshalb kein Zufall, dass Georg von Brandenburg 
in dem Jahr in Ofen ankam, als Vladislav nach einer Versöhnung mit den 
1  Walther Hubatsch und Erich Joachim (Hrsg.), Regesta Historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae 
Theutonicorum 1198-1525. Pars I: Index Tabularii Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum. Regesten zum 
Ordensbriefarchiv, Göttingen 1973. III. no. 19376, 19381. [Weiterhin: Hubatsch-Joachim 1973]
2  Ibid., no. 19397. 
3  Ibid., no. 19400.
4  Maike Sach, Hochmeister und Grossfürst: die Beziehungen zwischen dem Deutschen Orden in 
Preußen und dem Moskauer Staat um die Wende zur Neuzeit (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte 
des östlichen Europa, 62), Stuttgart 2002, pp.170–1. [Weiterhin: Sach 2002]; Péter Kulcsár, 
A Jagelló-kor [Die Zeit der Jagiellonen], Budapest 1989,  pp.104-6. [Weiterhin: Kulcsár 1989]
5  Zoltán Csepregi: ‘“… ich will kain fleis mit sparen…” – Königin Maria von Ungarn und das 
Haus Brandenburg’ in Martina Fuchs und Orsolya Réthelyi (Hrsg.), Maria von Ungarn (1505-




Habsburgern strebte, um den Adelskreis um den machthungrigen Aristokraten 
János Szapolyai herum in Schach zu halten. Szapolyai bat um die Hand von 
Anna, der Tochter von Vladislav, die damals noch ein Kind war, und als er mit 
einem Korb abgefertigt wurde, richtete er sich öffentlich gegen den König. 
Vladislav bat den Kaiser um Hilfe, der im Sommer 1505 Truppen an die 
ungarisch-österreichische Grenze schickte und mehrere Städte und Burgen 
eroberte. In dieser Zeit kam Georg von Brandenburg nach Ungarn. Vladislav 
schloss im Frühling 1506 in Wienerneustadt mit Maximilian I. einen Vertrag: 
Die Tochter von Vladislav werde als Erwachsene den Enkel des Kaisers, und 
den zukünftigen Sohn von Vladislav werde Maria, die Enkelin von Maximilian, 
heiraten. Wenn Vladislav stürbe, kämen seine Kinder unter die Vormundschaft 
des Kaisers. Auch die Punkte des Friedens mit den Habsburgern vom 7. 
November 1491, abgeschlossen in Pressburg, denenzufolge bei einem Mangel 
an einem männlichen Thronfolger die Habsburger die ungarisch-böhmische 
Krone erben, wurden bestätigt.6 Albrecht nahm 1509 an einem Feldzug von 
Kaiser Maximilian gegen Venedig teil, wo er schwer verwundet wurde. Nach 
seiner Erholung reiste er nach Ungarn, um seinen Bruder Georg zu besuchen. 
Georg heiratete noch in demselben Jahr Beatrix von Frangepan/Frankopan, 
die Witwe von Johannes Corvinus, dem Sohn von König Matthias Corvinus, 
und wurde so Mitglied der ungarischen Aristokratie. Während seines Besuchs 
traf er auch seinen Onkel König Vladislav.7 Andererseits gab es auch politische 
Gründe, warum Vladislav die Wahl von Albrecht von Brandenburg zum 
Hochmeister diplomatisch aktiv unterstützte. Er versuchte János Szapolyai 
und seinen Kreis von machtbesessenen Adligen in Schach zu halten und die 
Beziehungen zu den Habsburgern zu stärken. Dies konnte er am einfachsten 
durch die familiären Beziehungen, durch das Haus von Brandenburg erreichen. 
Die Vereinbarung mit Maximilian in Wienerneustadt von 1506 hatte auch 
außenpolitische Folgen. In den Konflikten zwischen den Habsburgern und den 
polnischen Jagiellonen (König Alexander und Sigismund) stellte der Kaiser 
infrage, ob Danzig und Elbing unter der Herrschaft der polnischen Krone 
stehen, und belegte sie am 5. Juni 1497 mit der Reichsacht.8 Er trat eindeutig als 
6  Kulcsár 1989, 82, 106.; László Pósán, Németország a középkorban [Deutschland im Mittelalter], 
Debrecen 2003, p.361. [Weiterhin: Pósán 2003]
7  Sach 2002,170-1.
8  Ernst Hoffmann, ‘Danzigs Verhältnis zum Deutschen Reich in den Jahren 1466-1526’, 
Zeitschrift des Westpreußischen Geschichtsvereins 53 (1910), 11–14. [Weiterhin: Hoffmann 1910]; 
Marian Biskup (Hrsg.), Acta Stanów Prus Królewskich. Warszawa/Poznań/Toruń 1975, V. III. no. 
370. [Weiterhin: ASPK]; Christoph Beyers des Älteren Danziger Chronik, in Theodor Hirsch, Max 
Toeppen und Ernst Strehlke (Hrsg.), Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum Bd. V. Leipzig 1874, p.464. 
[Weiterhin:  SRP V.]
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Unterstützer des Deutschen Ordens auf und erkannte die Gebiete des Ordens 
als Gebiete des Reiches an. Ab 1506 stand Vladislav an der Seite von Kaiser 
Maximilian.9 Der ungarisch-böhmische König unterstützte diplomatisch den 
Deutschen Orden schon während der Hochmeisterschaft von Friedrich von 
Sachsen und versuchte in den Konflikten zwischen dem Orden und den Polen 
zu vermitteln. Zu der Besprechung im Juli 1510 im polnischen Posen schickten 
der Kaiser, der polnisch-litauische König Sigismund, der sächsische Herzog 
(der Bruder des Großmeisters Friedrich von Sachsen) und auch Vladislav 
ihre Gesandten.10 Da Vladislav mit Maximilian eine Allianz schloss und der 
Kaiser zusammen mit dem Deutschen Orden dem polnisch-litauischen König 
gegenüberstand, suchte der Krakauer Hof Kontakte zu der ungarischen inneren 
Opposition, den Anhängern von János Szapolyai. Szapolyai bat im Herbst 
1510 wieder um die Hand von Prinzessin Anna, der Tochter von Vladislav, 
aber er wurde wieder mit einem Korb abgefertigt.11 Für König Sigismund war 
die Wahl von Albrecht zum Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens trotz der 
familiären Beziehungen jedoch auch eine Bedrohung. Er hatte nämlich einen 
viel breiteren politischen Hintergrund und viel mehr Unterstützer als sein 
Vorgänger. Er drohte dem Bischof von Ermland Lukas Watzenrode in einem 
Brief vom 17. Januar 1511 mit einem militärischen Auftritt, wenn der neu zu 
wählende Hochmeister den Frieden von Thorn von 1466 nicht anerkenne. Er 
mobilisierte auch die Truppen der Grenzgebiete.12 Der Frieden von Thorn, der 
den 13 jährigen Krieg (1453-1466)13 abschloss, wurde weder vom Papst, noch 
vom Kaiser anerkannt. Der Krieg wurde zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und 
dem Preußischen Bund geführt, wurde militärisch von den Polen unterstützt, 
und hatte zum Ergebnis, dass der Orden fast die Hälfte seines Gebietes verlor 
und die Oberhoheit der polnischen Krone anerkennen musste. Für den Papst 
war es nach kanonischem Recht inakzeptabel, dass der Deutsche Orden, als 
eine Gemeinschaft der Mönche, Vasall einer weltlichen Macht ist, der Kaiser 
9  Maike Sach, ‘Hat Karl V. “Die Brieff“ wirklich erhalten? Überlegungen zu den Hintergründen 
eines russischen Schreibens im Königsberger Ordensbriefarchiv’, in Eckhard Hübner, Ekkehard 
Klag und Jan Kusler (Hrsg.), Zwischen Christianisierung und Europäisierung. Beiträge zur 
Geschichte Osteuropas in Mittelalter und früher Neuzeit. Festschrift für Peter Nitsche zum 65. 
Geburtstag. (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, 51.), Stuttgart 1998, 
p.344. [Weiterhin: Sach 1998]
10  Paul Pole, ‘Preussische Chronik’ in SRP V. 271–88.
11  Kulcsár 1989, 115.
12  AT I. no. 165.
13  Erich Weise (Hrsg.), Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert, 
Marburg 1955, II. no. 403.
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betrachtete jedoch Preußen als Teil des Reiches.14 Die Anerkennung des Friedens 
von Thorn spielte in der Beziehung zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen 
in politischer Hinsicht eine wichtige Rolle. Der vierköpfigen Regentenrat, der 
noch vom Großmeister Friedrich von Sachsen 1510 benannt worden war, bevor 
er nach Deutschland fuhr, wo er am 14. Dezember 1510 starb,15 informierte am 
27 Januar 1511 die Stände von Ostpreußen über die Besprechungen zur Wahl 
des neuen Hochmeisters.16 Der polnische König Sigismund schrieb in einem 
Brief an seinen Schwager Friedrich, Markgraf von Brandenburg, dass sein Neffe 
die Anerkennung des Friedens von Thorn und die Ableistung eines Treueids auf 
die polnische Krone nicht verweigern solle.17 Um seine politische Unterstützung 
zu beweisen, ermächtigte die Urkunde von Kaiser Maximilian vom 3. Mai 1511 
die norddeutschen Fürsten militärisch auftreten zu dürfen, wenn Polen den 
Deutschen Orden wegen der Verweigerung des Treueides und der Anerkennung 
des Friedens von Thorn angreifen würde.18 Das preußische Kapitel des Ordens 
sah das eindeutige politische Engagement des Kaisers und des Reiches und 
berücksichtigte die Möglichkeit eines militärischen Konfliktes. Es traf am 9. 
Mai 1511 in Königsberg die Entscheidung, die Burgen zu verstärken, die Anzahl 
der Garnisonen zu erhöhen sowie Lebensmittel- und Kriegsmateriallager 
anzulegen.19 Der Kaiser teilte dem zukünftigen Hochmeister am 28. Juni 1511 
mit, dass er Danzig und Elbing wieder mit der Reichsacht belegt hat, und verbot 
damit den deutschen Hansehändlern mit diesen Städten Handel zu treiben.20 
Da Kasimir, der andere Bruder von Albrecht von Brandenburg, unmittelbar am 
14  Marian Biskup, ‘Das Ende des Deutschordensstaates Preußen im Jahre 1525’, in Josef 
Fleckenstein und Manfred Hellmann (Hrsg.), Die geistlichen Ritterorden Europas, Sigmaringen 
1980, p.408. [Weiterhin: Biskup 1980]; Ottokar Israel, Das Verhältnis des Hochmeisters des 
Deutschen Ordens zum Reich im XV. Jahrhundert, Marburg 1952. p.32, 52.; László Pósán, ‘“… 
quod terra ipsa sub monarchia imperii est”. Az Imperium Romanum és a Német Lovagrend 
állama a középkorban’ [Das Imperium Romanum und der Staat des Deutschen Ordens im 
Mittelalter], in Tibor Frank (Hrsg.), Németföldről Németországba. Magyar kutatók tanulmányai 
a német történelemről [Von deutschem Gebiet nach Deutschland. Studien ungarischer Forscher 
über die deutsche Geschichte], Budapest 2012, 17–38.; Wojciech Hejnosz, ‘Der Friedensvertrag 
von Thorn (Toruń) 1466 und seine staatsrechtliche Bedeutung’, Acta Poloniae Historica 17 (1968), 
105–22.
15  Sach 2002, 171.
16  Max Toeppen (Hrsg.), Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens 
1458-1525, Leipzig 1886, V. no. 202. [Weiterhin: ASP V.]
17  Erich Joachim, Die Politik des letzten Hochmeisters in Preußen Albrecht von Brandenburg, Berlin 
1892, I. no. 20. [Weiterhin: Joachim 1892]
18  Ibid., no. 30.
19  Sach 2002,179.
20  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19444.
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kaiserlichen Hof diente,21 sah man in Krakau in den antipolnischen Schritten 
von Maximilian eine List des Hauses von Brandenburg und interpretierte die 
ungarische Rolle von Georg von Brandenburg und seinen Einfluss am Hof von 
Vladislav auch in diesem Zusammenhang.
Albrecht wurde offiziell am 6. Juli 1511 zum Großmeister des Deutschen 
Ordens gewählt, aber er kam erst viel später, Ende des Herbstes 1512,  in 
Königsberg, im Zentrum des Deutschen Ordens, an. Davor besuchte er 
Maximilian, um sich der Unterstützung des Kaisers zu versichern und noch 
mehr Unterstützer in Deutschland zu finden. Zu diesem Zweck reiste er nach 
Sachsen, Brandenburg und Franken und versuchte die Ableistung des Treueids 
zu verzögern, die der polnische König erwartete.22 Schon vor seiner Wahl zum 
Großmeister bereitete sich Albrecht darauf vor, deutsche fürstliche Unterstützer 
für den Deutschen Orden zu finden. Deswegen beauftragte er den Großkomtur 
Simon von Drache, den Bischof von Pomesanien, Job von Dobeneck und 
den Bischof von Samland Günther von Bünau am 14. Februar 1511 mit der 
Regierung der Gebiete des Deutschen Ordens.23 Der Großmeister nahm im 
Februar 1512 am Reichstag in Nürnberg teil, um fürstliche Unterstützer für 
den Deutschen Orden zu finden.24 Er führte im Mai 1512 mit den Ständen 
des Mainzer Kurfürstentums über die Unterstützung des Deutschen Ordens 
Verhandlungen,25 und im Landtag von Trier wandte er sich an die Stände mit 
der Bitte, ein Söldnerheer von 5000 Soldaten ein Jahr lang zu finanzieren, um 
Preußen militärisch helfen zu können. Er schlug vor, dass die Stände des Reiches, 
der Kaiser und der Deutsche Orden eine Armee von 20000 Soldaten aufstellen 
und damit Polen angreifen sollten.26 Gleichzeitig bevollmächtigte der Kaiser 
die Fürsten von Brandenburg, Sachsen und Pommern, im Falle eines polnisch-
21  Theodor Hirsch, ‘Casimir, Markgraf von Brandenburg’, in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, 
Leipzig 1876, IV. pp.43–53.
22  Grischa Vercamer, ‘Ein Hochmeister wird zum Herzog: Reaktionen und Schicksal der 
letzten Ordensbrüder in Preussen um das Jahr 1525’, in Roman Czaja und Jürgen Sarnowsky 
(Hrsg.), Die Ritterorden in Umbruchs- und Krisenzeiten (Ordines Militares. Colloquia Torunensia 
Historica, XVI), Toruń 2011, p.216. [Weiterhin: Vercamer 2011]
23  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19392.
24  Marian Biskup, ‘Der Deutsche Orden im Reich, in Preussen und Livland im Banne 
habsburgischer Politik in der zweiten Hälfte des 15. und zu Beginn des 16. Jahrhunderts’, in 
Zenon Hubert Nowak (Hrsg.), Die Ritterorden zwischen geistlicher und weltlicher Macht im 
Mittelalter (Ordines Militares. Colloquia Torunensia Historica, V), Toruń 1990, p.116.; Joachim 
1892, no. 46, 47.
25  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19636.
26  Joachim 1892, no. 51.; Sach 2002, 185–186.
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preußischen Krieges den Großmeister zu unterstützen.27 Aber Albrecht von 
Brandenburg suchte nicht nur im Westen, sondern auch im Osten mögliche 
Partner. So suchte er Kontakte mit dem Großfürsten von Moskau, der in einem 
Brief vom 21. September 1511 an den Hochmeister eine mögliche Allianz gegen 
Polen erwähnte.28 Die Tätigkeit von Albrecht von Brandenburg, die eindeutige 
politische Unterstützung des Kaisers und der norddeutschen Fürsten blieb dem 
polnischen Hof nicht unbekannt. So wurde die Beziehung zwischen Polen und 
dem Deutschen Orden immer gespannter.29 Um seine Position zu verbessern, 
verstärkte der polnische König Sigismund das Band zu János Szapolyai, dem 
Leiter der ungarischen inneren Opposition gegen Sigismunds Bruder Vladislav, 
und bat im Februar 1512 um die Hand von Borbála, der Schwester von Szapolyai.30 
Diese Ehe verschlechterte die Beziehung zum Kaiser, weil Maximilian hierin 
eine Gefahr für die Vereinbarung mit Vladislav in Wienerneustadt sah.31
Neben den politischen Überlegungen gab es auch andere Gründe, warum 
der Hochmeister nach seiner Wahl nicht nach Preußen reiste. Er konnte 
nämlich nicht sicher sein, ob der polnische König seine Einreise in das Gebiet 
des Deutschen Ordens nicht versuchen würde zu verhindern. Einen Monat nach 
seiner Wahl am 4. August 1511 sicherte ihm König Sigismund freies Geleit zu 
und versprach ihm freie Reise durch Polen nach Preußen,32 aber Albrecht war 
misstrauisch. Niemand wollte einen offenen Krieg außer dem Hochmeister. Der 
polnische König Sigismund musste sich schon im Mai 1511 mit den Tataren 
beschäftigen, die Litauen bedrohten. Im nächsten Jahr brach schon wieder der 
27  Joachim 1892, no. 48.
28  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19479.
29  Ezechiel Zivier, Neuere Geschichte Polens I. Die letzten zwei Jagellonen (1506-1572), Gotha 
1915, pp.72–3. [Weiterhin: Zivier 1915]
30  Kulcsár 1989, 115.; István Zombori, ‘Jagelló-Habsburg rendezési kísérlet 1523-ból 
Krzysztof Szydłowiecki naplója alapján’ [Ein Versuch zur Regelung der Verhältnisse zwischen 
den Jagiellonen und Habsburgern aus dem Jahre 1523 auf Grund des Tagebuches von Krzysztof 
Szydłowiecki], in István Zombori (Hrsg.), Krzysztof Szydłowiecki kancellár naplója 1523-ból [Das 
Tagebuch des Kanzlers Szydłowiecki aus dem Jahre 1523], Budapest 2004, p.224. [Weiterhin: 
Zombori 2004]
31  Hoffmann 1910, 27.
32  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19558.
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polnisch-russische Krieg aus, der 10 Jahre lang dauerte.33 Der Kaiser war mit 
dem italienischen Krieg und mit den Konflikten mit den Franzosen beschäftigt. 
1511 wurde ein Bündnis gegen Frankreich, die sog. Heilige Liga, geschlossen, 
die der Befreiung Italiens von Frankreich dienen sollte.34 Maximilian und die 
Fürsten des Reiches sicherten dem Hochmeister ihre politische Unterstützung 
zu und ermunterten ihn die Konflikte zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und 
Polen durch Verhandlungen zu lösen. Auf dem Reichstag in Trier wurde die 
Entscheidung getroffen, die Verhandlungen auf den nächsten Landtag zu 
verschieben.35 Der Kaiser war nur bereit, einen Brief an den polnischen König zu 
schreiben, um die Verhandlungen mit dem Hochmeister anzuregen. Wegen des 
Mangels an militärischer Hilfe vom Reich musste Albrecht von Brandenburg mit 
dem Krakauer Hof Verhandlungen beginnen. Nach mehrmaligem Briefwechsel 
mit den Polen vereinbarten sie, dass sie die umstrittenen Punkte am 24. Juni 
1512 in Krakau besprechen werden. Der polnische König verschob dies aber 
um ein paar Wochen, weil er sich entschloss, mit dem Orden im November 
1512 in Petrikau auf dem polnischen Landtag Verhandlungen zu führen. Er 
wollte damit klar machen, dass Ostpreußen und der Deutsche Orden zu Polen 
gehörten und deswegen die Fragen hinsichtlich des Ordens im Sejm besprochen 
werden müssten.36 Hochmeister Albrecht wollte dies aber nicht anerkennen. 
Deswegen schickte er nicht einen Würdenträger des Ordens, sondern seinen 
Bruder Kasimir, der im Dienst des Kaisers stand, am 2. November 1512 nach 
Petrikau, um in seinem Namen mit dem polnischen König Verhandlungen zu 
führen.37 Die Verhandlungen in Petrikau waren der letzte Versuch, die Konflikte 
zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen auf Grund des Friedens von Thorn 
von 1466 friedlich zu lösen. Die Vereinbarung vom 17. Dezember 1512 sicherte 
dem polnischen König bei der Wahl des Bischofs von Ermland großen Einfluss 
zu und garantierte die Grenzen gezogen im Frieden von Thorn. Polen sah dafür 
von dem Artikel ab, der vorschrieb, auch polnische Adlige in den Deutschen 
33  Norman Davies, Lengyelország története. [Geschichte Polens], Budapest 2006, p.125.; Jerzy 
Topolski, Lengyelország története. [Geschichte Polens] Budapest. 1989, p.106.; Paul Srodecki, 
Antemurale Christianitatis. Zur Genese der Bollwerksrhetorik im östlichen Mitteleuropa an der Schwelle 
vom Mittelalter zur Frühen Neuzeit, Husum 2015. p.294. [Weiterhin: Srodecki 2015]; Pavel 
Jasienica, Jagiellonian Poland, Michigan 1978, p.291.
34  Pósán 2003, 374.
35  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19635.
36  Sach 2002,186.
37  Walther Hubatsch und Erich Joachim (Hrsg.), Regesta Historico-Diplomatica ordinis S. Mariae 
Theutonicorum, 1198-1525. Pars II.: Regesta Privilegiorum Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum. Mit 




Orden aufzunehmen, weil es dafür seit 1466 kein Beispiel mehr gegeben hatte. 
König Sigismund machte Zugeständnisse bei den militärischen Verpflichtungen 
des Deutschen Ordens: Die Ritter sollten nur in dem Falle gegen einen 
christlichen Herrscher eingesetzt werden, wenn Polen angegriffen würde. Dazu 
schenkte der König dem Orden die Burg von Sokal nördlich von Lemberg 
mit dem dazugehörenden Gut und 2000 goldenen Forint vom Einkommen 
der Zisterzienserabteien von Mechow (Miechów) und Koprzywnica, damit 
der Orden in Podolien gegen die Türken und Tataren kämpfen könne.38 Die 
Vereinbarung in Petrikau weckte in Polen die Hoffnung, die preußische Frage 
gelöst zu haben. Der neue Bischof von Ermland Fabian Luzjański meinte am 
4. Dezember 1512, dass am Ende der Verhandlungen ein „ewiger Frieden“ zu 
jedermanns Zufriedenheit geschlossen zu sein schien.39 Der Optimismus der 
Polen beruhte darauf, dass die Würdenträger des Ordens in Ostpreußen auch 
die Bedingungen der Verhandlungen einhalten wollten.40 Maximilian verbot 
aber dem Hochmeister, den Würdenträgern des Ordens und den Ständen 
von Ostpreußen, die Vereinbarung von Petrikau zu akzeptieren, weil er die 
Gebiete des Ordens als Teil des Reiches betrachtete.41 Die brandenburgischen 
Verwandten von Hochmeister Albrecht unterstützten die Ablehnung der 
Vereinbarung.42 Die Ablehnung bedeutete einen offenen Widerspruch gegen 
den polnischen König. Deswegen wurde für Albrecht die Position, der politische 
Einfluss seiner Verwandten besonders wichtig. Aus diesem Grund war der Brief 
des ungarisch-böhmischen Königs Vladislav vom 20. Dezember 1512 an seinen 
Bruder in Krakau, worin er seinem Bruder mitteilte, dass die Gerüchte über den 
Unfall des einflussreichsten Mitgliedes seines Hofes Georg von Brandenburg 
falsch seien, sehr wichtig.43 Die Bedeutung seiner Person war dem Krakauer Hof 
klar, weshalb er Ungarn in einem Brief vom 4. Januar 1513 nach seinen Zustand 
fragte.44
Im Sommer 1512 erklärte Großfürst Wassili von Moskau dem polnisch-
litauischen Staat den Krieg. Der Landmeister des Deutschen Ordens in Livland 
teilte dem Hochmeister am 13. Februar 1513 mit, dass die russischen Truppen 
38  Biskup 1980, 411–2.
39  Ibid.
40  AT II. no. 164.
41  Ibid., no. 229.; Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19702.
42  Biskup 1980, 212.; Sach 2002,190.
43  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19626.
44  Ibid., no. 19653.
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unter Führung von Herzog Michail Glinski Smolensk belagern.45 Mit Blick auf 
die politischen Ziele in Preußen und unter Berücksichtigung der aktuellen 
militärischen Lage forderte Sigismund nach der Verhandlung in Petrikau keinen 
Treueid vom Großmeister, sondern bat um militärische Unterstützung im 
russischen Krieg.46 Hochmeister Albrecht von Brandenburg geriet in eine 
sensible Lage. Der Deutsche Orden, der einmal mit der Absicht gegründet 
worden war, gegen die Feinde des Christentums, des Katholizismus aufzutreten, 
konnte den Kampf gegen das orthodoxe, schismatische Moskau nicht ablehnen. 
Aber so ein Auftreten hätte die antipolnischen preußisch-russischen 
Beziehungen zerstören können. Aber auch aus politischer Überlegung war die 
Bitte des polnischen Königs inakzeptabel, denn der Hochmeister hätte mit der 
Teilnahme am Krieg die Vereinbarung in Petrikau und damit den Friedensvertrag 
von 1466 und die Oberhoheit der polnischen Krone anerkannt. Um Zeit zu 
gewinnen, antwortete der Hochmeister, dass er erst den Reichstag des Staates 
des Deutschen Ordens einberufen wolle.47  Der Reichstag trat im April 1513 
zusammen.48 Davor beriet er über die aktuelle Lage mit den Fürsten von 
Brandenburg und Sachsen, mit dem Landmeister von Livland und mit dem 
Landkomtur der Ballei von Elsass.49 Er bat auch den Heiligen Stuhl in dieser 
Situation um Rat, um eine für den Orden akzeptable Lösung finden zu können, 
da der Papst den Frieden von Thorn nicht anerkannte. Papst Leo X. bat 
Sigismund Anfang April 1513 in einem Brief, seine Beziehung zum Deutschen 
Orden in Ordnung zu bringen.50 Ende des Monats rief er beide Parteien auf, die 
Streitigkeiten durch Verhandlungen beizulegen.51 Der Hochmeister versuchte 
durch seinen Bruder Kasimir, der am kaiserlichen Hof diente, zu erfahren, 
welchen Standpunkt Maximilian in dieser Frage vertrat. Markgraf Kasimir 
äußerte sich in einem Brief vom 25. April 1513 an Albrecht über die Einstellung 
des Kaisers zu den wichtigsten Fragen des damaligen Europa, also auch zur 
Frage des Deutschen Ordens. Er schrieb, dass er vom Kaiser beauftragt wurde, 
den ungarisch-böhmischen König Vladislav zu treffen.52 Der andere Bruder des 
Hochmeisters, Georg von Brandenburg, berichtete am 6. Juni 1513 in einem 
45  Ibid., no. 19653.
46  Ibid., no. 19676, 19677, 19688, 19704, 19722, 19723.
47  Ibid., no. 19676, 19677, 19688, 19704, 19722, 19723.
48  ASP V. no. 204.
49  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19723, 19724, 19725, 19727.
50  Ibid., no. 19723, 19724, 19725, 19727.
51  Ibid., no. 19750.
52  Ibid., no. 19745.
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Brief über Nachrichten aus Ungarn.53 Da der polnische König Sigismund das 
Recht der Habsburger auf Erbnachfolge auf den ungarischen und böhmischen 
Thron infrage stellte, nahm der Kaiser eindeutig eine antipolnische Position ein, 
die er auch eindeutig bewies. Er belegte am 6. Juni 1513 die Städte Elbing und 
Danzig, die zwar zu Polen gehörten, aber gleichzeitig auch Mitglieder der Hanse 
waren, mit der Reichsacht.54 Er wollte auch das Bündnis mit Großfürst Wassili 
III. von Moskau erneuern, das er noch mit dessen Vater, Iwan III., 1490 
abgeschlossen hatte. Dieses Bündnis was eindeutig antipolnisch. Maximilian 
teilte dem Großmeister in einem Brief vom 11. August 1513 mit, dass er Georg 
Schnitzenpaumer als Gesandten nach Moskau schicke. Er habe vor, zusammen 
mit Moskau, Dänemark, Sachsen, Brandenburg und dem Deutschen Orden ein 
großes Bündnis gegen Polen-Litauen zu schließen.55 Er verbot dem Orden am 
21. September 1513, ohne seine Einwilligung weitere Verhandlungen mit dem 
polnischen König zu führen oder ein Abkommen zu schließen.56 Sigismund 
schloss im September 1513 mit Meñli I. Giray, Khan des Krimkhanats, eine 
Allianz, um die russischen Truppen, die in die litauischen Gebiete eingebrochen 
waren, aufzuhalten und die neue antipolnische Allianz in Schach zu halten. Als 
der Hochmeister das hörte, meinte er, dass er dem polnischen König, wenn der 
sich mit den Heiden verbünde, nicht helfen müsse.57 Die Tataren brachen im 
Herbst 1513 in die Gebiete von Rjasan ein und zogen einen großen Teil der 
russischen militärischen Macht aus Litauen weg. Anschließend forderte 
Sigismund Albrecht von Brandenburg auf, den Treueid bis zum 11. November 
abzulegen.58 Angesichts des festen Standpunkts von Maximilian legte der 
Hochmeister den Treueid bis zum Termin nicht ab. So nahm die Gefahr zu, dass 
der polnische König eventuell gegen den Deutschen Orden militärisch auftreten 
könnte. Deswegen versprach der Kaiser am 24. Dezember 1513 für den Orden 
Waffen und Kanonen anfertigen zu lassen.59 Der Kaiser bevollmächtigte die 
Fürsten von Brandenburg, Mecklenburg und Pommern in einem Brief vom 29. 
Januar 1514, im Falle eines Angriffs, dem Hochmeister militärische Hilfe zu 
leisten.60 Auch konnte der Kaiser durch seine Diplomaten erreichen, dass die 
53  Ibid., no. 19783.
54  Ibid., no. 19782.
55  Ibid., no. 19852.
56  Ibid., no. 19885.
57  AT II. no. 312.
58  Sach 2002,190.
59  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 19950.
60  Ibid., no. 20012, 20013, 20014, 20015, 20016.
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Kaufleute von Dorpat und Reval das von Iwan III. geschlossene Hanse-Kontor 
von Nowgorod wieder eröffnen konnten. Dieses Abkommen hatte einen 
eindeutig antipolnischen Charakter, da es die Kaufleute von Danzig, Elbing und 
Thorn vom Gebrauch des Kontors, also vom Handel mit Nowgorod, ausschloss.61 
Nachdem Großfürst Wassili die Tataren zurückgedrängt hatte, begann er mit 
einem neuen Feldzug gegen Polen-Litauen und besetzte im Juli 1514 Smolensk. 
Kaum anderthalb Monate später brachte das Heer von Sigismund am 8. 
September in der Nähe Orscha dem Russen eine schwere Niederlage bei.62 Über 
diese Tatsachte informierte der Beauftragte des polnischen Königs Fabian, 
Bischof von Ermland, aus politischen Gründen und mit der Absicht politischen 
Druck einzusetzen, den Deutschen Orden.63 Obwohl dieser Sieg die militärische 
Situation nicht veränderte und Smolensk in der Hand der Russen blieb, wuchs 
das Ansehen des polnischen Königs in Europa, was dieser auch ausnutzen 
wollte. Er stellte sein Reich als Bollwerk des Christentums (antemurale 
Christianitatis) gegen die Türken, Tataren und die schismatischen Russen dar. 
Papst Leo X. zelebrierte eine feierliche Messe in Rom anlässlich des Sieges.64 
Der polnische König informierte den Hochmeister am 29. Oktober 1514 über 
neue militärische Erfolge gegen die Russen.65 Neben den schlechten Nachrichten 
von der russischen Front bekam Albrecht von Brandenburg auch den Bericht, 
dass sein Onkel Vladislav, der ungarisch-böhmische König, sehr krank sei und 
sein Tod bevorstehe. Der Komtur von Ragnit berichtete ihm, dass Sigismund 
infolge der Nachrichten über die Krankheit von Vladislav die litauische Front 
verlassen habe und nach Krakau zurückgeeilt sei.66 Er wollte verhindern, dass 
Maximilian Vormund des minderjährigen Erben wird, wenn Vladislav stirbt, 
und er wollte den Einfluss der Jagiellonen über die ungarischen und böhmischen 
Gebiete sichern. Es schien sicher zu sein, dass die ungarischen Stände János 
Szapolyai, den Schwager von Sigismund, der den Baueraufstand von 1514 
niederschlug, zum Gouverneur wählen würden, wenn Vladislav stirbt. Die 
Berichte über die Krankheit von Vladislav schienen aber übertrieben zu sein, 
denn es ging dem König bald besser.67 Nach der Genesung von Vladislav hatte 
Sigismund keine Möglichkeit mehr, seinen Einfluss auf Ungarn und Böhmen 
61  Joel Raba, ‘Russisch-livländische Beziehungen am Anfang des 16. Jahrhunderts: Partnerschaft 
oder Konfrontation’,  Zeitschrift für Ostforschung 27 (1978), 579.
62  Manfred Hellmann, Grundzüge der Geschichte Litauens, Darmstadt 1976, p.62.
63  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 20209, 20215, 20219.
64  Sach 2002, 212–3.; Srodecki 2015, 297.
65  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 20251.
66  Ibid., no. 20289.
67  Kulcsár 1989, 151.
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auszudehnen. Der Sieg bei Orscha brachte auch keinen essentiellen Wendepunkt 
im russischen Krieg und das Bündnis zwischen dem Kaiser und dem Großfürsten 
von Moskau blieb erhalten. Der Deutsche Orden, gestützt von den Fürsten des 
Reiches, zeigte wenig Neigung, den Frieden von 1466 zu akzeptieren. Am 
polnischen Hof wuchs die Neigung, mit Maximilian Verhandlungen zu 
beginnen. Der Kaiser war mit dem italienischen Krieg beschäftigt und es gab 
keine große Hoffnung auf einen schnellen russischen Erfolg im Osten. So war 
auch Maximilian bereit zu unterhandeln, um seine Interessen in Ungarn und 
Böhmen zur Geltung zu bringen. Die Stärkung der Position der Habsburger in 
Ungarn war auch den Fuggern wichtig, weil ihre Interessen in Ungarn wegen 
der Beschlüsse des Landtages von 1514 in Gefahr gerieten. Sie waren nur unter 
der Bedingung bereit, Maximilian Geld für den italienischen Krieg zu geben, 
wenn er mit den polnischen Jagiellonen Verhandlungen führe.68 Die Vorgespräche 
der Gesandten des Kaisers, der polnisch-litauischen und ungarisch-böhmischen 
Könige waren in Pressburg/Bratislava, weder der Deutsche Orden, noch der 
Großfürst von Moskau nahm daran teil.69 Nach den Besprechungen in Pressburg 
kam es im Sommer 1515 zu Verhandlungen in Wien. Im Abkommen vom 22. 
Juli machten sowohl Maximilian als auch Sigismund Zugeständnisse. Der 
Kaiser erkannte den Frieden von Thorn von 1466 und den daraus folgenden 
Status quo an. Maximilian bekam über den Deutschen Orden in den Streitfällen 
zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen Schutzrecht. Dies bedeutete, dass 
der Hochmeister nur durch die Vermittlung des Kaisers diplomatische 
Verhandlungen führen konnte. Damit wurde das Prinzip gewahrt, dass die 
Gebiete des Ordens zum Reich gehören und der Großmeister keinen Treueid 
vor dem polnischen König ablegen muss. Im Abkommen von Wien erkannte 
Sigismund das Recht der Habsburger auf die ungarische und böhmische Krone 
an und damit auch das Ende des polnischen Einflusses und die Exklusivität des 
kaiserlichen Einflusses auf die Länder von Vladislav. Das Abkommen zwischen 
den Habsburgern und den Jagiellonen wurde mit der Doppelehe auf Grund der 
Vereinbarung von 1506 in Wienerneustadt bestätigt.70 
Die polnische Politik von Maximilian hatte nach dem 22. Juli 1515 das Ziel, 
den Frieden mit den Jagiellonen zu bewahren, da seine Lage an der italienischen 
Front nicht besonders gut war. Auch die Frage der kaiserlichen Thronerbfolge 
68  Ibid., 152–4.
69  Sach 1998, 350.
70  Xaver Liske, ‘Der Congreß zu Wien im Jahre 1515. Eine kritisch-historische Studie’, 
Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte 7 (1867), 463–558.; Id., ‘Der Wiener Congreß von 1515 und 
die Politik Maximilians I. gegenüber Preußen und Polen’, Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte 18 
(1878), 445–65.; Vercamer 2011, 218.; Sach 2002, 229.
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beschäftigte ihn. Zur Thronerbfolge brauchten die Habsburger die Unterstützung 
von Vladislav, der böhmische kurfürstliche Rechte hatte. Dafür war es aber 
notwendig, dass Polen die Unterstützung von Szapolyai und seinen Anhängern 
in Ungarn aufgibt.71 Die Beziehung zwischen den ungarisch-böhmischen und 
den polnisch-litauischen Königen wurde wiederhergestellt. Ein Zeichen hierfür 
war, dass beide Könige Anfang August 1515 einen Adligen, Derer von Zedlitz, 
dem Hochmeister zur Aufnahme in den Deutschen Orden empfahlen.72 Der 
Friedensvertrag zwischen den Habsburgern und den Jagiellonen im Jahre 1515 
machte dem Hochmeister deutlich, dass er vom Kaiser in der nächsten Zeit keine 
essentielle militärische Hilfe erwarten konnte. Nach der Schlacht vom 13.-14. 
September 1515 in Marignano, als die Franzosen Lombardien wiederbesetzten, 
wurde dies noch eindeutiger. Die Veränderung der Situation veranlasste 
Albrecht von Brandenburg statt behutsam zu handeln, die Beziehungen zu 
Moskau noch enger zu machen, da er wirkliche militärische Unterstützung nur 
von dort erhoffen konnte. Die Stärkung des Bündnisses mit Moskau wurde vor 
allem von Dietrich von Schönberg, dem Freund und wichtigsten Vertrauten 
des Hochmeisters aus Sachsen, betrieben.73 Der Hochmeister gab aber nicht 
auf, Unterstützer unter den deutschen Fürsten finden zu wollen. Dies kommt 
im Brief vom sächsischen Herzog Friedrich am 4. Dezember 1515 deutlich 
zum Ausdruck, worin er dem Deutschen Orden für die geschenkten Falken 
dankte.74 Der Kaiser lud den Hochmeister am 10. Januar 1516 zum Reichstag 
in Augsburg ein, um vor den Reichsständen zu demonstrieren, dass er mit dem 
Frieden mit den Jagiellonen nicht den Deutschen Orden abgeschrieben habe, 
ihn weiter als Teil des Reiches und den Hochmeister als einen der Reichsfürsten 
betrachte.75 Albrecht von Brandenburg reiste aber nicht nach Deutschland, 
sondern versuchte die Beziehungen zu Moskau zu verstärken. Aber er führte 
auch mit dem Kaiser und dem polnischen König eine aktivere Diplomatie.76
Am 13. März 1516 starb König Vladislav. Sein minderjähriger Sohn 
Ludwig folgte ihm auf dem Thron nach. In dessen Hof blieb weiterhin Georg 
von Brandenburg, der Bruder des Hochmeisters, die einflussreichste Person. 
Das Abkommen zwischen den Habsburgern und den Jagiellonen diente dem 
71  Sach 1998, 353.
72  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 20550, 20552.
73  Sach 1998, 353-4.
74  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 20646.
75  Ibid., no. 20726.
76  Ibid., no. 20792, 20802.
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Interesse und zur Stabilisierung der Herrschaft der ungarischen Jagiellonen 
gegenüber den Machtbestrebungen von János Szapolyai. Deswegen wollte 
sich auch Georg von Brandenburg nicht dem Deutschen Orden verschreiben, 
was mit Krakau zu Konflikten hätte führen können. Der Deutsche Orden traf 
nämlich ganz eindeutig militärische Vorbereitungen. Großmeister Albrecht 
schrieb an Heinrich Reuss von Plauen, den Komtur von Bartenstein, in einem 
Brief vom 13. April 1516, dass er sich wegen des sich nähernden Krieges 
aufrüsten, seine Wände verstärken und seine Waffenlager vergrößern solle.77 
Mit der Genehmigung des Hochmeisters gingen Streifzüge aus Ostpreußen in 
das Bistum von Ermland, das unmittelbar zur polnischen Krone gehörte. Die 
Prälaten, die Würdenträger und die Stände des sog. Königlich Preußens (die 
Gebiete des Deutschen Ordens, die Polen nach 1466 bekam) klagten in einem 
Brief vom 31. Mai 1516 an den Hochmeister über die Räuberei im Grenzgebiet 
von Ermland.78 Einen Monat später schrieb der polnische König selbst an 
den Hochmeister wegen dem großen Schaden, den die Räuber aus Preußen 
verursachten.79 Fabian, der Bischof von Ermland, berichtete im Juli 1516 über 
viele gewaltsame Räuberaktionen.80 Über die Streifzüge schrieben auch die 
Würdenträger des Deutschen Ordens. Der Landmeister von Balga berichtete 
am 13. Juli 1516, dass Marodeure aus Ostpreußen Mehlsack angegriffen 
hatten.81 Die Lage spitzte sich wegen der Fehde zwischen dem Bischof von 
Ermland und Hippolyt von Wedel, einem Grundbesitzer in Ermland, zu, weil 
der Bischof (nicht ohne Grund) annahm, dass sein Gegner vom Deutschen 
Orden unterstützt werde.82 Die Situation wurde im Ermlander Grenzgebiet so 
angespannt, dass Ende Oktober eine polnische Delegation den Hochmeister 
besuchte, um diese Situation in Ordnung zu bringen.83 Der Vorbereitung des 
Krieges diente auch, dass der Hochmeister am 9. November 1516 verbot, 
preußische Pferde zu exportieren.84 Die Vorbereitungen auf den sich nähernden 
Krieg und die Besprechungen mit den Russen blieben dem polnischen Hof 
nicht verborgen. Neben den Informationen aus unterschiedlichen Quellen 
77  Ibid., no. 20827.
78  Ibid., no. 20877.
79  Ibid., no. 20908.
80  Ibid., no. 20938, 20939, 20946.
81  Ibid., no. 20938, 20939, 20946.
82  Joseph Kolberg, ‘Ermland im Kriege des Jahres 1520’, Zeitschrift für die Geschichte und 
Altertumskunde Ermlands 15 (1905), 215. [Weiterhin: Kolberg 1905]
83  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 21062.
84  Ibid., no. 21090.
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erfuhr man Nachrichten auch von den gefangengenommenen Eilboten des 
Ordens, die durch die Gebiete des litauischen Großfürstentums nach Moskau 
geschickt worden waren.85 Die preußisch-polnischen Beziehungen wurden noch 
durch Migrantenfragen erschwert. König Sigismund klagte im Herbst 1516 in 
mehreren Briefen darüber, dass der Deutsche Orden geflüchteten Leibeigenen 
aus polnischen und litauischen Gebieten Zuflucht gewährt habe.86 In dieser 
außenpolitischen Lage wurde die Beziehung zwischen den ungarischen 
Jagiellonen und dem Deutschen Orden kühler. Der Briefwechsel zwischen 
Ofen und Königsberg wurde rar und in diesen Briefen ging es nicht mehr um 
politische Fragen. Der junge Ludwig oder Georg von Brandenburg schrieben 
im Mai 1516 an den Hochmeister, um die Aufnahme eines deutschen Adligen, 
Sigmund Daniel von Henningdorf, zu befördern.87 Der Deutsche Orden und 
der Großfürst von Moskau schlossen im März 1517 einen militärischen Bund 
gegen den preußisch-litauischen Staat.88 Der Hochmeister verbot Ende August 
1517, Lebensmittel aus Ostpreußen nach Ermland zu exportieren. Aus dem 
ostpreußischen Balga und Heiligenbeil brachen reitende Streifabteilungen in 
Ermland ein, wo sie die Vorstadt von Mehlsack abbrannten und die Pferdeherden 
vom bischöflichen Gut wegbrachten.89 Die große Familienversammlung des 
Hauses Hohenzollern im Jahre 1517 in Berlin traf die Entscheidung, Albrecht 
und dem Orden beim Krieg gegen Polen zu helfen. Dasselbe versprachen auch 
Friedrich, der Herzog von Sachsen, der Erzbischof von Mainz und der Zweig 
des Deutschen Ordens in Livland.90 Der Großfürst versuchte die Gnade der 
deutschen Fürsten mit Geschenken - wie er es vorher auch tat – zu gewinnen. Er 
schenkte im November 1516 seinem Bruder, dem Markgrafen von Brandenburg, 
Pferde und seiner Frau Hunde und Katzen.91 Friedrich, der Herzog von Sachsen, 
und Hermann, Erzbischof von Köln, dankten im Dezember 1516, und Richard, 
Erzbischof von Trier, und Albrecht, Erzbischof von Mainz, dankten ihm im 
Januar 1517 für die geschenkten Falken.92  
85  Ibid., no. 20952, 20990. 
86  Ibid., no. 21083, 21092, 21101.
87  Ibid., no. 20868, 20870.
88  Sach 1998, 354.
89  Kolberg 1905, 217–8.
90  Sach 2002,375.
91  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 21088, 21089.
92  Ibid., 21114, 21153, 21198, 21208.
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Es wurde aber nichts aus dem Krieg gegen Polen, geplant für 1517 oder 1518. 
Papst Leo X. brachte im März 1517 den Plan eines Kreuzzugs gegen die Türken 
auf, der vom französischen König, dem größten Feind des Kaisers, von Anfang 
an unterstützt wurde. Infolgedessen begann auch Maximilian den Kreuzzug 
zu unterstützen und tat alles dafür, den Frieden zwischen dem Deutschen 
Orden und Polen zu wahren. Die Möglichkeit eines gemeinsamen christlichen 
Auftretens gegen die Türken veranlasste den Papst dazu, eine Delegation aus 
Kardinälen aufzustellen. Sie hatte die Aufgabe, auf Grund der päpstlichen Bulle 
„Considerantes ac anime revolventes generale Consilium” vom 6. März 1518 in 
Europa Frieden zu schaffen und Geld für den Feldzug zu sammeln.93 Diese 
Entwicklungen durchkreuzten die Pläne des Großmeisters, weil er nicht mehr 
hoffen konnte, dass jemand in der Zeit der europäischen Solidarität einen 
Krieg gegen Polen finanzieren würde. Der Tod von Maximilian (12. Januar 
1519) schuf jedoch eine neue Situation. Die Kandidaten mit Anspruch auf den 
kaiserlichen Thron, Karl, der Enkel von Maximilian, und Franz, der französische 
König, versuchten, die Kurfürsten für ihre Unterstützung zu gewinnen, und 
versprachen, dem Deutschen Orden bei der Rückeroberung der im Jahre 
1466 verlorenen Gebiete zu helfen.94 Diese Versprechungen blieben auch dem 
polnischen König nicht verborgen. Deswegen forderte er den Hochmeister 
nach der Wahl von Karl V. zum Kaiser (29. Januar 1519)95 zur Ablegung des 
Treueides und zur Anerkennung des Friedens von Thorn auf. Albrecht von 
Brandenburg verließ sich jedoch auf die Versprechungen des Kurfürsten 
und auf das Bündnis mit Moskau und lehnte den Treueid ab. Russische und 
tatarische Truppen griffen im Sommer 1519 den polnisch-litauischen Staat 
an. Der Angriff aus Moskau hinderte den Krakauer Hof wegen des offenen 
Widerstandes des Hochmeisters in Ostpreußen gewaltsam aufzutreten. Aber 
die polnisch-litauische militärische Führung hielt den Deutschen Orden auch 
noch nicht für eine ernsthafte Gefahr.96 Ihre Meinung änderte sich, als sie im 
Herbst 1519 erfuhr, dass die Beauftragten des Hochmeisters in Deutschland 
Söldner werben. Sigismund versuchte die preußische Frage zu lösen, bevor die 
Söldner ankamen. Deswegen setzte er im November 1519 Truppen auf dem 
Gebiet Königlich Preußens ein und berief in Thorn den dortigen Ständetag ein, 
93  Kenneth Meyer Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, (1204–1571), Philadelphia 1984, III. 
pp.169–70.; Georg Wagner, ‘Der letzte Türkenkreuzzugsplan Kaiser Maximilians I. aus dem 
Jahre 1517’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 77:3–4 (1969), 321.
94  Sach 2002, 379.
95  Walther Peter Fuchs, Das Zeitalter der Reformation, (Gebhardt Handbuch der deutschen 
Geschichte, 8) München 1979, p.77. [Weiterhin: Fuchs 1979]
96  Zivier 1915, 211-4.
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der über die Unterstützung des Krieges gegen den Deutschen Orden entschied.97 
Die polnische Kriegserklärung kam am 21. Dezember 1519 in Königsberg an 
und der Starost von Sandomir brach mit einem Heer von 1000 Reitern und 
Fußsoldaten in Ostpreußen, in die Gegend von Riesenburg, ein.98 Die Truppen 
des Deutschen Ordens besetzten nicht viel später, am 1. Januar 1520, die Stadt 
Braunsberg im Bistum von Ermland.99 Mit diesen Geschehnissen begann der 
letzte sog. „Reiterkrieg“ zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen.100 Er 
verlief mit wechselnden Erfolgen und verwüstete Ost- und Königlich Preußen 
sowie die polnischen Grenzgebiete. Nach der Wahl von Karl V. zum Kaiser 
kehrte dieser nach Spanien zurück und kam erst im Sommer 1521 wieder nach 
Deutschland.101 Während der Abwesenheit des Kaisers durften die Fürsten, die 
den Orden unterstützten, keine tatsächliche militärische Hilfe leisten, vielmehr 
versuchten sie als Friedensvermittler aufzutreten. Die Kurfürsten von Mainz, 
Sachsen und Brandenburg teilten dem Hochmeister schon am 24. Februar 1520 
mit, dass sie Gesandte nach Preußen schicken, um zwischen den beiden Parteien 
zu vermitteln und den Frieden wiederherzustellen.102 Auch der Hochmeister 
selbst wollte einen Waffenstillstand schließen, dies ergibt sich zumindest aus 
einem Brief vom April 1520. Er wollte nicht die Streitfälle klären, sondern 
Zeit gewinnen, um bedeutende finanzielle Unterstützung aus Deutschland zu 
bekommen und noch mehr Söldner zu werben.103 Zu diesem Zweck schickte er 
am 5. April den Großkomtur, Claus von Bach, in das Reich.104 In einem Brief 
vom 22. April 1520 ist zu lesen, dass man in Sachsen Söldner für den Deutschen 
Orden warb.105 Aber nicht nur die deutschen Fürsten, sondern auch der Papst 
beförderte die diplomatische Lösung des polnisch-preußischen Konflikts und 
schickte Gesandte nach Polen.106 Die Gesandten des Papstes und der Fürsten 
kamen im Mai 1520 in Thorn an, um zwischen den kriegführenden Parteien zu 
97  ASPK VII. no. 148.
98  Max Toeppen (Hrsg.), ‘Aufzeichnungen zur Geschichte des letzten Hochmeisters, des 
Markgrafen Albrecht von Brandenburg’, in SRP V. p. 330. [Weiterhin: Aufzeichnungen]
99  Aufzeichnungen, 330.
100  Marian Biskup, Wojny polski z zakonem krzyżackim (1308-1521), Danzig 1993, pp.260-328.
101  Fuchs 1979, 79.
102  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 23239.
103  Ibid., no. 23629.
104  Ibid., no. 23513.
105  Ibid., no. 23584.
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vermitteln.107 Seit dem Ausbruch des Krieges versuchte Hochmeister Albrecht 
durch seinen Bruder Georg von Brandenburg die Beziehungen zum wichtigsten 
Verbündeten der Habsburger, dem ungarisch-böhmischen König Ludwig II., 
zu verstärken. Infolgedessen schalteten sich auch die ungarischen Jagiellonen 
in die Verhandlungen ein und auch ihre Gesandten erschienen im Mai 1520 in 
Thorn.108
Das militärische Übergewicht der Polen war schon zu Beginn des Krieges 
eindeutig. Laut einem zeitgenössischen Gedicht, wahrscheinlich aus Königlich 
Preußen, setzte König Sigismund eine Truppe von 3000 Soldaten ein und hatte 
vor, den Orden in sieben Wochen zu besiegen („In VII wochen und nicht furttan 
/ Wollen wir das landt gewynnen”).109 Krakau vertraute seiner Macht und zeigte 
keine Neigung, einen Waffenstillstand zu schließen oder den Konflikt durch 
Verhandlungen zu lösen. Hierüber äußerte sich der Hochmeister im Mai und 
Juni 1520 in mehreren Briefen. Er schrieb sowohl an die deutschen Fürsten, als 
auch an den ungarischen König und den Papst.110 Die militärische Lage war so 
schwierig, dass die polnischen Truppen Ende Mai 1520 von Königsberg, dem 
Sitz des Hochmeisters, nur anderthalb Meilen entfernt waren.111 Der Brief von 
Großfürst Wassili III. vom 17. Mai, worin er Albrecht von Brandenburg 
mitteilte, dass seine drei Beauftragten Geld für den Kampf gegen die Polen nach 
Königsberg bringen, weckte ein wenig Hoffnung.112 Die Gesandten des 
Großfürsten kamen am 6. Juni auf dem Gebiet des Deutschen Ordens in Livland 
an.113 Das russische Geld wurde für die Bezahlung der Söldner und für die 
Werbung neuer Truppen ausgegeben. Georg, der Bischof von Samland, 
berichtete am 14. Juni 1520, dass unter Führung der Söldnerkapitäne Georg 
Anger und Moritz Knebel 2000 Landsknechte aus Deutschland mit dem Schiff 
nach Ostpreußen reisten.114 Nachdem die Vermittlung der deutschen Kurfürsten, 
des ungarisch-böhmischen Königs und der Gesandten des Papstes gescheitert 
waren, mischte sich Kaiser Karl V., unter dem Einfluss der Reichsfürsten, Ende 
Juni 1520 in den Konflikt ein. Er schrieb am 26. Juni einen Brief an den 
107  Ibid., no. 23641, 23643.
108  Ibid., no. 23654.
109  Aufzeichnungen 341.
110  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 23679, 23680, 23681, 23828.
111  Ibid., no. 23756.
112  Ibid., no. 23709.
113  Ibid., no. 23792.
114  Ibid., no. 23816.
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polnischen König, dass er kaiserliche Gesandte wegen der Beendigung des 
Krieges nach Polen schicke.115 Aufgrund der kaiserlichen Vermittlung begannen 
unmittelbar Verhandlungen über den Waffenstillstand zwischen dem Orden 
und dem polnischen Hof,116 aber wesentliche Fortschritte gab es nicht und die 
Kämpfe wurden fortgesetzt. König Sigismund zögerte wegen der polnischen 
militärischen Erfolge117 und der Hochmeister wegen der Versprechungen der 
Russen, finanzielle und militärische Hilfe zu leisten.118 Karl V. schrieb deswegen 
am 21. Oktober 1520 einen Brief nach Königsberg, worin er den Hochmeister 
um Waffenstillstand mit Polen bat, bis seine Friedensvermittler angekommen 
seien.119 Der ungarisch-böhmische König Ludwig II. vermittelte aktiv in den 
Verhandlungen über den Waffenstillstand. Sein Beauftragter „Ambrosius Sarkan 
de Acoshaza“ (Ambrus Ákosházi Sárkány) informierte den Hochmeister Ende 
Oktober 1520 ausführlich über die Verhandlungen mit den Polen.120 Albrecht 
von Brandenburg dankte dem König in einem Brief vom Ende November, dass 
er Ambrus Ákosházi Sárkány als Vermittler nach Polen geschickt habe.121 Die 
kaiserliche Delegation kam Anfang 1521 in Thorn an, konnte aber nur erreichen, 
dass die Gegner am 7. April auf Grund des Status quo für vier Jahre 
Waffenstillstand schlossen. Im Sinne der Vereinbarung sollte ein Schiedsgericht 
aus dem Kaiser oder, wegen dessen anderweitigen Verpflichtungen, dem 
Statthalter des Reiches, dem Bruder des Kaisers, Erzherzog Ferdinand, dem 
ungarisch-böhmischen König, Ludwig II., dem sächsischen Herzog sowie 
anderen deutschen und ungarischen Prälaten die Streitfälle klären.122 An den 
Verhandlungen über den Waffenstillstand nahmen neben den Beauftragten des 
Kaisers auch Gesandte des ungarischen Königs Jagiello teil, wie sich aus einem 
Brief vom 21. März 1521 herausstellt.123 Die Verwirklichung der Vereinbarung 
von Wien aus dem Jahre 1515 trug ohne Zweifel dazu bei, dass Ludwig II. in 
den Verhandlungen und im Schiedsgericht eine wichtige Rolle spielen konnte. 
Im Sommer 1521 wurde die Frau von Ludwig, Maria von Habsburg (die jüngere 
Schwester des Kaisers Karl V. und die ältere Schwester des Erzherzogs 
115  Ibid., no. 23842.
116  Ibid., no. 23869, 23887, 23922.
117  Ibid., no. 23957, 23981, 24049, 24087, 24269.
118  Ibid., no. 23865, 23981.
119  Ibid., no. 24265.
120  Ibid., no. 24266.
121  Ibid., no. 24355.
122  Hubatsch-joachim 1949, no. 4051.
123  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 24728.
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Ferdinand), in Ofen erwartet und mit ihr kamen noch mehr Deutsche nach 
Ungarn, was die Position von Georg von Brandenburg, dem Bruder des 
Hochmeisters, in der ungarischen Politik stärkte.124 Der Großfürst von Moskau 
versuchte den Waffenstillstand mit Geld zu verhindern und den Deutschen 
Orden zur Fortsetzung des Krieges zu veranlassen. Er schrieb schon am 27. Mai 
1521 an den Hochmeister, dass das Geld für den Krieg gegen Polen schon in 
Pleskau sei.125 Die russische Unterstützung und das politische Eintreten des 
Kaisers und der ungarischen Jagiellonen für den Deutschen Orden gaben dem 
Hochmeister die Hoffnung, dass er während der Friedensverhandlungen nach 
dem Waffenstillstand seine Interessen geltend machen könne. Albrecht von 
Brandenburg beschloss Anfang des Jahres 1522, Ferdinand, den Bruder von 
Karl V., und dessen Verwandten Ludwig II. persönlich zu besuchen, um sie zu 
überzeugen, ihren Einfluss für den Deutschen Orden geltend zu machen.126 Im 
April 1522, als sich das ungarisch-böhmische königliche Paar in Prag aufhielt, 
reiste der Hochmeister nach Böhmen, um Ludwig um Hilfe zu bitten. Der 
polnische König Sigismund protestierte sofort, dass sein Verwandter König 
Ludwig II. seinen Kriegsgegner so herzlich willkommen hieß. Der Hochmeister 
reiste im August 1522 nach Wien und führte dort mit Erzherzog Ferdinand 
Verhandlungen. Er wollte erreichen, dass die Frage der militärischen 
Unterstützung des Deutschen Ordens auf dem Reichstag behandelt wird. 
Ferdinand wollte aber wegen des Krieges der Habsburger gegen Frankreich die 
Beziehung zu Polen durch die Behandlung der Sache des Ordens auf dem 
Reichstag nicht verschlechtern. Er sagte dem Hochmeister, dass er zu dieser 
Frage erst seinen Schwager König Ludwig II. konsultieren müsse.127 Aus diesem 
Grund kehrte Albrecht von Brandenburg von Wien nach Prag zurück, um dort 
den ungarisch-böhmischen König von der effektiveren Unterstützung des 
Deutschen Ordens zu überzeugen. Er schrieb in einem Brief vom 1. Januar 1522 
an den Bischof von Samland Georg von Polenz (der während der Abwesenheit 
des Hochmeisters die Regierung führte), dass er seine Beschwerden dem 
Erzherzog Ferdinand vorgetragen habe und dieser sich bereit erklärt habe, am 
Feldzug gegen die Türken teilzunehmen, wenn die preußische Frage in Ordnung 
gebracht werde. Er berichtete auch darüber, dass die kaiserlichen Truppen am 
27. April 1522 bei Bicocca die Franzosen und die Schweizer besiegt hatten.128 
124  Kulcsár 1989, 180.
125  Hubatsch-joachim 1973, no. 24872.
126  Paul Tschackert (Hrsg.), Urkundenbuch zur Reformationsgeschichte des Herzogthums Preußen, 
Leipzig 1890, I. no. 55. [Weiterhin: Tschackert 1890]
127  Fuchs 1979, 94–5.; Zombori 2004, 251.
128  Geheimes Staatsarchiv PK, XX. HA Hist. StA Königsberg, Ordensfolianten 49, Bl. 28r-29r.
129
Die ungarischen Jagiellonen und der Deutsche Orden
Wegen der türkischen Bedrohung von Ungarn war Ludwig II. auch nicht 
imstande, den Deutschen Orden zu unterstützen, denn er brauchte selbst die 
Hilfe seiner Schwager, der Habsburger. Die Besprechung der ungarischen Frage, 
die Erzherzog Ferdinand den Reichsständen vorlegte, wurde auf den Reichstag 
von Nürnberg im Herbst verlegt.129 Albrecht von Brandenburg erschien im 
Oktober in Nürnberg, aber die deutschen Fürsten beschäftigten sich weder mit 
der Frage des Deutschen Ordens, noch mit der türkischen Bedrohung von 
Ungarn. Trotzdem bleib der Hochmeister in Deutschland und versuchte 
finanzielle Unterstützung von den Fürsten zu bekommen. Er versuchte den 
Waffenstillstand für die militärische Verstärkung des Deutschen Ordens 
auszunutzen und gab den Auftrag zur Werbung von Söldnern. Weil das nicht 
geheim gehalten werden konnte, hatte Albrecht Angst davor, dass der polnische 
König den Waffenstillstand aufkündigen und Ostpreußen angreifen könne. 
Hierüber berichtete er am 23. März 1523 dem Bischof von Samland und bat ihn 
die Burgen zu verstärken.130 Der dänische König Christian schrieb am 2. August 
1523 an den Kurfürsten von Brandenburg, dass der Großmeister ihm den Lohn 
von 600 reitenden Söldnern schulde.131 Auf Betreiben von Georg von 
Brandenburg wandte sich Ludwig II. (der Mitte März aus Prag nach Ofen 
zurückkehrte)132 in einem Brief Ende August 1523 an seinen Onkel, den 
polnischen König Sigismund, mit der Bitte, dass sie bei ihrem Treffen, geplant 
für den Herbst, neben der moldauischen Frage auch die polnisch-preußischen 
Sachen auf die Tagsordnung nehmen sollten.133 Im Oktober 1523 schrieb der 
dänische König, dass der Hochmeister ihm 37926 Gulden für die Werbung der 
Söldner schulde.134 Die finanziellen Probleme von Albrecht wurden teils durch 
seine Familienmitglieder gelöst: Sein Bruder Joachim, der Kurfürst von 
Brandenburg, lieh ihm am 25. November 1523 4600 Gulden.135 Der Hochmeister 
führte Ende 1523 mit Achac Czeme, dem Starost von Stargard, informelle 
129  Kulcsár 1989, 174.
130  Hubatsch-joachim 1949, no. 348.
131  Ibid., no. 4100.
132  Václav Bŭžek: ‘Saját országában idegen. Jagelló Lajos és Habsburg Mária csehországi 
tartózkodása 1522-1523 fordulóján’ [Fremd in seinem eigenen Land. Der böhmische Aufenthalt 
von Ludwig von Jagiello und Maria von Habsburg zum Jahreswechsel 1522-1523] in Orsolya 
Réthelyi et al. (Hrsg.), Habsburg Mária, Mohács özvegye. A királyné és udvara 1521–1531 [Maria 
von Habsburg, die Witwe von Mohács. Das Gericht der Königin], Budapest 2005, pp.57–8.
133  Zombori 2004, 231.
134  Hubatsch-joachim 1949, no. 4105
135  Ibid., no. 4106.
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Gespräche,136 weil man in Krakau dachte, dass sich Albrecht wegen des Mangels 
an Unterstützung zurückziehen und abdanken müsse.137 Achac Czeme teilte 
dem Hochmeister im Namen des polnischen Kanzlers und der anderen hohen 
Würdenträger mit, dass ihm König Sigismund Grundbesitz geben würde, wenn 
er abdanken würde.138 Markgraf Joachim berichtete seinem Bruder Albrecht am 
21. Februar 1524, dass er die Frage des Deutschen Ordens auf dem Reichstag 
vertreten werde, weil der Ablauf des Waffenstillstandes sich nähere.139 Aus 
demselben Grund reiste der Hochmeister im Oktober 1524 nach Ungarn, um 
Ludwig II. um Unterstützung zu bitten. Er hoffte vielleicht, dass mit der 
Verstärkung des Hauses Brandenburg in Ofen auch die Sache des Ordens am 
ungarischen Hof der Jagiellonen Unterstützung finden würde. Im November 
1523 kam auch sein anderer Bruder Wilhelm nach Ungarn, blieb bis Ende Mai 
1525 dort, und übte zusammen mit Georg von Brandenburg einen sehr 
bedeutenden Einfluss auf das königliche Paar aus.140 Ludwig II. machte aber 
deutlich, dass er für die friedliche Regelung des preußisch-polnischen Konflikts 
alle diplomatischen Mittel zur Verfügung stelle, aber wegen der türkischen 
Bedrohung nicht imstande sei, den Deutschen Orden in einem Krieg gegen 
Polen militärisch oder finanziell zu unterstützen.141
Der ungarisch-böhmische Zweig der Jagiellonen nahm aktiv an der 
Vermittlung in den preußisch-polnischen Friedensverhandlungen teil. Anfang 
1525 begannen offizielle Verhandlungen in Ofen zwischen dem Deutschen 
Orden und Polen, woran der Beauftragte des Papstes, die Gesandten des 
Reiches und sechs ungarische Prälaten teilnahmen.142 An den Verhandlungen 
nahm Hochmeister Albrecht bis zum 12. Februar 1525 persönlich teil, später 
wurde er von seinem Vertrauten Friedrich von Heydeck, seinem Bruder Georg 
und seinem Schwager Herzog Friedrich von Liegnitz bei den Besprechung mit 
den Gesandten von Sigismund vertreten.143 Diese Verhandlungen basierten 
auf den informellen Gesprächen Ende 1523 in Nürnberg und setzten diese 
136  Tschackert 1890, no. 248.
137  Zivier 1915, 270.
138  Peter Meier, ‘Die Ursachen der Säkularisation Preußens und ihre Beziehungen zur 
Lutherischen Reformation’ in Leo Stern und Max Steinmetz (Hrsg.), 450 Jahre Reformation, 
Berlin 1967, p.175. [Weiterhin: Meier 1967]
139  Hubatsch-joachim 1949,no. 4108.
140  Csepregi 2007, 66.
141  Tschackert 1890, no. 316.
142  Ibid., no. 265, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288.
143  Ibid., no. 333, 334.
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fort. Die Versammlung der ostpreußischen Stände am 6.-7. Dezember 1524 
in Bartenstein hatte einen wichtigen Einfluss auf die zukünftige Vereinbarung, 
weil die Stände dort über die Säkularisierung von Preußen eine Entscheidung 
getroffen hatten.144 Auf Grund der Vereinbarung, die durch die Vermittlung des 
ungarisch-böhmischen Königs entstand, wurde am 10. April 1525 in Krakau 
zwischen dem Deutschen Orden und Polen ein Friedensvertrag geschlossen. 
Dieser Vertrag stürzte die bisherige Situation völlig um. Albrecht von 
Brandenburg dankte als Hochmeister ab und trat zum Luthertum über, was die 
Säkularisierung des Deutschen Ordens und die Umgestaltung von Ostpreußen 
zum weltlichen Herzogtum einleitete. Der Hochmeister bekam den Titel „dux 
in Prussia“, erkannte den polnischen König als seinen Lehnsherrn an und legte 
während der Unterzeichnung des Friedensvertrags zusammen mit seinen 56 
Anhängern aus dem Deutschen Orden vor König Sigismund den Treueid ab.145 
Die preußischen Stände bestätigten am 29. Mai 1525 die Vereinbarung vom 
10. April.146 Das erste protestantische Fürstentum von Europa, das Herzogtum 
Preußen, war entstanden. Die Ritter, die weiterhin katholisch und Mönche 
bleiben wollten, verließen Preußen und reisten nach Deutschland.147
144  Meier 1967, 179.
145  Hubatsch-joachim 1949, no. 4128.; Stephan Dolezel und Heidrun Dolezel (Hrsg.), 
Die Staatsverträge des Herzogtums Preussens (Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preußischer 
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V. pp.360–84.
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The year 1526 and Jagiellonian Diplomacy*
The paper investigates whether the Jagiellonian kingdoms could have acted as 
a dynastic bloc in their foreign relations, especially towards the Ottomans in 
the year 1526, focussing as well largely on the antecedents of 1523-1525. I am 
seeking to explore whether there might have been any chances of a possible 
co-operation between Poland and Hungary regarding their relationship to the 
Turks, either before the peace signed by King Sigismund the Old with Sultan 
Suleiman in November 1525, or, even afterwards, in the first months of the 
tragic year leading up to the battlefield of Mohács, 29 August 1526. 
Giving an outline of the conditions resulting in Poland concluding a 
treaty with the Ottomans in 1525, I would introduce the military and political 
situation the Jagiellonians were to face from the side of Moldavia, the Tatars and 
the Teutonic Order. King Sigismund needed to protect its eastern-south-eastern 
borders, which were continuously and systematically threatened by the instigation 
of the Sublime Porte as Suleiman insisted on detaching the Jagiellonian relative 
of King Louis II before embarking on a large campaign against Hungary. One 
of the major questions is how Hungarian diplomacy treated Polish peacemaking 
either in the months preceding the November 1525 treaty, or, afterwards: in an 
examination of the Hungarian attempts towards Sigismund to intermediate to 
the Porte to have the Kingdom of Hungary involved in the Ottoman peace, 
I am interested whether Louis’s government saw any chance of reconciliation 
with the Turks. 
Another point of concern is how the Western powers looked upon the 
formerly existing dynastic coordination. How the policy-making centres of 
Europe saw Hungary’s chances of survival after the Polish peace? How did 
Suleiman’s breaking a ‘gap’ between the Jagiellonian dynasty affect the West in 
forwarding aid and military subsidies to Hungary?   
In researching Jagiellonian diplomacy, particularly of the crowns of 
Hungary-Bohemia and Poland-Lithuania from the 1490s to the mid-1520s, one 
is to face an ever present dichotomy of approaches, i.e. whether the monarchs 
were acting as a real dynastic bloc, or they, amidst fraternal strife had no chance 
for any kind of concerted action but they made up only a conglomerate of 
crowns. The issues seem to be always the same: could the rulers, Vladislaus II 
*The article is supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences – University of Debrecen 
“Lendület” Research Group (“Hungary in Medieval Europe”).
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of Hungary, his son, Louis II, and Alexander I and Sigismund I of Poland take 
a track of a familiar accord, make a common dynastic foreign policy on the 
basis of mutual interests and joint aid. The traditional view in historiography 
has been up until most recently that they were unable to co-operate, they could 
not take a unified stand – especially against the Ottomans. Polish diplomacy 
was largely affected by her relations to the Habsburgs and their allies (Teutonic 
Order and Moscow), as well as towards the Crimean Tatars, which set the course 
of her path, and her relationship to the Ottomans. That is why Poland was not 
possible to take part and supply aid to the Hungarian Jagiellonians. In my view 
the situation is not so simple, and the period of 1490-1526 is not to be over-
generalized: there were shorter phases where familiar concord, or attempts to 
have at least a mutual understanding was manifest in different spheres. There 
was a regular communication, beyond royal correspondence high dignitaries, 
secular and ecclesiastical officials in Poland and Hungary were keeping in touch, 
for instance the Ottoman news or the talks with Western envoys spread rapidly 
between the courts. There were coordinated negotiations, joint and allied treaties 
(e.g. 1500-1502 with France and England); joint embassies were commissioned, 
concerted procurationes were issued for envoys (e.g. for Girolamo Balbi in 1521 
to the Empire, England and France). The two kingdoms were several times 
represented commonly by one envoy in Rome or in Venice. Even papal envoys 
treated the crowns jointly (e.g. Burgio and Campeggio, as seen below). 
The articles is striving to investigate the possibilities of a joint diplomacy 
and concerted action after the intensification of the Ottoman threat, after the 
fall of Belgrade. We can start out from the expression used by the common 
envoy, Balbi sent to Western courts: he was negotiating “in our common cause”. 
Did this “common cause” exist in fact at that time? Is it true that the Ottomans 
applied a strategy of detachment: disjointing Poland from Hungary, just because 
they did also “believe” what Balbi spread that the dynasty has “a strong line of 
mutual defence”.
The outset to have an overview of the Jagiellonian foreign policy in the mid-
1520s is the October-November 1523 talks of Sopron and Wiener Neustadt. 
The negotiations were mainly aimed to deal with the Habsburgs and have 
them embraced in practice in the anti-Ottoman struggle, however, Hungarian 
political leadership fed high hopes that Poland could be more actively involved 
in the effort and would offer aid for a planned great enterprise. King Sigismund 
of Poland did not take part in person, but had himself represented by Chancellor 
Krzsysztof Szydłowiecki, and it seemed the conference would have at least a 
partial success as the parties managed to bring forward conciliation between 
Poland and the Teutonic Order. Although it was in the first place Ferdinand of 
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Habsburg whom the Hungarians asked aid from, however, he, alike the Imperial 
Council, sought to have warrants first as the Jagiellonians themselves would 
raise a sufficient army. True to say the Prince was at that time full-heartedly 
promoting the cause of the Turkish war. King Louis II of Hungary made an 
offer to recruit 60 thousand men and 100 cannons, while Archduke Ferdinand 
promised to supply 10 thousand soldiers and 30 cannons, which, finally did 
never in fact arrive, though a certain amount was rendered for the defence of 
the Croatian borders. It seemed the king of Poland was by any means willing to 
support the war effort and, though he did not state explicitly that he would not 
offer anything, but put it in a way that “he cannot state with what military aid 
he could assist against the Turks”.1 Nonetheless, although the king did not make 
his standpoint clear, his ambassador was to suggest informally that Louis has no 
other choice but move towards a peace with the Porte.2
The congress thus had an uneven success. It seemed more and more obvious 
that Sigismund was not to get entangled in any kind of an anti-Ottoman 
alliance. The East-Central European crusading coalition was feared to break. 
The Poles sought to reconciliate with the Ottomans and protect their eastern 
borders from the Crimean Tatars, which, in Hungary, revalued and reappraised 
the significance of the Western aid. What was the reason for this volte-face – the 
signals of which, nonetheless, were foreshown years before?
From the late 1510s on Poland treated her relationship to the Turks with 
greatest caution. King Sigismund refrained himself from large-scale anti-
Ottoman assaults, while, at the same time in his phraseology he kept on using 
the crusading propaganda. However, one was to feel that the tone of Polish 
diplomacy was getting more and more reserved towards crusading schemes and 
Poland was standing off and keeping a distance from any allied, anti-Ottoman 
1 “Et hiis de causis sua maiestas non potest specifice nominare certum numerum gencium, 
quibus posset maiestatem vestram relevare et contra communem hostem adiuvare.”: Chancellor 
Krzsysztof Szydłowiecki, Primus legationum diversarum tomus, Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych 
w Warszawie, L(ibri) L(egationum), vol. 22.: Published: Krzysztof Szydłowiecki kancellár naplója 
1523-ból, [Szydłowiecki’s Diary from 1523] ed. István Zombori, transl. Géza Érszegi, Budapest 
2004, [hereinafter Szydłowiecki] p.123. [I refer to page numbers when necessary, otherwise only 
document numbers are given.]
2  István Zombori, Jagelló-Habsburg rendezési kísérlet 1523-ban [A Jagiellonian-Habsburg 
attempt for consolidation in 1523], in Szydłowiecki, 283–84.; Gerhard Rill, Fürst und Hof 
in Österreich in Österreich. Von den habsburgischen Teilungsverträgen bis zur Schlacht von Mohács 
(1521/22 bis 1526), Band 1. Wien/Köln/Weimar 1993, pp.37., 47–49., Paula Sutter Fichtner, 
Ferdinand I.: Wider Türken und Glaubensspaltung , Graz/Köln/Wien, 1986. p.55.; Dezső Szabó, 




front. The king found that it was a stable peace with the Turks that served the 
best for his nation.3 
To shed light to the background, it needs to have an overview of the Polish-
Moldavian, and -Tatar relations. During the minority of Stephen IV (Ștefăniță, 
1517–1527) Prince of Moldavia, up to the beginning of 1523 Moldavia was 
governed by a regency council. The regency government – in contrast to the 
hectic rule of the former prince, Bogdan III (1504–1517), who was taking turns 
allying with either the Turks and the Tatars, or the Poles – tried now to take a 
pro-Jagiellonian and anti-Ottoman stand.4 Stephen IV, however, had himself 
come of age, suppressed the opposing boyars, the opportunity of which the 
Turks seized and increased their influence in Moldavia. King Louis, in a letter 
of June 1523 made a reference that the Turks made the Voivod of Wallachia flee 
and at the same time subdued the “other” Wallachia, that is, Moldavia, with the 
armies of which, added to the Tatars and their own forces are now threatening 
Hungary itself.5 That is why a Polish envoy, Wawrzyniec Międzyleski, bishop 
of Kamianets-Podilskyi (1518-1529) was detained in the principality as will 
be shown below in greater detail.6 The Voivod was willingly reporting any new 
information to the High Porte.7 Andrea dal Burgo, imperial envoy in Hungary 
reported that in Spring 1523 the Turks asked the Voivod of Moldavia to let free 
3  Zombori 2004, 241., 245.
4  Zombori 2004, 255.,296; Domokos Kosáry, Magyar külpolitika Mohács előtt, [Hungarian 
foreign policy before Mohács] Budapest 1978, p.31.
5  “[…] universo regno nostro impendeat periculi, adiungere enim hostes sibi poterunt Valachiae 
utriusque populos et sibi libitum fuerit, ipsos etiam Tartaros in belli ac praedae societatem allicere”: 
Louis II to István Brodarics, 1 June 1523. Hungarian National Archives Diplomatic Photo-
collection [hereinafter DF] 276 078. Published: Stephanus Brodericus, EpistulaE. Edidit, 
introduxit et commentariis instruxit Petrus Kasza, Budapest 2012, [hereinafter Brodericus, 
Epistolae] n. 18. Partially published: Acta et epistolae relationum Transylvaniae Hungariaeque 
cum Moldavia et Valachia, collegit et edidit Andreas Veress, I. 1468-1540, Kolozsvár [Cluj] – 
Budapest 1914. (Fontes rerum Transylvanicarum) n. 92. Also see Péter Kasza, ‘Egy magyar 
diplomata lengyel szolgálatban. (Újabb források Brodarics István római követi működéséhez)’, 
[A Hungarian diplomat in Polish service. Newer sources for the ambassiad of István Brodarics in 
Rome] Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények 113 (2009), 593. 
6  Laurentius/Wawrzyniec Miedzieleski/Miedzilewski/Miedzirzeski/Miedzileczki/Niedzielski 
(1480-1529).
7  “totam intelligentiam habens cum Turca”. British Library [hereinafter BL] Manuscript 
Collection Cotton MS Vespasian F. I. fos. 15–16.
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passage for her troops through his principality.8 A great number of Moldavian 
boyars fled to the countries of the Jagiellonians. Moreover, the Turks kept on 
laying assaults into Wallachia and Moldavia. Poland was closely touched by the 
more and more regular Ottoman onslaughts not far from her borders thus tried 
to step towards a rapprochement. The Ottomans, notwithstanding, found it very 
handy to divide the Jagiellonians’ huge conglomerate of crowns in this way and 
detach King Sigismund from his Hungarian nephew. In this they had recourse 
to the military aid of the Crimean Tatar khan, who, from 1516 onwards, in 
accordance with the Turkish assaults was making inroads into Polish territory, 
then, an even more imminent greater danger was hanging over since in 1519 
the khan allied with two of the staunchest enemies of the Polish Jagiellonians, 
the Teutonic Order and Moscow. For a while the political situation seemed to 
improve as in 1522 Poland managed for a short time to sign an armistice with 
the Tatars, and the hopes for a peace, however, vanished with the death of Khan 
Mehmed I Giray in 1523.9 King Sigismund found it more important to protect 
his eastern, south-eastern borders from the Ottoman-Tatar menace than give a 
helping hand to his nephew, King Louis. Although in 1522 he tried to forge an 
anti-Ottoman alliance with Emperor Charles V, and made attempts to come to 
terms with Prince Stephen IV of Moldavia, as his expectations failed, he moved 
closer to a reconciliation with the Turks.10 Polish envoys were still present at the 
1522 Reichstag, but they did not take part at the next one, which was a clear 
sign that Poland gave up the hopes for an imperial aid and made all effort to 
come to a compromise with the Sultan. From 1523 they made concrete steps to 
bring forward a long-term armistice. Sigismund was even reproved by the Pope. 
The contemporaries felt that the Polish behaviour was partly to blame because 
in May 1523 papal legate, Cardinal Tommaso de Vio “freezed” the crusading aid 
sent by the Holy See to Hungary.
The Polish and Hungarian political leadership might have had a last chance 
if they succeeded in keeping the voivod of Moldavia within the anti-Ottoman 
league. The Prince was nevertheless resolute is his pro-Turkish stand. The King 
of Poland was only interested in an anti-Ottoman war if he could make the King 
of Hungary put down the Moldavian voivod himself. As it will be seen below, 
Sigismund gave instructions under these terms to his envoy commissioned for 
8  András Kubinyi, ‘Magyarország hatalmasai és a török veszély a Jagelló-korban (1490-1526)’, 
[Hungary’s powerful men and the Turkish threat in the Jagiellonian age] In Közép-Európa harca a 
török ellen a 16. század első felében, ed. István Zombori, Budapest 2004, p.142. [English edn. Fight 
against the Turk in Central-Europe in the first half of the sixteenth century, Budapest 2004]
9  Zombori 2004, 253.
10  Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V. Aus dem Königlichen Archiv und der Bibliothèque de 
Bourgogne zu Brüssel, mitgetheilt von Karl Lanz, Bd. I-III. Leipzig 1844-46, I. n. 39.
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the Sopron, Wiener Neustadt and Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava negotiations. 
Nonetheless, Sigismund would have rather welcome a convenient peace with the 
Turks, with which he could keep a tight hold over his Tatar neighbours.
The Moldavian and Tatar affairs had a great effect on Poland’s rapprochement 
with the Turks, which alike influenced Hungary’s stand. In October and 
November Chancellor Szydłowiecki was several times resolutely representing 
Sigismund’s standpoint: in his speeches of, for instance, 17 and 18 October he 
spoke out firmly that Louis should consolidate his relations with the Turks, even 
though he did not state expressly that he was to conclude peace. Both Sigismund 
and his ambassador expressed several times that „the Emperor of the Turks 
rendered the Khan of the Tartars, and is helping him with men and money” to 
lay assaults in both Hungary and Polish Podolia, which was to prevent the Poles 
from supplying any aid to Hungary.11 The envoy warned King Louis that „the 
Emperor of the Turks is preparing with all his might, with all his manpower 
to invade Hungary in the following summer”. In the secret instructions to the 
Chancellor King Sigismund stated not less than the Ottomans would not only 
attack the kingdom with all their forces but are wishing to march into and occupy 
it”.12 The Sultan is instigating the Tatars to make disturbances of all kinds in 
order to divert the king of the Poles’ attention from so as he could not send any 
aid to his nephew.13 The Polish envoy suggested that „the king of Poland could 
only help Louis if she had looked after his own kingdoms and if he was could 
do it freely”.14 In addition, Sigismund advised King Louis, „yet he decided to 
enter into war” against the Ottomans, „he was to take it into consideration how 
he could trust the aid of foreign princes”.15 In a way, the King of Poland warned 
his nephew that he had no other choice, there was no real hope for a Western 
aid in practice. Before 1 November 1523 Emperor Charles was informed by the 
imperial envoy that Szydłowiecki let Louis know that he received news from 
11  “imperatorem Tartarorum ad hoc cesar Turcarum instituit et adiuvat gentibus et pecunis, ut 
regem meum et regna eius invadat, ... ut sic impediret suam maiestatem, ne maiestati vestre opem 
ferre possit”: Szydłowiecki, 122.
12  “[…] imperator Turcorum cum omnibus copiis et viribus suis anno et estate proximo vult 
regnum Vngariae agredi et ingredi, ut voto suo potiri possit et ne opem ferre possemus eius 
maiestati et eius regnis”: Szydłowiecki, 114.
13  “constituit Turcus imperatorem Tartarorum ... ... Omnibus modis regnum Polonie infestet 
et invadat, ut sic avertat regem Polonie, ne posset opem ferre nepoti suo et regno Hungarie”: 
Szydłowiecki, 120. 
14  „sua maiestas … provisis regnis suis – quantumcunque poterit – adiumento erit maiestati vestre 
et regno Hungarie, si modo id licite facere poterit”: Szydłowiecki, 123.
15  “[...] maiestas vestra preconcipiat bene ... quomodo fidem debet subsidiis aliorum principum et 
externis presidiis”: Szydłowiecki, 123.
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his monarch that the Turks together with the Tatars are making preparations 
to overrun both countries the following year.16 That is, the Ottoman strategy of 
detachment was already present at the Wiener Neustadt talks in 1523. 
Hungary was fully informed of Moldavian affairs. Even before the Wiener 
Neustadt talks, in August and September 1523 King Sigismund sent several 
letters to King Louis complaining over the Moldavian situation. He reported 
several times that the Voivod was threatening him with war, allied with the 
Tatars and the Turks. In secret Stephen instigated the Tatars to lay assaults 
against Polish territories.17 The King of Poland expressed that the prospect that 
the Ottomans gain a firm hand over Moldavia would deprive both Jagiellonian 
kingdoms of a part of their shields. In Wiener Neustadt, after 20 October King 
Louis indignantly protested against the detention of the Polish envoy in a letter 
to Prince Stephen. Furthermore, he did even send an embassy to Moldavia 
in order to press the Voivod to set the bishop of Kamianets free. The King of 
Poland, through his commissioner, Chancellor Szydłowiecki recommended 
that King Louis dispatch an army led by the voivod of Transylvania and have 
Prince Stephen deposed and install a reliable new voivod instead, which was, 
however, treated much more cautiously at the Hungarian court. The Hungarian 
government did not wish to get entangled in a new military conflict with 
Moldavia at all as they did their best not to confront the High Port in a new 
front. Therefore, they found they had better have the matter settled slowly by 
itself. Hungary, with a possible political action did not mean to bring forth the 
greater of two evils, that is, the chance the Voivod of Moldavia would flee to the 
Ottoman court with his faithful followers.18 Here it was the Turks who were in 
the winner position and it is to be assumed that any Hungarian intervention 
would have worsened the situation. Chancellor Szydłowiecki felt himself that 
“his chances were rather poor in the matter” and noted that there was not much 
hope for a prompt action for his majesty had followed all the advice not to make 
any attempt at all against the Voivod of Moldavia”.19 What the Chancellor finally 
managed to achieve was that the bishop of Eger expressed his king’s disapproval 
to the refugee boyars about the Prince’s cruelties. He, nevertheless, did even 
encourage them to return home. King Louis did not move off his track in the 
matter and did not risk a new conflict. It did however serve right for the Turks’ 
16  Zombori 2004, 323.
17  AT VI. nos. 275., 286.; Zombori, 2004, 293.
18  AT VI. n. 309.; Zombori 2004, 294.
19  “[…] maiestas regia secuta est omnium vota, ut nichil penitus attemptetur nichilque agatur 
contra waywodam Moldavie”. Szydłowiecki, p.172.
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purposes since they wanted that Louis’s decision be not appreciated at the Polish 
court and in this way the gap between the two Jagiellonians could be widened. 
The King of Hungary wished to preserve the status quo, the Turks – even despite 
the defeat at the battle of Szávaszentdemeter/Sremska Mitrovica (1523) – were 
able to fix the terms with all their might. The Ottomans surrounded and were 
approaching the Jagiellonians from several fronts and gaining new positions – 
the castles of Klis, Szörény/Turnu Severin, the territoriers of Bosnia, Moldavia, 
and the Crimean Khanate. The Turks were not too much cast back by the loss 
at Szávaszentdemeter.20 There would not have been point in bringing forward 
a peace offer, since they could take the initiative as the money collected for the 
1523 crusade was seized by the legate sent to Hungary, thus, the army was not 
raised, furthermore, after the death of Pope Adrian VI a new pontiff was elected, 
who was expected to take new measures and accomplish the task of the defence 
against the Turkish menace. 
To have a clearer view of the relations between Poland, Hungary and 
Moldavia at the time, one might look at a less known document preserved at 
the Manuscripts Collection of the British Library. As far as I know, the letter 
was only taken notice of in a document collection of a Hungarian amateur 
historian, who did not manage to reveal its author. The letter was written on 13 
January 1524, from Cracow to Legate Tommaso de Vio, Cardinal San Sisto.21 
We assume that the writer is Bishop Wawrzyniec Międzyleski, who, in 1523 
was commissioned, together with Jerzy Krupski, castellan of Lwów/L’viv to treat 
with the Prince of Moldavia in the matter of the refugee boyars.22 Then, the 
20  Ferenc Szakály, A mohácsi csata, [The battle of Mohács] Budapest 1975, p.21.
21  BL Cotton MS Vespasian F. I. fos. 15–16.; Magyar történelmi okmánytár a londoni könyv és 
levéltárakból, 1521-1717, I-II. ed. Ernő Simonyi, Pest – Budapest 1859–75, [hereinafter Simonyi, 
Okmánytár] II. n. VI. It is dated wrongly in the Cotton Catalogue: A Catalogue of the Manuscripts 
in the Cottonian Library, Deposited in the British Museum. London, 1802. p.483.; as well as put to 
1525 in the Letters and Papers: Letters and Papers Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII. 
I-XXI.; I/1-2: Appendix., Addenda, I-II. eds. J. S. Brewer – James Gairdner – R. H. Brodie, 
London 1867-1910; 1920-32, [hereinafter Letters and Papers Henry VIII] IV/1. n. 1062., and 
alike in its modern digitized edition: British History Online [http://www.british-history.ac.uk/
source.aspx?pubid=841 – 4 October 2013] State Papers Online 
[http://go.galegroup.com/mss/i.do?id=GALE|MC4301001097&v=2.1&u=nli_ttda&it=r&p=SP
OL&sw=w&viewtype=Manuscript – 2 October 2013]; 
22  Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor. 1510–1530, Culese, adnotate şi publicate de Nic. 
Densuşianu, Bucuresci 1892, (Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor culese de Eudoxiu de 
Hurmuzaki, II/3.) [hereinafter Documente] n. 299.; Krupski: AT VI. n. 242. 
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bishop was detained and taken captive of by „the insane youth”, Ștefăniță for a 
couple of months.23 
The letter supplies very valuable information about Moldavian matters. The 
most important first-hand information from Moldavia is that the “Turks would 
willingly enter into a peace” with the King of Poland, and, they are preparing to 
make steps in Moldavia to pave the way of a compromise. 
The author of the letter knew at the beginning of January in Poland that 
the Legate was still in the company of King Louis, he probably did not have 
new information when the talks after Wiener Neustadt in Pozsony ended – 
the Polish Chancellor left for Cracow on 16 December –, and thus hoped that 
through Cardinal de Vio he could address his words to the ruler of Hungary 
as well.24 It is conspicuous that the bishop is thinking in a joint Jagiellonian 
political sphere since he is talking of Poland and Hungary in particular in the 
plural, addressing his words to both rulers as “our monarchs” (per nostros reges) as 
well as referring to the two kingdoms as “ours” (ad regna nostra scilicet Hungariam 
et Poloniam). One feels the author is consciously treating the two countries as 
one, as having the same, mutual dynastic interests, expressing that they have 
to follow the same political track. He is to warn the King of Hungary that the 
Sultan is to deceive the King of Poland, he is only “holding out a carrot” for him, 
in fact he is preparing a great campaign at the background. Beyond his designs 
to invade Italy, at the same time Sultan Suleiman is wishing, augmented with 
the allied forces of the Tatars and the Moldavians, to lay waste to Poland and 
Hungary.25 
Despite the fact that Turkish troops were very close to the Moldavian-
Polish borders, the Sultan did not attack but was satisfied with a demonstration 
of force. As justified by the letter, based on the bishop’s information from the 
Moldavian court, Suleiman did not find a two-front war feasible, and beyond 
floating a constant military threat he was to make a compromise with Poland. 
However, the text of the letter does not suggest that the Sultan was by any means 
afraid of the Christians’ strength, not at all of their “useless negotiations”, since 
their arms “got blunted”. He did not “meet any resistance” at the capture of 
23  “[…] per Stephanum Vojevodam insanum juvenem detentus in Valachia”: AT VI. n. 275.; 
Documente n. 304.
24  Zombori 2004, 324.
25  “turcus eo intendit animum ut non modo ex turcis suum struat exercitum sed etiam ex tartaris de 
taurica et transalpina quibus duabus regionibus bellicosis dedit […] ex Moldavis conflat exercitum 
ad regna nostra scilicet Hungariam et Poloniam”: BL Cotton MS Vespasian F. I. fos. 15–16.
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Belgrade, for months’ time there was “no sword drawn against them”.26 He was 
not planning any peace with the Hungarians but before making preparations 
for a great campaign against the Danubian shield of strongholds, he was to 
prevent any chance of a common Jagiellonian defence and even wished to force 
Sigismund to ask for a truce himself. 
The Hungarian leadership was aware that a great, two-pronged Ottoman 
attack was to be expected. The bishop was right: a few days after the letter arrived, 
the Turks set out against the stronghold of Klis (5 February) and, in another part 
of the frontline, laid siege to Szörény, which was to fall by September 1524.27 The 
West was aroused by such “bad news”, of which the Imperial envoy in Rome, the 
Duke of Sessa in no time rushed to let his lord know.28 It was not only Bishop 
Międzyleski through whom they learnt of the designs. In accordance with this, 
King Louis II, more or less at the same time, on 12 January wrote to his Rome 
envoy, István Brodarics, and informed him that he learnt through envoys and 
spies that the Turks had already been inciting their allies, the Tatars to invade 
Hungary in that March.29
The writer of the letter is aware that the peace offer of the Turks was 
“unsteady and fraudulent”, and it was only a part of a “divide et impera” tactics.30 
The only solution could have been an alliance between the Christian coalition 
with Persia at the back of the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars, yet the author 
points it out how “ignominiously” the envoys of the Shah, the Sophi were treated 
in Moldavia, and, what is more, Voivod Stephen did even declare war against 
Persia, with which all the chances for a living relationship came into nothing.31 
Nonetheless, the “message” of the letter was that at that time, at the beginning 
of 1523 King Sigismund was still unwilling to treat with the Ottomans, since, 
as justified by the bishop, he „does not wish to get disjointed from the body of 
26  “Turcus nihil metuit christianorum vires, sive longas et inanes consultationes contra eum 
nostras [...] Nam cum debellasset et obsidione cingens intercepisset Taurinus seu Albanenander 
nullam repressionem nullum gladium adversus se vibratum per multos menses vidit.”: Ibid. 
27  A Magyar tud. akadémia Történelmi bizottságának oklevél-másolatai, ismerteti Lipót Óváry, 
1. A Mohácsi vész előtti okiratok kivonatai. Budapest 1890. [Charter copies of the History 
Commission of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences] I. nos. 1189., 1194. 
28  Calendar of Letters, Despatches and State Papers relating to the Negotiations between England and 
Spain preserved in the Archives of Simancas and elsewhere, eds. G. A. Bergenroth – Pascual de 
Gayangos, I-III/1., Supplement I-II. 1485-1526. London, 1862-73, [hereinafter CSP Spain] II. 
n. 693.
29  DF 276 058.
30  “[...] incerte pacis atque fictae”: BL Cotton MS Vespasian F. I. fos. 15–16..
31  “Oratores autem principis persarum Sophi ignominiose sunt excepti et tractati non enim 
pacem afferebant sed bellum denunciabant.”: Ibid. 
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the Church”, which means there might have been a slight hope for a dynastic 
co-operation.32 It is to be stressed that King Sigismund, in spite of all enchanting 
Ottoman offers and the Western aid lagging long behind is not intending to 
treat for a truce. It seems however astonishing, especially in regard to the former 
stand the King was for decades taking with the Ottomans: in the rivalry of the 
Tatars, Moscow, and the Teutonic Order he was primarily concerned to have 
himself secured from the south. The re-emergence of Sigismund’s crusading 
fervour might have not been entirely genuine. It might have been deliberately 
directed to the papal legate, keeping a tight hand over the crusading aids, and, 
through him, to the whole Curia. The King was to demonstrate it gently that 
although he does not share Louis’s crusading zeal and would not for the time 
being take part with all his might in an anti-Ottoman campaign, he is still eager 
to pay attention to Hungary’s planned campaign as he is still not cut off from the 
“ecclesia”, i.e. he would neither give up the hopes to receive Western help at all.33 
The Międzyleski-letter might have induced the Hungarian diplomacy to 
make an appeal to the Western princes and the Holy See and ask aid again in 
February 1524 as they learnt of the attitude of the Poles and the circumstances 
of the Ottoman peace offer towards Poland. In fact the Hungarian leadership 
did not lay much hope in a reappraisal of Sigismund’s political doctrines and did 
not expect that Poland would stay within the Christian coalition in the long run. 
In this situation the Ottomans’ detachment strategy worked well and Poland 
was pressed into a three-year peace in 1525.34 
All this strengthened the positions of a – if not always existing, but recurrently 
emerging – Hungarian ‘peace party’ that set out to reach a compromise. It might 
be concluded from the reports of the Imperial envoy, Andrea dal Burgo that a 
possible armistice had a number of supporters in the Hungarian leadership. In 
the spring of 1523, when the Turks summoned the Voivod of Moldavia to enter 
into a military alliance and demanded a passage for his troops, the possibility was 
raised in principle in what way Hungary could apply for a truce.35 On the other 
hand, Sultan Suleiman, even amidst the military operations and ongoing sieges 
might have made informal inquiries about the purposes of the Hungarian court 
through his envoy staying in Buda from 1521 onwards. Nevertheless, it seems 
rather unlikely, in addition, does not simply fit into the Turkish politics of 1524 
that they come forward with any kind of a peace initiative towards Hungary. 
32  “nollet se disjungere a corpore ecclesiae”: Ibid. 
33  “[…] princeps presertim intuitus serenissimi Regis Hungariae nepotis sui propter quod totam 
militiam regni sui movere decrevit ad resistendum vere instanti potentiae turcarum”: Ibid.
34  János B. Szabó, A mohácsi csata, [The battle of Mohács] Budapest 2006, p.52.
35  Andrea dal Burgo’s report to Salamanca, 5 May 1523: Kubinyi 2004, 142.
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The Hungarian ‘pro-compromise’ side might have yet found a means to feel 
out subtly of the Sultan’s designs and it does not seem improbable that they, in 
informal meetings and secret talks sounded the Ottoman chavus in Hungary. 
However in July 1523 the Royal Council issued a resolution that “although 
the Turks suffered great losses in the Rhodes campaign, they are not lacking in 
strength, and since they have sufficient knowledge of the inner conflicts of the 
Christians, they will not be inclined to an armistice, what is more, will take even 
more courage.36 Nonetheless, an attempt might have just as well been made to 
learn of the ‘evil’ designs.
It became clear for the Hungarian leadership that they were only to rely 
on external help, there was no other choice. Poland was unavoidably drifting 
towards an Ottoman peace. King Louis already in a letter of July 1524 to 
Pope Clement VII stressed that the fate of Hungary stood or fell with a peace 
between Christian princes, for which he was urgently appealing again in July.37 
At that time the King made a last attempt to apply to the Christian princes, 
the Emperor, the kings of France, Portugal and England and made it clear the 
situation was acute and the country would not be able to stand out against the 
Ottoman pressure any longer without financial aid. In his letter to the Emperor 
the monarch emphasized that the Turks had opened the way in land and at 
sea to invade the whole Europe, that is, it was also Germany that was under 
immediate threat now.38 They are constantly attacking the confines, capturing 
cities, and “this kingdom, together with our own crown and person could be 
wiped off and brought to an end”. Louis has still hopes that the Emperor would 
be more eager for a compromise, but expresses that „the permanent rivalry” of 
36  Andrea dal Burgo’s report to Ferdinand, 3 July 1523: Kubinyi 2004, 141.
37  “[...] rogo ut negocium pacis inter Principes Christianos, ita urgere velit”: 14 July 1524: Edgár 
Artner, “Magyarország mint a nyugati keresztény művelődés védőbástyája”. A Vatikáni Levéltárnak 
azok az okiratai, melyek őseinknek a Keletről Európát fenyegető veszedelmek ellen kifejtett erőfeszítéseire 
vonatkoznak, [Hungary as the shield of Western Christian culture] eds. Kornél Szovák – Péter 
Tusor – József Török, Budapest – Roma 2004, n. 132.; Theiner, VMHH, II. n. 832.
38  6 January 1525: Lettere di principi. Litterae principum ad papam (1518-1578), ed. József 
Bessenyei, Roma – Budapest 2002, [hereinafter Bessenyei, Fejedelmi] n. III/3. 18–20.; Theiner, 
VMHH, II. n. 838.
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the princes is dangerous.39 The Emperor’s task would now be the protection 
of Germany proper, which could only be saved through a general, large-scale 
campaign, embracing the two strongest armies of the Christian world. In this 
sense King Louis wrote several letters to Christian princes, pointing out that it 
was now the Empire that was to be defended. 
A good insight into Hungarian politics as well as Polish and Ottoman 
relations in 1525 can be given by the letters of the new legate to Hungary, 
Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio, written not only to Rome, but also addressed 
to his patron, one of the prime movers of European diplomacy of the time, 
Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, Lord Chancellor of England, Archbishop of York. 
Their warm relationship started in the 1510s and it was through Wolsey’s 
intermediation that Campeggio was installed into the bishopric of Salisbury. 
The legate was staying in Buda as the representative of the Holy See from the 
end of 1524 to the summer of the following year, and his objective ‘external’ 
perspective can shed much light onto the workings of Jagiellonian diplomacy. 
Most of his reports to the papal Curia are known, however, the several times 
longer dispatches addressed to Wolsey, mainly held in English archives, have 
not yet been investigated in historical scholarship. When in Hungary, the legate 
was primarily concerned of the ongoing Polish-Ottoman rapprochement and 
Hungarian government’s reactions. 
In one of Campeggio’s first letters to Pope Clement VII, of 20 February 
1525, he asked for a subsidy to raise an even greater number of mercenaries.40 
He expressed his expectations that despite all the clear signs of an approaching 
39  “[…] noster hostis, Thurcarum caesar aditu iam sibi terra marique patefacto ad Europae totius 
imperium vel evertendum vel subiugandum tanto furore ac crudelitate rapiatur. […] intelligamus 
nullis adhuc conditionibus Maiestatum Vestrarum animos leniri aut controversias sedari potuisse 
quumque ad regnorum nostrorum ac totius orbis Christiani ruinam nihil sit his armis civilibus ac 
Maiestatuum Vestrarum contentione perniciosius, […] Vestrae Maiestati duximus explicandum 
sperantes, […] ad concordiam vel ad succurrendum caducis ac labentibus rebus nostris faciliorem 
se sit praebitura […] Constituit […] non unum nobis aut alterum oppidum adimere, non 
excursionibus fines nostros impetere, sed, quicquid est ditionis Hungaricae, ita Thurcarum viribus 
ac multitudine obruere, ut cum nostro capite huius quoque regni nomen extingui ac tolli in 
perpetuum nefandoque suo imperio possit subiugari […] Si nostra pericula tanquam aliena minus 
fortasse movent Vestram Maiestatem, moveant Germania et avite provinciae quas profecto tam 
diu suas numerare poterit, quamdiu regnum Hungariae manebit incolume, […] Maiorem ettenim 
[…] apud Deum et homines magisque illustrem ac stabilem Maiestas Vestra consequetur gloriam 
de conservata semel ab impiis Thurcarum manibus Pannonia ac Germania”. Ibid.
40  Bessenyei, Fejedelmi, n. IX/1. pp.52–3.; Theiner, VMHH, II. n. 846.; Egyháztörténeti emlékek 
a magyarországi hitújítás korából, [Church history monuments of the age of the Reformation] eds. 
Vince Bunyitay – Rajmund Rapaics – János Karácsonyi – Ferenc Kollányi – József Lukcsics, 
I-V. Budapest 1902-1912, I. n. 186
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Polish-Turkish compromise the King of Poland would not finally abandon the 
cause of Christendom. In two months’ time he was not so optimistic. He wrote 
a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, dated the same day, 26 April, of which the latter is 
more informative. He received news of Turkish war preparations, which, however, 
would not be feared unless they knew the “treachery of the tyrant”, i.e. the Sultan, 
with a planned invasion by the “prefect of the East”, the Beylerbey of Anatolia 
only to provoke the Christians for a counter-strike. However, the Christians 
should have by now learnt of his perfidy since the Turks acted “deceitfully” with 
the King of Poland. They made treaties with Wallachia and Moldavia, and they 
“have sent to and received ambassadors from Poland to treat of friendship”. It is 
made clear that it was not only the Turks that sent envoys to the King of Poland 
to conclude an alliance but vice versa, the Poles commissioned messengers as 
well, the confoederatio was being negotiated in both directions. Here, in Hungary 
“they fear” the Ottomans “none [the less], because they have received a severer 
blow from him, while peace or truce was treated for, than during open war”. In 
other words, in spite of all the peace treaties with Poland and the Romanian 
principalities, the Turks do in fact prepare to embark on a large scale campaign 
against Hungary. The Poles do also fear the Turks, but they cannot do anything 
but accept the terms.41 Campeggio also wrote a report to Jacopo Sadoleto, papal 
secretary, dated ten days before, 16 April 1525, in which he also let him know of 
these affairs, though in a less informative way.42
Another new insight can be supplied about the workings of Jagiellonian 
diplomacy in the mid-1520 through the letters of István Brodarics, the envoy of 
King Louis II to the Holy See, who was more or less regularly commissioned as 
a representative of the Polish monarchy as well. There was a ‘last’ cause for which 
the Polish and Hungarian Jagiellonians were acting in concord: after the battle 
of Pavia in early 1525 both crowns made serious efforts to set King Francis I 
41  “A turcha nunciantur varii motus quoque causa ex a quo possemus aliquo […] et timere, nisi 
cuius perfidia plusque punica et abditissimi doli de tyranno […] belli cogitandus docerent. […] 
sunt enim ab orientis prefecto negocium […] putent, ac propterea de lacessendis Christianis 
rationem aliquam hoc anno […] de causa cum Transalpine regionis Principi […] apellant et 
cum Moldavo sibi convenire [...] federa […] cum Pol[oniae] rege nunciis ultro citroque missis 
amiciciam et confoederationem tractari, […] cum majestate ista dissimulanter tentassi non multo 
ante videt”. Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 1286.; Dated to 26 April: A Catalogue of the 
Manuscripts in the Cottonian Library, p.398.
42  “Re [di Polonia] essa intenderá la praticha et manegio che ha col Turcho […] Radul Vayvoda 
de Transalpina dicesi essere d’accordo col Turcho, et el simile si dice del Moldavo […] Ha etiam 
detto chel Turcho teme chel suo Bassa qual mando in Oriente, non se levi contra de lui, […] cosa 
che sarebbe molto in proposito per tutti Christiani”: Relationes oratorum pontificiorum 1524-1526, 
(Monumenta Vaticana Hungariae historiam regni Hungariae illustrantia), Budapest 1884 [2001], 
[hereinafter Mon. Vat.] II/1. n. 46. pp.168–9. 
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of France free of his Habsburg captivity. The two monarchies were taking joint 
steps and Brodarics was charged as a joint ambassador to treat with the Emperor 
in the regard in the spring. King Louis, having just learnt of Pavia, addressed a 
letter to Charles V to have the King of France liberated in order to preserve the 
balance of powers, inevitable for the protection of Christendom.43 The Polish 
ruler did neither wish an aggrandizement of Habsburg power that is why he 
sought for taking the same track with his Hungarian nephew. Brodarics was sent 
out to meet the King of France in his Italian captivity in Italy, in Pizzighettone 
and negotiate with him about the conditions of a possible peace.44 The envoy did 
let King Sigismund of Poland let know of everything in his mission.45 (Although 
we know that Brodarics wrote to the King of Poland particularly of his meeting 
with the King of France, his letter has not survived.46) When treating with the 
Valois ruler in Pizzighettone, Brodarics was promised that the French would aid 
Hungary against the Turks in return for Louis’s intermediation to have Francis 
released.47 Brodarics was also commissioned by Pope Clement VII, together with 
Cardinal Giovanni Salviati, Bishop of Ferrara, apostolic protonotary to treat 
with King Francis and Emperor Charles V to bring forward a truce.48 Brodarics 
did in fact bring it to King Francis’s knowledge that if his mission failed and 
France would not give any help, Hungary was not possible to save, unless, at the 
price of a Turkish peace. The envoy made it absolutely clear that after the turnover 
of the political situation following Pavia there was a real chance – if at least for 
a certain proportion of the Hungarian leadership – for a compromise with the 
43  Brodarics’s letter to Sigismund: AT VII. n. 72. p.304. Negotiations over Francis’s liberation: 
Papiers d’État du Cardinal de Granvelle d’après les manuscrits de la bibliothèque de Besançon, sous 
la direction de Ch. Weiss, I-IX. Paris 1841-52, I. nos. 39–49.
44  Brodarics’s embassy: Louis to Pope Clement, 13 February 1525: Bessenyei, Fejedelmi, n. 
III/4. p.24.; Theiner, VMHH, II. n. 844.; Vilmos Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi és politikai 
összeköttetései a római Szent-Székkel, [The relations of Hungary with the Holy See] I-III. Budapest 
1901-1903, II. p.350. 
45  Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 40.
46  To King Sigismund: Rome, 17 May 1525: Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 43.
47  Ibid.; Mon. Vat. II/1. p.cvii.; Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 14.; Lajos Hopp, Az „antemurale” 
és „conformitas” humanista eszméje a magyar-lengyel hagyományban, [The Humanist notions of 
antemurale and conformitas in Hungarian and Polish tradition] Budapest 1992, p.74.
48  “Pontifex in facto pacis inter caesarem et Christianissimum regem faciendae ...laborat, delegit 
eius rei gratia [...] cardinalem Salviati, ad cesarem mittendum. Cum quo consultissimum iudicaret 
me quoque, qui huius potissimum rein gratia a maiestate domini mei […] missus sum, illuc 
proficisci”. Brodarics’s letter, Rome, 17 May 1525: Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 43. On 20 May 
he wrote to Salviati that he was ordered beside him to treat with King Francis by the Pope. 
Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 44.
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Ottomans.49 On 10 June Brodarics still hoped that there was a solution since 
he wrote to Legate Giovanni Salviati that after having talks with the King of 
France, and treating also with the Emperor’s representatives in Italy, it seemed 
necessary to meet with Charles V himself, and they both were needed tp travel 
to Spain to see him in person and discuss the matter.50 However, the mission to 
the Emperor was to be cancelled. He wrote in a sad tone to King Sigismund on 
4 July that he was not going to Barcelona, and, for which, as he confessed at that 
time, he did not see any reason.51 According to the pope it was because King 
Louis’s letter arrived late in which he again assured that he wished to see the 
King of France free, by which time the Emperor stubbornly rejected any talks 
over. Brodarics emphasized that the mission would have been much useful both 
for the Polish and the Hungarian monarchs since the peace would have largely 
helped in bearing the burden of the Turkish war.52 What is the most important 
in regard to the Poles’ relationship with the Ottomans is that the Hungarian 
envoy might have found it probable that with the possibility of a Habsburg-
Valois peace in the near future, the King of Poland would reassess his position 
towards the Turks. 
Even more intriguing evidence is a deciphered scheda, a sheet with a few 
sentences, attached to the letter as a post scriptum. This draws a clear picture 
of the mobility space of contemporary Hungarian foreign policy and Louis’s 
chances in relation to a general European peace and a Western financial aid. 
Brodarics gives up all hope about any compromise between Christian princes. 
It turns out what hindered him in fact in his work an absolving his mission in 
Spain as well as shows the reason why the Pope’s stand-point also changed in 
regard to the Emperor. It is to be made clear there is no chance for a peace, 
Charles V is adamant, it is not to be thought that he would be at all more 
compromising in the long run. The solution is to be found in a new direction. The 
49  „[…] essemus securi de salute Christianae Reipublicae, praesertim ob eum animum, quem 
certe magnum et excellentem in rege Christianissimo esse animadverti superioribus diebus, dum 
apud eum essem […] sin minus ego, quantumcunque cogitem, [...] non video ullam aliam salutis 
nostrae rationem”: Brodarics to King Sigismund, Rome, 17 May 1525: Brodericus, Epistulae, 
n. 43. 
50  Brodericus, Epistulae, n. 45.
51  Brodericus, Epistulae, n. n. 47., AT VII. n. 72. p.304.
52  “Et ego ita certe existimo, Sapientissime Rex, non futuram fuisse hanc vel meam vel alterius 
et prudentioris et maioris me [...] illuc profectionem a statu praesentium rerum atque ab 
illorum principum nunc inter se tractatibus alienam. Non enim dubito Vestrarum Maiestatum 
auctoritatem, qui soli cum vestris subditis sustinetis pondus diei et aestus, multum potuisse illos 
monere, et plus quam omnium reliquorum principum auctoritatem.” Ibid.
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only way to survive is not to have the relationship towards the Turks depended 
on a peace between Christian princes. If an opportunity arose, it is to be grasped 
and make peace with the Turks. Brodarics put it straight and asked Sigismund 
„if His Majesty would make peace with the Turks, and do not wish the complete 
overthrow of his nephew’s country, he was not to lose time to have him and his 
kingdom involved in the treaty”.53
All efforts failed however, Charles was by no means willing at that time to 
take Francis’s liberation into consideration. Brodarics’s expectations in regard 
to King Francis did alike scatter. It was to be sadly recognized by himself: after 
the battle of Mohács he wrote how disappointed he was in his hopes about 
the French aid.54 He was disillusioned at King Francis’s promise, who he was 
desperately begging not to leave the Hungarians in the greatest peril. The 
monarch did assure him he would supply aid to protect Hungary, if once he was 
to gain his freedom again. Yet, all came to nothing amidst power politics.
Brodarics was not the only one in his expectations for an Ottoman peace. 
In April-May the possibility did come again to the forefront in Hungary. The 
King and the government found the situation utterly hopeless. That is why 
the Hungarian leadership decided to make informal inquiries about a possible 
inclusion of the kingdom in the would-be Polish peace treaty peace. Poland had 
by that time advanced in their negotiations.55 First, King Louis was to sound out 
how the Ottomans would react at all, through a mission towards the Turkish 
envoys for the time being present in Poland.56 An envoy, Johannes Statileo was 
commissioned to feel out the Turkish stand-point in Cracow and follow the 
course of the on-going Polish-Ottoman talks. It was also a possibility that a 
53  “Interpretatio schedae oratoris domini regis Hungariae per cifram scriptae: Si Maiestas Vestra 
habet aliquam bonam occasionem facienda pacis cum Turca, fortasse non erit malum, non pendere 
a spe istius pacis inter Christianos, quae parva est immo nulla, neque credo aliquid secuturum. […] 
Si Maiestas Vestra faciat pacem, et si non vult extremum excidium nepotis sui et regnorum eius, 
includendus videtur ipse quoque et regna illius pacem”: Ibid. 
54  In 1526 King Louis appealed to King Francis again  „[...] regi Gallorum et illud in memoriam 
reducit, quid sibi in oppido Picziogetone captivus per oratorem suum de defendenda Hungaria et 
ferendis, si Deus eum pristinae libertati restituisset, suppetiis promiserit”: [Stephanus Brodericus] 
De conflictu Hungarorum cum Solymano Turcarum imperatore ad Mohach historia verissima edidit 
Petrus Kulcsár, Budapest 1985, pp.27–8. 
55  AT VII. nos. 43., 47. pp.277–79.; Campeggio’s letter to Sigismund, 10 June 1525: AT VII. n. 
39. p.272.
56  Also reported by the Venetian secretary Vincenzo Guidoto: István Balogh, Velencei diplomaták 




Turkish envoy would even come to Hungary, as reported by the Papal nuncio, 
Baron Burgio.57 
Although László Szalkai, Archbishop of Esztergom utterly refused the 
idea of an Ottoman peace, and did even prohibit anyone mention an armistice 
or truce at all,58 others in the Hungarian leadership were not so rigid. Even 
the papal nuncio, Burgio and the legate, Campeggio were now less rejective 
about a chance of an Ottoman-Hungarian compromise, as the situation in 
the West still seemed chaotic after the shock of Pavia.59 Campeggio, however 
judged that the situation was even dangerous for Italy itself, since he reported 
that a Polish peace would make it possible for the Turks to invade Italy in three 
directions, from Sicily, Apulia and Genova.60 Burgio at the same time reported 
that Statileo’s mission did not fail since the King of Poland sent an envoy to 
Hungary with a proposal that Hungary be in fact included in their Turkish 
treaty. The nuncio pointed out that the Polish envoy was commissioned upon the 
wish of the Hungarian councillors, who would have liked to enter on to a peace, 
but had no courage to bring it forward at the Hungarian parliament.61 This was 
to be supported by King Louis himself as well, as he abandoned all chances of 
a Western aid.62 
Nevertheless, the Ottomans promptly refused any peace negotiations and 
did reject to include Hungary in the treaty.63 In addition, at the Hungarian 
parliament the lesser noble opposition inexorably refused a Turkish peace.64 
Yet, in this critical situation the Hungarian leadership desperately sought 
57  Burgio, 26 April: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 47.; Kosáry 1978, 155.
58  “[...] li quali intendono trattare questo articolo de la pace, de la quale niuno sin qui era stato 
ardito parlarne, peroche giá fu fatta una ordinatione sotto gravissime pene, che niumo potesse 
parlare di pace o tregua col Turcho”: Campeggio: 8 May 1525: Man Vat. II/1. n. 49. p.179.
59  Kosáry 1978, 155.
60  “[...] il Turcho con quel Re et questo la tregua o pace, che verrá ad assaltare l’Italia da tre parti, 
in Sicilia, in Puglia et in Genoa”: Campeggio: 8 May 1525: Man Vat. II/1. n. 49. p.183. 
61  „Il Re Pollono manda uno ambaxatore a questa Maestá, et viene per proponere la pace o treuga 
cum il Turco, la quale il Turco li offerisce per suo nuntio. [...] questo ambaxatore sia stato ordinato 
da questi Signori, perche loro non ossano proponere la pace o treuga cum il Turco in dieta.”: 
Burgio to Sadoleto: 8 May 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 48.
62  Guidoto’s report of 30 April 1525: Gusztáv Wenzel, ‘Marino Sanuto Világkrónikájának 
Magyarországot illető tudósításai’, [Sanuto’s reports on Hungary] Magyar Történelmi Tár 8/13/25 
(1878), 325.
63  Jan Dąbrowski, ‘Lengyelország és a török veszedelem Mohács előtt’ [Poland and the 
Ottoman threat before Mohács], in Mohácsi emlékkönyv 1526 [Mohács memorial book], Ed. Imre 
Lukinich, Budapest 1926, p.138.
64  “[...] et la nobilita non vive di altro che di la guerra”: Burgio to Sadoleto: 8 May 1525: Mon. 
Vat. II/1. cxxiii.; n. 48.; 
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now to apply to the Turks directly – although the final appeal through Polish 
intermediation was again rigidly refused by Grand Vizier Ibrahim in November 
1525.65 Nevertheless, even on this last occasion they did not “dare” to send an 
envoy to Constantinople, being afraid of the protest of the opposition, but to 
Cracow to the Turkish ambassador present.66 What is more, they went as far 
as Pál Tomori, Archbishop of Kalocsa and Warden of the Southern Marches – 
though it was only allegedly reported – treated with the Turkish chavus, Behram, 
held in captivity in Hungary, and asked him to write to the Sultan of Hungary’s 
appeal for peace.67 Yet, there was no answer. The government was hastily and 
desperately begging for help. 
All this explains why Louis made a last, panic-stricken attempt in early 
1526 to ask aid from the West. King Louis and Queen Maria addressed letters 
to all the Christian princes, and sent an envoy to Charles V.68 There being no 
hope for a Turkish peace, all the straws had to be grasped. The government 
would have even been pleased to get any kind of help. In the autumn of 1525 
the Pope sent grain, ammunition, cannons and only 4,000 florins, however, in 
the bleak prospects they insisted that each ducat would do.69 The treasury, being 
arrears with months’ wages, was not able to pay the garrisons any longer from 
November 1525. In lack of food and fodder, the castle guards left their positions 
in greater and greater number. Some key strongholds got simply abandoned.70 
The only means available for the time being were the wages Burgio paid for 300 
soldiers.71 Some wardens of the confines did order their troops back from the 
borders. It was feared that the Turkish forces of the marches would embark on 
a siege against the key positions of Pétervárad/Petrovaradin or Titel.72 The pro-
compromise side of Croatian nobles, having been floating the alternative of a 
65  Burgio: 18 January 1526: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 78.; Hopp 1992, 75.
66  Gábor Barta, ‘Illúziók esztendeje: Megjegyzések a Mohács utáni kettős királyválasztás 
történetéhez’, [Year of illusions. Notes to the history of the double election after Mohács] 
Történelmi Szemle 20 (1977), 23.
67  Burgio: 2 February 1526: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 81.; 5 March: Ibid. n. 85. Kosáry 1978, 157. 
68  “La Maestati Sue scrivirano per hora lettere a tutti li Principi, conforme di quelle che ha 
fatto Nostro Signore, […] Apresso poi Sua Maestá fa pensero di mandare ambaxatori […] et per 
Caesare serra expedito lo, primo”: Burgio, 5 March 1526: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 85.
69  Gábor Nemes, ‘VII. Kelemen pápa magyar vonatkozású brévéi (1523-1526): Adatok a 
Magyar Királyság és a Szentszék kapcsolataihoz’, [Clement VII’s briefs on Hungarian issues] in 
Magyarország és a Római Szentszék. (Források és távlatok). Tanulmányok Erdő bíboros tiszteletére, ed. 
Péter Tusor, Budapest – Roma 2012, p.61.; Wenzel 1878, 347.
70  Wenzel, 1878, 347.; Artner 2004, 88.
71  Burgio: 30 November 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 72. 
72  Burgio: 2 October 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. n. 68
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Turkish truce for years, raised the issue again. Nevertheless, the Turks laid down 
now new terms: beyond submission and taxation they demanded free passage 
for their armies through the country.73 In October 1525 a commissioner of the 
sultan was sent to Croatia, charged with tempting the nobles to pay homage to 
the High Porte in return for exemption from taxation. 
There was a last attempt for a joint Jagiellonian action. It is known from a 
17 November letter of Cardinal Campeggio, staying at that time in Italy that 
the King of Hungary was planning to meet the King of Poland “shortly” at 
Olomouc, where they were expecting Archduke Ferdinand as well. Although 
we do not know much more of the would-be negotiations, King Louis might 
have “begged” for another meeting from his uncle to try to persuade him to 
make another inquiry whether the Ottomans would have Hungary included in 
the peace. They might have wished to meet with Ferdinand, and discuss what 
urgent help he could give if the Ottomans refused the Hungarian peace again.74 
All was in vain, the Olomouc meeting was not to take place, and days before 
Campeggio reported of his expectations for a solution between the Jagiellonians, 
on 15 November the King of Poland concluded a treaty with Sultan Suleiman.75
With the separate Polish peace European politics took an abrupt turn. 
Clement VII decided to send an aid of 50 thousand ducats to Hungary.76 As 
the reports to the Spanish court raised the likelihood of a Hungarian-Ottoman 
peace and a large-scale Turkish assault into Italy, more exactly Naples,77 early in 
March 1526 Charles V declared that he was preparing to embark on campaign 
to face the Ottomans. He emphasized that the situation was acute due to the 
Polish peace that is why he was willing to help with men and money.78 Yet the 
Emperor was more than watchful in financial questions and in practice he was 
73  “[…] tutti quelli Conti di Croatia volino far liga cun il Turco et farsi loro tributarii. Il Turco 
li fa conditione di donarli tutti li soi villani che l’have guadagnato per avanti et altri tanti castelli 
in Skiavonia di quelli che aquistirano; ma vole da loro lo passo libero per ogni parte che volino 
andare”. Burgio: 10 October 1525: Mon. Vat. II/1. 69. p.274., partly to be found in DF 276 094.
74  “[…] cum Polonie Regi apud Olmuczum conventurum”: 17 November 1525: BL Cotton MS 
Vitellius B. IV fos. 210–214.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 1771. It is not published 
by Theiner.
75  Kosáry 1978, 156.
76  CSP Spain, III. n. 412.
77  CSP Spain, III. n. 363.
78  Edward Lee to Henry VIII, Seville, 12 March 1526: “He make the preparation with all spede 
towards Italie […] bicause He is nowe advertysid of ij great armes oone by sea a noother by lande, 
wiche the Turc hath mad redie to invade Italie and Hungarie […] He tolde me also that the 
saied Turc hathe taken treaux with the Kyng of Poil, but with the Kyng of Hungarie he will none 
take. Wherfor the Emperour entendeth to help Hym with men and monaye”: BL Cotton MS 
Vespasian C. III f. 223.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2022. 
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to get most assured whether the menace against Christendom was real. In a 
few days’ time, when asked about his commitment to go to war against the 
Ottomans, he answered “such reports [of a Turkish invasion] are so often spread, 
I know not what to believe”.79 There was no money that could be pressed from 
Charles, even when the Turks were standing on the battlefield of Mohács. In 
this it seemed King Sigismund was right: already in 1524, explaining his reasons 
for an Ottoman compromise, he “foretold” that they could not rely on Western 
promises and encouragement, since the princes are fighting for others’ lands, 
they take no care of us and the protection of Christendom.80 
One of our prime concerns is how the Western powers looked upon the 
formerly existing dynastic coordination. As Tudor England was one of the 
two powers supplying monetary aid in fact, I am trying to shed light to the 
Western attitude towards Jagiellonian diplomacy through English sources. I am 
interested how the policy-making centres of Europe saw Hungary’s chances of 
survival after the Polish peace, and how this was reflected in English foreign 
policy in 1526. 
King Louis II wrote a letter on 25 March to Henry VIII, appealing financial 
aid from the Defensor Fidei.81 We do not have an answer, but on the basis of the 
Tudor monarch’s letter of 16 April to Pope Clement VII, we might reconstruct the 
English standpoint.82 The grief that King Henry felt for the danger of Hungary 
from the Turks has been increased by the calamities he has most recently heard. 
England has information of the oncoming campaign of the Sultan. However, 
the King expresses that he regrets he can give no aid to Hungary “on account of 
the distance”, and the “present incertitude” existing in Christendom. The latter 
expression might refer to the fact that the English government received news 
in April, and even in May that there was still a chance for a Turkish-Hungarian 
truce. On 21 May the Spanish envoy of the Tudors reported that although he 
had reliable news that the Turks had arrived to Hungary, he did also receive 
information through “merchants” that the King of Hungary has already become 
79  Charles V, 25 March 1526: Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2051.; The Correspondence 
of Emperor Charles V and his ambassadors at the courts of England and France… 1519-1551, ed. 
William Bradford, London 1850, p.108.
80  “[…] nihil minus pensi habeant quam nostrum et commune rei christianae discrimen”: AT VII. 
n. 84.; Hopp 1992, 71.
81  BL Cotton MS Vespasian F. I f. 74. (Louis II, manu propria, orig.); Simonyi, Okmánytár, I. 
73–5.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2049.
82  BL Additional MS 15387. f. 176.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2105.; Theiner, 
VMHH, II. n. 878.; Artner 2004, n. 144.
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tributary unto the Turk”.83 Returning to Henry’s words, he explains that England 
being far away from the theatre of war, he is not the one who is to stop “the fatal 
storm” off Christendom. It is conspicuous that he points out that those princes 
who are nearer to the threat have not been possible to unite for the cause. He will 
give an insignificant aid but he is uncertain what the princes to whose kingdoms 
Hungary is closer are to do. He is to give support but before he wishes to learn 
of the designs of these princes, how true their souls are, what help they are to 
give. It seems the King might have referred to Poland and the Habsburgs as the 
princes closer. It means that the Tudors did not find it impossible that the Polish 
Jagiellonians would yet enter into the Christian coalition if Hungary was in 
fact attacked. If so, England made it clear she would supply help to protect her 
“friends”, in the plural, which might have even included Poland as well.84
Parallel evidence is a letter written by Cardinal Wolsey to the Pope, dated 
the same day.85 The Archbishop of York is aware of the menace threatening the 
whole Christendom, which can be fatal if not beaten back by a united front of 
Christian princes. He emphasizes the same, that is, those princes who are closer 
do not make all effort against the Turks. These princes, who might have just as 
include Poland as well, are to take up arms. He asks the Pope to intervene and 
83  “The Legate here sheuethe me that he hath certayne Avorde that a greate ost of Turccs ben 
arrived in Hungaria. […] Somme saye that the merchauntes have letters that the Kynge of 
Hungarie is allredie becomme tributarie unto the Turke.”: Seville, The National Archives / Public 
Record Office [TNA/PRO] State Papers [SP] 1/38 f. 160.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. 
n. 2195.
84  “[...] casum eo magis indolemus, quod non fuerit a Christianis Principibus inter se dissidentibus, 
ut sepe antea potuit, previsus, et quod in nostra solius, qui longe absumus, manu tam exiciosam a 
Christiana republica procellam depellere neutiquam situm sit. Quid enim Nos soli his Principibus, 
quorum ex propinquo magis hac in re negocium agitur, vix solide conciliatis, tanto intervallo ab 
Hungaria sejuncti prestare possumus? Nullius profecto momenti esset quicquid opis aut subsidij in 
sublevanda illius regni miseria a solis Nobis, qui tantum non modo in nostris, verum et amicorum 
tuendis causis impendimus, impresentia conferretur; incertique quid apud ceteros Principes, 
quorum preter communem causam hec res propius interest statutum sit, videremur parum 
prudenter nostris actionibus consuluisse, nullaque in re potentes Turcarum apparatus repressisse.” 
[…] Ceterum hujusmodi est innatus noster erga Christianam rempublicam zelus, […] ut nullis 
opibus, nullis periculis, nec proprio sanguini simus parcituri, […] Proinde, si forsan maturius rebus 
Hungaricis prospicere expediat, quam conjuncta ulla in his sustinendis expeditio suscipi queat, 
Vestram Sanctitatem, […] ut aliorum Principum, qui Turcarum conatibus viciniores sunt, consilijs 
animisque cognitis, nos velit efficere certiores, quae vera sit et constans illorum mens, quidque 
singuli velint, auxilij in commune conferre, tunc ea rebus ipsis prestabimus, que Christianum 
Principem decent.” BL Additional MS 15387. f. 176.
85  Theiner, VMHH, II. n. 879. I have not yet managed to find a copy of this letter in England. 
Setton refers to the Vatican Archives document. Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant 
(1204-1571), I-IV. Philadelphia 1976-84, III. p.248.
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report if all the rest of the princes went to war as well. If so, England would do 
her duty.86
England was one of the two powers supplying monetary aid in fact, of 25,000 
ducats, which an envoy was commissioned to take to King Louis, however, Sir 
John Wallop did not reach Hungary in time but after the fall of the kingdom.
The Polish Jagiellonians’ diplomatic position might be investigated through 
a couple of documents of correspondence between Tudor England and Poland 
in 1526. Cardinal Wolsey made attempts to learn how strongly the Polish peace 
was carved into stone, and how firm was the “non-intervention” stand the Polish 
leadership was taking up before sending the money in practice to Hungary. 
In May 1526 there was an unheard intensification of Polish-English royal 
and diplomatic correspondence. During 11-14 May four letters were issued 
by King Sigismund to Henry VIII and Wolsey on the accusation of Polish 
merchants of heresy in England.87 Heretic books were found at the lodgings of 
Danzig/Gdańsk tradesmen in England, and a Polish envoy, Felix ab Allen went 
to London in order to ask Wolsey to absolve them of the charge of heresy.88 A few 
weeks later, the London Venetian ambassador, Gasparo Spinelli also reported that 
the Jagiellonian envoy, Sigismund’s royal chamberlain arrived and intervened on 
account of certain Poles who had been condemned for Lutheranism. The whole 
affair is not simply only about the condemnation of Polish merchants. What is 
important for our concerns in the report is that touching the news of the Turk’s 
marching into Hungary, the Polish ambassador “told him [Wolsey] that the 
King of Poland had been requested by the Turk to make a truce, but refused, unless it 
were to include his nephew the King of Hungary; which truce was to last five years. 
The Cardinal said he would await the next letters from Rome as to whether this 
86  “[…] intellexi, quantum periculi atque discriminis non Regno solummodo Hungariae, sed 
etiam, nisi unitis principum animis mature occurratur, universae christianitati a Turcis immineat: 
[…] studio, Regie Maiestati crebro commendare, que ut est christianae religionis amantissima, ita 
propensionem quandam Catholico principe dignam in tantis arcendis malis constanter semper 
exhibet, cuius vires, quum non huiusmodi sint, que solae possint tam grandi Turcarum ingruenti 
turbini mederi, a Vestra Beatitudine certior fieri expectat, quid re vera ceteri christiani principes, 
tanto exitio viciniores effecturi sint, ipsam principis officiis nec defuisse antea, nec impresentia 
defuturam esse, in qua optima voluntate conabor illam perpetuo conservare. […] si qua in re mea 
opera his usui esse poterit, haud committam, ut Beatudinis Vestrae monitis non paruisse, vel me 
officii immemor fuisse dicar, quod autem ministerium meum ipsa presens exoptat.” Ibid.
87  Sigismund I to Henry VIII: 11 May: Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2168; 12 May: 
Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2169–2170; 15 May: BL Cotton MS Nero B II f. 99., Letters 
and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2179.
88  15 May 1526: AT. VIII. n. 46.; Józef Jasnowski, England and Poland in the XVIth and XVIIth 
Centuries, Oxford 1948, p.9.
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truce would take effect.89 It is unbelievable at the first sight: King Sigismund was 
asked by the sultan to make a peace, then, he refused the offer since King Louis 
was not included in the treaty. Wolsey might have had a good knowledge of the 
1525 peace between Poland and the Porte, and it is obscure why he would ask 
it at the Curia whether there was any chance for a peace with Hungary. There 
might be however a solution. The Venetian envoy might have misunderstood 
something in the Polish-English talks. The Cardinal could have made inquiries 
whether the King of Poland would at all be willing to revalue and renegotiate the 
terms of the November 1525 treaty in the light of the given situation, i.e. as the 
Ottomans had launched a great campaign against Hungary. Wolsey could have 
let the Poles know that he disapproved the Ottoman peace and made it clear 
England would not support Poland further in his conflicts with the Teutonic 
Order. However, if they were to reassess their relationship towards the Turks, 
Wolsey might be able to give them financial assistance as they are about to do in 
the case of Hungary. That is, Spinelli’s words might refer to a new peace. 
There was communication between England and Poland in other channels 
even before May. Chancellor Szydłowieczki wrote a letter to the King of England 
on 11 June, referring to an earlier request from Henry VIII. The King of England 
asked for Polish falcons, however, we do not have this letter. The Chancellor 
promised to send some by way of an Englishman – “James, of the household of 
the Duke of Norfolk” – present in Poland at that time.90 The Duke of Norfolk’s 
falconer was received in Poland with great hospitality and the Chancellor sent 
the finest falcons, even all of his own. “If the King wishes for more falcons next 
year, he should send a man at the beginning of spring”. There is also a reference 
to a certain Philip Bijschow or a certain Joannes de Werden, who “will forward 
letters to him”. The document shows that there was a regular communication 
between the two courts. Probably the business of falcons might not be taken 
literally, it was only, on our opinion, a “cover story”. The two kingdoms contacted 
informally – a formal envoy cannot be sent out since “officially” Poland concluded 
a peace agreement with the Heathen, thus, was on the other side than England 
striving for Christ’s cause. The important thing is that there was an English 
envoy – a reliable retainer of the household of one of the closest followers of the 
Tudor monarch – present in England, as well as a number of Polish envoys were 
to travel to England, did stay in the country in June, and there was a possibility 
that Chancellor Szydłowieczki would commission others. Felix ab Allen was 
staying at the English court up until early 1527. These missions are not known 
89  Calendar to the English Affairs, existing in the Archives and Collections of Venice and in other 
Libraries of Northern Italy, ed. Rawdon Brown, I-III. 1202-1526. London 1864-69, III. n. 1307.
90  TNA/PRO SP 1/38. f. 195.; Letters and Papers Henry VIII, IV/1. n. 2241.; Jasnowski 1948, 8. 
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to touch the issue of the Turkish war in Hungary, but judging from the fact that 
the envoys were travelling to and fro just at the same time when Ottoman armies 
were marching against King Louis II, it seems unlikely that they talked only of 
heretics and falcons. On 15 June King Henry answered Sigismund about the 
charges of heresy, though formally he did not mention any other issue.91 
The English government wished to feel out the standpoint of the Polish 
Jagiellonians: if their stand was not inexorably rigid against the Ottomans, there 
was a way to reassess their position about the crusading aid. A hypothetical 
assumption is that even further English monetary aid might have been given 
to Louis II if Wolsey could get himself convinced that the Polish standpoint 
towards the Ottomans was not irreversible, and Sigismund might have given at 
least formal support to his Jagiellonian nephew.
91  Henry VIII to Sigismund: 15 June 1526: AT VIII. n. 52.; Jasnowski 1948, 9.
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Antonín Kalous
Jagiellonian Kings of Bohemia and Hungary and papal legates*
The two kingdoms of Central Europe, Kingdom of Bohemia and Kingdom of 
Hungary, were a target of the Polish foreign policy throughout the fifteenth 
century. The kings of the Polish-Lithuanian state were negotiating, plotting, 
fighting to get the respective thrones. The serious attempts came with the 
Polish or rather Lithuanian involvement in the Hussite wars in the person of 
Sigismund Korybut, who was operating several times in the Bohemian lands. 
The first successful attempt, however, was linked to Hungary and the accession of 
Vladislaus III, King of Poland, to the Hungarian throne as Vladislaus I in direct 
competition to the Habsburgs. The period of “national” kings that followed the 
Habsburg intermezzo was, however, followed by the rule of Vladislaus II as King 
of Bohemia from 1471 and as King of Hungary from 1490. His rule is the most 
significant trace of the Jagiellonian presence in the two kingdoms. This presence, 
however, proved to be very short-lived as Vladislaus’ son Louis II at Mohács 
together with his life lost the two kingdoms for the Polish-Lithuanian royal 
dynasty, which never recovered in the fight for dominance in Central Europe 
and the field was taken over by the successful Habsburgs.
These regions drew attention not only of the competing dynasties, but also 
of the revived papal diplomacy of the fifteenth century. After the schism, the 
region was attracting papal representatives due to the problematic nature of the 
political and ecclesiastical developments. In Bohemia, the Hussite wars needed 
to be checked by the crusades, organized—though unsuccessfully—by papal 
legates de latere.1 Even though the papal (and conciliar) diplomacy was then 
used mainly for negotiation with the Utraquists, the crusading idea revived in 
the later years of the rule of George of Poděbrady, King of Bohemia. In the 
case of Hungary, papal legates or other representatives were frequently involved 
in the organisation of the crusades against the other archenemy of the late-
medieval Christianity, the Ottoman Turks.2 The later wars against George, King 
of Bohemia, were partially organized from Hungary, with the help of the papal 
* The research for this study was conducted within the project of the Grant Agency of the Czech 
Republic, Prelates on the road, nr. 13-01279S.
1  Cf. František Šmahel, Die Hussitische Revolution, Hannover 2002, II. III. passim; and also 
Birgit Studt, Papst Martin V. (1417–1431) und die Kirchenreform in Deutschland, Köln/Weimar/
Wien 2004.
2  Cf. Antonín Kalous, ‘Papal legates and crusading activity in central Europe: the Hussite and 
the Ottoman Turks’, in Norman Housley (ed.), The Crusade in the Fifteenth Century: Converging 
and competing cultures, London/New York 2017 (published 2016), pp.75–89. 
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diplomats. When Vladislaus II gained the throne of Prague, the papal presence 
in the dealings of the region had a long history and the legates, nuncios and 
other representatives continued in their efforts to solve the troublesome situation 
between Hungary, Bohemia and Poland.
Apart from the crusade, the main topics of the legatine representation in 
Hungary and Bohemia during the reign of the Jagiellonian kings were related to 
the church development in Bohemia and Moravia. First, the attempts to secure 
peace between the warring kings of Central Europe, in particular in relation to 
the conflicts of King Matthias of Hungary and King Casimir of Poland on one 
side and King Matthias and King Vladislaus on the other. When the peace was 
concluded, the conflicting situation ceased and the activity of the legates was 
limited to the renewed negotiations about the status of the Utraquist church 
and its possible unification with the Catholics. These talks were a highlight in 
the beginning of the 1520s, when the Roman church was threatened by an even 
bigger problem of the German Reformation. The specific relations of individual 
legates and nuncios to the Jagiellonian kings might be also observed apart from 
these two biggest topics of papal diplomacy.
What was the relation of the individual papal legates to individual kings? 
How did they communicate? What were the problems or matters that were 
present in their meetings? Could there be a personal relation of these persons as 
individuals? Such questions arise when we start thinking of the papal diplomats 
in relation to the Jagiellonian kings. This study will present activities of some of 
the legates that visited the region in the period of the rule of Jagiellonian kings. 
It does not pretend to cover all the legates and all the sources, but rather tends 
to bring forth some of the topics, which illustrate the relation of the kings and 
legates. Naturally, we might start with Vladislaus, who ruled in Bohemia for 
forty-five years, the last twenty-six of which he sat on the throne of Hungary as 
well.
Even though Vladislaus was a Catholic with no heretical inclinations, 
for a long time he was not taken into account by the papacy, or rather not 
considered as a legal King of Bohemia. That is why, there were practically no 
dealings between the king and the papal diplomats of any rank, until he was 
recognized in the late 1480s; after he became the king of Hungary the contacts 
intensified, as they were related mostly to the kingdom of Hungary. One such 
example might be the treatment of the Utraquist uprising in Prague in 1483, 
when Catholic city councillors were cast down out of the windows of the Old 
Town city hall.3 This event stoked fears of a new Hussite war and Pope Sixtus IV 
3  Cf. František Šmahel, Husitské Čechy: Struktury, procesy, ideje, [Hussite Bohemia: Structures, 
processes, ideas] Prague 2001, pp.119–140.
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started sending letters to all possible recipients in Central Europe, neighbouring 
German bishops and princes, administrator of the Prague archdiocese, and even 
to the kings of Poland and Hungary, never mentioning Vladislaus as King of 
Bohemia, actually never mentioning Vladislaus at all. What he mentioned, 
however, was the title of King Matthias. Usually, in most of the correspondence 
Matthias is entitled rex Hungarie; in this case he is rex Hungarie et Bohemie.4 The 
pope, moreover, wrote to his legate de latere in the region, Giovanni d’Aragona, 
who was asked to urge the king to fight the heretics, as it was always proper 
for him to protect the Catholics: ‘that kingdom of Bohemia, in which he has 
so many nice provinces, would not be without danger, if the heretics prevail’. 
The legate also learned that the pope wrote to a nuncio cum potestate legati de 
latere, who should also talk to ‘our most beloved sons in Christ Frederick etc. 
and Matthias, king of Hungary and Bohemia’.5 The nuncio was the bishop of 
Città di Castello Bartolomeo Maraschi, who was active in the region of Central 
Europe in 1483–1485. The assignments of the nuncio and orator, as he was also 
named, were quite clearly stated in the previous letter. When writing to him, the 
pope (or the curia) put it into lengthy sentences and nice words, Matthias being 
king of Hungary and Bohemia and the ‘kingdom of Bohemia subjected to him’.6 
Vladislaus as King of Bohemia was left out completely, not being mentioned 
even in the breve to his father, Casimir of Poland.7
Vladislaus became king of Bohemia even for the papal curia only after 
1487, when the Czech obedience embassy was finally favourably received by 
Pope Innocent VIII, who was not on such good terms with Matthias Corvinus 
as his predecessors were.8 The legates and nuncios, who came to Central Europe 
with the tasks to organize peace in the region because of the war against the 
Ottoman Turks, were usually sent to the King of Hungary, Matthias Corvinus, 
and to the King of Poland, Casimir IV. Before the recognition by the papal 
4  The confirmation of Matthias as King of Bohemia was problematic and the discussions 
protracted between 1471 and 1475 (with papal nuncio Lorenzo Roverella and legate Marco Barbo 
involved), when Pope Sixtus IV confirmed the election of Matthias on 9 December (cf. Třeboň, 
Státní oblastní archiv, fond Historica, sign. 2883).
5  Archivio segreto vaticano (=ASV), Arm. XXXIX 16, fol. 91r–91v, quotes 91r.
6  ASV, Arm. XXXIX 16, fol. 91v–92v, quote 92r, ‘regnum illud Bohemie sibi etiam subiectum’.
7  ASV, Arm. XXXIX 16, fol. 89v–90r; edited by Augustinus Theiner, (ed.), Vetera Monumenta 
Poloniae et Lithuaniae gentiumque finitimarum historiam illustrantia, Roma 1861, II. p.228, nr. 
CCLIV.
8  Attested in Enrico Celani, (ed.), Johannis Burckardi Liber Notarum ab anno MCCCCLXXXIII 
usque ad annum MDVI, Città di Castello 1906, I. pp.196–198; cf. also Josef Macek, ‘Prag und 
Rom am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts: Zum Verhältnis der päpslitchen Kurie zur böhmischen 
Reformation’, in Sabine Weiss et al. (eds.), Historische Blickpunkte: Festschrift für Johann Rainer, 
Zum 65. Geburtstag dargebracht von Freunden, Kollegen und Schülern, Innsbruck 1988, pp.401–403.
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curia, it was never Vladislaus. It is only the nuncio cum potestate legati de latere 
Angelo Pecchinoli, whose faculties and instructions named Vladislaus as King 
of Bohemia, even if it was in reference to events before the official acceptance of 
Vladislaus by the papal curia.9
A substantial change was brought about by the new position and title of 
Vladislaus, when he sat on the throne of the Kingdom of Hungary, as it was even 
reported by the aforementioned nuncio Angelo Pecchinoli. On 18 July 1490 
Pecchinoli wrote from Buda and spoke of public acclamation of the king in Buda 
(on 15 July) as well as the troubles with the struggle between the Jagiellonian 
pretenders to the throne: it was believed that Casimir, King of Poland, would 
make peace and agreement between the warring brothers.10 Vladislaus then 
became not only the recognized King of Bohemia, but also as King of Hungary 
the successor of Matthias Corvinus, who inherited all his activities, issues and 
strives. For the curia, then, Vladislaus is predominantly the King of Hungary.
The assignments and tasks of papal legates and nuncios in Central Europe 
did not change much after Vladislaus’ ascension of the Hungarian throne. 
Obviously, the only crucial mission that lost its purpose with the death of 
Matthias Corvinus was the conflict between the King of Hungary and Emperor 
Frederick III. Legates and nuncios had much more personal contact and dealings 
with the king in Hungary than they had before. For example, papal nuncio cum 
potestate legati de latere Orso Orsini was present in Hungary in the time when the 
jurisdiction of the Roman curia and legatine powers within Hungarian church 
were reviewed again by the land diets. The king of Hungary was traditionally 
holding the patronage right of the Hungarian church, which was renewed by 
the document of the Council of Constance for King Sigismund.11  Another 
right, or libertas regni, was the right to initiate all lawsuits in Hungary and not 
elsewhere, as would be the case with citing inhabitants of Hungary before the 
Roman curia.12 Such claims were made in the decrees of the diets in 1440, 1445, 
9  ASV, Reg. Vat. 734, f. 231v–232v, edited by Theiner, VMHH, II. p.520, nr. DCCXV; ASV, 
Misc., Arm. II 56, f. 168r, edited by József Teleki, (ed.), Hunyadiak kora Magyarországon, [The age 
of the Hunyadis in Hungary] Pest 1857, XII. p.431.
10  Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Lat. X 175 (=3622), f. 116r–116v (I am now preparing 
an edition of the documents related to the legation of Angelo Pecchinoli).
11  Elemér Mályusz, Das Konstanzer Konzil und das Patronatsrecht in Ungarn, Budapest 1959; 
Péter Erdő, ‘The Papacy and the Kingdom of Hungary during the reign of Sigismund of 
Luxemburg (1387–1437)’, in István Zombori, Pál Cséfalvy and Maria Antonietta De Angelis, 
(eds.), A Thousand Years of Christianity in Hungary: Hungariae Christianae Millenium, Budapest 
2001, pp.63–68; Péter Tusor, The Papal Consistories and Hungary in the 15th–16th centuries: To the 
history of the Hungarian Royal Patronage and Supremacy, Budapest/Rome 2012, pp.35–60.
12  On the discussion of forbidding even the appeal, see Erdő 2001, 67–8.
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1447, 1471 and 1481 before the time of Vladislaus.13 An innovation that was 
brought by the diets of the first years of the reign of Vladislaus was a mention of 
the legatine powers. All the citations and summoning in various lawsuits to the 
Roman curia and ‘when a legate of the pope comes to this kingdom of Hungary, 
into his presence’ were to cease immediately.14 The legatine jurisdiction, as it was 
practiced in western Christendom, was based on the power of the pope to be 
the judge ordinary in any diocese. Thus, the legate as the direct representative of 
the pope assumed the same power.15 Consequently, in the kingdom of Hungary, 
where the liberty of the kingdom forbade the papal jurisdiction in the first 
instance, the legatine powers in such matters were also to be dismissed. In 1495, 
the decree specifically named Orso Orsini: all the cases, which were judged by 
him, should be brought back to the judges ordinary.16 The jurisdictional powers 
of the legates in Hungary were, thus, substantially reduced.
The evergreen among the tasks of the papal legatine representation in 
the two kingdoms of Vladislaus and his son Louis were the negotiations for a 
union between the Utraquists and the Roman church. It was handled basically 
without much interference of King Vladislaus or his son and successor King 
Louis. Among those, who were more or less actively participating in the talks, 
were Bartolomeo Maraschi, Angelo Pecchinoli, Orso Orsini, Pietro Isvalies and 
during the reign of Louis Lorenzo Campeggi and Antonio Burgio.17 Moreover, 
it was Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, legatus de latere, who was commissioned to follow 
the Olomouc matters; matters of disputations between the still more firmly 
established Unity of Brethren and the Dominicans represented by Heinrich 
Kramer (Institoris), who actively participated in the disputes and had several of 
13  See the law articles: 1440:4, 1445:16, 1447:33, 1471:19, 1481:17, cf. Franciscus Dőry (ed.), 
Decreta Regni Hungariae: Gesetze und Verordnungen Ungarns 1301–1457, Budapest 1976 and Idem, 
(ed.), Decreta Regni Hungariae: Gesetze und Verordnungen Ungarns 1458–1490, Budapest 1989.
14  Law article 1492:45, see Péter Banyó, Martyn Rady and János M. Bak, (eds.), Decreta regni 
mediaevalis Hungariae / The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, Budapest 2010, IV. pp.22–5.
15  Cf. X 1.30.1, Cum non ignoretis, in Aemilius Friedberg, (ed.), Corpus Iuris Canonici, pars 2, 
Decretalium collectiones, Leipzig 1881, reprint Graz 1959, col. 183).
16  1495:10, see Banyó, Rady and Bak 2010, IV. pp.60–1.
17  Antonín Kalous, ‘The Politics of Church Unification: Efforts to Reunify Utraquists and 
Rome in the 1520s‘, in Jaroslav Miller and László Kontler (eds.), Friars, Nobles and Burghers 
– Sermons, Images and Prints: Studies of Culture and Society in Early-Modern Europe, In Memoriam 
István György Tóth, Budapest/New York 2010, pp.179–97.
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his works printed in Olomouc. The Catholic city became a centre for discussions 
between Catholics and the reformed groups from the vicinity.18
Similarly, the topic of the crusade could not be avoided, even though it 
could have connotations that would not be expected. Basically, all the legates 
were coming with the rhetoric of crusade in their credentials and especially in 
their bulla legationis, the main bull which gave reasons for their legations. As 
kings of Hungary, Vladislaus as well as Louis were expected to fulfil the hopes 
of the papacy and the Christian world and to be the proponents of the war 
against the Ottoman Turks. It was true, for example, for the afore-mentioned 
Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, who even printed his crusade indulgence letters in 
Olomouc (even with a reference and in fact advertisement to the newly published 
Clippeum of Heinrich Kramer).19 After some rest in the last two decades of the 
fifteenth and the first decade of the sixteenth centuries, the Ottomans started to 
attack their north-western border again. The transition between Vladislaus and 
Louis, his son, was on the one hand, uncontested and quite typical, on the other 
hand, Louis, who was not even ten years old, had to have guardians in his youth. 
Vladislaus wanted to secure his position on all sides, so he had asked not only 
the Emperor and the King of Poland, with whom they celebrated the double 
wedding in Vienna a year earlier, but also the Holy Roman Church and Pope 
Leo X to be the guardians of the young king.20 The pope promised to do all he 
could to help and support his rule. Cardinal Tamás Bakócz, papal legate de latere 
in Hungary already since 1513, was to be aided in this task by the archbishop of 
18  Amedeo Molnár, ‘Protivaldenská polemika na úsvitu 16. století’, [The anti-Waldensian 
polemics in the beginning of the sixteenth century] in Historická Olomouc, [Historical Olomouc] 
Olomouc 1980, III. pp.153–74; František Šmahel, ‘Role Olomouce v ideových svárech druhé 
poloviny 15. století’, [The Role of Olomouc in the ideological conflicts of the second half of 
the fifteenth century] in Historická Olomouc, Olomouc 1980, III. pp.207–223; with numerous 
references in her writings, Tamar Herzig, ‘Witches, Saints, and Heretics: Heinrich Kramer’s Ties 
with Italian Women Mystics’, Magic, Ritual, and Witchcraft 1 (Summer 2006), 24–55; Eadem, 
‘Flies, Heretics, and the Gendering of Witchcraft’, Magic, Ritual, and Witchcraft 5 (Summer 
2010), 51–80; Eadem, ‘Le “sante vite” italiane tra propaganda antiereticale appello alla crociata 
e critica luterana’, Genesis 10 (2011), 125–146; Eadem, ‘Italian Holy Women against Bohemian 
Heretics: Catherine of Siena and the “Second Catherines” in the Kingdom of Bohemia’, in Jeffrey 
F. Hamburger and Gabriela Signori (eds.), Catherine of Siena: The Creation of a Cult, Turnhout 
2013, pp.315–338; Antonín Kalous, ‘Between Hussitism and Reformation, 1450s–1520s’, in 
Antonín Kalous (ed.), The Transformation of Confessional Cultures in a Central European City: 
Olomouc, 1400–1750, Rome 2015, pp.59–60.
19  The text edited in Antonín Kalous, Plenitudo potestatis in partibus? Papežští legáti a nunciové ve 
střední Evropě na konci středověku (1450–1526), [Papal legates and nuncios in Central Europe in 
the late Middle Ages] Brno 2010, pp.358–360.
20  Cesarius Baronius, Odoricus Raynaldus, Jacobus Laderchius, Augustinus Theiner, (eds.), 
Annales ecclesiastici, Barri-Ducis 1877, XXXI.131–132; Luigi Nanni, (ed.), Epistolae ad Principes, 
Leo X – Pius IV (1513–1526), Città del Vaticano 1992, I. pp.120–1.
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Reggio di Calabria Roberto Latino Orsini.21 His legation, which is accounted 
by many historians (Setton, Smołucha)22 and mentioned by Paride Grassi, the 
papal master of ceremonies—Roberto was sent to Hungary after the obsequies 
of King Vladislaus on 3 June 1516 in Rome—,23 however, most probably never 
happened, as András Kubinyi claimed.24 Certainly, no local sources are known, 
that would mention any activity of Roberto Orsini.
The guardianship of the pope was not only crucial for the church in Hungary, 
but also for the continuous fight against the advancing Ottoman Turks. In this 
sense, Tamás Bakócz was still present in Hungary; his name was, however, 
compromised in the failed crusading attempt of 1514. In 1518 Pope Leo X was 
organizing a crusade that was designed to encompass the whole continent. Four 
papal legates were sent all around Europe and in this sense the organisation was 
similar to that of Pope Sixtus IV in 1471, who dispatched five papal legates. 
Paride Grassi, the above-mentioned papal master of ceremonies, recounted a 
fascinating discussion he held with the pope:
‘And when I told the pope, why he did not create another legate to the kings 
of Hungary and Poland, he responded that already for long there is the cardinal 
of Esztergom [Tamás Bakócz], destined by himself as legate on this matter.
I replied that the cardinal of Esztergom is not a useful legate, because he 
is of the same nation and a creation of the king of Hungary (regis Hungarie 
creatura). He does not behave as a legate, but rather as the chaplain of the king, 
for when he should be, as the papal legate, above the king, not only is he not 
above the king, but he is below him and in all matters he is reduced as a minor 
and his minister, as when the king washes hands he passes him towel and during 
mass he administers peace and the book, what he should not do. And therefore, 
in these and other things, the legate lessens the honour of the Holy See, because 
the legate should be above any kings.
And the pope responded that he had learned the same about the cardinal 
from many others, that he behaves improperly with honour, on the contrary 
rather with disgrace of the apostolic see, and that he was insufficiently accepted 
by the nation and little esteemed, wherefore he [the pope] wanted to provide for.
21  Baronius et al. 1877, XXXI.131–132; Nanni 1992, 120–1.
22  Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, Philadelphia 1984, III. p.158; Janusz 
Smołucha, Papiestwo a Polska w latach 1484–1526: Kontakty dyplomatyczne na tle zagrożenia 
tureckiego, [The Papacy and Poland in the years 1484–1526: Diplomatic contacts against the 
Turkish Threat] Kraków 1999, p.163.
23  Paride de Grassi, Il diario di Leone X, Roma 1884, p.34.
24  András Kubinyi, Főpapok, egyházi intézmények és vallásosság a középkori Magyarországon, 
[Prelates, ecclesiastical institutions and religiousity in medieval Hungary] Budapest 1999, p.116.
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On that I said it would be good, if his sanctity sent there another prelate 
as a nuncio, who would at the same time provide for a legate, so that the two 
strongest kings would embark on that expedition against the Turks.
And the pope responded to me that there are no doubts about the two 
kings, because they daily disturb the pope (papam interpellabant) with various 
envoys and letters about that expedition, because they are first endangered, if the 
Turk attacks Christendom.’25
One might see, that Tamás Bakócz was not in high esteem with the pope 
and the Roman curia and as a legate not really sufficient and fulfilling his tasks. 
As a local cardinal, he had too much association with the king, even though 
he was not the creation of Louis, but rather his predecessors’, Matthias’ and 
Vladislaus’.26 The general crusade in 1518 did not materialize and the fight 
against the Ottomans was postponed again.
Only in the 1520s the situation started to be critical for the respublica 
Christiana. New legates and nuncios were sent with the typical tasks of 
organizing or overseeing the crusade and helping to stop the inner danger of the 
church, i.e. the advance of the German Reformation, as mentioned earlier. Even 
though the legates were no longer the great leaders of the crusades in the style 
of the first crusade and Bishop Adhémar of Le Puy, or even the crusades of the 
first half of the fifteenth century against the Hussites or Ottomans and Cardinal 
25  Paride Grassi, Diarium Curiae Romanae, in Christ. Godofredus Hoffmannus (ed.), Nova 
scriptorum ac monumentorum … collectio…, Leipzig, 1731–1733, I. pp.402–4, ‘Et cum dicerem 
pape, quare etiam non faceret alium legatum ad regem Hungarie et Polonie, respondit mihi, quod 
ibi esset cardinalis Strigoniensis, ut legatus destinatus iam diu ab ipso super hac materia.
Replicavi, per ipsum Strigoniensem non esse utilem legatum, quia cum sit de natione et tanquam 
regis Hungarie creatura, non se gerit tanquam legatum, sed tanquam capellanum regis; nam cum 
deberet esse tanquam legatus apostolicus supra regem, non solum non est supra regem, sed sub illo 
et in omnibus regi defert tanquam minor; sed et minister eius, quia lavanti manus regi ministrat 
mappam et in missa pacem et librum, quod non deberet facere et propterea in his et in aliis ipse 
legatus detrahit honori sedis apostolice, quia semper legati debent esse supra reges quoscunque.
Et papa respondit, quod hoc idem a pluribus aliis de hoc Strigoniensi cardinali intellexit, qui se 
male habet cum honore, imo cum dedecore sedis apostolice et quod ille esset male aut parum 
nationi acceptus et parum existimatus, unde volebat providere.
Desuper dixi bonum fore, si sanctitas sua etiam illuc destinaret unum prelatum tanquam nuncium, 
qui simul cum legato provideret, ut reges illi duo potentissimi venirent ad expeditionem istam 
contra Turcas.
Et papa mihi respondit, quod non esset de his duobus regibus dubitandum, quia ipsi quotidio 
papam interpellabant, cum diversis nunciis et litteris super hac expeditione, quia in primo periculo 
sunt, si Turcus christianitatem petit.’
26  Vilmos Fraknói, Erdődi Bakócz Tamás élete, [The life of Tamás Bakócz] Budapest 1889; Frank 
S. Tompa, Cardinal Thomas de Erdeud and His Clan: A genealogical and historical revision, Pender 
Island 2001.
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Giuliano Cesarini, they were still present as observers and representatives of 
the involvement of the papacy. In the late years of Louis II, it was Cardinal 
Lorenzo Campeggi, who was present in the Hungarian court as legate de latere 
and organized mainly the anti-Reformation matters, but also the famous nuncio 
Giovanni Antonio Buglio, barone di Burgio. He was a nuncio of the new de-
sign, an observer and reporter in various matters of the state and of the church, 
including the struggle against the enemies of the faith.27 In his case, he was 
close to the king or even the royal couple and participated in the ceremonial 
presentation of the Christian forces of the kingdom. A drawing of the structure 
of the army, which ceremonially left the Hungarian capital a few weeks before 
the decisive battle at Mohács, for example, documents his involvement. The 
nuncio’s position is quite close to the king and the central representatives of the 
kingdom: he (il signor barone) followed the king between Elek Thurzó, master 
of the treasury, and the archbishop of Esztergom László Szalkai. Only behind 
them appeared the royal standard; which illustrates the closest position within 
the royal train.28 The closeness to the king was crucial for the representation of 
the papal intentions in the region. The unsuccessful outcome of the campaign is 
well known and does not need further commentaries.
The crucial position of the kingdom of Hungary in the fight against the 
Ottomans was acknowledged in the frequent presence of the legates at the 
Hungarian and Bohemian royal court in Buda. A few examples might illustrate 
the situations, in which the legates and the king (or the royal couple) would 
meet. Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, legate de latere, who was mentioned above and 
who later became the bishop of Veszprém and the protector of Hungary, Poland 
and Bohemia at the papal curia, was present in Central Europe between 1501 
and 1503. In 1502 he was, together with Tamás Bakócz, present at the most 
significant event of Hungary of that year, namely the royal wedding and the 
coronation of the new queen, Anne of Foix and Candale. According to the diary 
27  Cf. Antonín Kalous, ‘Elfeledett források a mohácsi csatáról: Antonio Burgio pápai nuncius 
jelentései, és azok hadtörténeti jelentősége‘, [Forgotten sources on the battle of Mohács. Burgio’s 
relations and their military history importance] Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 120 (2007), pp.603–
621.
28  Cf. Kalous 2007, 606–607; facsimile of the sketch in Kis magyar hadtörténet, [Short Hungarian 
military history] ed. Róbert Hermann, Budapest 2013, p.59. I have mistakenly ascribed the 
drawing to Burgio himself (Kalous 2007, 606), but the author was most probably another 
papal representative in Hungary, Giovanni Verzelio, a papal messenger and courier, who always 
mentioned Burgio in his letters as ‘il signor barone’. In one of his letters to Jacobo Sadoleto he 
even mentioned his report on the ceremonial leaving of the city (Vilmos Fraknói, (ed.), Relationes 
oratorum pontificiorum / Magyarországi pápai követek jelentései 1514–1526, Budapest 1884, p.424, 
nr. 114), cf. Antonín Kalous, ‘The last medieval king leaves Buda’, in Balázs Nagy, Martyn Rady, 
Katalin Szende and András Vadas (eds.), Medieval Buda in Context. Leiden 2016. pp.513–25.
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of the frequently mentioned Paride Grassi, Cardinal Pietro was the one, who 
held the service and celebrated the wedding itself. The Roman diary of Grassi 
preserved a liturgical order for the ritual, which is entitled: Ordo servandis in 
sponsalitiis regis quem servavit cardinalis Reginus legatus in Vngaria, quando rex 
desponsavit reginam anno domini 1502.29 Cardinalis Reginus is naturally Pietro 
Isvalies, who was the highest ranking ecclesiastical dignitary present, surpassing 
even Cardinal Tamás Bakócz, who was not created legatus de latere yet.
The cooperation of the legate and the king was, however, not always that 
ideal. On ceremonial level, the meetings of legates and kings might cause 
problems. Legatine ceremonial was, at the end of the fifteenth century, clearly 
designed and had rigid rules. The legate was supposed to stand above the king, 
as even Paride Grassi remarked.30 In 1523, the young king Louis and his queen 
Mary welcomed at their court in Bratislava (Pozsony, Preßburg) the papal legate 
de latere Cardinal Tommaso De Vio. After the talks in Vienna and Wiener 
Neustadt, the court moved to Bratislava, where the Polish ambassador, Chancellor 
Krzysztof Szydłowiecki reported a meeting of the king and the legate in the lo-
cal parish church of St Martin during the celebrations of All Saints’ Day. The 
legate requested to be given the Gospel before the royal couple, which, however, 
was prevented by the representatives of the land. According to Szydłowiecki’s 
account it was the pride of the nobles that was stronger and thus no one was 
given either the Gospel or any other cerimonialia.31 The presence of the legate 
in the city continued and apart from visiting the local church at important feast 
days, the legate had dinner with the royal couple after the new pope Clement VII 
was elected, to prove that the discord in the church concerning the precedence 
was only temporary.32 Similarly, when Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggi came to 
Hungary in 1524, he was greeted by the king one mile outside Buda and later 
had breakfast with the royal couple, before he delivered the speech about his 
legation to Hungary in the royal council.33
The position of the papal legates and nuncios in relation to the Jagiellonian 
kings of Bohemia and Hungary was to a large extent drawn by the official 
29  BAV, Vat. lat. 4739, fol. 36v–38v (edited in Antonín KALOUS, ‘Late Medieval Nuptial 
Rites: Paride Grassi and the Royal Wedding of Székesfehérvár (Hungary) in 1502’, Questiones 
Liturgiques 97 (2016), 51–64, in print).
30  Cf. Franz Wasner, ‘Fifteenth-Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal “Legatus a 
latere”’, Traditio 14 (1958), 295–358.
31  István Zombori, (ed.), Krzysztof Szydłowiecki kancellár naplója 1523-ból, [The diary of 
Chancellor Szydłowiecki of 1523] Budapest 2004, p.160.
32  Zombori 2004, 190.
33  Fraknói 1884, 101–108, nr. 32.
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position of both the parties. It is difficult to find any sign of personal relations 
that would prove some non-standard relations. Before the permanent nuncios 
started to appear on a regular basis, after the system of papal representation 
went through a thorough restructuring, the legates and/or nuncios were assigned 
individual specific tasks that reflected general politics of the papacy and its 
relation to both the kingdoms. From an unwanted king, Vladislaus became the 
prominent exponent of papal policy in Central Europe and even more so his son 
Louis. When peace in Central Europe was secured by the ascension of the Polish 
throne by Vladislaus’ beloved younger brother Sigismund and the agreements 
of Vladislaus with the Emperor, the main task of all the legates was again the 
fight against the Ottomans and newly the German Reformation. Day-to-day 
practice, however, and their presence at the royal court might have brought the 
church dignitaries closer to the kings and queens on a personal level as well. The 
available sources represent still a limitation here.

171
The Holy See and Hungary under Clement VII 
Gábor Nemes
The relations of the Holy See and Hungary under the pontificate 
of Clement VII (1523–1526)
‘The archives of the Roman Holy See can be compared 
to the mines, where the deeper a miner reaches the 
richer and more valuable strikes he finds.’
(Vilmos Fraknói)
Due to the scarcity of the Hungarian Medieval documents, which have survived 
the storms of history, the Hungarian historians have always put great emphasis 
on the study of foreign sources referring to Hungary with the researches at 
the Vatican Secret Archives having been in the forefront. Since the opening 
of the Archivo Segreto Vaticano in 1881 Hungarian historians have studied 
first of all the registers of bulls and the fonds of the Apostolic Camera, while 
the study of the briefs as the second type of the papal documents besides bulls, 
have remained neglected. Although Vilmos Fraknói published most of the briefs 
issued during the reign of Mathias I (Hunyadi), the sources of the Jagiellonian 
Age have remained untouched.1
Why are these briefs2 important? The practical demand of creating a new 
form of correspondence for the diplomatic letters and the confidential measures 
concerning the state administration instead of the slow, overstaffed Apostolic 
Chancery often consisting of unreliable persons rose in the chaotic period of 
1  Péter Tusor, Magyar történeti kutatások a Vatikánban [Hungarian historical studies in the 
Vatican] (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae I/1 – Excerptum), Budapest/Roma 2004.; Gábor 
Nemes, ‘A Jagelló-kori Magyarország és az Apostoli Szentszék kapcsolatai a pápai brévék 
tükrében. Kutatási beszámoló’ [The relation of the Apostolic See and Hungary in the Jagello age 
in the light of the papal briefs], in Ida Fröhlich (ed.), Tíz éves a Történelemtudományi Doktori 
Iskola, Piliscsaba 2011, pp.43–58.
2  Thomas Frenz, ‘Zur äußeren Form der Papsturkunden 1230–1530’, Archiv für Diplomatik 
22 (1976), 347–375; Idem, Papsturkunden des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit (Historische 
Grundwissenschaften in Einzeldarstellungen, 2), Stuttgart 1986, pp.28–9. [hereinafter: Frenz 
1986]; Idem, Die Kanzlei der Päpste der Hochrenaissance 1471–1527 (Bibliothek des deutschen 
Instituts in Rom, 63), Tübingen 1986, pp.12–15.
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the Avignon Papacy:3 this new form of correspondence is the brief.4 During the 
fifteenth century the demand for the work of domestic and private secretaries 
(secretarius domesticus et intimus) depending directly from the Pope further 
intensified so that the Pope could have direct insight into the content of the 
letters to be sent out. Initially, issuing the brief was exclusively the duty of the 
secretaries, who worded and penned them according to the verbal instruction of 
the Pope. From the beginning of the fifteenth century the Holy See carried out 
its diplomatic correspondence almost exclusively in the form of brief.5
Comparing to the clumsy administration of the Chancery and the Chamber 
the faster and cheaper expedition of the briefs resulted in the fact that from the 
middle of the fifteenth century more and more applicants turned to the Holy 
See for papal license in briefs instead of bulls.6
In contrast to the compact series of the registers of supplications and bulls, 
the briefs issued before the organisational reforms of the Council of Trent can 
be found in scattered form in the Vatican Archives. Most of the briefs can be 
found in the archaic part of the archives, i.e. in the so called Armadi. Here, in 
addition to the registers of briefs and drafts, the legacies of secretaries contained 
briefs referring to Hungarian – first of all – diplomatic matters (Arm. XXXIX–
3  Friedrich Bock, ‘Über Registrierung von Sekretbriefen. Studien zu den Sekretregistern Johanns 
XXII’ , Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 28 (1937–1938), 147–
234.; Idem, ‘Über Registrierung von Sekretbriefen. Studien zu den Sekretregistern Benedikts XII’, 
Quellen und Forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 29 (1938–1939), 41–88.; Idem, 
‘Einführung in das Registerwesen des Avignonischen Papsttums’ , Quellen und Forschungen aus 
Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 31 (1941), 37–58.; Gottfrid Opitz, ‘Über Registrierung 
von Sekretbriefen. Studien zu den Sekretregistern Clement VI’, Quellen und Forschungen aus 
Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 29 (1938–1939), 89–134.
4  Karl August Fink, ‘Die ältesten Breven und Brevenregister’, Quellen und Forschungen aus 
Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 25 (1933–1934), 292–307.; Idem, ‘Untersuchungen über 
die päpstlichen Breven des 15. Jahrhunderts’, Römische Quartalschrift für christliche Altertumskunde 
und Kirchengeschichte 43 (1935), 55–9, 74–7.; Idem, ‘L’origine dei brevi apostolici’, Annali della 
Suola Speciale per Archivisti e Bibliotecari dell ’Università di Roma 11 (1971), 75–81.; Armando 
Petrucci, ‘L’origine dei brevi pontifici e gli antichi eruditi’,  Archivio della Società Romana di 
Storia Patria 89 (1966), 79–84.
5  Andreas Kraus, ‘Die Sekretäre Pius II. Eine Entwicklungsgeschichte des päpstlichen 
Sekretariats’ , Römische Quartalschrift 53 (1958), 72–75.; Idem, ‘Secretarius und Sekretariat. Der 
Ursprung der Intuition des Staatsekretariats und ihr Einfluß auf die Entwicklung moderner 
Regierungsformen in Europa’ , Römische Quartalschrift 55 (1960), 63–7.; Charles-Martial De 
Witte, ‘Notes sur les plus anciens registres de brefs’ , Bulletin de L’Institut historique Belge de Rome 
31 (1958), 153–68.
6  Frenz 1986, 105–80.
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XLIV).7 The Archives of the Dataria Apostolica contains the documents of those 
applicants who expected briefs for their applications (Brevia Lateranensia).8 The 
Archivum Arcis of the Castle of the Holy Angel keeps first of all the original 
testimonials of the returned envoys of the Holy See.9
Based on the papal briefs and supplemented them with the letters of 
Hungarian reference sent to the Holy See,10 the files of the Papal consistories,11 
the reports of nuncios’ and other envoys’ reports,12 the Hungarian documental 
sources13 as well as the recent international and Hungarian literature I have 
reviewed this crucial period in the light of new points of view. 
The briefs that I have revealed and published have offered a possibility to 
review the mentioned three years of relations of the Kingdom of Hungary and 
the Holy See in the light of the available sources and the recent literature.14 
More than a hundred and ten years have passed since Vilmos Fraknói published 
his basic monograph about the relations of Hungary and the Holy See15 and 
7  Karl August Fink, Das Vatikanische Archiv. Einführung in die Bestände und ihre Erforschung, Rom 
19512, p.32, 75. [hereinafter: Fink 1951]; Lajos Pásztor, Guida delle fonti per la storia dell ’America 
Latina negli archivi della Santa Sede e negli archivi ecclesiastici d’Italia (Collectanea Archivi Vaticani, 
2), Città del Vaticano 1970, pp.16–9. [hereinafter: Pásztor 1970]; Leonard E. Boyle, A Survey 
of the Vatican Archives and of its Medieval Holdings (Subsidia medievalia, 1), Toronto 1972, p.39, 
pp.63–5. [hereinafter: Boyle 1972] ; Luigi Nanni (ed.), Epistolae ad principes I (Collectanea 
Archivi Vaticani, 28), Città del Vaticano 1992.
8  Karl August Fink, ‚Zu den Brevia Lateranensia des Vatikanischen Archivs’, Quellen und 
Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 32 (1942), 260–6.; Fink 1951, 68–9.; 
Pásztor 1970, 54–6.; Boyle 1972, 52–3.
9  Fink 1951, 146–8.; Pásztor 1970, 21–4.; Boyle 1972, 58–60.
10  Bessenyei, Fejedelmi; Péter Tusor, ‘Fejedelmi forrásközlés’, [Princely source publications], 
Budapesti Könyvszemle 16:2 (2004), 107–20.
11  Péter Tusor – Gábor Nemes (ed.): Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia de Regnis Sacrae 
Coronae Hungariae (1426–1605) (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae I/7), Budapest/Roma 2011. 
[hereinafter: Consistorialia]
12  Mon. Vat. II/1. 
13  György Rácz (ed.), Database of Archival Documents of Medieval Hungary (DL-DF 5.1), 
Budapest 2010. http://mol.arcanum.hu/dldf/opt/a140506htm?v=pdf&a=start.
14  Gábor Nemes, Brevia Clementina. VII. Kelemen pápa magyar vonatkozású brévéi (1523–
1526) [The Hungarian related briefs of Clement VII] (Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae, I/12; 
Publicationes Archivi Dioecesani Jauriensis. Fontes, studia, 23), Budapest/Győr/Roma 2015.
15  Vilmos Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római Szentszékkel I–III 
[The political and ecclesiastical connections of Hungary with the Roman Holy See], Budapest 
1901–1903. [hereinafter: Fraknói 1902]
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the contributions dedicated to this issue since then, have all been based on his 
work.16 The result of my research could be grouped into three fields:
• I have outlined the participants of the relations between the two states in the 
possibly wildest spectre touching also their role in the connections. 
• I have reviewed the efforts of the Pope in the interest of Hungary at the 
different Christian courts. 
• I have summarised the role the diplomacy of the Holy See played in the 
domestic policy of Hungary. 
The manifolded character of the relations between Hungary and the Holy 
See was a result of the diverse role of the Pope himself. The Holy Father, as the 
ruler of the Papal State, was an active participator of not only the Italian but also 
the whole European policy and held diplomatic connections with the courts of 
other countries. A lot of ecclesiastical and secular individuals turned to the Pope 
as the head of the Holy Church so that he did justice or favour. Since the courts 
of the Curia were forums of higher instances, a lot of people went to Rome in 
legal matters. Besides, Rome was also one of the most widely visited places of 
pilgrimage. 
The highest ranking envoys that the Pope could send to a certain country 
were the legates, who usually were persons of outstanding abilities, experienced 
diplomats and mainly cardinals.17 In May 1523 Pope Adrian VI sent the learned 
Dominican cardinal, Tommaso de Vio to Hungary, who were staying in Buda 
for almost a year.18 A new legate, Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggi(o) was appointed 
in January 1524 and arrived at the Hungarian court at the end of the year after 
having stayed in Nürnberg and Vienna. He remained in Buda for about half a 
year.19 In addition to the diplomatic representation the legates supervised the 
16  Edgár Artner, ‘Magyarország és az Apostoli Szentszék viszonya a mohácsi vészt megelőző 
években (1521–1526)’ [The relations of Hungary and the Apostolic See in the years prior to the 
battle of Mohács], in Imre Lukinich (ed.), Mohácsi emlékkönyv 1526, Budapest 1926, pp.63–123.; 
Domokos Kosáry, Magyar külpolitika Mohács előtt [Hungarian foreign policy prior to Mohács], 
Budapest 1978.; András Kubinyi, ‘Diplomáciai érintkezések a Jagelló-kori magyar állam és a 
pápaság között’ [Diplomatic connections of the Holy See and Hungary in the Jagello era], in 
András Kubinyi, Főpapok, egyházi intézmények és vallásosság a középkori Magyarországon [Prelates, 
ecclesiastical institutions and religiousity in medieval Hungary] (METEM Könyvek, 22), 
Budapest 1999, pp.107–21. [hereinafter: Kubinyi 1999a]
17  Antonín Kalous, Plenitudo potestatis in partibus? Papežští legáti a nunciové ve střední Evropě 
na konci středověku (1450–1526) [Papal legates and nuncios in Central Europe in the late Middle 
Ages] (Knižnice Matice Moravské, 30), Brno 2010.
18  Consistorialia, no. 21, 36, 38.
19  Consistorialia, no. 43.; Nemes 2015a, no. 7–9, 19–21, 35, 64, 69, 72, 89.
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money of the papal financial aid that was deposited in the Fugger Factory of 
Buda and acted as judges in lawsuits concerning the Holy See. During his stay in 
Buda, Campeggi lead the discussions preparing the union of the Czech Catholics 
and Utraquists, tried to mediate in the canonisation of John of Capistrano to-
wards the Pope and managed to persuade the Archbishop of Esztergom: László 
Szalkai to have himself consecrated to a priest.20
While the legates stayed at their destination for a specific mission and for 
shorter periods of time, the standing representation was the duty of the apostolic 
nuncios. The office of the standing envoy’s duty of the Holy Father in Buda was 
fulfilled for more than three years by Giovanni Antonio Burgio who arrived in 
Hungary together with Legate Vio in the summer of 1523.21
The operations of Nuncio Burgio were basically determined by the instruc-
tions he received from Rome. His primary duty was the diplomatic correspond-
ence and the information provision, so he regularly sent reports (dispacci) to 
Jacopo Sadoleto, who was responsible for contacting with the envoys.22 Burgio 
handed the letters of the Holy See while commenting them according to the 
instructions of the Curia.23 He also maintained contacts with the papal envoys 
staying at the neighbouring courts (especially with Nuncio Girolamo Rorario 
having been sent to the Austrian Archduke, Ferdinand) and interfered at the 
Holy See in the interest of Hungarian applicants.24
Burgio’s reports have not ceased to strongly influence and shape the general 
picture of Hungary before the Battle of Mohács. It was András Kubinyi, who 
first observed that Burgio, the papal diplomat of Sicily, was often misinformed 
by János Bornemissza, the biggest intriguing of the time, so this study also con-
tributes to the study of the reliability of the picture having been provided by the 
papal nuncio.25
20  Gábor Nemes, ‘Elszalasztott lehetőségek. VII. Kelemen pápa és II. Lajos országainak 
belpolitikája (1523–1526)’ [Missed opportunities. The internal affairs of the countries of Clement 
VII and Louis II of Hungary], Egyháztörténeti Szemle 15:4 (2014), 3–19; Nemes 2015a, no. 24, 
49, 51–5, 88, 98, 113–4, 122.
21  Gerhard Rill and Giuseppe Scichilone, ‘Buglio, Giovanni Antonio’, Dizionario Biografico 
degli Italiani , 15 (1972), 413–7.
22   Mon. Vat. II/1.
23  Nemes 2015a, no. 7, 35, 59, 89, 106, 141–2, 146, 150.
24  Bessenyei, Fejedelmi, 122–123, no. XIX/1.; Archivio Segreto Vaticano [hereinafter: ASV], 
Segreteria di Stato, Principi, vol. 2, fol. 344r.
25  András Kubinyi, ‘Szalkai László esztergomi érsek politikai szereplése’  [The political 
performance of Archbishop László Szalkai], in Kubinyi 1999, 147–60, here 147–8.; István 
Tringli, Az újkor hajnala. Magyarország története 1440–1541 [The dawn of the modern age. The 
history of Hungary] (Tudomány–Egyetem), Budapest 2003, p.108.
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The Pope might have sent his deputies to arrange any specific matters. He 
sent two deputies to distribute the supplies having been sent to support the 
Croatian-Dalmatian frontier: Thomas Niger/Tommaso Negri/Toma Crnić, the 
Bishop of Trau in 1524 and Leonardo Cresci in 1525–1536. While the latter 
is known only as a familiar of the Pope, Thomas Niger was an old, experienced 
diplomat of the Holy See.26
The relations between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Holy See from a 
Hungarian side showed a very colourful picture: Hungary was represented in 
the Vatican mainly by Italians who could find their ways easier in the maze of 
the curia offices.
As the Paragraph 65 of Decree 1514 of Vladislaus II strongly restricted the 
Hungarian prelates’ travels to Rome, they could not be appointed to be papal 
deputies. As a counterpart of the papal legates representing the Pope in the 
country of destination, the Hungarian king was represented in Rome at the 
highest level by the cardinal protector. During my research I managed to re-
construct the medieval antecedents of the important role of this office in the 
early modern age.27 One of the most important duties of the protector was the 
administration of the matters concerning the benefices; he would supervise the 
ecclesiastic lawsuits and carried out deputy’s appointments.28 After possible 
antecedents of the fifteenth century (Gabriele Rangoni, Giovanni d’Aragona, 
Rodrigo Borgia, Giambattista Orsini) the first person having been called ‘the 
26  Gábor Nemes, ‘VII. Kelemen pápa magyar vonatkozású brévéi (1523–1526). Adatok a 
Magyar Királyság és a Szentszék kapcsolataihoz’ [The Hungarian related briefs of Clement VII. 
Data for the connections of the Kingdom of Hungary with the Holy See], in Péter Tusor (ed.), 
Magyarország és a római Szentszék (Források és távlatok). Tanulmányok Erdő bíboros tiszteletére 
(Collectanea Vaticana Hungariae, I/8) Budapest/Roma 2012, pp.51–69. [hereinafter: Nemes 
2012] ; Nemes 2015a, no. 26, 31, 47–48, 56–57, 84, 87, 107–108, 126, 131, 133–5.
27  Gábor Nemes, ‘Magyarország kapcsolatai az Apostoli Szentszékkel (1523–1526)’ [The 
connections of Hungary with the Apostolic See], SZ 149:2 (2015), 479–506, 479–83.
28  Joseph Wodka, Zur Geschichte der nationalen Protektorate der Kardinäle an der römischen Kurie 
(Publikationen des ehemaligen Österreichischen Historischen Instituts in Rom, 4/1) Innsbruck/
Leipzig 1938.; William E. Wilkie, The Cardinal Protectors of England. Rome and the Tudors before 
the Reformation, New York/London 1974.; Péter Tusor, ‘A magyar koronabíborosi és bíboros 
protektori “intézmény” kialakulása és elhalása a XV–XVI. században’ [The development and decease 
of the crown cardinal and cardinal protector ‘institution’ in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries], in 
Tibor Neumann (ed.), Várak, templomok, ispotályok. Tanulmányok a magyar középkorról (Analecta 
mediaevalia, II), Budapest/Piliscsaba 2004, pp.291–310.; Péter Tusor, Purpura Pannonica. 
Az esztergomi bíborosi szék kialakulásának előzményei a 17. században [The antecedents of the 
development of the Cardinal See of Esztergom in the seventeenth century] (Collectanea Vaticana 
Hungariae, I/3), Budapest/Roma 2005, p.45.; Michael von Cotta-schønberg, ‘Cardinal Enea 
Silvio Piccolomini and the Development of Cardinal Protectors of Nations’, Fund og Forskning 
51 (2012), 49–76.
177
The Holy See and Hungary under Clement VII 
cardinal protector of Hungary’, was Cardinal Pietro Isvalies, a former legate to 
Hungary and an administrator of the Episcopate of Veszprém.29
After Isvalies the same Giulio de Medici Cardinal Vice-Chancellor, a 
nephew of Pope Leo X became the protector, who ascended the papal throne 
under the name Clement VII in 1523. As for his operations as protector we 
mainly have data of offering benefices and he running the earliest known ca-
nonical investigation of Hungarian reference.30
My researches have revealed that after the election of Cardinal Medici to 
Pope, Giovanni Salviati became the cardinal protector of Hungary. Since in the 
years 1520 and 1521 he reported about the Hungarian provision at the consis-
tories several times in parallel with his relative, Cardinal Protector Giulio de 
Medici, it can be supposed that he represented the Hungarian interests as a 
Vice-Protector that time. Salviati also informed the Pope about the inheritance 
matter of János Lászai confessor father based in Rome,31 followed the develop-
ments of the fights on the Croatian frontier against the Turks,32 the matter of the 
union of the Czech Catholics and Utraquists33 as well as the developments of the 
discussions between Poland and the Teutonic Knights.34 To maintain continuous 
information flow he also ran regular correspondence with Nuncio Burgio.35
It was the Florentine Francesco Marsuppini who served the longest in 
Rome on behalf of the Kingdom of Hungary. He was a familiar and secretary 
of Cardinal Tamás Bakócz already in 1511.36 Later, except for some periods of 
intermission he officially stayed in Rome for more than two decades. His main 
duty was to deliver the letters from Hungary to the Curia and report about them 
before the Consistory. Besides, he provided information to the Buda court and 
29  ASV Arm. XXXIX., vol. 25, fol. 340r–341r.; Theiner, VMHH, II. pp.574–5, no. 778.
30  Consistorialia, no. 20.
31  DL 82 653.
32  ASV Segr. Stato, Principi, vol. 2, fol. 344r.
33  Petrus Kasza (ed.), Stephanus Brodericus: Epistulae, (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Medii Recentisque 
Aevorum. Series Nova, 16), Budapest 2012, no. 35, 45. [hereinafter: Kasza 2012]
34  Ibid., no. 44.
35  Nemes 2015a, no. 7.
36  Guilelmus Fraknói – Iosephus Lukcsics (eds.), Monumenta Romana Episcopatus Vesprimiensis 
IV, Budapest 1908, no. 166.; Nemes 2015b, pp.483–485.
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Nuncio Burgio. He was remunerated partly by regular provisions in cash and 
partly – following the contemporary practice – by benefices.37
The envoy of the Hungarian king, who spent years in Rome, was István 
Brodarics/Stephanus Brodericus/Stjepan Brodarić’, Provost of Pécs, who repre-
sented the interests of both the Hungarian court and Poland, since the Polish 
deputy Bishop Ciołek płocki had died.38 Brodarics appeared at the Consistory 
several times, where he held oratories before the Pope when commenting the 
letters sent from Hungary. Sometimes he read out the letter before the body of 
the cardinals and once he translated the speech of the deputy of the Croatian 
Ban János Torquatus (Karlovics)/Ivan Karlović Kurjaković delivered in Croatian 
into Latin.39
Besides the Hungarian and the Polish kings he also corresponded with 
Archduke Ferdinand, and when the Holy Father sent the Cardinal Protector of 
Hungary: Salviati to Parma, he was also informed about the Hungarian news by 
way of Brodarics staying in Rome.40
When Brodarics was away from office, he was substituted by his secretary 
Imre Kálnai.41 The Hungarian legation in Rome employed a special commis-
sioner for running the everyday businesses at the different offices of the Curia, 
namely Egidio Zefiri, who came from the Amelia Diocese in Umbria.42 Similarly, 
an experienced person, Pietro Antonio Berri from Parma became the secretary 
of the Hungarian legation, who had been the scribe of Cardinal Vio during his 
legate mission to Hungary.43
37  DL 25 313., 46 842.; Vilmos Fraknói, ‘II. Lajos király számadáskönyve 1525. január 12. – 
június 16.’ [The account book of Louis II of Hungary], MTT 22 (1877) 43.; †József Lukcsics 
et al. (eds.), Cameralia Documenta Pontificia de Regnis Sacrae Coronae Hungariae (Collectanea 
Vaticana Hungariae, I/9–10), Budapest/Roma 2014, no. 1375, 1388.
38  Péter Kasza, ‘Egy magyar diplomata lengyel szolgálatban. Újabb források Brodarics István 
római követi működéséhez’ [A Hungarian diplomat on Polish duty. Latest sources on the envoy 
service of István Brodarics in Rome], Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények 113 (2009) 593–605.
39  Consistorialia, no. 32.
40  Kasza 2012.; Nemes 2015b, 485–489.; Nemes 2015a, no. 67, 91–97.
41  Bálint Lakatos, ‘The Papacy’s Policy on Hungarian Court Personnel 1523–1526: the Case of 
Imre Kálnai’s Appointments as Archdeacon and Royal Secretary’, in Péter E. Kovács – Kornél 
Szovák (eds.), Infima aetas Pannonica. Studies in Late Medieval Hungarian History, Budapest 2009, 
pp.163–93.
42  Kasza 2012, no. 102.; Lukcsics 2014, II, no. 1383–6.; Nemes 2015b, 490–1.
43  Augustin Theiner, Vetera monumenta Slavorum meridionalium historiam illustrantia, Roma/
Zagreb 1863, I. no. 788–9.; Angelo Mercati, Saggi di storia e letteratura, Roma 1951, I. pp.321–3.; 
Nemes 2015b, 491.
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In addition to the Hungarian deputies in Rome there were several envoys 
with ad hoc assignments, who were partly the couriers of the Hungarian court, 
partly pilgrims who were commissioned with dispatching letters to Rome (i.e. 
István Brodarics’s brother Mátyás, the late Péter Beriszló/Petar Berislavić’s cous-
in, János and István Aczél, Castellan of Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava).44
The main coordinators of the money transfers between Hungary and the 
Holy See both in Rome and Hungary were the powerful Fuggers whose overall 
European connection network was also an important channel of the informa-
tion flow. Most of the dues payable for the different benefices arrived at Rome 
through the Fuggers and their factors often delivered even the bulls. The papal 
financial aids deposited at the Fuggers served not only the purpose of the de-
fence, but also the costs of the papal ‘legation’ in Buda were partly covered by 
them.45
While at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth century the number of the 
Hungarian pilgrims to Rome was demonstratively high, it decreased radically in 
the years before the Battle of Mohács. However, in spite of the Turkish threat, 
the war in Northern-Italy and the plague hitting Rome, there were some who 
ventured to travel even in these years, i.e. István Aczél, Castellan of Pozsony 
(Pressburg/Bratislava), Chamberlain László Kanizsai, Steward of the Household 
András Trepka.46 The Hungarian confessor fathers provided for the spiritual care 
of the Hungarian pilgrims in Rome, but during the Holy Year a Croatian con-
fessor also served at St. Peter Basilica, namely Andreas Vrecsevics/Vrčević.47
The ecclesiastical travelled to Rome not only on pilgrimage, but also to find 
justice, and there were others, who wanted to study. The most famous Hungarian 
student of the time in Rome was Tamás Nádasdi, the would-be Lord Palatine, 
who escorted Cardinal Vio during his legate mission to Hungary as his inter-
preter in the summer of 1523.48 Again others were attracted to Rome by its 
44  Nemes 2015b, 494–5.; Nemes 2015a, no. 10, 75–77, 82.
45  Aloys Schulte, Die Fugger in Rom 1495–1523, Leipzig 1904, I. pp.266–75.; Lukcsics 2014, 
I. p.306, 314, 317, 323–5.; Nemes 2015a, no. 8–9, 35, 50, 62, 64–6, 68–71, 103–6.
46  DL 39 348.; Nemes 2015b, 495–8.; Nemes 2015a, no. 46, 75–7.
47  Nemes 2015a, no. 102.
48  Endre Veress, Olasz egyetemeken járt magyarországi tanulók anyakönyve és iratai 1221–1864 
[Documents and registers of Hungarian students in Italian universities], (Monumenta Hungariae 
Italica, 3.), Budapest 1941, pp.260–1.; Kubinyi 1999a, 119.; András Kubinyi, ‘Magyarok a késő-
középkori Rómában’ [Hungarians in late medieval Rome], in József Bessenyei et al. (eds.) Studia 
Miskolcinensia 3, Miskolc 1999, p.85.
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vivid, humanist spiritual life: Girolamo Balbi49 moved here in 1524 and Georg 
von Logau50 gained recognition with his poetry amongst the learned men of the 
Eternal City and he received two testimonials from Pope Clement VII upon 
leaving for home. 
As a result of the new sources the number of the participators in the rela-
tions of the two states has grown considerably and the nature and quality of the 
relations have also became more refined. In the years before Mohács the repre-
sentation of Hungary in Rome can be considered continuous and full. However, 
this interest representation did not operate in today’s institutional forms, but it 
was based on the informal channels of an intricate network of personal connec-
tions. 
Since the middle of the fifteenth century a key element of the foreign policy 
of the Papal State was the fight against the biggest enemy of Christianity: the 
Ottoman Empire. The Holy See offered assistance to the Hungarian Kingdom 
in its fight against the Turks not only by financial support, but the main motif 
of the Pope in shaping the connection system of the European countries was 
the consolation of the different courts with each other to create a single front 
against the Turks.
In 1526 the Pope sent letters calling for assistance repeatedly to the 
German, French, English and Portuguese courts. On 1 March 1526 the Pope 
sent Capino de Capi to Francis I King of France to urge him to assist Hungary 
against the Turkish threat, but the nuncio rather entered into discussion to cre-
ate the League of Cognac against Emperor Charles V. Due mainly to the tense 
political atmosphere in Europe these letters of Clement VII calling for assis-
tance hardly had any results.51
49  Nándor Knauz, ‘Balbi Jeromos II. Lajos király tanára’ [The teacher of Louis II of Hungary, 
Balbi],  Magyar Sion 4 (1866) 5–27, 81–106, 161–83, 241–61, 321–52, 401–19, 481–502.; 
Jenő Ábel, Magyarországi humanisták és a Dunai Tudós Társaság, [Humanists in Hungary 
and the Danube Scholarly Society] (Értekezések a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Nyelv- és 
Széptudományi Osztálya köréből) Budapest 1880, pp.32–75.; Nemes 2015a, no. 49.
50  Stephanus Hegedüs, Analecta recentiora ad historiam renascentium in Hungariam litterarum 
spectantia, Budapest 1906, pp.238–247.; Peter Schaeffer, ‘Humanism on Display: Epistles 
Dedicatory of Georg von Logau’, The Sixteenth Century Journal 17:2 (1986), 215–23.; Bálint 
Lakatos, ‘Pannoniae luctus – egy humanista antológia és a törökellenes Habsburg-lengyel 
összefogás kísérlete, 1544’ [A Humanist Anthology propagating Anti-Ottoman Cooperation 
of the Habsburg Monarchy and Poland], Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények 112:3 (2008), 259–86.; 
Nemes 2015a, no. 110–111.
51  Joseph Fraikin, Nonciatures de France. Nonciatures de Clement VII, (Depuis la bataille de Pavie 
jusqu’au rappel d’Acciaiuoli, Archives de l’historie religieuse de la France), Paris 1906, I. pp.7–10.; 
Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571), Philadelphia 1984, III. pp.238–42.; 
Maurizio Gattoni, Clemente VII e la geo-politica dello Stato pontificio (1523–1534), (Collectanea 
Archivi Vaticani 49), Città del Vaticano 2002, pp.132–3.; Nemes 2015a, no. 123–30.
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In its fight against the Turks the Holy See attributed a prominent role to 
Poland which had tensions with almost all of its neighbours. The Hungarian 
king Louis II received important role in negotiating peace between Poland and 
the Teutonic Knights, and the papal legates and nuncios also took part actively 
in these negotiations.52
His Holiness also interfered several times with shaping the internal po-
litical power relations of Hungary in order to rule out political figures causing 
internal hardships and support figures that were loyal to the Holy See beyond 
doubt. Although István Werbőczy/Verbőci enjoyed the full support of the Pope, 
his promotion to the office of the Lord Palatine cannot be attributed to any 
direct papal interference.53
However, in case of the Chancellor’s office his Holiness exerted serious 
pressure. He promoted István Brodarics, the Hungarian king’s envoy to Rome to 
the office, instead of László Szalkai Archbishop of Esztergom, who was present-
ed in unfavourable light in Nuncio Burgio’s reports to Rome who had received 
this denouncing information from János Bornemissza. At the same time, the 
diplomacy of the Holy See got into difficult situation, since the Pope would have 
needed the services of Szalkai in the matter of returning the Czech Utraquists 
to the Catholic Church which issue had gained importance because of the uni-
fication of the radical Picard sect with the Lutherans. So, Clement VII had 
promised the biretta to Szalkai in case of the success of the confessional union, 
but later he made it dependent upon Szalkai’s resign from his Chancellor’s office. 
Paradoxically, the promised biretta was simultaneously a means of motivation 
and recompense.54
In conclusion, the effect of the diplomacy of the Holy See to the Hungarian 
domestic policy cannot be considered beneficial. The confessional union failed, 
due partly to the tense domestic political situation in Bohemia and partly to the 
unrelenting attitude of Legate Campeggi and the weakened political influence 
of Szalkai, who, as a consequence of Nuncio Burgio’s denouncing reports and 
the papal strive to change the composition of the cardinals’ body, was not ap-
52  Fraknói 1902, II. 349–51.; Nemes 2015a, no. 98.
53  Nemes 2014, 3–4; Nemes 2015a, no. 116–121.
54  Antonín Kalous, ‘Tárgyalások az utraquisták és a római egyház egyesüléséről: a kiegyezés 
politikája’ [Negotiations on the union of the Utraquists and the Roman Church: a compromising 
policy], in Beatrix F. Romhányi and Gábor Kendeffy (eds.), Szentírás, hagyomány, reformáció. 
Teológiai- és egyháztörténeti tanulmányok, Budapest 2009, pp.154–63; Idem, ‘The Politics of Church 
Unification: Efforts to Reunify the Utraquists and Rome in the 1520s’, in Jaroslav Miller and 
László Kontler (eds.), Friars, Nobles and Burghers – Sermons, Images and Prints. Studies of Culture 
and Society in Early-Modern Europe. In memoriam István György Tóth, Budapest/New York 2010, 
pp.181–97.; Nemes 2014, 5–19.
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pointed to be a cardinal. On the other hand, István Brodarics, who was weight-
less in the internal matters, received one of the most important positions of the 
country: the Chancellor’s office. 
Since the end of the fifteenth century, when the Hungarian kings could 
not fully fulfill their duty of defending the southern frontiers, the dominant 
political actors of Croatia and Dalmatia – that were under the protection of the 
Hungarian Crown – the Frangepáns, Péter Beriszló and János Torquatus inten-
sified their own diplomatic activities. After the fall of Nándorfehévár (Belgrád), 
Knin and Scardona, Klissza/Klis became one of the most important fortresses, 
so even Pope Clement VII considered its support as a priority. Following the 
example of his predecessor Adrian VI, he supported the forts in dire strait with 
money, corn and war materials. In order to evade misuse he commissioned his 
own men: Bishop Thomas Niger and Leonardo Cresci with the distribution 
of the aids. This measure seemed also justified by the fact that the captains of 
Zengg/Senj: Péter Krusics/ Petar Kružić and Gergely Orlovics/Grgur Orlović, 
who were always in need of money, tried to better their situation with violent 
actions in many cases; i.e. they sold the corn having been sent by Pope Adrian 
VI for their own purse, occupied a Turkish commercial ship in Zara having 
been under Venetian control and confiscated several benefices of the Bishop 
of Zengg.55 An intensive relationship was created between the Pope and the 
Frangepán/Frankopan family the members of which asked for protection from 
His Holiness and the Holy See in their difficult situation.56
The Papal State offered assistance to the Hungarian Kingdom in its fight 
against the Turks not only by financial and diplomatic means, but also with its 
spiritual power. An example of this was that in the Holy Year of 1525, when – 
because of the Roman plague and the standing Turkish threat – only a very small 
number of pilgrims could visit the Holy City, the Pope was generous to offer in-
dulgence licenses, thus the subjects of Bernát Frangepán/Bernardin Frankopan, 
the soldiers of Kristóf Frangepán/Krsto Frankopan with a white cross on their 
chests and the inhabitants of Klissza received indulgence by visiting the nomi-
nated churches in the Holy Year.57
55  Nemes 2015a, no. 27, 59–60.
56  Nemes 2012, 57–64.
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The Hungarian Episcopate and the Papacy after 1526
After the Battle of Mohács (1526) the peculiar but consolidated conditions 
between the Papacy and the Kingdom of Hungary1 became more radicalised. In 
Hungary this was manifested in the almost complete expropriation of benefices 
by the state. The greatest part of provostrie and abbeys were transferred as a 
pledge to secular, and often even to Protestant owners. In the first half of the 
sixteenth century the pledging of bishoprics also became general practice (e.g. 
Győr,2 Nyitra/Nitra), and some of them were even left unfilled subsequently 
for years or decades (Esztergom, Eger). The revenues in such cases went to the 
Chamber.3 The situation was not any better when there was an appointed prelate 
at the head of the diocese. He too had to devote a significant part of his incomes 
to state purposes.4 It also happened that he did not even come to own the 
revenues but was merely paid a pension that was determined by the monarch.5
These developments, together with the practice that characterized the late 
Middle Ages, represented the clearest case of the intertwining of the (Catholic) 
Church and the State in Europe. Apart from the Hungarian monarch, who 
could in this way rely on an internal power base that was free from problems 
of succession and was solely dependent on him, the most fervent enthusiasts 
and beneficiaries of the system were members of the local hierarchy. In spite 
of the economic restrictions, the immediate ownership of benefices from the 
fifteenth century on proved a considerable advantage for Hungarian bishops. 
This peculiar state church structure, just as in France, was characterized by a 
1  See Péter Tusor, The Hungarian Royal Patronage and Supremacy in the Hunyadis’ and Jagellos’ 
Age, under publication.
2 The mechanism of the transfer as a pledge and the difficulties of the taking out of pawn on 
the evidence of the diocese, gained by the Thurzós: Gabriella Erdélyi, Bethlenfalvi Thurzó Elek 
levelezése (Források a Habsburg–magyar kapcsolatok történetéhez), [Elek Thurzó’s correspondence. 
Sources to Habsburg-Hungarian relations] Budapest 2005, I. ad indicem.
3 A thorough analysis of the problem from 1587–1589, by Joseph Schweizer: Die Nuntiatur am 
Kaiserhofe. II. Antonio Puteo in Prag 1587–1589, Paderborn 1912, Cxxix–Cxxxvi (Die Vakaturen 
in Ungarn).
4 On these, Vilmos Fraknói, A magyar királyi kegyúri jog Szent Istvántól Mária Teréziáig, [The 
Hungarian Patronage right from St. Stephen to Maria Theresa] Budapest 1895, pp.233–243 and 
passim. – A good review of the period: Antal Molnár, ‘A pápaság és Magyarország a török uralom 
idején (1526–1686)’, [The Papacy and Hungray during the Ottoman conquest] in István Zombori 
(ed.), Közép-Európa harca a török ellen a 16. század első felében, Budapest 2004, pp. 189–217.
5 Cfr. for example, Helmut Goetz (ed.), Nuntiatur Giovanni Delfinos (1572–1573), Tübingen 
1982, n. 30; the earlier editor of Delfino’s reports do not know Fraknói’s edition).
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special ideological background in ecclesiastical circles. The main element beside 
the tenets of Werbőczy, presumably due to the histories of Antonio Bonfini 
(† 1502) and János Thuróczy (†1489), was an ever more emphatic stressing of 
St. Stephen’s traditions.6 These traditions were associated with the interesting 
implication, which was only informally voiced but more and more often applied 
in practice, that after their frequent relocations consecrated bishops were not 
obliged to obtain the papal bulls to sanction their governance of their new 
bishoprics.7 The Hungarian opinion and practice is explained most intelligibly 
by nuncio Camillo Caetani (1591–1592) to his successor, Cesare Speciano 
(1592–1598) in his instruction of 1592:
‘The root of the problems in Hungary – namely the Holy See do not fill the episcopal 
sees, moreover the bishoprics are charged with pensions and the prelates call themselves 
bishops without an apostolic confirmation – is the prelates themselves. They, in order 
to win their monarch’s favour, state that all the dioceses were founded by their king, St 
Stephen, and their kings are more privileged than all the monarchs in Europe. They, 
practically speaking, practice a sacred jurisdiction over the bishoprics. What one should 
demand of them, however, they show respect towards the Apostolic See, for which we 
have to express the signs of love in many different ways […]’.8
The Hungarian opinion could hardly gain ground even after having sent 
letters of royal bearer to the Pope after Mohács. It seems, the simple supplicant 
form remained at John I (Szapolyai), of which the royal granting’s term of 
6 Their modern editions: Béla Iványi et al. (eds.), Antonius de Bonfinis, Rerum Ungaricarum 
decades, I–IV, Lipsiae–Budapestini 1936–1941; Margit Kulcsár and Péter Kulcsár (eds.), Rerum 
Ungaricarum decades, IV/2, Budapestini 1976; Erzsébet Galántai and Gyula Kristó (eds.), 
Johannes de Thurócz, Chronica Hungarorum, Budapest 1985. These works presumably lead to the 
change of the vetera consuetudo of Constance at Werbőczy to St. Stephen’s tradition.
7 To prove that it did not always mean the neglect of the confirmational process, but its peculiar 
shortening, see the following presented unique interpretation of Kutassy on the validity of the 
cedula consistorialis.
8 ‘Di questi inconvenienti, che si vedono in Ungaria, che sua maestà non provede alle chiese, che grava i 
vescovati di pensione d’autorità propria, li prelati ardiscono di chiamarsi vescovi senza la confirmazione 
apostolica; ne sono causa l ’istessi prelati, li quali per acquistare la grazia di sua maestà asseriscono, che il 
santo re Stefano di Ungaria ha fondato tutte quelle chiese, et che i rè loro hanno azione sopra i vescovati 
piů privilegiata che gli altri rè dell ’Europa et giurisdizione quasi sacrata. Et meritano sopra id ciò gran 
riprensione, sebbene per il resto si mostrano molto devoti della sede apostolica et de suoi ministri, et devono 
essere trattati con ogni sorte di amorevolezza da vostra signoria con lettere in questo ingresso et poi secondo 
l ’occorrenze delle loro venute in questa corte.’ Biblioteca Casanatense (Roma), ms. 2672, fol. 84r. See 
its edition, Joseph Schweizer (ed.), Die Nuntiatur am Kaiserhofe. III. Die Nuntien in Prag: Alfonso 
Visconte 1589–1591, Camillo Caetano 1591–1592, Paderborn 1919, n. 284. 584–585; as I happened 
to copy the whole by hand, I will refer to the original. The document was used by Fraknói, as well, 
however, he did not make the most of the valuable information. – Alfonso Gesualdo (who was
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‘collatio’ reduced the value in the Curia’s esteem.9 Ferdinand I, on behalf of 
Tamás Szalaházy’s bishopric of Eger, made an exceptional request to Clement 
VII on 24 September 1527.10 At the supplication of Pál Várdai’s archbishopric of 
Esztergom in 1528, there is already the concept of ius patronatus and praesentatio, 
exercised according to the predecessors’ example.11 From the middle of the 
century, namely from the proposals of 1550, there are mainly corresponding 
texts, in which, besides the consolidation of the advowson and the terms of 
elegimus et nominavimus and praesentamus, the verb of supplicare vanishes, since 
it is exchanged for the more neutral verb, rogare.12 Likewise, it happened in the 
royal bearer documents of the late sixteenth century, though, there are some 
varieties (for example, electionem, nominationem et postulationem…, eligeremus, 
nominaremus et sanctitati vestrae pro impertienda benedictione et confirmatione…).13
*
In the middle of the sixteenth century Hungarian demands were expanded 
with one more element. This was the demand that papal bulls should be issued 
free of charge in the form of annates or other taxes. The payment acquittal was 
well aware of the details, though, he did not have close relations with the Hungarian prelates) 
launched the curial campaign against the Hungarian bishops’ anti-canonical practice, in 1589. 
The description and the loquacious documents of the exceedingly interesting and important case: 
Fraknói 1895, 275–86; Vilmos Fraknói, Magyarország egyházi és politikai összeköttetései a római 
Szentszékkel, [Hungary’s ecclesiastic and political relations with the Holy See] Budapest 1903, III. 
222–227; Vilmos Fraknói Oklevéltár a magyar királyi kegyúri jog történetéhez, [Charter collection 
for the royal patronage right in Hungary] Budapest 1899, nn. 97–100. (Gesualdo’s letter repeated 
edition without referring to Fraknói: Schweizer 1919, pp.Xxi–Xxiv, note 3.). Cesare Speciano 
mentions first the obtainment of the papal bulls, though, his information was indirect. On the 
effort of the nuncios and the observance of the canons: Fraknói 1895, loc. cit.; Fraknói 1903, pp. 
259–262; Oklevéltár, nn. 101–106; and Natale Mosconi (ed.), La nunziatura di Praga di Cesare 
Speciano (1592–1598) nelle carte inedite Vaticane e Ambrosiane I–V, Brescia 1966–7, passim.
9 Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV), Archivum Arcis (A.A.), I–XVIII, n. 5243; Augustinus 
Theiner (ed.), Vetera monumenta Slavorum meridionalium historiam illustrantia maximam partem 
nondum edita ex Tabulariis Vaticanis deprompta collecta ac serie chornologica disposita, Romae–
Zagrabiae 1863, I, p.628 [n. 860].
10 Fraknói 1899, n. 74.
11 ASV A.A., I–XVIII, n. 2453; Theiner 1863, p.598 [n. 817.].
12 The originals of the praesentatios of Pécs, Vác, Eger, Tinin/Knin, dated in Pozsony/Pressburg/
Bratislava on 25 February: ASV A.A., I–XVIII, nn. 5256–5259; cfr. Theiner 1875, p.8. – See 
ASV A.A., I–XVIII, n. 5120 and n. 5247; Theiner 1863, pp.654. 662–663.
13 See for example the letters of Maximilian I (Vienna, 8 March 1569) – and Rudolph II (21 
February 1588) written concerning on different bishoprics: ASV Segreteria di Stato, Principi, vol. 
30, fol. 51rv and vol. 44, fol. 80rv.
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included in the bull of Constance but presumably in the interest of keeping the 
whole system alive they had not taken advantage of it. The old-new argument 
was referring to the costs of the fight against the Turks and to the idea of 
propugnaculum Chirstianitatis. This common denominator was always present 
in the relationship of Hungary with the papacy14 in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, and greatly contributed to the evolution of the state church in Hungary, 
beginning with Constance, when the idea was born, leading to the seizure of the 
revenues of bishoprics on the grounds of defence expenses.15 
The idea of the bulwark of Christianity in this case did not prove effective 
enough. Although it was on account of this argument, constantly and rightfully 
referred to by both clerical and secular circles, that the papacy, contrary to what 
happened in England in the sixteenth century and in France in the seventeenth 
century, did never launch a sweeping attack against the Hungarian state church 
system that would have made use of solemn excommunication, and time and 
again, especially during the Long Turkish War, contributed enormous sums 
towards the expenses of warfare, in the case of the annates it only granted 
occasional concessions.16 We are aware of only one case where Rome applied 
sanction against the Hungarian prelates for their illegal possession of benefices, 
for which they needed to be given absolution in 1554. Cardinal Medici wrote 
the following about this:
‘I introduced the Hungarian dioceses at the consistory according to the royal 
nomination; their filling was favourable conducted along with the absolution of the 
bishops from the canonical threats, owing to their control over their diocese without a 
papal confirmation…I beg…, that henceforth [Your Majesty] do not let an appointed 
function in his diocese without a papal confirmation, otherwise it would show a bad 
14 The following extract from Giovanni Morone’s instruction of 24 October 1536 is a descriptive 
example for this: ‘Quia regnum Hungariae fuit semper validum propugnaculum et veluti antemurale 
Christianitatis, ideo iudicavit sanctissimus dominus noster non esse praedictum regnum ob discordiam 
principum super temporalibus rebus ortam a sanctitate sua in spiritualibus deserendum […]’ Walter 
Friedensburg (ed.), Nuntiatur des Morone 1536–1538, Gotha 1892, n. 2. pp.58–9.
15 István Kenyeres, Uradalmak és végvárak. A kamarai birtokok és a törökellenes határvédelem a 
16. századi Magyar Királyságban, [Lordships and frontier castles. The chamber estates and anti-
Ottoman frontier defence in 16th c. Royal Hungary] Budapest 2008, here and there.
16 Cfr. Florio Bánfi, ‘Grianfrancesco Aldobrandini magyarországi hadivállalatai’, [Aldobrandini’s 
Hungarian military ventures] Hadtörténelmi Közlemények 40 (1939), 1–33 and 213–228 and 41 
(1940), 143–56; recently Tamás Kruppa, A Kereszt, a Sas, és a Sárkányfog. Közép-kelet-európai 
törökellenes ligatervek és küzdelmek a Báthory korszakban (1578–1597), [The Cross, the Eagle and 
the Dragon Tooth. East Central European anti-Ottoman league schemes in the Báthory era] 
Budapest-Róma 2014, particulary pp.446-70.
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example to Christianity and can be interpreted here as a sign of detestation [towards 
the Holy See].’17
Previously, Ferdinand I pleaded the fact in vain that the prelates were 
the head of the country as an excuse for the prelates’ pluralism and the anti-
canonical possession of benefices and he made promises in vain of the obtaining 
of the bulls.18 The bishop of Modrus, who – owing to the closeness of Venetian 
territories – was to face an inquisitional process, was saved by the nuncio of 
Vienna. He insisted that he gave permission to the diocese’s registering due to 
the prolongation of papal sede vacante and the royal proposal to Rome. He argued 
that, the removal of the well-operating prelate would create a scandal, followed 
by more serious problems, such as the vacancies, or the fact, that the bishopric of 
Győr was still transferred as a pledge for 50 thousand Forints. Nuncio Delfino 
completely supplies us with those circumstances that stood as viewpoints for 
making the Papal Curia reconsider in case of the probable application of the 
canonical punishments.19
Already in 1552, there was a separate cardinal part-congregation 
established for the Hungarian problems. Although, we do not know much 
about its functioning, it could be regarded as the archetype of the Congregazione 
d’Ungheria, which operated during the long turkish war.20 The administration of 
the Hungarian affairs took place rather in the Congregatio Germanica, yet, the 
involvement of the Holy Office is out of the question due to the anti-canonical 
behaviour.21
17 ‘[…] io proposi in consistorio le chiese d’Ungaria secondo la nomination di quella, et furno espedite 
favorabilmente, insieme con l ’absoluzione per li vescovi che erano incorsi in le censure per haver 
administrato senza la confirmazione del papa […] supplico […], che da hora inanzi non voglia 
permettere che alcuno nominato da lei s’ingerisca a l ’administratione prima di esser confirmato da sua 
santità, perché è cosa di cattivo esempio in tutta la Christianità, et di qua può esser interpretata, che si 
faccia a contempto.’ to Ferdinand I, Rome, 4 September, 1554. Helmut Goetz (ed.), Nuntiatur 
Delfinos. Legation Morones. Sendung Lippomanos (1554–1556), Tübingen 1970, p.321, ind. n. 3.
18 See the report of nuncio Girolamo Martinego (1550–1554) Vienna, 11 June, 1553, which cites 
the royal excuse: ‘essendo gli prelati membri principali del regno, la necessità era tale, che senza notabil 
pregiudizio non potevano far’ di meno.’ Helmut Goetz (ed.), Nuntiatur des Girolamo Martinego 
(1550–1554), Tübingen 1965, n. 120. p.250.
19 His report was dated in Vienna, on 12 August, 1556. Goetz 1970, n. 139, pp.286–90 and n. 
136 and n. 138.
20 Cfr. Goetz 1965, n. 78.
21 ‘Intorno alle chiese d’Ungaria sua santità ha voluto, che siano considerate nella congregazione 
Germanica le cose adotte da vostra signoria illustrissima, come si farà per pigliarne poi qualche buon 
consiglio a gloria di Dio et consolazione di tant’anime, che ivi restano perdute […]’ The curial order to 
nuncio Caetani from February 1592, Schweizer 1919, nn. 223. 446.
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To revert to the question of the annates: the emphasis of the event of 
propugnaculum Christianitatis was only restrained, they made occasional 
concessions. The question of paying the taxes had a central role already in 1539, 
when after a long pause, with the conclusion of the Treaty of Várad/Oradea 
a canonical settlement of the Hungarian bishops’ situation became possible, 
which had been prevented by the parallel appointments made by King János I 
(Szapolyai) and the Habsburgs.22 In 1548 and 1550 the problem’s solution was 
urged by parliamentary laws and by a legation sent in the name of the count-
ry.23 The main difficulty for Rome was the fact that already at this time a great 
portion of taxes would end up in the hands of various officers in the Curia. On 
the other hand, a general exemption would have made a negative example for 
other national churches. Nonetheless, the balance of the papal state budget was 
not yet nearly so unfavourable as not to make possible a momentary yielding to 
the Hungarian demands in 1550.24
In 1554, a temporary arrangement suggested by Vienna was made, which 
fitted both the principle of reservation of curial rights as well as the Hungarian 
interests, according to which the taxes paid would be directly spent on the 
maintenance of border fortresses. In the following breve, written by Julius III to 
nuncio Zacharia Delfino (1554–1556 and 1561–1565) one can read:
22 On the negotiation of 1539–1540, Fraknói 1895, pp.250–52; Árpád Károlyi, ‘Adalék a 
nagyváradi béke s az 1536–1538. évek történetéhez’, [Addition to the history of the peace of 
Oradea and the years 1536-38] Századok 11 (1878), 591–617. 687–732. 790–840. On Statileo’s 
negotiations in Rome and on the problems of the issue and delivery of the bulls, Ludwig Cardauns 
(ed.), Nuntiaturen Morones und Poggios. Legationen Farneses und Cervinis 1539– 1540, Berlin 1909, 
nn. 6. 17. 233. 235. 329. 330. 334. On 13 March 1528, Pál Várday, the archbishop of Esztergom, 
already asked his bulls’ free dispatch, referring to the destruction of the Turks, from Clement VII 
(ASV Segr. Stato, Principi, vol. 5, fol. 144rv), and so did Ferdinand I in his letter of 20 November, 
1534. He emphasized that if there was not the threat of the Turks, the archbishop would be willing 
to pay (ASV A.A. I–XVIII, n. 5101; Theiner 1963, p.627). György Fráter (Martinuzzi) also paid 
attention to this question (his letter to cardinal Farnese, Várad/Oradea, 7 February 1547, ASV 
Segr. Stato, Principi, vol. 14, fol. 382r–383v).
23 The necessity of the filling of the episcopal sees was highlighted by Fraknói, who stated that the 
texts underlined the ecclesiastical superiority of the monarch and the archbishop of Esztergom. 
Fraknói 1895, pp.243–4; Fraknói 1903, pp.71–3.
24 ‘[…]non pervenendo questi danari in benefizio di sua santità, ma de diversi offiziali, come sua maestà 
sapea esser il solito delli offizi di Roma, et far grazia de quello d’altri era cosa tanto difficile come odiose.’ 
Confalonieri nuncio to cardinal nepos Odoardo Farnese, Vienna, 4 January 1541. Cardauns 
1909, nn. 334. 219; Fraknói 1895, 243–244. 252–253. 255. – The suspension of the payment 
of the officials could have caused inner tension in the Papal State. Cfr. Wolfgang Reinhard, 
‘Staatsmacht als Kreditproblem. Zur Struktur und Funktion des frühneuzeitlichen Ämterhandels’, 
Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 61 (1974), 289–319.
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‘We are sending Thou these bulls of appointment with leaden seal, accompanied by the 
register of those demands that are deserved by the officials of the Apostolic Chancery 
and the Roman Curia, who issued these documents. We enjoin Thou to convey the bulls 
to the bishops apiece and have them pay their debts, which keep by yourself. […] We 
command Thou to give the sum to His Majesty, the king of Hungary or to the one he 
orders, to devote the fund to those fortresses and bulwarks, which are being built in 
Hungary against the formidable enemies of Christianity.’25
Ferdinand I, failed in his effort to finalise this arrangement.26 Concerning 
the annates, a case-by-case agreement would have to be made in the years to 
come. This was mainly successful,27 though, not always. On 12 August 1556 
nuncio Delfino reported to Rome that János Újlaki, the bishop of Tinin, who 
had been already acquainted with his duties for a year, did not want to obtain the 
bulls since he did not have any hopes of dispensing with the annate.28 According 
to the report of Stanislaus Hosius (1560–1561) on 30 May 1560, Ferdinand 
was complaining that under the pontificate of Paul IV (1555–1559) nobody 
won confirmation from the territory of his countries. Specifically, he suggested 
that the annates of the Hungarian bishops should be dispensed with, due to 
Hungary’s catastrophic pastoral state, since there were barely ten priests in each 
diocese.29
On the Hungarian side, they tried in vain to regard the regular concessions 
as acquired right, even in the late sixteenth century, however, from the middle of 
the century the demand of dispensing with the annates was a part of the royal 
25 Rome, 11 and 22 September, 1554: ‘[…] provisionis sub plumbo expeditas litteras nunc tibi mittimus 
una cum indice iurium atque emolumentorum, quae propter huiusmodi expeditiones camerae apostolicae 
et Romanae curiae officialibus debentur, tibi mandantes, ut praedictas litteras ipsis episcopis et singulis 
eorum ita tradas, ut praedicta iura et emolumenta occasione ipsorum expeditionis per eos debita, ab eisdem 
exigas eaque per te exacta penes te conserves […] – Ungariae regi illustri, seu quibus ille iusserit, nostro 
nomine consignes, in propugnaculis et munitionibus quae ab ipsius serenitate ad praedicti Ungariae regni 
ab immanissimo Christiani nominis hoste defensionem extruuntur, impendendam, tibi per praesentes 
committimus et mandamus. ’ Published: Goetz 1970, pp.20–3, nn. 10–11.
26 See his memoir to nuncio Delfino. Augsburg, 8 August 1555. Published: Goetz 1970, pp.330–
3, ind. n. 8.
27 Cfr. for example Samuel Steinherz (ed.), Die Nuntien Hosius und Delfino 1560–1561, Vienna 
1897, n. 40; Guilelmus Van Gulik et al. (eds.), Hierarchia Catholica medii et recentioris aevi, sive 
Summorum Pontificum, S.R.E. Cardinalium, ecclesiarum Antistitum series, Monasterii 1923, III. 98. 
161. 172. 216. 259. 294. 301. 304. 313–314. 325. 326. 331. 338. On Rome’s willingness, concerning 
the concessions: Mosconi 1966, II. 59 and 69.
28 ‘…nè pensa di mandare a Roma, perché dice che non ha un quatrino, et il vescovo Jauriense novamente 
tornato di costà ha affirmato che egli non può sperar grazia circa l ’annata.’ Goetz 1970, nn. 139. 
pp.289–90.
29 Steinherz 1897, nn. 9. 39.
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bearer documents.30 Antonio Puteo (1587–1589) warned – in written form, as 
well – the Royal Chancery to phrase that part of the presentational document, 
which related to the discharge of the annates, in more of a request nature. He 
added that the Hungarian prelates, as a sign of their willingness to compromise, 
should pay the servitia minuta, the well proportioned tax, owing to the officials 
besides the items of the fixed documentary tax.31 
*
The question of the payment of the annates coupled with other difficulties of a 
technical nature. In the system after the Council of Trent, the bishop’s sources 
of livelihood had to be accounted for and the canonical investigation process 
had to be conducted in a more precise way. A long series of events show how it 
burdened the relationships of the Hungarian episcopate and the Roman Curia. 
On 12 July 1572 Tolomeo Galli, secretary of states, informed Giovanni Delfino, 
the nuncio of Vienna (1571–1578), of the following:
‘As far as the canonical filling of the bishoprics, recommended by the Emperor concerns, 
in the name of that benevolence that the Holy See desires to show for His Majesty, 
he ordered to summon up those documents and processes that were composed under 
his sainted predecessor and can be found at cardinal Morone. Yet, I denoted him 
that these minutes are very incomplete and they do not confirm that their proper 
livelihood is provided. Neither do they prove that the consecrated priests are of legal 
origin, whether they meet the other requirements of the Council of Trent and they took 
their creed in a proper form. As a consequence of all these, his predecessor denied the 
canonical institution. Therefore, His Majesty must be informed that the process should 
be conducted again, and the minutes should be sent in a proper issue to enable His 
Holiness to confirm them without affronting God and a scandal. In such cases, as His 
Majesty is aware, he acts with due foresight.’32
30 Cfr. for example the letters of Maximilian and Rudolph: ASV Segr. Stato, Principi, vol. 30, fol. 
51rv and vol. 44, fol. 80rv.
31 See the instruction left to Alfonso Visconti in 1589. Schweizer 1912, nn. 262. 506.
32 ‘Et quanto alla spedizione d’ vescovati desiderata et raccommandata da sua maestà Cesarea conforme 
a la buona voluntà, che ha di compiacere a la maestà sua in tutto quel che possa, ha ordinato che si 
trovino i processi et le scritture mandate sopra ciò in tempo della santa memoria del suo predecessore, 
li quali sono in mano dell ’illustrissimo cardinal Morone protettore. Ma io ho inteso, che detti processi 
erano molto defettivi, et che oltra il non haversi certezza del modo, con che potessero sostentarsi i 
vescovi, non constava che li nominati fussero in sacris et nati di legitimo matrimonio et havessero le 
altre qualità requisite da i sacri canoni et dal concilio di Trento et sopra tutto che havessero fatta come 
s’usa la professione de la fede, et che questa fu la causa che detto predecessore non passò la speditione. 
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Due to the regulation of Pope Gregory, the bulls were issued – if the 
cardinals of the inquisition had not found the ‘signs of heresy’ – without repeating 
the process33 and free of charge, considering the Habsburg monarch.34 There 
occurred some problems in the conduct of the process also in the following 
decades, especially when the nuncios granted their duties to the prelates. 
It happened chiefly in the second part of the 1580s under the nunciature of 
Antonio Puteo and Filippo Spinelli (1598–1603). In 1588, Puteo entrusted 
Franciscus de Andreis,35 the bishop of Scopia and working as the auxiliary 
bishop of Esztergom, with the conduct of the processes of Tinin/Knin, Zagreb, 
Veszprém, Csanád/Cenad, Pécs, Várad/Oradea and Nyitra/Nitra.36 Puteo often 
called his attention not to send the minutes immediately to Rome37 but to him, 
since he had to sign them first to make them valid.38 
Under the service of Spinelli, Primate János Kutassy controlled the canonical 
process.39 Moreover, we can find examples to a process, where, on the basis of 
the regulation, the nominee himself organized a part of it, though, without 
much success.40 This part was the avowal of the Tridentine Creed (Professio Fidei 
Tridentina), which was taken very seriously on the consistorial meetings and 
Onde sarà bene di avvertire sua maestà, afinché i processi si facciano et mandino in buona forma, accioché 
sua santità li possa d mettere senza offesa di Dio et sacandalo, convenendo in cose tali, come sa la maestà 
sua, procedere con grandissimo riguardo.’ Goetz 1982, pp. 46– 47, n. 21; and more ibid., nn. 27. 30. 
62. 74. 83. 117.
33  Péter Tusor and Gábor Nemes (eds.), Consistorialia Documenta Pontificia de Regno Hungariae 
(1426–1605) (CVH I/7), Budapest–Róma 2011, nn. 164–165 and nn. 166–174.
34 ‘[…] senza spesa alcuna in grazia de la maestà sua.’ The register of Galli to the nuncio, Rome, 31 
May 1573. Almut Bues (ed.), Nuntiatur Giovanni Dolfins (1573–1574), Tübingen 1990, nn. 21. 
53.
35 Van Gulik et al. 1923, p. 294; Tusor and Nemes 2011, n. 161.
36 Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 210–213 and nn. 215–218.
37 By agent Diotalevi, see below.
38 Schweizer 1912, nn. 66. 82. 170. 331. 334.
39 Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 240–244. As a matter of curiosity, in France, after the Council of 
Trent, under Henry III and IV mainly the archbishops and bishops conducted the process, which 
was obviously not accepted by the Holy See, since in this way, the canonical control over the royal 
appointment was in the hand of those bishops, who were nominated by the monarch. In 1610, the 
French ecclesiastics themselves proclaimed the unreliability of the fabricated registers to Rome. 
Joseph Bergin, The Making of the French Episcopate 1589–1661, New Haven–London 1996, p.62.
40 ‘Qui alligate vengono le sodette scritture et insieme con esse una professione di fede per il nominato alla 
chiesa di Giavarino dubitando esso, che quella, che si mandò già, non sia fatta intieramente nel modo, 
che fů avvertito da me […]’ Schweizer 1912, n. 47. Cfr. however Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 
194–195 and n. 236.
194
Péter Tusor
almost in case of the smallest mistake, its repetition was ordered.41 The nuncios 
usually complied with their duty, so did Zaccaria Delfino42 and Cesare Speciano 
around 1590.43 Speciano – who was previously the confidant of Carlo Borromeo 
– charged commission only in case of Vác in 1597, however, he did not entrust a 
local bishop but the Jesuit Antonio Possevino.44
*
There were two methods of introducing the Roman stage of the institutio 
canonica – or rather the ‘expeditio’, which not only marks the issue of the bulls 
but it depicts a much longer procedure. Either the representative (agent) of 
the nominees conveyed the minutes and documents to Rome and gave to the 
cardinal (protector), or the nuncio sent it over through the papal Secretariat of 
State.45 The delivery of the royal presentational documents to the Pope (and 
to the protector to deal with the case) was normally the task of the imperial 
legate,46 however, it happened that the agent organized it.47
The reformed conduct of the examinations, the meticulous, circumstantial 
and expensive obtainment of the bulls caused severe problems, not only in 
the Hungarian relation but also for instance in the case of the archbishop of 
Prague.48 The problem greatly contributed to the fact that the Hungarian prelates 
persistently adhered to the ideology of the state church, and made even more 
emphatic the lack of a proper high-level representation in the Curia that would 
have helped to overcome occasional, concrete problems. They were satisfied with 
the royal appointment, they neglected their bulls’ obtainment or they wanted to 
use the ‘back door’ during the process. A perfect example of this is that behaviour, 
when, despite the nuncios’ prohibition, the Hungarian prelates – besides that 
they regarded the request and claim for the concession of the annates as an 
acquired right – did not feel obliged to pay even the tax for the expediting 
41 Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 130. 188. 191. 192. 210. 211. 212. 213. 216. 217. 218. 222.
42 Goetz 1982, pp. 46–47, n. 21; and more, ibid., nn. 27. 30. 62. 74. 83. 117.
43 Mosconi 1966, III. nn. 70. 110, IV. n. 15.
44 Mosconi 1966, IV. n. 49.
45 Schweizer 1912, n. 312.
46 Cfr. for example Fraknói 1899, n. 80.
47 This is mentioned by cardinal Gesualdo in 1583, by criticizing the Hungarian bishops. Péter 
Tusor, Purpura Pannonica. Az esztergomi bíborosi szék kialakulásának előzményei a 17. században, 
[The antecedents of the development of the Cardinal See of Esztergom in the 17th c.] Budapest–
Róma 2005, p. 57.
48 Bues 1990, ad indicem.
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the bulls. János Kutassy’s, the bishop of Győr (later primate of Hungary), 
proposition was conducted without any hindrances on the secret consistory on 
23 September 1593, in other words, the institutio canonica happened. He had the 
cedula consistorialis sent by his assistant with the explanation that this document 
proved the authoritativeness of the provision, so they did not need to bother 
about the complicated office charges of the bull. The ingenuity of Kutassy – 
which demonstrated his thorough knowledge of the curial inner policy – did 
not win the appreciation of nuncio Cesare Speciano. The prelate-diplomat could 
hardly regain possession of the original document from the bishop of Győr, 
moreover, he could scarcely persuade the bishop that the document, written as a 
basis of the draft, was not equal to a papal bull.49
The behaviour of the Hungarian episcopacy put an emphasis on the lack 
of a Hungarian higher curial representation, which could solve the temporal or 
concrete problems. Two out of the three agencies – the cardinal protectorate and 
the royal legacy – integrated into the system of the Habsburg diplomacy, due to 
the personal union concluded between the Hungarian and the imperial court in 
1556. The practical transformation of the Protettorato d’Ungheria to Protettorato 
degli stati ereditari caused numerous problems. The protectors, who operated 
with a more and more precise bureaucracy,50 especially Alfonso Gesualdo, 
regularly had confrontations with the Hungarian practice and ideology. They 
decided to face this polemic not only as the emissaries of the doctrines of Trent 
and as the protectors of the canon law. They were also financially involved in this 
question, since a particular sum from the tax of the institutio canonica was their 
due (the so-called propina), however, the Hungarian nominees were not willing 
to pay it.51 Nor did they pay, when the protector achieved the concession at the 
Pope and the College of Cardinals. However, Gesualdo proudly announced his 
achievements to Rudolph II in 1598.52
*
49 His reports from Prague on 15 February and 11 May 1593: Mosconi 1966, III. nn. 30. 74. 77. 
178). Cfr. Tusor and Nemes 2011, n. 221.
50 The canonical registers were preserved in the protectorial office of Gesualdo, and if it was 
needed, they could search for the eleven year-old documents.
51 Tusor 2005, loc. cit.; cfr. more, Péter Tusor, ‘A magyar koronabíborosi és bíboros protektori 
„intézmény” kialakulása és elhalása a XV–XVI. században’, [The development and decease of the 
cron cardinal and cardinal protector institution in Hungary in 15th-16th c.] in Tibor Neumann 
(ed.), Várak, templomok, ispotályok. Tanulmányok a magyar középkorról, Budapest–Piliscsaba 2004, 
pp. 291–310.
52 Schweizer 1912, n. 240.
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This lack of proper representation could not be compensated for by the relatively 
modern form of communication with the Curia that was developed in the last 
decades of the sixteenth century. At this time, between 1573 and ca. 1600, the 
Hungarian hierarchy had a permanent chargé d’affaires in Rome in the person 
of the owner of the provostry of Ság, Francesco Diotalevi. 
We have scarce information about Diotalevi. György Draskovich mentions 
in one of his letters that he was Antal Veranchich’s secretary, who accompanied 
his master to Turkey, as well.53 In 1586 he was considered to be the Roman chargé 
d’affaires of the Hungarian prelates.54 As far as Caetani was concerned, he was 
in the inner circle of the Curia, however, according to his writings – and other 
resources’ honorabilis address – he might take only the smaller orders.55 On 16 
September 1586 – probably by Draskovich’s recommendation – after the death 
of Miklós Telegdy, he won the vacant provostry of Ság. The appointment refers 
to the services to the Holy Crown, the king and his predecessors as a Roman 
agent (‘fidelis nostri nobilis Francisci Diotaleuÿ fidelium nostrorum reverendissimi 
et reverendorum universorum episcoporum Hungariae in Urbe agentis’).56 Yet, he 
did not receive the whole benefice, he was obliged to share it with Philippo 
de Monte (magister capellae Caesareae et regiae),57 for whom he granted 550 
Forints within 4 years. Then, with the assistance of an imperial committee, he 
paid him up by granting a single allocation of 266 Forint, which could be his one-
year income. The compromise of the possession with full power was reached on 
23 July 1591.58 The possible year of Diotalevi’s death is 1603, since the provostry 
53 ‘…quique a multis annis dominis praelatis Hungaris, maiestatis vestrae sacratissimae sacellanis 
Romae inservivit et nunc quoque inservit, et qui ad latus reverendissimi quondam archiepiscopi Verantÿ 
dum Constantinapoli oratorem ageret maioribus maiestatis vestrae sacratissimae fideliter inservivit 
[…]’. Draskovich to the monarch on 19 February 1586. Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), 
Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Ungarische Akten (Hungarica), Allgemeine Akten, Fz. 
116, fol. 28–29.
54 See the preceding note. – László Lukács, in his brief memoir, reckons that his Roman agency’s 
establishment was in 1568 and his death at the turn of the century. He highlights that he was 
the agent of the Hungarian Paulines, and in this position he came to a clash with István Szántó, 
in relation to the Collegium Germanicum et Hungaricum (Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae. 1550–
1600, Romae 1969–1987, I. 891, 5. note [n. 344]; II, nn. 254. 274. 344).
55 ‘Venerà anco qui presto il signor Francesco Diotalleui, gentilhuomo Italiano, cortigiano vecchio di 
Roma, che è agente di tutti li prelati del regno, huomo molto prattico di quelli humori […]’. Biblioteca 
Casanatense, ms. 2672, fol. 83v; cfr. Schweizer 1919, nn. 284. 585.
56  Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (MNL-OL), Magyar Kancelláriai Levéltár 
[MKL], Magyar Királyi Kancellária, Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 484.
57 MNL-OL MKL Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 479.
58 MNL-OL MKL Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 625.
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of Ság was already vacant on 5 January 1604, moreover the deed of gift, issued 
to Faustus Veranchich on 18 December 1604, specifically referred to his death.59 
The latest researches have also dealt with his character, since nuncio Spinelli’s 
main-instruction of 1598 mentioned his role in the episcopal confirmations. 
However, Klaus Jaitner – though, he knew about his ‘Séez’ provostry in Ság 
and his shuttling between Rome and Hungary (he visited his home still in 
1601) – in his memoires, confused Diotalevi with his best-known namesake, 
with Francesco Diotalevi (†1622), who was the referendarius of the Apostolic 
Signatura, then a bishop and a nuncio in Poland.60 The Hungarian agent could 
have agreed with such a career, however, his paths were determined by a different 
way. While his namesake was from Rimini, he was from Fano, according to our 
sources.61 This is proved by our sources, implying that he obtained an indigenatus 
in Hungary: ‘Quasti procesi li doverà portare a Roma il signor Francesco Diotalevi 
da Fano, ma modo ungaro […] ’
At present we only have sporadic data concerning his activities. As a 
secretary to Veranchich, he had on several occasions visited the Curia: made 
ad limina visits, organised the obtainment of bishop’s bulls,62 and cooperated in 
his patron’s appointment as cardinal.63 His tasks included similar things in later 
years as well, and it is mainly on his account that in the years 1570–1580 the 
frequency of papal confirmations, if not exactly to the extent and with the speed 
expected by Rome, increased significantly.64 The urges of the Curia, addressed to 
the Hungarian bishops, to send somebody to obtain the bulls, often mentioned 
59 László Tóth, ‘Verancsics Faustus csanádi püspök és emlékiratai V. Pál pápához a magyar 
katholikus egyház állapotáról’, in [Faustus Veranchich and his memoranda to Pope Paul V on 
the state of the Hungarian Catholic church] Dávid Angyal (ed.), A gróf Klebelsberg Kuno Magyar 
Történetkutató Intézet Évkönyve, Budapest 1933, pp. 155–211. 176; the newer document of the 
appointment’s publication: p.178, note 1.
60 Klaus Jaitner (ed.), Die Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII. für die Nuntien und Legaten an den 
europäischen Fürstenhöfen 1592–1605, Tübingen 1984, II. p.568, note 5.
61 MNL-OL MKL Libri regii (A 57), vol. 4, n. 625; Mosconi 1966, IV. n. 15 (the quotation is 
from the report of Speciano).
62 See for example, Mosconi 1966, III. nn. 74–83. 117.
63 ‘Itaque cum videretur mihi non sufficere, ut saltem meis humillimis litteris maiestati vestrae 
sacratissimae gratias agerem, nobilem virum Franciscum Diotalleuium, qui meus in hoc negocio Romae 
procurator fuit… pro humillimis gratiis agendis ad aulam maiestatis vestrae sacratissimae misi. Itaque 
maiestati vestrae sacratissimae humillime supplico, dignetur ipsum benigne audire et clementissimis oculis 
intueri. Quod ego per omnem vitam meam a maiestate vestra sacratissima orationibus et fidelibus servitiis 
meis promereri contendam.’ Draskovich’s already quoted letter to the monarch: ÖStA HHStA Ung. 
Akt., Allg. Akt., Fz. 116, fol. 28–29. Cfr. Tusor 2005, p.54.
64 Cfr. Schweizer 1912, nn. 36. 42. 83. 170. 331; Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 183ss.
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the name of Diotalevi. It happened only in 1593, when nuncio Speciano did not 
consider him but the so-called ‘Signor Castellano’, as the agent. Furthermore, 
previously, Speciano put the blame also on him that the cedula consistorialis 
was sent to Kutassy. On the other hand, Castellano’s assistance could only be 
temporal.65 Besides, not only did Diotalevi represent the Hungarian prelates but 
the bishop of Passau, as well.66
The existence of such an agent, often making the way between Italy 
and Hungary in later years too, was mostly the result of favourable personal 
conditions: an Italian humanist having links and a benefice in Hungary, who 
also acquired diplomatic experience in the service of Veranchich, rather than of 
a consciously planned decision based on a recognition of needs. 
Diotalevi’s activities could not hide the fact that direct contacts between 
the hierarchy and the Roman centre became incredibly sparse in the second half 
of the sixteenth century. Between 1556 and 1600 not one Hungarian prelate 
visited the Eternal City, which is rather striking, especially in comparison with 
the diplomatic surge of the previous decades caused primarily by the struggle for 
the throne.67
*
Somewhat surprisingly, almost no problem was caused by the fact that, in direct 
opposition to the Hungarian position, the papacy of the age was even calling into 
question the Hungarian kings’ rights over ecclesiastical benefices. This opinion 
of the Apostolic See was first voiced in 1539. Its position was openly formulated 
65 Mosconi 1966, III. nn. 110. 30.
66 Schweizer 1912, nn. 78. 165. 184 [p.343, note 1.]. 224.
67 Cfr. Fraknói 1903, pp.3–71; Lipót Óváry (ed.), III. Pál pápa és Farnese Sándor bíbornok 
Magyarországra vonatkozó diplomácziai levelezései (1535–1549), [The correspondence of Pope Paul 
III and Cardinal Alessandro Farnese regarding Hungary] Budapest 1879, passim (his details are 
processed by Fraknói). Just as additional data. In March, 1543 a legate visited Rome, by representing 
the Hungarian orders and asking for subsidy, however he was welcomed with a great suspicion, since 
there was not a hint about Ferdinand in his letter of credence, though, the monarch participated in 
the Diet of Pozsony/Pressburg/Bratislava. Ludwig Cardauns (ed.), Berichte vom Regensburger und 
Speierer Reichstag 1541, 1542. Nuntiaturen Verallos und Poggios. Sendungen Farneses und Sfondratos 
1541–1544, Berlin 1912, n. 132. Prior to 1600, in 1556, the last person from the episcopacy to 
visit Rome was Pál Gregoriánczi, who organized the confirmations. Cfr. Goetz 1965, n. 24; 
Goetz 1970, n. 139. pp.289–90; the documents of his last Roman legate: ASV A.A., I–XVIII, nn. 
1604ss. – For some important members of the Hungarian episcopate from the second half of the 
sixteenth century see a new approach: Zsófia Gál-mlakár, ‘Verancsics Antal korának humanista 
hálózatában. Vázlat egy kapcsolatháló modellezéséhez’, [In the Humanist network of Veranchich’s 
age. Sketch to model a network of connections] Publicationes Universitatis Miskolciensis. Sectio 
Philosophica 14:2 (2009), 115–144.
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one decade later. On 4 July 1550, a consistorial decree announced in connection 
with seven bishoprics (Eger, Pécs, Veszprém, Vác, Nyitra, Zagreb and Tinin) that 
the bulls should only be dispatched on the basis of a papal disposition (‘ad meram 
dispositionem sanctitatis suae’), as the rights of the king of Hungary could not be 
verified (‘de nominatione et praesentatione regis Ungariae nihil constat’).68 In fact, 
an extraordinary situation arose in which after the Turkish seizure of Buda the 
royal archive was also lost to the Turks and since the papal privilege could not 
be authentically certified, as always in the coming years, the Hungarians could 
only quote the laws and traditions of the country, and a reference to Constance 
in Werbőczy’s history. This was hardly satisfactory in Rome’s opinion, especially 
with regard to the fact that, as has been mentioned, the consistorial documents 
in general preserved no sign of any involvement by the monarch. 
We might not be mistaken if we state that the consistorial decree’s issue of 4 
July 1550 was for tactical reasons. It was composed in order to settle the matters, 
its main aim was to prohibit the seculars from being granted benefices. Two 
weeks earlier, on 21 June, the papal breve, which appointed Ágoston Sbardellati, 
bishop of Vác, to the administrator of Esztergom for two years, mentions the 
Hungarian monarch’s advowson, based on apostolic privilege over Esztergom,69 
moreover, the Curia did not even attempt to enforce its canonical opinion in 
practice.70 At the same time, the Roman Curia did not even try to vindicate 
its position in practice. In 1539 and 1550 the papal bulls were obtained by the 
monarch’s nominees. The same happened in 1554. Thereafter, the framework 
of a modus vivendi started to evolve,71 in so far as the royal nomination was 
declared in the consistorial documents. The first known example for this was the 
consistorial decree, which made György Draskovich the bishop of Zagreb on 22 
March 1564.72
During the pontificate of Pius IV (1559–1565) the contours of a modus 
vivendi were beginning to take form, inasmuch as in later curial documents, 
68 Fraknói 1895, pp.250–5; for the decree which encloses the special annate concession see: 
Fraknói 1899, 101–102, n. 79; and Tusor and Nemes 2011, n. 118.
69 The only exception of this could be Esztergom, as the royal rights were exceptionally accepted in 
the case of primatial see: ‘Cum, sicut accepimus, ecclesia Strigoniensis, que de iurepatronatus charissimi 
in Chirsto filii nostri Ferdinandi Romanorum et Ungarie regis illustri, ex privilegio apostolico, cui non 
est hactenus in aliquo derogatum, esse dignoscitur […]’ Fraknói 1899, n. 77. 99.
70 He tried the observance of the right of spolium. His attempts to gain the bequest of György 
Fráter and János Statilio, the bishop of Transylvania, were vain. Cardauns, Berichte vom 
Regensburger und Speyerer Reichstag, n. 106. 217; Fraknói 1895, p.254.
71 The summary of the confirmations and annate minutes from the sixteenth century: Fraknói 
1895, pp.250–5; Fraknói 1903, pp.89–90.
72 Tusor and Nemes 2011, 130; Van Gulik et al. 1923, p.338.
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although by no means consistently, the fact of the monarch’s nomination was 
regularly recorded. The reason must clearly be seen in the strengthening of 
Ferdinand I’s positions and then in the personal union of the Hungarian and 
the imperial crown (1556). In the consistorial protocols of the second half of 
the sixteenth century the formula ad nominationem Caesaris uti regis Hungariae 
certainly occurs for a good reason.73
The papacy was consistent in trying to exert influence, at times in an urging 
manner, on the filling of Hungarian episcopal sees only through the court of 
Vienna/Prague.74 The papal diplomacy occasionally made its recommendations 
of persons to the Habsburg court, for instance, so did they operate in favour of 
Demeter Náprágy, Pál Baranyay, who finally died in the battle of Mezőkeresztes, 
the bishopric of György Draskovich in Pécs and the bishopric of Faustus 
Veranchich in Zengg.75 We have no knowledge of any one canonical institution 
having been hindered during the sixteenth century because of a debate concerning 
‘the right of supreme patronage’.76 
Rome did not hesitate to accept the monarch’s patronage in the dioceses 
under enemy rule and was in fact urging institutions, although not primarily 
73 Cfr. Van Gulik et al. 1923, 98. 161. 172. 216. 259. 294. 301. 304 (Veszprém, 25 September 
1570). 313–314 (Tinin/Knin, 26 January 1571). 325. 326. 331. 338; Fraknói 1899, n. 90. 
According to Gerhard Hartmann, as he wrote it in his summary, the date of the obtainment of 
the nominational right over the Hungarian bishoprics by Ferdinand, in parallel with the Kingdom 
of Bohemia, was in 1561. However, it is not precisely true, but he touches upon the essence. Der 
Bischof: seine Wahl und Ernennung, p.29.
74 A huge amount of examples on this in the reports: Goetz 1965, nn. 88. 116. 120; Steinherz 
1897, n. 9; Goetz 1982, nn. 2. 8. 11. 12. 22. 25. 27; Bues 1990, nn. 49. 50. 71. 101. 112. 115. 
116. 132. 142. 157. 175. 252. 292; Ignaz Philipp Dengel (ed.), Nuntius Biglia 1566 ( Juni) – 
1569 (Dezember). Commendone als Legat bei Kaiser Maximilian II. 1568 (Oktober)–1569 ( Jänner), 
Wien 1939, nn. 75. 106b. 112. 116. 121. 133. 141. 147; Joseph Schweizer (ed.), Die Nuntiatur 
am Kaiserhofe. I. Germanico Malaspina und Filippo Sega (Giovanni Andrea Caligari in Graz), 
Padernborn 1905, p. 214 and nn. 115. 174 (Sega’s order to his successor, Giacomo Puteo, in case 
of which chairs’ filling he should cooperate with the Hungarian chancellor); Schweizer 1912, 
nn. 46. 51. 84; Schweizer 1919, nn. 96. 284; Mosconi 1966, II. nn. 40. 51, III. n. 31, IV. n. 12; 
Mosconi 1967, V. nn. 6. 12 (mainly); and Fraknói 1895, 256–274; Fraknói 1899, nn. 84–86. 
104–106. – Cfr. furthermore, the notes of the consistorial papers. Tusor and Nemes 2011, passim.
75 Steinherz 1897, n. 84b; Schweizer 1919, nn. 208. 284. 584–585; Klaus Jaitner (ed.), Die 
Hauptinstruktionen Clemens’ VIII. für die Nuntien und Legaten an den europäischen Fürstenhöfen 
1592–1605, Tübingen 1984, I. nn. 10. 55–58; Mosconi 1966, III. n. 70; Theiner 1875, 99–100, 
n. 114; Tusor and Nemes 2011, n. 243.
76 The only – not in relation to a titular see – and well-known refusal was conducted partly due to 
the nominee’s, the later cardinal Ferenc Forgách, young age, partly due to his ‘heretic’ origin (it is 
less known). The stories are told by the instruction of Caetano: Biblioteca Casanatense, ms. 2672, 
fol. 84r; cfr. Schweizer 1919, nn. 284. 585; and Gesualdo’s report on 25 April, 1589: Schweizer 
1912, nn. 240. 441.
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from a pastoral point of view. In his report on 26 October 1572, nuncio Dolfin 
was for the filling of the episcopal see in Kalocsa, since in this way its suffragant 
bishoprics would not be without a metropolitan.77 It was directly stated in the 
main instruction of Speciano that the monarch should appoint bishops also to 
the sees in the territory under Turkish rule, since they could function on the 
Diet with profit.78 According to the report of 10 August 1592, the nuncio tried 
to persuade Rudolph to make the appointments, however he was reluctant to 
comply, due to the fact that he would have had to arrange the payments, as well. 
The solution was found in the wealthier German auxiliary bishoprics, namely, 
they received the titles of the sees in the territory under Turkish rule. The nuncio 
called the monarch’s attention to live up to the unique opportunity that the Pope 
denied to the other governors, no matter if it was in contrast to the decrees of 
the Council of Trent.79 The priesthood in the territory under Turkish rule was 
re-established in another way, based on the assistance of the Franciscan monks 
from Bosnia in the sixteenth century. It was of a more decisive and conscious 
nature.80
The Tridentine papacy relied on the Habsburgs and the hierarchies, 
controlled and authorised by them, in the territory of the Hungarian monarch. 
The popes regarded the Habsburg House as the main force that could ensure the 
repression of Protestantism. There are no tracks of the nuncios’ direct intervention 
in the Hungarian ecclesiastical affairs, they rarely had visits to Hungary, only 
in case of Diets.81 They intended to make Hungarian clerics obey the canons 
and introduce the reforms through the Habsburgs.82 This is attested to by the 
interventions they made on several occasions for this purpose in Vienna and 
Prague, so that Hungarian prelates would not fail to honour their obligations 
to Rome: to obtain the bulls (which would usually occur after such actions in a 
‘collective’ manner); to visit ad limina; to abandon the practice of taking over the 
governance of their dioceses and using their pontifical insignia instantly after 
their appointment; to conduct the canonical inspections according to the reform 
77 Goetz 1982, 179–180, n. 74.
78 Jaitner1984, I. nn. 10. 55–58.
79 Mosconi 1966, I. n. 28; see more, Fraknói 1895, pp.262–3.
80 Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 116. 175. 176. 177. 208. 209.
81 Fraknói 1903, pp.148–51.; 196–204.




regulations, making the obligatory profession of faith and profession of Trent; 
and finally to obey their obligation of residence.83
Occasionally, we also come across direct influence. In 1587–1588, nuncio 
Puteo was nearly begging Péter Heresinczy, the bishop of Győr, to send somebody 
to Rome to obtain the papal bulls – be it Diotalevi, or somebody else. It would 
have meant to express their respect towards the Apostolic See, otherwise they 
could have appeared as if they despised the Pope. As a rare exception, the nuncio, 
by nearly losing his nerve, divulged the ecclesiastical censorships, though, only in 
words, because he did not like mentioning them. According to his instruction to 
his successor, he desired to affect the conscience of the Hungarian prelates.84 The 
canonical legitimation of the Hungarian dioceses’ administration was usually 
demonstrated in a ‘condensed’ way; in 1560, 1568, 1573, 1578 and 1583. The 
occasional arrangements became urging necessity due to the repeated vacancies.85 
The representatives of the Apostolic See required the assistance of the state 
power in the introduction of the Tridentine centralisation’s main tools, in the 
ad limina visit and the report-making. In 1589, the Hungarian bishops were 
reluctant to obey the order – one of the bishops had to go to Rome to make 
a report – of Sixtus V and his Secretariat [of State], conveying by Alfonso 
Visconti. They referred to the fact that they complied with their duties through 
their agent, which was accepted by Rome, notwithstanding that the permanent 
residence of Diotalevi – highlighted by the Secretariat – was Rome. Already 
Puteo dealt with the question, and as he informed his successor, he took the 
necessary steps not only by the Emperor, but by Archduke Ernst.86
The nuncios were against the manifestations of the practice of the state 
church’s ideology already in the second half of the sixteenth century, as an 
example, they were against the prelates’ immediate assumption of the dioceses’ 
administration after their appointment. The effort of the papal diplomacy, 
namely that, like the Germans, the Hungarian bishops should not receive royal 
authorisation for taking possession their benefices, was rejected in the imperial 
court in Prague. Their explanation was that in contrast to the German capitular 
election, the royal appointment is a guarantee of the decent and ‘non-heretical’ 
people’s appointment so the adoption of the German solution was gratuitous in 
Hungary. They added, if one of the Hungarian prelates does not take possession 
83 See the earlier noted reports of the nuncios, concerning the filling of the ecclesiastical sees and 
the conduct of the processes.
84 Schweizer 1912, nn. 312. 331. 262. 505–506.
85 Van Gulik et al. 1923, pp. 98. 161. 172. 216. 294. 301. 259. 304. 313–314. 325. 326. 331. 338; 
Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 164–174. 191–195. 206–218. 235–237. 240–245.
86 For example Schweizer 1919, nn. 20. 36. 42 and n. 262, 511; cfr. Fraknói 1903, p.222.
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of his benefice immediately after his appointment, he could face a severe financial 
crises, since the chancery directly gains the control of his former benefice.87
Neither the problems, nor the state role were eliminated, when the 
Hungarian hierarchy tried to harmonise the canons with the unique local 
practice, namely, that the ecclesiastical and non-ecclesiastical badges were used 
right after the royal appointment. It happened that Antal Veranchich, before 
the coronation of Rudolph in 1572, applied for the permission of the pontifical 
liturgical badges’ usage – for the earlier appointed bishops – during the service 
from Rome. He referred to the undue length of the confirmation process and to 
the scarce number of bishops (in the course of the liturgical coronation process, 
only the consecrated bishops could participate). Although, the Holy See was not 
refusal, according to cardinal Galli, the request was addressed late, moreover it 
should not have been submitted by the primate but by the legate of the Emperor. 
This case is exemplary, since it proves how much easier it was to refer to the 
ideology of the state church than to bother with obtaining curial confirmation.88
Finally, we could mention the nuncios’ appeals, in which they urged that, in 
Hungary, the canonical investigation process should be conducted according to 
the reform regulations along with the obligatory act of swearing the Tridentine 
oath and a vow of belief,89 moreover, they wanted the residence commitment to 
be kept.90
Neither could the influence of the Tridentine papacy on the hierarchy and the 
state power interfere in the Hungarian system, nor the Protestantism. However, 
the Tridentine papacy did not manage to undermine the close alliance of clerics 
and power in Hungary, yet they might not want to do, understanding that it 
was basically not against Rome and could perfectly function in the repression 
of Protestantism. Apart from the uncertainty of confessional boundaries,91 the 
‘consensual Catholicism’ of Ferdinand I, Maximilian and partly of Rudolph II, 
and the commencing Long Turkish War, it was mainly this intertwining of 
church and state that thwarted the immediate introduction of the Tridentine 
87 On the cases of 1587 see Puteo’s report: Schweizer 1912, 58–59 (= Fraknói 1899, n. 93).
88 The request of Veranchich, the answer of cardinal Galli, the description of the coronation: 
Goetz 1982, nn. 43. 56, furthermore 455–456, ind. n. 18.
89 See the sources quoted concerning the difficulties of the conduct of the processes.
90 The situation of the court-chancellor was problematic already at this time, however, in his case 
the nuncio held out the prospect of the papal exemption. Steinherz 1897, n. 29. There occured 
similarly a problem with the court-chancellor in 1587: Schweizer 1912, n. 46.
91 These can be traced back the most remarkably in the reports of Antonio Possevino. Cfr. Fraknói 
1903, pp.158–95; the latest source on the function of the Jesuit diplomat in Central Europe: John 
Patrick Donnelly, ‘Antonio Possevino S.J., as Papal Mediator between Emperor Rudolf II and 
King Stephan Bathory’, Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu 69 (2000), 3–56.
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programme in Hungary. In the state power itself, which was Catholic owing 
to the dynasty, and on the higher decision making level – for instance, in the 
Secret Council (Consilium Intimum),92 or in the Hungarian Council (Consilium 
Hungaricum) – the Protestant presence was significant. However odd it was, 
in the appointment of the Catholic bishops, also the Protestant landlords’ vote 
and opinion was determinate.93 This explains, by itself, the peculiarities of the 
Hungarian episcopacy’s behaviour and the moderate enthusiasm towards the 
ideas of Trent and towards the regulations of the Roman Curia. It was hardly 
accidental that the modification of the councils’ constitution was the emphasised 
duty of the nuncio.94
As long as the state, controlling the ecclesiastical structures and being served 
by the hierarchy, did not stabilize its confessional nature and did not and could 
not launch the repression against the Protestants, the Hungarian realization 
of the program of Trent was not feasible. Efforts made by the papal nuncios 
and some committed reform prelates, such as Miklós Oláh (archbishop of 
Esztergom), György Draskovich (archbishop of Kalocsa, later cardinal), Miklós 
Telegdy (bishop of Pécs) or András Monoszlay (bishop of Veszprém), were all in 
vain. The results achieved by the Hungarian hierarchy until the beginning of the 
seventeenth century were rather insignificant: despite the ever increasing efforts 
only a few secularised benefices had been regained, and only a minimal Jesuit 
presence established.95 The new generation of priests was educated practically 
only in the small seminary of Nagyszombat (Tyrnavia/Trnava), founded by 
Oláh, complemented by some Hungarian students studying in the colleges of 
92 The incomplete processing of the Habsburg Geheimer Rat monographer: Henry Frederick 
Schwarz, The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century, Cambridge 1943. (I do not intend 
to cite here the newer results of the sources on the age of, for example Maximilian II and Leopold 
I.)
93 See for example Tusor and Nemes 2011, n. 221 and n. 240.
94 Jaitner 1984, I. n. 10 (55–58), n. 35 (252–254); II. n. 71 (568), n. 95 (709–710); Zdenęk 
Kristen (ed.), Johannis Stephani Ferrerii nuntii apostolici apud imperatorem epistulae et acta, Pragae 
1944, I/1. n. 2 (9–10). Cfr. more Mosconi 1966, I. n 52; II. n. 37.
95 The detailed catalogue of the pawned benefices: Bues 1990, 418–419, ind. n. 5.
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Vienna and Olmütz/Olomouc.96 Those clerics, who did not become Protestant, 
from the higher, middle or lower clergy kept their late medieval, renaissance 
nature until the end of the sixteenth century.
But importantly, with all that said, the peculiar Hungarian state church 
system was not characterised by anticurialism proper. In practice the Hungarian 
state church system went way beyond the conditions in France (in one case the 
papacy took action against the non-canonical use of a benefice exactly in order 
to set an example for France), but unlike Gallicanism, it was not supported by 
publications. The reports of papal nuncios, while condemning the abuses, on 
several occasions highlighted the ‘devotion’ of Hungarian prelates to the Holy 
See. This again can only be explained in the context of the war against the Turks.
The lack of militant publications could not however obscure the fact that 
Hungarian and curial opinions were getting ever further from each other. The 
unresolved situation of the question of the appointment of bishops carried in 
itself the risk of several potential sharp conflicts, which up to that point had 
been avoided due to the flexibility of the Tridentine papacy. This, however, 
could no longer be expected from a more rigorous papacy, thinking exclusively 
in Italian dimensions. The changes in the traditional system of relations with 
the Habsburgs in the first half of the seventeenth century,97 and the developing 
organisation of missions in South-East Europe98 threatened with the opening 
of hitherto unknown front lines. It was so especially because from the period 
of the Long Turkish War the attention of the imperial court also turned more 
intensively toward the Balkans. 
This became manifested in the ever more frequent conferment of bishopric 
titles in the area, some of which unquestionably belonged to the Hungarian 
sphere of interests. 
96 All summarized: Egyed Hermann, A katolikus egyház története Magyarországon 1914-ig, 
[The history of the Catholic church in Hungary up to 1914] München 1973, 221–230; Gábor 
Adriányi, ‘Der erste Erneuerer des katholischen Lebens nach der Reformation in Ungarn: 
Primas Miklós Oláh, Erzbischof von Gran (1493–1568)’, in Walter Brandmüller et al. (eds.), 
Ecclesia Militans. Studien zur Konzilien- und Reformationsgeschichte. Remigius Bäumer zum 70. 
Geburtstag gewidmet, Paderborn–München–Wien–Zürich 1988, II. 491–517; On the details of 
the postponement of Trent’s national pronouncing: István Fazekas, ‘Kísérlet a trentói zsinat 
határozatainak kihirdetésére Magyarországon’, [Attempt to declare the decrees of the Council 
of Trento in Hungary] in R. Várkonyi Ágnes Emlékkönyv. Születésének 70. évfordulója ünnepére, 
Budapest 1998, pp. 154–164; István Fazekas, ‘Oláh Miklós reformtörekvései az esztergomi 
egyházmegyében 1553–1568 között’, [Oláh’s reform endeavours in the diocese of Esztergom in 
1553-68] Történelmi Szemle 45: 1–2 (2003), 139–153.
97 Péter Tusor, A barokk pápaság (1600–1700), [The Baroque Papacy] Budapest 2004, here and 
there.
98 The monographical analysis of the topic: Antal Molnár, Katolikus missziók a hódolt 
Magyarországon, [Catholic missions in Ottoman conquest Hungary] Budapest 2002, I.
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However, the obtainment of the title of Scopia did not cause any problems, 
the first hindrance of this nature occurred in 1587–1588, though, it did not lead 
to a significant tension. Nuncio Puteo removed the professio fidei from György 
Zalatnaky, the newly appointed bishop of Roson, and conducted his process. 
Moreover, as in Prague, nobody was aware of the location of the bishopric, the 
conduct of this phase of the process, dealing with this question, was entrusted 
to the nominee himself: ‘presupponendo esso nominato di far poi essaminare costì 
sopra il restante, che sarà necessario alla validità del processo.’ Nevertheless, the case 
was blocked in Rome, since they were not convinced that the right of nominatio 
belonged to the Emperor.99
The gradual increase of the arguments of this nature indicated the decline 
in the cooperation of crucial importance between the Habsburgs and the papacy 
in the late sixteenth century, whose consequences the Hungarian Catholic 
confessionalism’s development, represented by Péter Pázmány, suffered.
99 Schweizer 1912, nn. 46.47. 331; Patritium Gauchat, O.M.Conv. (ed.), Hierarchia Catholica 
medii et recentioris aevi, sive Summorum Pontificum, S.R.E. Cardinalium, ecclesiarum Antistitum 
series, Monasterii 1935, IV. 297. See more, Tusor and Nemes 2011, nn. 13. 161. 163. – On the 
question of the Hungarian titular bishoprics: Joachim Bahlcke, ‘A „Magyar Korona püspökei”. 
Adalék az egyház 17–18. századi társadalom- és alkotmánytörténetéhez’, [The bishops of the 
Hungarian Crown. Addition to the 17th-18th c. constutitional and social history of the church] 
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Szymon Brzeziński
Dynastic policy and its limits: the Jagiellonians and post-1541 
Hungary
Several decades ago the American historian Paula Sutter Fichtner pointed out 
the limits of the Habsburg dynasticism in struggle for Hungary in the 1540s. 
Based on the events of 1542, she indicated that dynastic connections of this 
ruling house, although strong, proved as not sufficient to provide tools to restrain 
the Ottoman rule in Hungary.1 Realization of dynastic potential rested upon 
fragile cooperation of its members. Moreover, the case of Ferdinand I and the 
House of Habsburg in fight for Hungary in 1542 reflected a general discrepancy 
of the contemporary rulers, frequently forced to maneuver between interests of 
the dynasty, own country and depending territories.2 More recently, a similar 
conclusion drew Zoltán Korpás in his analysis of the Emperor Charles V’s 
pragmatic, but not unconcerned attitude toward Hungary and the war against 
the Ottomans in Central Europe.3 With reference to this opinions on Habsburg 
policy I give a brief outline of key aspects of the policy of Sigismund I and 
Sigismund II August, Kings of Poland and Grand Dukes of Lithuania, toward 
Hungary in the 1540s. 
This period is important for several reasons. First of all, it faced an essential 
geopolitical shift in South-Eastern Europe as the Ottoman expansion led 
to the tripartite division of Hungary in 1541. The event caused a significant 
resonance in the Jagiellonian countries, comparable to the defeat of Mohács. In 
the following years the division of Hungary and its permanence became even 
clearer as the attempts to integrate the remains of medieval Hungary and to 
stop the Ottomans failed. Parallel to that, an eastern Hungarian state came into 
being, which later became Principality of Transylvania. The key roles in it were 
played by non-dynastic actors, above all the influential bishop and treasurer 
George Martinuzzi (known also as Brother George/Fráter György) and Peter 
Petrovics, ban of Temesvár. As Isabel of Jagiellon, daughter of King Sigismund 
I of Poland, married John Zapolya in 1539, her brother and heir of the Polish-
1  Paula Sutter Fichtner, ‘Dynasticism and its Limitations: the Habsburgs and Hungary, 
1542’, East European Quarterly 4:4 (1970–1), 389–407. 
2  Ibid., 406–407. 
3  Zoltán Korpás, V. Károly és Magyarország (1526–1538), [Charles V and Hungary] Budapest 
2008.; See: Idem, ‘The History of Charles V in Hungary. The Unavailable Subject of Hope’, in C. 
Scott Dixon and Martina Fuchs (eds.), The Histories of Emperor Charles V. Nationale Perspektiven 




Lithuanian throne Sigismund August in 1543 after several years of postponed 
negotiations married Elisabeth of Austria, daughter of Ferdinand I. The relati-
ons with the Ottoman Empire were based upon the Polish-Ottoman treaty from 
1533 and remained stable despite the permanent tensions in the borderland 
region. Therefore, the Jagiellonians were diplomatically bound to major actors of 
the conflict in the Carpathian Basin. Moreover, this involved dynastic ties with 
antagonists in the struggle for Hungary. 
Recently historiography largely contributed to our understanding of the 
process of the Ottoman conquest of Hungary, the Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry 
and shaping of the Transylvanian state, together with its external and internal 
factors.4 I do not attempt to summarize its results here. However, I think there is 
a need to reconsider some opinions on Polish-Hungarian relations in this period. 
For example, Janusz Pajewski, author of an impactful pre-war Polish monograph 
on the Polish policy toward Hungary between 1540 and 1571, blamed Sigismund 
I for a ‘lack of policy toward Hungary’ and opposed the ‘weak’ Sigismund to 
Bona, his royal consort, which he perceived as a main author of the Polish po-
licy in Hungarian matters. This kind of dual diplomacy was perceived then as a 
cause of failure, expressed by the decisions of the 1549 Habsburg-Jagiellonian 
treaty of Prague.5 That view, in somewhat moderated form, was basically shared 
also by more recent authors.6 A much more balanced approach presented by 
4  Out of the rich scholarship and for further references see: Géza Pálffy, The Kingdom of Hungary 
and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century, Boulder/New Jersey 2009; Géza Dávid and 
Pál Fodor (eds.), Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: the Military Confines in 
the Era of Ottoman Conquest, Leiden 2000.; Cristina Feneşan, Constituirea principatului autonom al 
Transilvaniei, Bucureşti 1997.; Sándor Papp, Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden 
der Osmanen für Ungarn und Siebenbürgen. Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung, Wien 2003. 
5  Janusz Pajewski, Węgierska polityka Polski w połowie XVI wieku (1540–1571), Kraków 1932, 
pp.51–3, 66. [hereinafter: Pajewski 1932] See also Zygmunt Wojciechowski, Zygmunt Stary 
(1506–1548), Poznań 1946.; Władysław Pociecha, Królowa Bona (1494–1557). Czasy i ludzie 
odrodzenia, Poznań 1958, IV.; Henryk Łowmiański, Polityka Jagiellonów, Poznań 1999 (written 
in 1940s); ‘beyond the Carpathian Mountains Sigismund sacrificed just ambitions of his family, not the 
interest of Poland’: Władysław Konopczyński, Dzieje Polski nowożytnej, Warszawa 2003 (First 
edn. 1936), p.121. Critical review of some views of earlier Polish historiography: Anna Sucheni-
grabowska, Zygmunt August. Król polski i wielki książę litewski 1520–1562, Kraków 2010, 
p.63. [hereinafter: Sucheni-Grabowska 2010] ; Eadem, ‘Stanisław Hozjusz jako dyplomata 
Zygmunta Augusta. Wokół traktatu praskiego 1549 roku’, Studia Warmińskie 18 (1981), 99–
156; for historiographical overview in English see: Natalia Nowakowska, ‘Jagiellonians and 
Habsburgs: Polish Historiography of Emperor Charles V’, in Dixon-Fuchs 2005, pp.249–73.
6  Marian Biskup (ed.), Historia dyplomacji polskiej, Warszawa 1982, I.; Maria Bogucka, Bona 
Sforza, Wrocław 20042, pp.192–8; Małgorzata Duczmal, Izabela Jagiellonka królowa Węgier, 
Warszawa 2000.; Jacek Wijaczka, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski z Rzeszą Niemiecką (1519–1556), 
Kielce 1998, pp.170–3.: Jagiellonians ‘gave up dynastic aims in Hungarian matters’, ‘the […] policy 
of neutrality brought no benefits’. See also Alfred Kohler, Expansion und Hegemonie. Internationale 
Beziehungen 1540–1559, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 2008, p.245. 
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Anna Sucheni-Grabowska. According to her research, the Jagiellonians did not 
abandon active policy towards Hungary, but were forced to reemphasize their 
goals by growing importance of Baltic, Livonian and Muscovite issues.7 
It seems necessary then to highlight the continuity of Jagiellonian diplomacy. 
Contrary to widespread chronological patterns, the so-called ‘Jagiellonian age’ 
in Hungary did not end with the disaster of 1526. The dynasty continued to 
affect the country after this date – mainly due to the fact that Isabel of Jagiellon 
remained Queen of Hungary up to her death in 1559. Both her widowhood 
(as of July 1540) and endangered reign strengthened the role of bonds with the 
family of origin. That also concerned her son, John Sigismund, who later made 
use of his Jagiellonian kinship.
Both marriages, that of Isabel with John Zapolya and of Sigismund August 
with Elisabeth, were parallel political steps and just seemingly in contradictory 
directions. The marriage of Isabel with Zapolya was a counterweight to the 
strengthened position of the House of Habsburg in Central Europe. Both 
contracts revealed an unchanged belief in effectiveness of dynastic policy in 
securing the country’s and the dynasty’s position.8 In case of the marriage with 
Zapolya, it proved to be more durable and decisive than many agreements or 
treaties, negotiated and signed so eagerly in those years by Habsburgs, the 
Zapolyan (Transylvanian) and Polish sides in order to settle the situations 
of Hungary.9 However, the situation in Hungary became highly complicated 
in consequence of the events of 1540 and 1541: the birth of Zapolya’s heir, 
the death of Zapolya, the failed military attempts of Ferdinand to occupy 
whole Hungary and finally but decisively, the Ottoman seizure of Buda and 
central Hungary. Dynastic marriage undoubtedly remained an eligible mean of 
7  Sucheni-grabowska 2010, pp.60ff., 278ff.; Eadem, ‘Jagiellonowie i Habsburgowie w 
pierwszej połowie XVI w. Konflikty i ugody’, Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka 38:4 (1983), 
449–67; Eadem, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Vertrages von 1549 zwischen Ferdinand I. und 
Sigismund II. August von Polen’, Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung 
89:1–2 (1981), 23–51. [hereinafter: Sucheni-grabowska 1981] See: also: Stanisław Cynarski, 
Zygmunt August, Wrocław 2006. (First edn. 1988) 
8  See Alfred Kohler, ‘Dynastes, bellum et pax. Zur Systemisierung und Verrechtlichung der 
Internationalen Beziehungen im 15./16. Jahrhundert’, in Thomas Angerer et al. (eds.), Geschichte 
und Recht. Festschrift für Gerald Stourzh zum 70. Geburtstag, Wien/Köln/Wiemar 1999, pp.391, 
410. On Jagiellonian and Habsburg dynastic marriages of the age See: Urszula Borkowska, ‘Pacta 
matrimonialia domu Jagiellonów’, Roczniki Humanistyczne 48:2 (2000 [Special issue]), 45–60. 
[hereinafter: Borkowska 2000]; Paula Sutter Fichtner, ‘Dynastic Marriage in Sixteenth-
Century Habsburg Diplomacy and Statecraft: An Interdisciplinary Approach’, The American 
Historical Review 81:2 (1976), 243–65. 
9  See: Ludwig Bittner, Chronologisches Verzeichnis der österreichischen Staatsverträge, Wien 1903, 
I.11–25; Roderich Gooss, Österreichische Staatsverträge. Fürstentum Siebenbürgen (1526–1690), 
Wien 1911, pp.65–149. 
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diplomacy in settling down the Hungarian issues, as revealed by repeated efforts 
to arrange marriages of the widowed Isabel and, later, of John Sigismund.10 
Meaningful remains an example from 1545, when the Habsburg agents spread 
a rumour about planned marriage of John Sigismund with (intended to be 
baptized) daughter of sultan, what should have secured the Zapolya’s heir rule 
over vast part of Hungary.11 Yet, the contest for Hungary with the Ottomans was 
not to be settled by such means, well-known for European side of the conflict.12 
The situation demanded other instruments of diplomacy and statecraft, which 
could help to meet the changing conditions in the region.
The first major motive of the Jagiellonian policy toward Hungary after 
Zapolya’s death were the family relations, that is, the fate of Queen Isabel and 
her estates in Hungary. In the 1540s it remained a main issue in the dynasty’s 
relations with Hungary, Austria, and Ottoman Empire. As Sigismund I ensured 
Ferdinand I in January 1541, Isabel’s dowry was then the limit of Jagiellonian 
ambitions in Hungary.13 Of course it cannot be a surprise at all, but we should 
notice that the family relations of Jagiellonians appeared as very close, even if we 
consider the usual courtesy, expressed in correspondence and also keep in mind 
10  On rumours and news concerning Isabel’s marriage in the 1540s: Karolina Lanckorońska (ed.), 
Elementa ad fontium editiones, Romae 1960–1992, vol. 48, no. 398; vol. 49, no. 524; Karl Nehring 
(ed.), Austro-Turcica 1541–1552. Diplomatische Akten des habsburgischen Gesandschaftsverkehrs mit 
der Hohen Pforte im Zeitalter Süleymans des Prächtigen, München 1995, pp.320–1, no. 110., p.539, 
no. 203. [hereinafter: Nehring 1995]; Lipót Óváry, A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi 
Bizottságának oklevél-másolatai [The charter collection of the Historical Committee of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences], Budapest 1894, II.no. 435. [hereinafter: Óváry 1894]
11  HHStA, Ungarische Akten Allgemeine Akten, Fasc. 54, Konv. B, f.67–8 [hereinafter: HHStA, 
UA AA) (Maciej Łobocki to Leonhard von Fels, 22 July 1545). 
12  See: Gábor Ágoston, ‘Az oszmán és az európai diplomácia a kölcsönösség felé vezető úton’ [The 
Ottoman and the European diplomacy on the road to mutuality], in Péter Hanák and Mariann 
Nagy (eds.), Híd a századok felett. Tanulmányok Katus László 70. születésnapjára, Pécs 1997, 83–
99; Arno Strohmeyer, ‘Das Osmanische Reich – ein Teil des europäischen Staatensystems der 
Frühen Neuzeit?’, in Marlene Kurz et al. (eds.), Das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie, 
Wien/München 2005, pp.149–64.; Daniel Goffman, ‘Negotiating with the Renaissance state: 
the Ottoman Empire and the new diplomacy’, in Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (eds.), 
The Early Modern Ottomans. Remapping the Empire, New York 2007, pp.61–74; A. Nuri Yurdusev 
(ed.), Ottoman Diplomacy. Conventional or Unconventional?, Basingstoke 2004; Moritz Csáky, 
‘Ideologie oder “Realpolitik”? Ungarische Varianten der europäischen Türkenpolitik im 16. und 
17. Jahrhundert’, Anzeiger der Philosophisch-Historischen Klasse der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften 120:7 (1983), 176–95.
13  Sigismund’s instruction for envoy Andrzej Czarnkowski: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (The 
Central Archives of Historical Records, Warsaw), Metryka Koronna, Libri Legationum [hereinafter: 
AGAD, LL) vol. 7, f.137v–142v, edition: Péter Tóth (ed.), A lengyel királyi kancellária Libri legationum 
sorozatának magyar vonatkozású iratai [The Hungarian-related documents of the Libri legationum 
series of the Polish Royal Chancellery], Miskolc 2003, II.403–7. [hereinafter: Tóth 2003]
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some serious conflicts, which later emerged between the family members because 
of Sigismund August’s marriages. Things did not change, however, in the rela-
tions of the royal parents toward Isabel. She was their beloved child, just as her 
brother. Significantly, that relation was expressed also in the marriage contract 
of Isabel.14 Royal letters to her were full of warmth and care. King Sigismund for 
many times hurried his daughter to deliver news about her and her welfare – as 
in June 1539, when he stated that he expected a courier from her for a long time 
and that is why he decided to send his own with greetings.15 This was especially 
apparent in the first months and years of Isabel’s reign in Hungary and was 
obviously even strengthened by the dramatic events of 1540–1541. This attitude 
did not change in the following years. After 1541, the royal worries concerned 
Isabel’s security, revenues and court. The latter was expected to be ‘proper’, that is, 
corresponding to her royal descent and dignity. The problem returned again and 
again in the 1540s because of the internal struggle in Transylvania of Martinuzzi 
and his followers and on the other hand, of Petrovics and other supporters of 
the Zapolyas. Especially painful for Isabel were accusations against her raised 
by Martinuzzi to her parents.16 What is noteworthy, the diplomatic actions in 
Isabel’s interest were frequently undertaken jointly by her royal parents. This 
was the case in December 1542, when the envoy of Ferdinand I, Gáspár Serédy, 
reported to his sovereign that Sigismund and Bona were real authors of Isabel’s 
policy, carried on ‘ex suggestione regis ac praesertim reginae Poloniae’ – which was, 
by the way, an answer to the numerous former requests of the widowed queen.17 
Similar views expressed also another informer of Ferdinand, Maciej Łobocki, 
reporting on the attitude of the Polish royal pair toward the 1542 treaty of 
Gyalu/Gilău between Ferdinand and Isabel.18
Not only Sigismund and Bona tried to interfere the situation on behalf 
of Isabel. From mid-1540s Sigismund August joined them in these efforts, 
which coincided with his growing role after he took over rule in the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania in 1544. In his letter to Martinuzzi from 1546 he insisted 
on safeguarding the sister’s security and adequate conditions (meaning proper 
14  Borkowska 2000, 48.
15  Biblioteka Czartoryskich w Krakowie (Czartoryski Library, Cracow), Teki Naruszewicza 
[hereinafter: TN], 56.675, no. 134. 
16  Biblioteka Narodowa (National Library, Warsaw), Biblioteka Ordynacji Zamoyskich, Teki 
Górskiego [hereinafter: Teki Górskiego), 22.67–8 (in 1542).
17  HHStA, UA AA, Fasc. 49, Konv. B, f.51v, 53.; Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. 
Ossolińskich we Wrocławiu (Ossoliński Library, Wrocław, hereinafter: Ossol.), Ms 179/II (AT, 
vol. 20), pp.168–9; See: TN, 58.521–3, no. 115.; Óváry 1894, no. 390. (Isabel to Jan Tarnowski, 
18 October 1541). 
18  HHStA, UA AA, Fasc. 48, Konv. B, f.69.
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court and financial conditions of the household), that is, he joined the efforts 
and argumentation of his parents.19 As Sigismund August assured Isabel 
in June 1548, shortly after he succeeded his father, looking after sister was 
indispensable part of the royal ‘officium’.20 He undertook the duty to look after 
unmarried sisters and widowed Isabel. It meant he declared to continue to use 
this argument as a tool in his policy. The next years of his reign showed that 
he was able to use this position in diplomatic mediation between the Zapolyas 
(Isabel and John Sigismund) and Ferdinand I. That was the aim of the 1549 
Transylvanian legation of bishop Andrzej Zebrzydowski who previously already 
served as envoy in Hungarian matters to Ferdinand in 1543.21 The 1549 treaty 
of Prague between Sigismund August and Ferdinand settled down the relati-
ons between two monarchs, among them also the Hungarian issue. It did not 
mean an abandonment of Hungarian policy and still gave Jagiellonians some 
possibilities to take advantage of Queen Isabel’s rights, even if her situation 
actually became a real burden for her brother.22 
As Queen of Hungary Isabel met serious difficulties in exercising her power 
in the 1540s. She remained largely dependent to hostile parties and often seemed 
to be an object of other policies. Organization of power in the Transylvanian 
state made it harder to constitute a centre of royal authority with adequate 
resources, which could be then influenced by usual means. It was caused by 
the essential role of non-dynastic actors (above all Martinuzzi) and rapidly 
changing political relations and loyalties.23 It was not without a reason that the 
Jagiellonian diplomacy so constantly insisted on providing Isabel proper financial 
background to exercise her power. Additionally, the Jagiellonian dynasticism 
met serious difficulties in the late 1540s originating from the relations of the 
members of the dynasty. Because of internal conflicts between the members of 
the royal family (above all between Queen Bona and Sigismund August) and as 
a result of age and worsening health of Sigismund I the marriages of Jagiellonian 
19  Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN (Polish Academy of Sciences, Kórnik Library), Ms 221, f.164–6. 
20  Ibid., f.444–6. 
21  On the legations: Katarzyna Gołąbek, Działalność publiczna biskupa włocławskiego Andrzeja 
Zebrzydowskiego w latach 1546–1551 w świetle jego korespondencji, Warszawa 2012, pp.62–5, 222–
35. 
22  HHStA, Staatsabteilungen Polen, Karton 6, Konv. 1, f.63–9v.; Sucheni-grabowska 1981.
23  See: The legations of Sigismund I from 1546 and 1547: Biblioteka Kórnicka PAN, Ms 221, f.191–
4, 213–5 (to Süleyman), 206–7, 209–10 (to Francis I), 210–2 (to Martinuzzi); Teréz Oborni, Udvar, 
állam és kormányzat a kora újkori Erdélyben (tanulmányok) [Court, state and government in Transylvania 
in the early modern period], Budapest 2011.; Eadem, ‘From Province to Principality: Continuity and 
Change in Transylvania in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century’, in István Zombori (ed.), Fight 
Against the Turk in Central Europe in the First Half of the 16th Century, Budapest 2004, pp.165–79. 
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princesses were delayed until 1550s (Sophia) and 1560s (Catherine). That fact 
influenced the dynasty’s effectiveness in relations with other ruling houses. Death 
of Elisabeth of Austria in 1545 undermined the Habsburg alliance. Decease of 
the aged monarch and shift on the Polish-Lithuanian throne made it necessary 
for the Jagiellonians to renew the alliances with Habsburgs and Ottomans. This 
need affected their attitude to the Hungarian issues after 1548. 
Parallel to that challenges the Jagiellonians noticeably tended to rely on 
Isabel’s opinion in matters that concerned her and her reign. At the end of 
1541, Sigismund I, Bona and Sigismund August stated in the joint mission to 
Isabel that they wish to help her, but not to enforce anything upon her against 
her will. As they directly wrote, she should not rely solely on their opinions, 
as they want to follow her mind.24 This view repeated in the following years.25 
It may be considered as an excuse and solely diplomatic trick, which aimed to 
keep a convenient distance in highly complicated Hungarian matters. But it is 
equally justified to interpret such words as an evidence of close family relations 
and careful usage of them in foreign policy. Behavior of Isabel after death of 
Sigismund I supports this view. As she emphasized to the Porte in October 
1548, close family ties will not urge her to leave Hungary.26 
Undoubtedly the fate and security of Isabel and her son were a chief matter 
for the Jagiellonians in their south-eastern diplomacy. From this perspective, an 
opinion of Jagiellonian ‘withdrawal’ from Hungary in this period seems to be a 
misinterpretation. It does not mean that the dynasty’s policy did not evolve: in 
1541–1542 the royal parents clearly advised Isabel to return to Poland, even if 
they treated such a decision only as temporary. In the following years, after the 
failure of Habsburg attempts to regain Hungary in 1542, proven elusiveness of 
Ferdinand’s promises according Isabel’s future Hungarian domains and – last but 
not least – considerable military successes of Ottoman armies in the Carpathian 
Basin, the main goal of the Jagiellonians was to prevent an internal conflict in 
Transylvania and strengthen the position of the new country in order to avoid 
further Ottoman expansion in the region. A plan to send Isabel back to Poland 
appeared again in 1548, but it was not initiated by the Jagiellonians. 
24  Joint legation of Sigismund I, Sigismund August and Bona to Isabel, 25 November 1541, 
Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.197–198v; TN, 58.381–4., no. 86.
25  See: Teki Górskiego, 23.13–14v (legation of Sigismund I to Isabel, 16 August 1542), 35 (March 
1543), 96v–97v (Sigismund’s answer to the legation from Isabel, in June 1543, concerning her 
doubts whether to stay in Transylvania or leave the country). 
26  HHStA, UA AA, Fasc. 55, Konv. A, f.34v. See: Árpád Károlyi (ed.), Codex epistolaris 
Fratris Georgii Utyesenovics (Martinuzzi dicti) 1535–1551. Fráter György levelezése 1535–1551 
[Correspondence of Frater György], Budapest 1881, p.357, no. CCXXXIV.; Nehring 1995, 
311–7, no. 110. 
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Another question is, what use the dynasty made out of the family ties. It is 
noteworthy to examine the arguments by which the royal policy tried to explain 
key decisions. In correspondence with political actors outside the family, the 
responsibilities emerging from valid alliances, above all with the Ottomans, 
dominated the family’s duties. The cautious attitude of King Sigismund, 
characteristic also for his earlier policy toward Hungary, was present after 
Isabel’s marriage as well. In January 1540 in the letter to Piotr Kmita, the 
voivode of Cracow, he distinguished that in the Hungarian question there were 
‘public’ and ‘private matters’. He declared the ‘public’ ones as more important 
in making decisions.27 However, at that time, the king concentrated on ‘private 
matter’, that is, securing Isabel’s property in Hungary and declared his readiness 
to abandon serious plans in his Hungarian policy28. After Zapolya’s death the 
king constantly refused to help militarily (as in a letter from 13th August 1540 
to Petrovics and Martinuzzi).29 As he repeatedly described his situation, using a 
phrase by Plautus from Erasmian Adagia, he found himself ‘between the shrine 
and the stone’.30 In a letter to Hungarian lords loyal to Isabel at the beginning of 
1541 he used threats from Muscovy and Tatars as an excuse. ‘It is easy to start the 
war’ – claimed Sigismund – ‘but it is hard to finish it’.31 
A major reason behind this policy was the will to maintain peaceful re-
lations with the sultan. On the other hand, Sigismund was well aware of 
his duties toward daughter and grandson, as he expressed his doubts in the 
aforementioned letter to senators, asking them for advice in August 1540.32 The 
‘public’ prevailed in the king’s argumentation for the Emperor Charles V from 5 
October 1540: ‘Dear is our daughter to us, dear is her son, but dearer is the good and 
peace of the Christian commonwealth’.33 Such declarations were rather rhetoric, 
as the Jagiellonian diplomacy served both goals: to secure a possibly best and 
27  Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.36v–38; TN, 57.4–5, no. 2. 
28  Sigismund I to Ferdinand I, 10 January 1540, Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.40v–41.
29  AGAD, LL, vol. 9, f.9v–11 (Tóth 2003, no. 146); TN, 57.455–7, no. 121. 
30  AGAD, LL, vol. 9, f.19–20 (Tóth 2003, no. 155): ‘Itaque inter sacrum, quod aiunt, et saxum 
stamus’, Sigismund to the Polish senators, 26 November 1540.
31  Ossol., Ms 179/II, f.46.
32  AGAD, LL, vol. 9, f.19–20. See: Pajewski 1932, 19–20.
33  AGAD, LL, vol. 9, f.26–27 (Tóth 2003, no. 166), Teki Górskiego, 21.137.; HHStA, 
Staatsabteilungen Polen, Fasc. 2, f.87–8 (‘Chara quidem nobis est serenissima filia nostra, charus est nepos 
ex illa natus, sed multo charior salus et tranquillitas reipublicae Christianae, cui nihil est, quod anteponendum 
existimemus’). See: Sigismund’s legation to Hungarian lords in January 1541: ‘Amat quidem [King 
Sigismund – S. B.] nepotem suum […] ardentius […], sed non minor ei est de regno Hungariae conservando, 
quam de ornando nepote cura’: AGAD, LL, vol. 7, f.147v (Tóth 2003, p.411, no. 191.). 
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firm position for the family and to keep as large part of Hungary out of direct 
Ottoman authority as possible. 
In decisive for Hungary the early 1540s and in the following period as well 
the Jagiellonian diplomacy had indeed dual character. This dualism, however, 
should not be described through diversity of policies (‘active’ Bona vs. ‘weak’ 
or ‘lukewarm’ Sigismund), but as dualism of principles of dynastic policy and 
pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, the dynastic (‘private’) goals were interrelated 
with those defined as ‘public’, state interests. Separating or opposing them 
according to modern patterns would be artificial. The royal diplomacy used 
both arguments, depending on the recipient. I suggest then to be very careful 
in applying the modern idea of the ‘reason of state’ to this policy. It had much 
more common with classical understanding of this idea and with a type of ruler 
promoted by Erasmus. Therefore, it is more useful to consider this policy as 
cautious continuation, a careful and tactic ‘appeasement’, as a matter of fact, an 
effect of so carefully maintained relations of Jagiellonians with the Ottoman 
Empire. Jagiellonian aim was not to act directly, not to be burdened by rule over 
Hungary but simultaneously to prevent negative trends there: extending zone 
of instability and further Ottoman expansion, highly unfavourable for Polish 
and Lithuanian domains.34 They accomplished this general goal. Paradoxically, 
the difficult situation in the Carpathian Basin, an effect of a policy realized by 
mainly dynastic means had to be solved by consciously restrained dynasticism. 
The Jagiellonians used the advantages of dynastic ties, but were well aware of 
their limitations. The European dynasticism met difficulties in confrontation 
with the Porte. In contrary to failed Habsburg attempts to control whole 
Hungary, sovereigns from Cracow and Vilnius were able to earlier realize this 
limits and concentrated to save what can be saved. Nevertheless, Hungary should 
not be seen solely as an ‘obstacle’ in the Jagiellonian policy. The engagement of 
the dynasty still made it possible to save at least some chances to play a role in 
the Carpathian Basin, all that in extremely unfavourable circumstances. 
34  See: Teréz Oborni and Szabolcs Varga, ‘Peace as the Basis of Power in the courts of Wladislav 
II of Jagiellon and John I of Szapolyai’, in Arno Strohmeyer and Norbert Spannenberger 
(eds.), Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Räumen, Stuttgart 2013, pp.31–50.
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